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Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: the Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation

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Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: the Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation

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Abstract

The Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution, federal statutes, and ratified treaties part of the “supreme law of the land.” Despite the textual and historical clarity of the Supremacy Clause, some courts and commentators have suggested that the “non-self-executing treaty doctrine” means that ratified treaties must await implementing legislation before they become domestic law. The non-self-executing treaty doctrine has in particular been used as a shield to claims under international human rights treaties.

This Article does not seek to provide another critique of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine in the abstract. Rather, I suggest that a determination that a treaty is non-self-executing only means that the treaty of its own force does not provide a private individual with cause of action. The treaty nonetheless remains domestic law under the Supremacy Clause. It is my contention that where a human rights treaty requires domestic implementation, that duty of implementation may be judicially enforced by mandamus relief. Although U.S. policymakers may attempt to modify the treaties they ratify to obviate any duty of domestic implementation, they may not do so by reliance on a misinterpretation of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine nor may they do so by a Senate declaration of non-self-execution. In short, ratified treaties are part of our law. And it is not only international law, but also our Constitution, that is flouted when

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the government refuses to comply with the supreme law it voluntarily creates upon ratifying a treaty.

I. Introduction

The international legal system largely relies on the cooperation of domestic governments. This is particularly true with regard to international human rights treaties. However, with some notable exceptions, most countries have failed to make international human rights law directly enforceable within their domestic legal systems.

It should be encouraging, then, that the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause makes ratified treaties an integral part of our domestic legal system by declaring them part of the “supreme law of the land.” Notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, however, the “non-self-executing treaty doctrine” is often invoked as justification for judicial refusal to recognize individual claims under international human rights treaties. In brief, the non-self-executing treaty doctrine holds that treaties do not provide a cause of action in domestic courts unless the treaty itself explicitly or implicitly requires that it be enforceable without additional domestic legislation implementing the treaty. The current judicial practice is to presume that most treaties are non-self-executing. Additionally, to the extent that a given human rights treaty from its language could be considered self-executing, the Senate

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2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

3 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). Foster is discussed in more detail in Section II.B., infra.

consistently issues declarations of non-self-execution as a condition of its advice and consent to ratification.  

Scholars have criticized the United States’ refusal to implement international human rights treaties domestically. Some have argued that the current presumption that most treaties are non-self-executing is flawed. Others have argued that regardless of whether a treaty is non-self-executing, it is nonetheless “the Supreme Law of the Land” under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and should therefore be domestically enforceable. These scholars argue that characterizing a treaty as non-self-executing speaks only to whether the treaty itself creates an individual cause of action, still leaving room for its enforcement via other statutes providing a cause of action for the vindication of federal rights.

While I believe the non-self-executing treaty doctrine is constitutionally flawed, this Article is not intended to be another attack on the doctrine itself. Rather, I examine the limits of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine and analyze how those limits reveal that even non-self-executing treaties are amenable to  

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8 See, e.g., Sloss, supra note ___ at 44 (arguing that a declaration of non-self-execution by the Senate “mean[s] only that the treaties to which these declarations are attached do not create a private cause of action.”). For example, 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides a civil action against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of rights guaranteed by federal law, which would include ratified treaties. See also 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) 2254(a) (providing that writs of habeas corpus may be granted in cases where custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”) (emphasis added).
domestic judicial enforcement in a manner consistent with both separation of powers principles and the rule of law.

As originally conceived, the non-self-executing treaty doctrine solely addresses whether a treaty itself creates a private cause of action domestically for the treaty’s violation. In other words, the non-self-executing treaty doctrine does not directly address whether a ratified treaty imposes a binding domestic legal obligations on the United States. Rather, it addresses several other issues that are mistakenly taken to amount to the conclusion that a non-self-executing treaty can have no domestic legal effect whatsoever.

Where a treaty is non-self-executing, the treaty's obligations do not themselves provide a cause of action. This view of non-self-execution concedes that ratified treaties have the force of law domestically, but lack only a cause of action that would allow enforcement by private individuals. If the cause of action is provided by another source of law, such as a federal statute, then the treaty presumably can be the basis for a private lawsuit. Moreover, although a private individual cannot bring a cause of action based on a non-self-executing treaty, the treaty may still be invoked defensively, such as in a criminal proceeding. What these definitions of non-self-execution have in common is that none denies that non-self-executing treaties are federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Nor could they, consistent with the Clause's text. The Supremacy Clause provides that “all treaties made . . . under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, not that some treaties or only self-executing treaties have that effect."

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9 See Section II.B., infra for a discussion of the origins and original meaning of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine.
12 This was the argument in Medellin, discussed infra.
13 Paust, supra note ___ at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
This article analyzes an overlooked possibility for enforcing international human rights treaties within the United States. Since the Supremacy Clause provides that ratified treaties are supreme federal law, a writ of mandamus may provide a means for requiring the U.S. to make a treaty domestically effective. Mandamus provides the federal judiciary with the power to order federal officers or agencies to carry out a duty that they have failed to effectuate. Whether mandamus would be effective in a particular case depends on the precise nature of the treaty obligation at issue. In appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to invoke mandamus and request that a federal court order government officials to comply with their legal obligation to implement the rights covered by the treaty and to provide an effective mechanism for the vindication of those rights. To be clear: such a mandamus action would seek to enforce the government's duty to implement the treaty, not to provide individual relief for a breach of the treaty.

This Article has both doctrinal and normative dimensions. Doctrinally, I posit the mechanism of mandamus as an unrecognized alternative to direct enforcement of international human rights treaties. The doctrinal aspect is important, because international human rights treaties often afford substantive rights beyond those provided by the Constitution or federal laws. Normatively, this Article makes what should be a relatively uncontroversial proposition: the United States must follow the laws that it enacts. Respect for the rule of law refutes the existence of a body of law that is recognized by the Supremacy Clause as "supreme law" but is completely unenforceable.

Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 606 (2009) ("the plain text of the Supremacy Clause rules out the possibility that a treaty might be valid and in force yet lack the force of domestic law").

As discussed in more detail infra, the U.S.'s compliance with its duty (if any) to guarantee enjoyment of the rights provided by a particular treaty need not necessarily take the form of passing a statute authorizing private lawsuits. It is at least plausible, for example, that the creation of an administrative agency with real power to investigate and redress alleged treaty violations could satisfy the U.S.'s "duty" under a particular treaty.

Examples of this "implementation gap" are discussed in Section IV.C., infra.
I recognize the substantial separation of powers concerns that would confront a court contemplating ordering the political branches to implement a treaty. Moreover, this Article purposefully leaves open the difficult doctrinal questions regarding proper plaintiffs and defendants in such a mandamus action. Nonetheless, the Constitution demands, at a minimum, that the federal government either implement treaties it has ratified or that it modify or withdraw from the treaty, thereby depriving it of the status of law under the Supremacy Clause.

Section II of this article reviews the history and purpose of the Supremacy Clause, the origins of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine, and the subsequent expansion of that doctrine beyond its original meaning. Section III discusses and responds to separation of powers concerns regarding domestic judicial enforcement of treaty obligations. In Section IV, I conclude that when a non-self-executing treaty contains a clear duty of domestic implementation, such a duty may be judicially enforced in a mandamus action. Finally, in Section V, I consider the effect that a declaration of non-self-execution has upon the preceding analysis. I conclude that such a declaration may negate the duty of domestic treaty implementation, but only in very narrow circumstances.

II. Treaty Enforcement in U.S. Courts

A. Text and History of the Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution itself, federal statutes, and "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Under the Supremacy Clause's text, a treaty becomes fully incorporated into our domestic legal system upon ratification. The Clause's text does not contemplate further action beyond ratification in order to create this type of "supreme law."

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16 I do briefly address those issues at the end of Section IV.C., infra. A full examination of such procedural issues would be beyond the scope of this Article. Here, I seek only to show that a mandatory duty of treaty implementation is consistent with the Supremacy Clause.

17 U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
Therefore, the United States is nominally a “monist” legal system, one in which ratified treaties become part of domestic law at the moment of ratification. 18

The available historical evidence indicates that the Constitution’s Framers intended that this approach to treaties would differ substantially from the practice of Great Britain. At the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, Great Britain followed a strictly "dualist" approach to international law, whereby treaties would have no domestic legal effect unless and until Parliament took action. 19 Under the U.S. Constitution, by contrast, the President's ratification of a treaty with the Senate's consent would render a treaty domestic law without further legislative action. 20

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19 See Henkin, supra note ___ at 865 (explaining that in Great Britain, "[t]reaties are made under the authority of the Crown and are international acts rather than the law of the realm, and treaty obligations are enforced in court only as they are enacted or implemented by Parliament").

20 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1379 ___ U.S. ___ (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting, citing Justice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796)) ("after the Constitution's adoption, while further parliamentary action remained necessary in Britain [for a treaty to become domestic law], further legislative action was no longer necessary in the United States" by virtue of the Supremacy Clause); Carlos M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695, 701 (1995) ("the Supremacy Clause served to alter the British rule, and established the different principle in the United States that treaties do not generally require legislative implementation to become domestic law") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760, 760-764 (1988) (reviewing the historical evidence and concluding that "most of the Framers intended all treaties immediately to become binding on the whole nation . . . . to be applied by the courts whenever a cause or question arose from or touched on them; and to prevail over and preempt any inconsistent state action").
B. The Original Understanding of Non-Self-Execution

Foster v. Neilson\(^\text{21}\) was the first Supreme Court case to explicitly articulate the non-self-executing treaty doctrine. Foster involved a lawsuit between two private individuals over a parcel of land. Plaintiffs sought to eject defendant from the land, claiming title to it by virtue of a treaty between the United States and Spain. The relevant treaty provision provided that land grants made by the Spanish government while it still controlled the territory at issue “shall be ratified and confirmed” by the United States.\(^\text{22}\) If the treaty itself confirmed the Spanish land grant to the original grantee, then the land would have rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs, who were successors in interest to the original owner. The Court held that the treaty itself did not “ratify and confirm” the Spanish land grant. Rather, the Court held, the treaty was a promise by the U.S. government to later enact laws performing the acts required by the treaty.

Foster distinguished between a treaty that "operates of itself" versus one that "the legislature must execute."\(^\text{23}\) In modern parlance, the former would be considered self-executing, while the latter would be non-self-executing. It is important for purposes of this Article is to examine exactly how and why the Foster Court made this distinction and what the Court believed the distinction did and did not mean for Supremacy Clause purposes.

The Foster Court began with the presumption established by the Supremacy Clause's text that "all treaties" made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land.\(^\text{24}\) Chief Justice Marshall's opinion stated that

> in the United States a different principle [from that in dualist legal systems] is established [by the Supremacy Clause]. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to

\(^{21}\) 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
\(^{22}\) Id. at 310.
\(^{23}\) Id. at 314.
\(^{24}\) Id.
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself.

Chief Justice Marshall, however, recognized one exception to the principle that ratified treaties are part of domestic law. Some treaty obligations by their terms could not be "regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature" because they constitute promises to perform future action and the nature of the promised action is such that it is addressed to the legislative or executive branches. In other words, treaty provisions falling in this category cannot provide a rule of decision for the courts because they are not vested rights and duties but are instead promises to undertake future action. Barring this exception, however, Foster held that the Supremacy Clause presumptively makes ratified treaties "equivalent to an act of the legislature" and therefore enforceable in our courts like the Constitution and federal statutes.

The Foster doctrine, as originally articulated, is relatively limited. Despite the Supremacy Clause, a ratified treaty may not be enforceable in a private cause of action if by its very terms it promises future action by the political branches rather than creating vested rights that can provide a rule of judicial decision. What is critical about the Foster distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties for purposes of this Article is that the Court was seeking to determine whether the treaty itself created a judicially enforceable cause of action for the treaty's violation. Treaties that were already "executed" upon ratification could provide such a cause of action; those that were to await further domestic legislation before being executed could not. But in no part of the Foster opinion did the Court suggest that non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law under the Supremacy Clause. Subsequent courts and scholars who have argued that non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law at all.

For example, the Supreme Court recently articulated the following Supremacy Clause principles:

The label "self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey different meanings. What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon
cannot be based upon Foster itself because Foster is limited to the question of whether such treaties create a cause of action:

The Foster Court did not declare, however, that non-self-executing treaties are not law of the land; it stated only that if a treaty contains a promise by the United States to do something that only the political branches can do, then by hypothesis the courts cannot give effect to that treaty . . . . Nothing [in Foster] suggests that [a non-self-executing] treaty is not law in some other sense for other purposes. In fact, as an obligation of the United States, the treaty is law for the political branches, a binding obligation for the political branch that had the duty and the authority to carry it out on behalf of the United States.\textsuperscript{26}

To be sure, there are circumstances where a treaty cannot become effective as domestic law upon ratification despite the Supremacy implementing legislation passed by Congress.


Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.

\textit{Medellin}, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n.3.

These principles cannot be squared with Foster. To reiterate: Foster held that a treaty that "operates of itself" provides a cause of action for a private individual to seek a judicial remedy for the treaty's breach. A treaty whose text contemplates further legislative action in order for the treaty to be "executed" does not provide such a cause of action. Foster did not hold, contrary to the Medellin Court's footnote 2, that non-self-executing treaties are not "domestically enforceable." Rather, it held that one particular means of domestic enforcement -- a private civil cause of action asserting the treaty itself as a basis for substantive relief -- is foreclosed if the treaty is non-self-executing. Moreover, Foster held that if a treaty \textit{is} self-executing, then it \textit{does} provide a private cause of action, contrary to the Medellin Court's footnote 3.

\textsuperscript{26} Henkin, supra note ___ at 866 n.65.
Clause. But those situations are not a result of Foster-type non-self-execution. For example, a treaty cannot become domestic law if it conflicts with the Constitution, either because it infringes a constitutionally protected right or because it violates a structural provision of the Constitution. Similarly, a treaty cannot become domestic law where it seeks to accomplish domestic goals that under the Constitution can only be accomplished by statute. Moreover, a treaty’s terms may be sufficiently vague or precatory as to lack the status of law altogether.

These situations all differ from Foster-type non-self-execution in at least two significant respects. First, Foster-type non-self-execution is “internal” to the treaty: that is, it results from the text and intent of the treaty itself, rather than an “external” limitation on domestic lawmaking imposed by the Constitution. Second, where a treaty provision is unconstitutional, extra-constitutional, or too vague, that provision cannot become effective as domestic law for any purpose. It is a domestic legal nullity. By contrast, the Foster non-self-execution inquiry asks a far more limited question: whether the treaty creates a private cause of action. Given that most treaties are neither unconstitutional nor extra-constitutional and that most international human rights treaties are sufficiently clear in their terms to be amenable to judicial enforcement, they presumptively become domestic law upon ratification. This remains true even if the treaty itself does not create a private cause of action.

The conflation of whether a treaty creates a domestic cause of action with whether it is domestic law at all is partially based on confusion between rights and remedies.28 Courts have long recognized that the two other forms of supreme federal law – the Constitution and federal statutes -- can create a right or duty without also creating a private cause of action for violations of that

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28 See Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 (criticizing the “common but untenable view that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law”). The Supreme Court recently contributed to this confusion in Medellin. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, the Medellin decision can be read as intimating that a non-self-executing is not domestic law at all.
right or duty. The absence of a private cause of action does not mean that the statute or constitutional provision is not binding domestic law. Nor does it necessarily mean that the statute is unenforceable by private individuals, provided that a court finds either that the statute implicitly authorizes a cause of action, or that some other statute provides an applicable cause of action.

Regrettably, the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Medellin v. Texas* has contributed to the confusion regarding the meaning of non-self-execution. *Medellin* involved Mexican nationals imprisoned in Texas. They claimed that Texas officials' failure to notify them of their right to notify and contact their consulate upon their arrest violated their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR"). Several lower courts held that Medellin's VCCR claim was barred by state rules of procedural default, because he first raised it in a proceeding for post-conviction relief rather than at trial or on direct appeal of his conviction. While the domestic litigation was ongoing, the

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30 The President, for example, presumably could not with impunity ignore a federal statute eliminating funding for a war or establishing federal taxation, even if such a statute does not provide a civil cause of action for its enforcement. See generally Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (discussing the implied cause of action doctrine, under which a federal statute lacking an explicit cause of action may be deemed to implicitly contain one if Congress so intended).

31 See generally Gonzaga, *supra* note ___ (discussing use of §1983 to enforce federal rights created by federal statutes that do not themselves contain a cause of action for their enforcement). I do not mean to suggest that treaties and federal statutes are necessarily constitutional equivalents, which would be an oversimplification. See, e.g., Henkin, *supra* note ___ at 871-72 ("The supremacy clause does not address the hierarchy of various forms of federal law; it only declares the supremacy of every kind of federal law over state law"). Whatever the nature of that hierarchy, it is beyond the scope of this Article. The discussion above is intended merely to point out that the question of whether a law provides a cause of action and the question of whether it is binding law are two different questions.


International Court of Justice ("ICJ") issued its decision in the *Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)* ("Avena").\(^{35}\) *Avena* held that due to the VCCR violations, certain Mexican nationals (including Medellin) were entitled to review and reconsideration of their sentences, notwithstanding procedural default rules. The President then issued a memorandum stating that the United States would comply with its international obligations under the *Avena* decision "by having State courts give effect to the decision."\(^{36}\)

When the case reached the Supreme Court, Medellin argued that he was entitled to review of his sentence based on the *Avena* decision and the President's Memorandum seeking to implement *Avena*. Medellin argued that under the Supremacy Clause, the treaties requiring U.S. compliance with ICJ judgments became the law of the land binding upon all courts upon their ratification. The Court disagreed, holding that "neither *Avena* nor the President's memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law" sufficient to override state procedural default rules.\(^{37}\) The Court adopted a strict dualist interpretation of the relationship between international and domestic law, stating that "no one disputes that the *Avena* decision . . . constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts."\(^{38}\)

In reaching its holding, the Court made several critical errors. First, the Court seems to have presumed that most treaties are to be interpreted as non-self-executing unless extraordinarily clear language to the contrary appears in the treaty.\(^{39}\) Failing to find such language in the treaties at issue in *Medellin*, the Court

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\(^{35}\) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31).

\(^{36}\) Memorandum to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005).

\(^{37}\) *Medellin*, 128 S.Ct. at 1353.

\(^{38}\) *Id.* at 1356 (emphasis in original).

\(^{39}\) *Id.* at 1369 (stating that a treaty should be seen as non-self-executing whenever it was "ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect"). *See also id.* at 1380 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (stating, in criticizing the majority's reasoning, that "self-executing treaty provisions are not uncommon or peculiar . . . " and that "the Supremacy Clause itself answers the self-execution question by applying many, but not all, treaty provisions directly to the States . . . .").
concluded that they were non-self-executing. As noted above, however, the non-self-executing treaty doctrine as originally articulated in *Foster v. Neilson* presumes the opposite. *Foster* held that under the Supremacy Clause, most treaties are self-executing unless evidence to the contrary appears in the treaty or its drafting history.

The more fundamental error in *Medellin* is that the Court seems to have erroneously equated "self-executing" with "domestic law." The original and correct understanding is that a treaty is non-self-executing where the treaty itself does not create a cause of action. As noted above, however, concluding that the treaty does not by itself give private individuals the right to sue for the treaty's violation does not mean the treaty is not domestic law. Rather, it means that a person whose rights under the treaty are violated must seek some mechanism for redress other than a private civil cause of action under the treaty itself. *Medellin* sought such an alternative: he claimed that the VCCR violation provided a basis for habeas corpus relief. The Court failed to acknowledge that the VCCR might provide a basis for a habeas claim even if it did not give Medellin a right to bring an affirmative civil claim against the government.

The *Medellin* Court also held that the President could not order state courts to comply with a non-self-executing treaty. The President argued that he could enforce *Avena* domestically by

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40 See *id.* at 1369 (stating that if the President and Congress want a treaty to “have domestic effect of its own force, that determination may be implemented in making the treaty, by ensuring that it contains language plainly providing for domestic enforceability.”).

41 See the discussion of *Foster*, supra.

42 See the discussion of *Foster*, supra.

43 See the discussion of *Foster*, supra. The clearest instance of the *Medellin* Court conflating rights with remedies is its statement that “[e]ven when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.” *Medellin*, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

44 See 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) 2254(a) (providing that writs of habeas corpus may be granted in cases where custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”) (emphasis added).
ordering state courts to comply with it even if the treaties obliging the U.S. to comply with the ICJ judgment in Avena were non-self-executing. In short, the President contended that the treaties at issue were supreme—albeit non-self-executing—federal law that the Executive Branch could enforce domestically. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning as follows:

The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress. . . . [W]hen treaty stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.45

The Court here again repeated its mistaken assumption that only self-executing treaties carry the force of domestic law. In so doing, it characterized the President’s Memorandum as a constitutionally illegitimate form of executive lawmaking rather than executive enforcement of law previously made.

If Medellín stands for the proposition that a treaty has no domestic legal force unless it is self-executing,46 it is a radical departure from the Supremacy Clause’s text and the Court’s own precedent. While some lower courts and legal scholars have taken that view, the Court itself has never before so held.47 Reading

45 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1368. In assessing whether the President could constitutionally order domestic compliance with the treaties obligating the U.S. to enforce ICJ judgments, the Court applied Justice Jackson’s “familiar tripartite scheme” for assessing presidential power articulated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). At least one scholar has suggested that Youngstown was, at best, of marginal relevance to the issues presented in Medellín. See generally Ingrid B. Wuerth, Medellín: the New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. ___ (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301283 (criticizing Medellín’s “unnecessary and expansive” application of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework).
46 Recall that in Court’s view, a finding of self-execution requires that the treaty’s terms clearly and explicitly state that it is to have immediate domestic effect in each country upon ratification.
47 See Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Medellin in this way would require finding that the Court implicitly meant to overrule its earlier cases while citing those cases favorably. However, whatever Medellin’s merits, it need not conflict with the premise of this Article for the following reasons.

The first holding of Medellin was that the particular treaties at issue, based on the Court’s textual analysis, were not self-executing. Having determined that the treaties were not self-executing, the Court held that the treaties’ substantive protections were not enforceable by private individuals such as the Medellin petitioners. The approach advocated in this Article, by contrast, does not address whether private individuals may seek to vindicate their rights under non-self-executing treaties, but instead addresses whether such treaties are domestic law requiring domestic implementation.

The second holding of Medellin was that the President’s Memorandum could not require state courts to apply Avena. Specifically, the Court held that:

[T]he non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts. The President may comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. But he may not rely upon a non-self-executing treaty to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.

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Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 648 (2009) (quoting passages from Medellin that “suggest that the [Court] understood that the effect of a determination that a treaty is non-self-executing is that the obligations imposed by the treaty as a matter of international law lack the force of domestic law. If so, the Court was endorsing a view that had been repeated by many lower courts and commentators but had never before been endorsed by the Court itself.”)

48 See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at ___ (citing, inter alia, Foster; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (1833); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190 (1888)). While I believe the Medellin Court either misunderstood or misapplied these cases, see pp. ___-____, supra, the Court did not purport to overrule these cases.

49 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1371.
This approach is also erroneous. However, it focuses only on the President's ability to domestically enforce a treaty by one particular means: "unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts." It does not purport to limit other methods of domestic treaty enforcement "by some other means." Nor does it directly speak to judicial enforcement of the duty to implement a treaty domestically, which is the focus of this Article.  

III. Separation of Powers: Critiques and Responses

The analysis above illuminates several principles. The first is that a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not provide a private individual with a judicially enforceable cause of action to seek a remedy for the treaty's breach. Second, the most natural reading of the Supremacy Clause's text and history is that even a non-self-executing treaty is, upon ratification, part of the domestic law of the United States. The question then becomes, what does it mean for a ratified, but non-self-executing, treaty to be "supreme law" domestically?

This Article contends that the Supremacy Clause makes such treaties binding domestic law. If the treaty imposes a duty of domestic implementation, compliance with that duty may be

50 To illustrate: assume that on the facts of Medellin, the federal government had taken no action to secure compliance with the ICI's Avena judgment. Under the approach advocated by this Article, the Medellin petitioners could have sought a writ of mandamus ordering the appropriate federal officials to fulfill their alleged duties under the treaties discussed in Medellin. Their contention would be that Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, which provides that each member state “undertakes to comply” with ICJ judgments to which it is a party, supplies the type of governmental duty suitable for mandamus relief. Thus, had the President undertaken no action to comply with the Avena decision, petitioners could have sued in mandamus seeking to force such action if Article 94 provides a mandamus duty. As noted in Section IV, infra, however, the question of how to secure compliance with Avena would lie with the political branches. The mandamus alternative seeks only to remove from the political branches one particular and limited option with regard to ratified treaties' domestic effect. It would recognize that once the political branches have voluntarily created supreme domestic law in the form of a ratified treaty, they no longer have the option of deciding not to comply with that law simply by ignoring it.
secured by the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Before beginning
that inquiry, however, it is useful to consider the broader
separation of powers concerns that even such a limited judicial role
in domestic treaty enforcement might entail.

Scholars and courts have offered various rationales for the
position that, despite the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are
not domestic law unless they are implemented by a subsequent act
of Congress.51 I will here only address those objections based
upon structural principles of federal lawmaking and those based
upon separation of powers.

The first argument concerns the process of federal
lawmaking. Ratification of a treaty by the President with the
Senate's consent deviates from the bicameralism and presentment
process for federal legislation because treaty ratification does not
require the involvement of the House of Representatives. It has
been argued that while the Constitution may allow international
obligations to be created by just the President and Senate, such
obligations should not become domestic law until the full
democratic process has functioned.52 Under this view, requiring
implementing legislation to make the treaty domestic law cures
this "democracy gap"53 because the House must participate in the
passing of such implementing legislation. Indirectly inserting the
House in the treaty process in this manner thereby arguably
ensures "that the treaty power [retains] majoritarian roots."54

51 See Foster v. Neilson, 96 U.S. 483 (1877).

52 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1962 (1999) (arguing that "the Treaty Clause [created] a democracy gap . . . because vesting the power partially in the Senate and excluding the House threatened to remove the people's most direct representatives from an important lawmaking function"). Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884):

A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are
made by the President, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives . . . . If there be any difference in this regard,
it would seem to be in favor of an act in which all three of the
bodies participate.

53 See Yoo, supra note 52 at 1962 [Globalism and the Constitution
article]

54 Yoo, supra note 52 at 1962 [Globalism and the Constitution]
This structural argument falls short. As Professor Henkin has noted, "the question is not how many or which branches are involved [in creating a treaty or a federal statute]; rather, the issue is the constitutional status of the two instruments."\(^{55}\) The Constitution provides two different mechanisms for creating supreme domestic law. Federal statutes require bicameralism and presentment; treaties, under the text of Supremacy Clause and Treaty Clause,\(^{56}\) do not. The Constitution's Framers presumably would have worded the Supremacy Clause or the Treaty Clause quite differently had they intended the House's participation as a prerequisite to treaties having the status of domestic law.\(^{57}\) Moreover, even commentators who oppose judicial enforcement of treaties in private causes of action seem to agree that even non-self-executing treaties are domestic law in the sense that they have preemptive effect over contrary state laws.\(^{58}\) As a structural matter, it is difficult to see why it is only constitutionally

\(^{55}\) Henkin, supra note ___ at 871.

\(^{56}\) U.S. CONST. art. II, §. 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur").

\(^{57}\) Indeed, the historical record makes clear that the Framers deliberately excluded the House from the process of making supreme federal law in the form of treaties. See Oona Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1277-78 (2008). Professor Yoo seeks to refute this straightforward analysis with a "functional approach" by which he seeks to demonstrate that the Constitution generally renders treaties non-self-executing. Yoo, supra note ___ at 1960 [Globalism and the Constitution]. Whatever the merits of such a "functional approach," Professor Yoo, like most other commentators, also appears to overread Foster and consequently to conflate the question of whether a treaty is domestic law with the question of whether it provides a private cause of action (although he also criticizing "internationalist" scholars for doing the same). Compare id. at 1969 ("the original understanding does not compel a reading of the Supremacy Clause that immediately makes treaties law within the United States [upon ratification]") (emphasis added) with id. at 1978 (stating, after discussing scholars supporting self-execution in the sense of treaties providing a private individual with a cause of action for the treaty's breach, "internationalists too hastily equate 'Law of the Land' with judicial enforceability").

\(^{58}\) See, e.g., Yoo, supra note ___ at 1978-79 [Globalism and the Constitution] ("Including treaties in [the Supremacy Clause] serves the purpose of making clear that treaties are entitled to the same supremacy as constitutional and statutory provisions, when they are enforced by the national government in conflict with state laws . . . . ")).
permissible to exclude the House when creating federal law in the form of a treaty that preempts state law, but not otherwise. 59

The more substantial objections to the view that treaties become domestic law upon ratification relate to separation of powers. I readily acknowledge that even a limited judicial role in domestic treaty enforcement may raise separation of powers concerns. Opposition to domestic judicial enforcement of treaty obligations often rests upon the argument that the Constitution delegates the foreign affairs power to the political branches and the corollary proposition that the judiciary has no constitutional role in foreign affairs. 60 Under this view, judicial enforcement of treaty obligations violates separation of powers principles. If the political branches want the judiciary to have a role in treaty enforcement, they can enact implementing legislation providing for a domestic cause of action. When the political branches have chosen not to do so, the argument goes, the judiciary should stand aside.

At the broadest level, describing all judicial involvement in treaty interpretation or enforcement as raising "separation of powers" concerns is imprecise. There are myriad situations in which international law interacts with our domestic legal system, only some of which actually raise real separation of powers concerns:

59 One distinction may be the difference between treaty enforcement by the political branches in the form of preemption versus treaty enforcement by private individuals in lawsuits. The latter is argued to raise concerns about an ad hoc foreign policy being created by private individuals' lawsuits. This is a serious policy concern and is discussed in greater detail below. But it is a policy concern, not one grounded in structural issues related to excluding the House from the lawmaking process.

60 See, e.g., Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1363 (quoting Foster) ("The judiciary is not that department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided"); Yoo, supra note ___ at 1962 [Globalism and the Constitution] (arguing that the Framers intended that "the political branches, rather than the courts, would maintain the discretion to decide how the nation should meet its international obligations"). Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that, by applying the "law of nations" via the Alien Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350), "unelected federal judges have been usurping [the political branches'] lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of international law into American law").
First, international law could be used to override domestic law or policy formulated by the elected branches . . . . Second, international law might be used to evaluate the legitimacy of actions undertaken by other nations . . . . Third, international law can be used to supplement existing [domestic] law . . . .

Different domestic uses of international law raise different separation of powers concerns, which may carry more or less weight depending on the circumstances. Indeed, some uses of international law may not raise separation of powers problems at all.

Furthermore, this Article recognizes that Congress and the President have constitutional mechanisms -- such as later-in-time legislation superceding the treaty, jurisdiction-stripping legislation, or reservations to the treaty under international law -- that they can use to limit domestic treaty enforcement. Requiring actual legislation limiting the domestic applicability of a treaty is preferable to the sub silentio attempt to do the same by adopting a treaty requiring domestic implementation but then refusing to implement it. If Congress were to ratify a treaty and then pass legislation stripping the courts of jurisdiction over the treaty, the process would then at least be subject to public scrutiny and debate.

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62 See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
63 See Section V, infra.
64 The position that Congress can create supreme domestic law by ratifying a treaty and yet not be bound to do what the treaty commands is somewhat reminiscent of the recent debate over presidential "signing statements." See, e.g., Neil Kinkopf, *Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration*, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 308 (2007). With treaties, the President and Senate agree to ratify a treaty, making it supreme domestic law under the Supremacy Clause, and then refuse to comply with its terms domestically by calling it "non-self-executing." With presidential signing statements, the President signs a bill rather than vetoing it, making it supreme domestic law under the Supremacy Clause, and yet claims by virtue of a signing statement to not be bound by the law. In both circumstances, the relevant branch of government claims the right to not be bound by the supreme domestic law that it helped create.
Moreover, this separation of powers argument is generally couched in terms of avoiding lawsuits by private individuals seeking to determine the meaning of a treaty's substantive obligations. The concern is that we should have a single consistent foreign policy, determined by the President and Congress, not multiple foreign policies determined ad hoc by individual litigants and federal judges. Under the approach this Article advocates, however, the judicial role would be limited to enforcing the government's duty to make a treaty domestically effective. A mandamus action would not involve the adjudication of the treaty's substantive obligations or an inquiry into whether they have been breached. Rather, the issue would be whether the treaty's terms impose a duty of domestic implementation. If so, the judicial task would be to issue injunctive relief requiring the political branches to comply with that duty by adequate and effective means of their own choosing.

It is true that the political question doctrine generally requires that judges abstain from reviewing "those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch." However, the political question objection rests on the mistaken view that all treaties deal solely with foreign affairs matters. The classic statement of this view of treaties is reflected in dicta from the Head Money Cases:

A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations . . . . It is obvious that

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65 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note ___ at 1976 [Globalism and the Constitution] ("If individuals cannot bring suit in federal court to enforce every treaty obligation, then the political branches need not worry that the litigation decisions of private persons or judicial decisions will interfere with foreign policy").

with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.  

The Court has recognized, however, that the *Head Money Cases* dicta should not be taken literally in all circumstances. As the Supreme Court has said in discussing the political question doctrine "[i]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." It is the nature and purpose of the treaty that determines whether it presents matters amendable to judicial resolution, not the mere classification of treaties as dealing with "foreign affairs." Where a treaty truly concerns obligations between nations, then committing the treaty's interpretation and enforcement to the political branches may make sense. However, where a treaty is designed to regulate the conduct of each government toward individuals within their own territories, it can no longer be said to deal exclusively with foreign affairs matters delegated solely to the political branches. Indeed, as Professor Vazquez has noted, the *Head Money Cases* Court itself acknowledged that treaties can confer individual rights:

> A treaty, [under the Supremacy Clause], is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty

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67 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
69 One author considers this to be the difference between treaties that are "horizontal" (those that involve relations among nations) versus those that are "vertical" (those that involve relations between nations and individuals). See Lea Brilmayer, *International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal*, 100 YALE L. J. 2277 (1991). Professor Brilmayer argues that "cases with predominately vertical elements have a superior claim to be heard in an American court." Id. at 2280. See also Carlos M. Vazquez, *Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution*, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 605 (2009) (arguing that "when a treaty binds the United States to behave in a given way towards particular individuals, the treaty is 'judicially enforceable' by the individual just as any statute or constitutional provision would be, unless the treaty is non-self-executing in the sense contemplated by Foster").
for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.\textsuperscript{70}

International human rights treaties are designed to confer rights upon individuals and to regulate each nation's treatment of its own citizens and subjects.\textsuperscript{71} Having agreed to such a treaty, a state's objection that such treaties solely involve foreign affairs rings hollow.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99. As Professor Vazquez notes, the two portions of the Head Money Cases quoted above are consistent with one another when understood in the context of the case. The case dealt with the "last in time" rule whereby a later inconsistent federal statute can trump a previously ratified treaty for domestic purposes. The Court simply recognized that this is a domestically valid regime and therefore the other parties to the treaty were left "international negotiations" as their remedy. Where a treaty remains valid and in force domestically, however, the Court stated that the Supremacy Clause makes it "a law of the land as an act of Congress is." Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, ___ (2009).

\textsuperscript{71} See, e.g., Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 612-13 (2009) ("[T]reaties often obligate the states parties to behave in certain ways towards individuals. When treaties impose such obligations, the individual involved may be said to have a primary right to be treated in such ways, even though [individuals] lack secondary or remedial rights under international law"); Peter Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 569 (1997) ("Human rights has built significantly from the basic premise that nations cannot treat their subjects as they please. In addition to freedoms from torture, political executions, and other extreme forms of inflicted human suffering, human rights now cuts deeply to vindicate individual rights against a broad range of governmental activity . . . "). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31, para. 9, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). ("The beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] are individuals.")

\textsuperscript{72} Additionally, the United States has been a strong proponent of the principle of subsidiarity regarding international human rights treaties: that is, the principle that international human rights standards are best and most properly implemented by domestic governments, with international mechanisms serving a subsidiary enforcement role. See generally William M. Carter, Jr., Rethinking Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Adjudication, ___ HAMLINE J. OF LAW & PUB. POL. ____ (forthcoming, 2008). There is substantial inconsistency between this view -- which holds that human right enforcement should be left to domestic governments -- and the view expressed above, which holds that international human rights treaties have no domestic effect.
Finally, viewing human rights treaty enforcement as solely the province of the political branches ignores the fact that victims of domestic human rights violations are unlikely to be able to sway the political branches to act in their favor. Persons seeking the benefit of human rights protections are often politically and economically powerless and invoking the political process is therefore likely to prove ineffective.\textsuperscript{73} It is also unlikely that the political branches would act of their own accord to enforce a treaty when such enforcement is sought for their own conduct in violation of the treaty.

IV. Treaties as Domestic Law: The Mandamus Alternative

The Constitution makes ratified treaties part of our domestic law. Even where the treaty itself does not create a private cause of action, it nonetheless remains domestic law under the Supremacy Clause. An essential attribute of the rule of law is that governmental actors are subject to constraints beyond their discretionary decisions regarding whether to comply with the law.\textsuperscript{74} It is axiomatic that checks and balances through judicial review provides one such constraint. The discussion that follows provides a way to relieve the tension between the Supremacy Clause, principles of separation of powers, and the rule of law.

A. The History and Nature of Mandamus

Relief in the nature of mandamus has ancient roots in common law legal systems. The Supreme Court has held that

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty . . . . It also is employed to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{United States v. Carolene Products Company}, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may . . . tend[n] to seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [therefore] a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” is appropriate in such cases).

particular way nor to direct the retraction or reversal of action already taken in the exercise of either.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Marbury v. Madison}\textsuperscript{76} is the seminal case regarding mandamus relief. While \textit{Marbury} is best known for its holdings regarding subject matter jurisdiction and judicial review, it is also instructive regarding mandamus relief.

\textit{Marbury} involved several individuals who had been validly appointed as justices of the peace by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The President had signed the letters of commission evidencing their appointments. All that remained was for the Secretary of State to deliver the commissions. The Secretary of State, on orders from the President, refused for political reasons to do so.\textsuperscript{77} The appointees sued in the Supreme Court, requesting that the Court issue mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to deliver the commissions.

\textsuperscript{75} Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 451 (1934). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the writ of mandamus in federal district courts. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 81(b) ("The writs of scire facias and mandamus are abolished. Relief previously available through them may be obtained by appropriate action or motion under these rules"). However, the district courts may issue relief in the nature of mandamus through the use of statutory or equitable remedies. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1361 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff"). Accordingly, the traditional considerations governing the issuance of a writ of mandamus remain the same when a court is asked to order equitable or statutory relief in the nature of mandamus. Miguel, 291 U.S. at 452 ("The mandatory injunction here prayed for is in effect equivalent to a writ of mandamus, and governed by like considerations"); Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir.1984) ("a mandatory injunction is essentially in the nature of mandamus, and jurisdiction can be based on either 28 U.S.C. §1361, §1331 [the general federal question statute], or both"). For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this Article will therefore refer simply to "mandamus" rather than "relief in the nature of mandamus."

\textsuperscript{76} 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

The Court expressed skepticism that mandamus could issue to the President himself.\footnote{Marbury, 5 U.S. at 149 (“Can a mandamus go to a secretary of state in any case? It certainly cannot in all cases; nor to the President in any case.”) (emphasis in original).} As to a cabinet office such as the Secretary of State, however, the Court believed there was no constitutionals barrier to mandamus in an appropriate case. The Court held that "mandamus to a secretary of state is [not] equivalent to a mandamus to the President of the United States" when mandamus is sought to compel a cabinet officer to perform a ministerial duty commanded by law.\footnote{Id.} The Court stated:

It is true that [the Secretary of State] is a high officer, but he is not above the law. It is not consistent with the policy of our political institutions . . . that any ministerial officer having public duties to perform should be above the compulsion of law in the exercise of those duties . . . . As a ministerial officer, he is compellable to do his duty, and if he refuses . . . a specific civil remedy to the injured party can only be obtained by a writ of mandamus.\footnote{Id. at 149-150.}

Thus, the \textit{Marbury} Court recognized that mandamus is an available remedy for governmental officials' failure to perform duties required by law.

\section*{B. The Requirements for Mandamus}

The traditional requirements for mandamus relief are that "(1) the plaintiff's claim is clear and certain; (2) the duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available."\footnote{Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Marbury, 5 U.S. at 152 (“It is the general principle of law that a mandamus lies if there be no other adequate, specific, legal remedy.”). As well be discussed below, there is substantial authority for giving a broader scope to duties sufficient for mandamus beyond the purely ministerial, including the duty to exercise discretion granted by law.} These requirements are designed to respect separation of powers principles, by
ensuring that "to the extent a statute vests discretion in a public
official, his exercise of that discretion should not be controlled by
the judiciary." 82 A plaintiff can only invoke mandamus to seek the
enforcement of an underlying right. Thus, where governmental
action or inaction is wholly discretionary, the plaintiff cannot claim
any right to be enforced by mandamus. 83

The availability of mandamus relief has traditionally turned
on the distinction between ministerial and discretionary
governmental duties. The most conservative view is that
mandamus relief can only be issued when the governmental duty is
purely ministerial. Under this view, mandamus is only appropriate
where the duty to act is of a mechanical nature, such as the duty to
deliver the letters of commission at issue in Marbury. A more
nuanced approach, however, recognizes that mandamus will also
be appropriate to compel the exercise of discretion when the law so
requires. Even under this approach, however, a court is "not to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way." 84
In other words, a court may find that a governmental official has a
legal duty to exercise her discretion, but the court may not order
that such discretion be exercised to reach a particular result.

Assessing whether a particular international human rights
treaty imposes duties sufficient for mandamus purposes requires
specific analysis of the treaty's text and intent. Prior to providing
textual analysis of several treaties, it is worthwhile to first examine
the nature of the duties beyond the purely ministerial 85 that have
been found sufficient for mandamus purposes.

82 Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d at 591 (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Wright & Miller, 14 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3655, 394 (stating that mandamus jurisprudence "reflects the policy that the
judiciary should not interfere with a government officer's valid exercise of a
deged power").
83 See, e.g., Miguel, 291 US at 451 (where the governmental duty is not
plainly prescribed, it is regarded as being discretionary and cannot be controlled
by mandamus).
84 Miguel, 291 U.S. at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85 Seldom will an international human rights treaty impose duties that are
purely ministerial. As will be discussed in Section __, infra, the duty that is the
focus of this Article is the duty of member nations to make international human
rights treaties domestically effective. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
involved the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ("ICRW"), which established quotas on whaling activities. Federal law required the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President when "nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program [e.g., the ICRW]." Upon such certification from the Secretary of Commerce, federal law further required the Secretary of State to impose economic sanctions.

Despite the fact that Japan had exceeded the ICRW’s quotas during the 1984-85 whaling season, the Secretary of Commerce refused to certify that its actions had diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW. Instead, the United States negotiated an executive agreement with Japan, whereby Japan agreed to certain whaling limits and also to stop all commercial whaling by 1988.

Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of Commerce. They argued that the Secretary was required to certify once it was determined that ICRW quotas had been violated. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Secretary had discretion in the substantive determination of whether to certify, thereby triggering the imposition of sanctions, or not to certify and instead pursue alternate means of achieving the treaty’s goals. The Court also stated, however, that the Secretary had a non-discretionary duty to “promptly make the certification decision,” which he did by deciding that certification was not warranted. Accordingly, while the substance of the decision was discretionary, the Secretary had a mandatory duty to make the certification decision promptly.

Japan Whaling Association, 478 U.S. at 232.
A recent case sheds further light on the propriety of relief in the nature of mandamus issuing to federal agencies and Cabinet officers. In *American Council of the Blind v. Paulson*, plaintiffs alleged that the design of paper currency made it difficult for persons who are blind or visually impaired to distinguish between denominations of money. They sued the Secretary of the Treasury, claiming that the design of paper currency discriminated against the visually impaired in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they identified a range of changes to the design of paper currency that would allow the visually impaired to distinguish denominations. Both the district court and the D.C. Circuit found a violation of the Act and held that injunctive relief should issue. Notably, while both courts refused to specify the appropriate remedial action, they did hold that an injunction ordering the Secretary to comply with the law by means of his own choosing was proper. The court of appeals, in rejecting the Secretary's argument that injunctive relief would "impermissibly curtail the [his] discretion," noted that "the district court expressly acknowledged the Secretary's broad discretion to determine how to come into compliance with section 504."  

On remand, the district court addressed the propriety of injunctive relief. The Secretary argued that injunctive relief was unnecessary because the Treasury Department was already in the process of crafting a remedial plan. While acknowledging this to be the case, the court held it insufficient to obviate the need for injunctive relief:

> [W]hile I do not question the Treasury Department's commitment to achieving compliance, the best-laid plans can be derailed by shifting priorities, limited

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90 See id. at 233 ("We do not understand the Secretary to be urging that he has *carte blanche* discretion to ignore and do nothing about [excess whaling in violation of ICRW quotas]").
91 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
92 29 U.S.C.A. §794 (2002) (providing in relevant part that no individual with a disability shall be "subject to discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency.")
93 *Paulson*, 525 F.3d at 1273.
resources, and the other vagaries of bureaucratic action. As I have noted [in the original litigation], this Court has neither the expertise, nor, I believe, the power, to choose among the feasible alternatives, approve any specific design change, or otherwise to dictate to the Secretary of the Treasury how he can come into compliance with the law. But this Court does have the expertise and the authority to create goals and to hold the government to those goals. That is the purpose of this injunction.94

In short, the court held that while the Secretary did have discretion in determining how to comply with the law at issue, he did not have discretion regarding whether to comply with it.95

94 American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 581 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The court's opinion also contains a rather ambiguous reference to mandamus relief, the entire text of which is as follows:

The Treasury Department also argues that an injunction would be inappropriate because it would the equivalent of mandamus, and mandamus is only permissible when a public official has violated a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, duty . . . . But that claim is based on language from the plaintiffs' proposed order that is not in the Court's injunction order.

95 State courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Botkins v. Laws, 632 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ohio 1994) (writ of mandamus cannot control an officer's exercise of discretion, but can be used to compel him to exercise that discretion when he has a clear legal duty to do so); Dunston v. Town of York, 590 A.2d 526, 528 (Me. 1991) (mandamus can be used to compel officials to exercise their discretion); Brownlow v. Wunch, 80 P.2d 444, 455 (Colo. 1938) (in a mandamus action, the court can compel the exercise of discretion without attempting to control it); Gustafson v. Wetherfield Tp. High School Dist. 191, 49 N.E.2d 311, 312 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1943) (board of education's refusal to act, when it was their duty to act, may be the subject of mandamus, although the manner in which they are to act is left up to the board); Hargis v. Swope, 114 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Ky. App. 1938) (court will issue mandamus to compel the exercise of discretion, but not that it be exercised in any particular way).
C. The Duty to Implement International Human Rights Treaties

Considering whether a treaty provision imposes a duty that is amenable to mandamus enforcement requires an assessment of what the United States agreed to do when it ratified the treaty. If the treaty provision is wholly precatory or discretionary, it will not impose a "duty" for mandamus purposes. By contrast, where the duty to implement is clear and mandatory, even if it involves discretion as to means and methods of enforcement, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel implementation. The discussion that follows makes the following propositions:

(1) The text and history of several major international human rights treaties do create a mandatory duty of implementation;

(2) The Supremacy Clause incorporates these duties into domestic law upon the treaty’s ratification;

(3) Barring a provision in the treaty itself or other federal law indicating a contrary result, mandamus is an appropriate remedy where governmental officials have failed to implement such treaties, as it would be if a similar duty existed under a federal statute; and,

(4) The selection of means of implementation should be the exclusive province of the President (or his Cabinet officers) and Congress, provided the means selected are in good faith directed toward effective implementation.

The major human rights treaties that the United States has ratified impose a duty of domestic enforcement. The discussion to this point has, for the sake of simplicity, spoken generally of a duty to “implement the treaty” in domestic law. To be more specific, human rights treaties do not necessarily require that the treaty be implemented by making the treaty itself part of domestic law. Rather, what is required is that the states parties make effective in

96 The United States’ reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs") may be part of the treaty itself in accordance with principles of international law. The effect of RUDs -- particularly, declarations of non-self-execution -- is considered in Part V, infra.
their domestic law the rights guaranteed by the treaty. While
making the treaty in toto enforceable as domestic law would satisfy
the duty of implementation, methods short of such wholesale
incorporation may satisfy the duty.

Of the major international human rights treaties, the United
States has ratified the ICCPR and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Race
Convention”).97 Each of these treaties textually requires domestic
implementation of the rights contained in the treaty. For example,
ICCPR Article 2(1) provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .” Article 2(2) provides that
“[w]here not already provided for by existing [domestic law], each
State Party . . . undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes . . . to adopt such laws
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” Thus, the United States has
the following legal obligations under the ICCPR: (1) to “respect”
the rights in the ICCPR by refraining from violating those rights
itself; (2) to “ensure” the rights in the ICCPR, by taking the steps
necessary to prevent others from violating those rights; and (3) to

97 G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47,
The United States has also ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46,
entered into force June 26, 1987 (“Torture Convention”) and the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
entered into force Jan. 12, 1951 (“Genocide Convention”). This Article does not
address the duty of implementation under these treaties for two reasons. First,
unlike the ICCPR and Race Convention, the United States has already taken
fairly extensive steps to implement the guarantees of the Genocide and Torture
Conventions into domestic law. Second, the Genocide and Torture Conventions,
to a much greater degree than either the ICCPR and Race Convention, require
implementing action that under our Constitution can only be accomplished by
legislation (such as criminalizing torture or genocide). Accordingly, these
treaties raise different Supremacy Clause issues with regard to whether their
provisions can become domestic law upon ratification. See generally Carlos
take whatever measures may be necessary to effectuate ICCPR
rights if those rights are not already protected under domestic law.

The Race Convention also contains specific duties of
implementation. It provides that the states parties “undertake to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms.”\(^98\) The Race
Convention provides several highly specific and mandatory
measures the states parties must take in pursuit of this goal. The
Convention provides that the states parties must refrain from
engaging in racial discrimination themselves\(^99\) and “shall” do the
following: (1) review and eliminate any laws or policies that have
the purpose or effect of creating or perpetuating racial
discrimination;\(^100\) (2) prohibit by all appropriate means racial
discrimination by others, including private actors;\(^101\) (3) when
necessary, adopt “special and concrete measures” aimed at
equalizing the status of racial and ethnic minorities in order to
ameliorate the present effects of past discrimination;\(^102\) and (4)
pass laws prohibiting hate speech and incitement and outlawing
groups engaging in such activities.\(^103\)

\(^98\) Race Convention, art. 2(1). In contrast with current U.S. constitutional
law, the Race Convention does not define race conscious policies aimed at
equalizing the status of racial minorities as prohibited “racial discrimination.”
Id., art. 1(4) (“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals . . . . shall not be
deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as
a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial
groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved”). Indeed, the Race Convention requires
states parties to adopt such measures when necessary. Id., art. 2(2) (“States Parties
shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take . . . special and concrete measures
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them . . . . These measures shall in no case entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial
groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”).

\(^99\) Id., art. 2(1)(a) and (b).

\(^100\) Id., art. 2(1)(c).

\(^101\) Id., art 2(1)(d).

\(^102\) Id. art. 2(2).

\(^103\) Id. art. 4. Art. 4 of the Race Convention differs in notable respects
from the other duties discussed in this section. First, even assuming that it does
impose a mandatory duty of the type suitable to mandamus enforcement, it
likely is both an impermissible content-based distinction and unconstitutionally
overbroad under current Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
When the United States ratified these treaties, the Supremacy Clause made these duties part of domestic law. The Clause also provides for the constitutional parity in domestic law of ratified treaties and federal statutes. Accordingly, such treaty duties should be enforceable by mandamus where similar duties would be enforceable if contained in a federal statute. An analysis of the binding nature of the duties imposed reveals that where they have not been fulfilled, mandamus would provide an appropriate remedy.

It is true that the duty of implementation will be considered fulfilled where the rights protected by a treaty are already adequately protected in existing domestic law. While existing U.S. constitutional and statutory provisions do provide some of the protections of the ICCPR and the Race Convention, there are a variety of areas where gaps remain. For example, Article 1(1) of the Race Convention defines prohibited discrimination as any distinction based on race that has the "purpose or effect" of impairing the exercise of "human rights and fundamental freedoms." By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that only

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505 U.S. 377 (1992). Accordingly, it could not, despite the Supremacy Clause, become effective as domestic law upon ratification because it conflicts with the Constitution. See Section II.B., supra. Second, the action it requires – the enactment of legislation – is of a type that only Congress can perform. Accordingly, it would be “non-self-executing” in the sense that under our Constitution, it is directed to the legislature. See Section II.B., supra.


This assumes that the reason for non-implementation is not that the government is unable to fulfill the obligation because doing so would violate the Constitution. Mandamus obviously would not be appropriate to compel the government to take unconstitutional action.

See, e.g., ICCPR Article 2(2) (“[w]here not already provided for by existing [domestic law], each State Party . . . undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant”).

purposeful racial discrimination triggers strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Another example is in the area of private action. Under the “state action” doctrine, constitutional protections against discrimination only apply where governmental officials are responsible for the discrimination. The lack of state action is an absolute bar to constitutional relief. Both the ICCPR and the Race Convention, however, require the states parties to take action to eliminate and remedy private discrimination by non-governmental actors.

Thus, there is an “implementation gap” between the rights protected under existing U.S. law and the requirements of these treaties. One need not believe that these treaty rights are normatively “better” than domestic law. Rather, for purposes of this Article, the point is that the duty to make those rights effective

109 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). It is true that federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, often prohibit private discrimination. Yet such statutes do not prohibit the full spectrum of the private discrimination envisioned under the ICCPR.
110 Race Convention, art 2(1)(d) (“Each state party shall prohibit and bring to an end . . . racial discrimination by any persons, group, or organization”) (emphasis added); ICCPR art. 2(1) (“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”) (emphasis added). The U.N. Human Rights Committee (the body charged with enforcing and construing the ICCPR) has interpreted art. 2(1) of the ICCPR as requiring states parties to take action against private violations of ICCPR rights, at least in some circumstances. The Committee has stated that:

the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure [ICCPR] rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities . . . . The [ICCPR] itself envisages in some articles certain areas where there are positive obligations on States Parties to address the activities of private persons or entities.

is one that the United States voluntarily assumed yet fails to effectuate.\textsuperscript{111}

Several principles are relevant in considering whether these unfulfilled implementation duties are amenable to mandamus enforcement. The first is that mandamus is only appropriate where the alleged duty is mandatory.\textsuperscript{112} A law’s textual use of the word “shall” has been consistently interpreted to imply a mandatory duty. In \textit{Miguel v. McCarl},\textsuperscript{113} for example, the Court ordered the Chief of Finance to pay military retirement benefits to a man who had served over thirty years in the military. The Comptroller General had argued that the petitioner did not qualify for retirement pay under the applicable statutes because sufficient funds had not been appropriated. The Court found that the Comptroller’s discretion did not extend to denying the pension because, \textit{inter alia}, the statute at issue stated that when a person had served thirty years in the military, “he \textit{shall} . . . be placed upon the retired list” and granted his pension.\textsuperscript{114} The use of the mandatory phrase “shall” indicated that Congress intended that executive officials were required to follow the statutory command once the statutory predicates were met.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{111} See U.N. Human Rights Comm., \textit{General Comment 31, para. 13, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant}, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) ("[w]here there are inconsistencies between domestic law and the Covenant, article 2 requires that the domestic law or practice be changed to meet the standards imposed by the Covenant’s substantive guarantees.")

\textsuperscript{112} As noted earlier, the contention here is that the duty to implement treaty rights is mandatory, even if the particular means of implementation are left to the discretion of each state party.

\textsuperscript{113} 291 U.S. 442 (1934).

\textsuperscript{114} 291 U.S. at 449.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Id.} at 454. \textit{See also} Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (construing the Constitution’s Extradition Clause and the federal Extradition Act, both of which require that upon a proper extradition request, states “shall” arrest and deliver fugitives to the requesting state, as imposing a mandatory duty amenable to mandamus enforcement); Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 918 (11th Cir. 2003) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that mandamus relief was appropriate to compel immigration authorities to grant of visa because, \textit{inter alia}, “throughout [the relevant statute], Congress chose to employ authoritative language that affirmatively directs action. The term ‘shall’ pervades [the statute].")
The implementation duties contained in human rights treaties the United States has ratified are phrased as mandatory affirmative commands ("shall"), not as discretionary suggestions ("may"). The constitutional parity of treaties and statutes under the Supremacy Clause indicates that mandatory language in a treaty should be construed to have similar domestic effect as mandatory language in a federal statute, unless there is an indication to the contrary.

However, mandamus will nevertheless be inappropriate if the law's command, although phrased in a mandatory fashion, is too indeterminate or unclear to be enforced. Mandamus requires that

See pp. ___-___, supra, discussing the duties of implementation under the ICCPR and the Race Convention. It could be argued that certain of these duties are discretionary because they do not state that the states parties "shall" do certain things, but that they "undertake" to do those things. See, e.g., ICCPR Article 2(1) ("[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure [ICCPR rights]") (emphasis added). The argument would be that agreeing to "undertake to" do something implies future discretionary action, i.e., implementing legislation, before the treaty's commands become domestic law. In Medellin, the Court found Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter to be non-self-executing because its text provides that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party," rather than stating that such judgments "shall" or "must" be complied with. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1358 (emphasis in original). As Justice Breyer pointed out, however, this reading of "undertakes" is highly dubious. More likely is that the U.N. Charter's drafters intended this language to "indicate a present obligation to execute, without any tentativeness of the sort the majority [in Medellin] finds in the . . . word "undertakes."" Id. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Regardless, certain of the treaty duties outlined in the text above do employ the word "shall," which the Medellin majority itself recognized contemplates an immediately binding obligation. Id. at 1358 (stating that Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter is non-self-executing because it "does not provide that the United States 'shall' or 'must' comply with an ICJ decision").

Authoritative interpretations of these treaties reinforce the textual indications that these duties were intended to be mandatory. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 15: Organized violence based on ethnic origin (Art. 4), para. 2, 23/03/93, Gen. Rec. No. 15 (stating that "the provisions of article 4 [of the Race Convention] are of a mandatory character"); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31, para. 5, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) ("[t]he article 2, paragraph 1, obligation to respect and ensure the rights recognized by the Covenant has immediate effect for all states parties"); id. para. 14 ("The requirement under article 2, paragraph 2, to take steps to give effect to the Covenant rights is unqualified and of immediate effect").
the duty to be enforced is “clear and certain.”\textsuperscript{118} Certain treaty provisions, even if couched in mandatory terms, would not be appropriate for mandamus enforcement because of the lack of clarity as to what exactly the duty is to be enforced. For example, Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, a treaty to which the United States is a party, provides that United Nations “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”\textsuperscript{119} Article 56 states that “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”\textsuperscript{120} These two provisions read together make clear that U.N. member states must take action to promote “human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Yet the indefiniteness of what is pledged would defy mandamus enforcement because there would be no touchstone by which to determine whether the duty had been fulfilled. In assessing whether a state party had failed to live up to its Article 55 and 56 duties, a court would first have to discern, among other matters, what it means to “promote” human rights, and indeed, what “human rights and fundamental freedoms” the member states have pledged to work together to promote.\textsuperscript{121}

By contrast, there is nothing indeterminate or unclear about, for example, the duty under the Race Convention to “review and eliminate any laws or policies that have the purpose or effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.”\textsuperscript{122} Fulfillment or non-fulfillment of this duty can be assessed by reference to concrete and determinate standards: (1) has the state party undertaken the required review of its laws and policies and (2) if

\textsuperscript{118} Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998).
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.} art. 56.
\textsuperscript{121} In \textit{Sei Fuji v. State of California}, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 724; 242 P.2d 617, 621 (1952), the California Supreme Court held that these provisions of the Charter could not be considered self-executing because they “lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.” As with many of court opinions on the subject of non-self-execution, the \textit{Sei Fuji} opinion is unclear as to whether it believed that the Charter was non-self-executing in the sense of not being domestic law at all or not providing a private cause of action.
\textsuperscript{122} Race Convention, art. 2(1)(c).
so, has it eliminated those that have the purpose or effect of creating or perpetuating discrimination? Similarly, under Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, the questions would be (1) are there rights under the ICCPR that are not adequately protected by existing domestic law and (2) if so, has the state party taken “the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes . . . to adopt such laws or other measures”\textsuperscript{123} to give effect to those rights? For purposes of mandamus, such duties need not be further construed; they are clear and understandable on their face.\textsuperscript{124}

While courts may therefore compel treaty implementation when the treaty so requires, they cannot compel the political branches to adopt a particular means of implementation. This is so for two separate reasons, one international and one domestic. As a matter of international law, most human rights treaties do not require that the rights they guarantee be implemented in a specific manner.\textsuperscript{125} Moreover, under mandamus jurisprudence, courts may order government officials to exercise discretion when the law so requires, but they cannot order that the discretion be exercised to reach a particular result.\textsuperscript{126} Accordingly, a judicial order that the mandatory duty of implementation under a human rights treaty requires government officials to implement the treaty must leave the means of implementation to the good faith discretion of the relevant officials. Possible means of

\textsuperscript{123} ICCPR art. 2(2).
\textsuperscript{124} Cf. Miguel, 291 U.S. at 453 (“Statutory provisions so clear and precise do not require construction. In such case, as this court has often held, the language is conclusive. There can be no construction where there is nothing to construe.”)
\textsuperscript{125} See, e.g., ICCPR Article 2(2) (“each State Party . . . undertakes to take the necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant”); Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. at 679 n.357 (citing the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s interpretation that Article 2 of the ICCPR “does not [necessarily] require that the [ICCPR] be directly applicable in the courts . . . ”). Some treaties do in fact require that specific means of implementation be adopted. For example, the Genocide Convention specifically requires that the states parties adopt domestic laws criminalizing acts of genocide. For the reasons discussed in note 97, supra, and note 157 and accompanying text, infra, however, a requirement that the Congress adopt particular laws could not be enforceable by mandamus.
\textsuperscript{126} See Section IV.B., supra.
implementation could include the following Executive Branch action: reviewing U.S. laws to identify any “implementation gaps” and recommendations to Congress as to legislation that would fill such gaps; requiring federal law enforcement agencies to establish complaint procedures specifically aimed at allowing individuals to assert treaty violations; investigating and pursuing allegations of violations of treaty rights; ordering relevant administrative agencies to pass federal regulations aimed at implementing treaty rights as to persons or matters within the scope of their regulatory power; and executive orders or other policymaking requiring that federal agencies apply treaty rights in actions that come before them.

As noted in the Introduction, this Article purposefully leaves open the question of proper plaintiffs and defendants in such a mandamus action. A few preliminary principles are worth noting, however. First, international human rights treaties address their rights and protections to individuals. When the U.S. has failed to comply with its duty to implement treaty rights, that duty is therefore breached with regard to individuals as well with regard to the other states parties. The Supremacy Clause assimilates that duty of implementation into domestic law. Accordingly, a private individual should be able to bring a mandamus claim alleging the government’s breach of a mandatory duty owed to the plaintiff.

Second, regardless of whether a court can issue mandamus to the person of the President himself, it is clear as a matter of international and domestic law that the primary duty to secure compliance with international law lies with the Executive Branch. It is also clear that mandamus will issue to those Executive Branch officials below the level of the President charged with the duty forming the basis of the mandamus action.

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127 See Section III, supra, discussing individuals as the rights-holders under international human rights treaties.
128 Additionally, principles of Article III standing would need to be assessed to determine, *inter alia*, whether the plaintiff has suffered an “injury in fact.” See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
129 See Section IV.A., supra.
130 Cite.
131 See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at 149-150 (“[The Secretary of State] is compellable to do his duty, and if he refuses . . . a specific civil remedy to the injured party can only be obtained by a writ of mandamus”); Miguel v. McCarl,
V. The Effect of Declarations of Non-Self-Execution on the Duty to Implement Human Rights Treaties

The analysis to this point has made the relatively modest proposition that when the federal government creates supreme domestic law in the form of a treaty, it must comply with that law domestically. Accordingly, if the United States ratifies a treaty containing a duty of domestic implementation yet fails to implement the treaty, I have contended that compliance with that duty can be secured through the mechanism of mandamus. The question remains as to how the United States can obviate that duty if it so chooses.

There are several unquestionably constitutional methods by which the United States can modify the domestic legal effect of its international obligations. The first would be simply to refuse to ratify the treaty. Another option would be to negotiate treaty language explicitly stating that the treaty will not have domestic effect as to any of the member states. While this option raises no constitutional concerns, it may be impracticable in the context of multilateral treaties. Different legal systems have different legal rules regarding the domestic effect of treaties. Accordingly, it would often be impracticable to formulate a general textual rule as to a treaty’s domestic effect in all member states, even if the U.S. could secure the other parties’ agreement to such a general rule.\footnote{See, e.g., Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 668 (noting that multilateral treaties may involve countries that have very different domestic rules regarding the domestic legal status of international agreements and that an attempt to formulate a general principle of domestic enforceability might run afoul of those rules); \textit{Cf. Medellin}, 128 S.Ct. at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties in searching for textual evidence of the treatymakers’ intent regarding domestic implementation because “whether further legislative action is required before a treaty provision takes domestic effect in a signatory nation is often a matter of how that Nation’s domestic law regards the provision’s legal status.”)}

291 U.S. 442 (1934) (relief in the nature of mandamus could issue to Comptroller General and Chief of Finance); Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Secretary of Commerce had a mandatory duty to exercise discretion); \textit{American Council of the Blind v. Paulson}, 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (relief in nature of mandamus issued against Secretary of Treasury).
The United States could also ratify a treaty and then separately pass a federal statute clearly stating that the treaty shall have no domestic legal effect unless and until implementing legislation is adopted. While treaties and federal statutes enjoy constitutional parity under the Supremacy Clause, the “last in time” rule means that a later federal statute that directly conflicts with an earlier treaty supersedes that treaty for domestic purposes. Congress could also take a more nuanced approach. Through the combination of legislation stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the treaty and legislation preempting state court consideration of such cases, Congress could maintain the treaty’s status as supreme domestic law but commit its enforcement solely to the political branches.

I do not suggest that any of these options for limiting the domestic effect of ratified treaties is necessarily wise or that this list is exhaustive. Rather, I provide these illustrations to point out that although the Supremacy Clause makes ratified treaties part of our domestic law upon ratification, there are a variety of ways in which the political branches can limit or eliminate the treaty’s domestic enforceability. Rather than pursuing such avenues, however, the current practice is as follows: (1) the United States ratifies an international human rights treaty that contains both rights-creating provisions and a duty to respect and ensure those rights with regard to all persons subject to their jurisdiction; (2) the United States submits a “declaration of non-self-execution” upon ratifying the treaty; and (3) relying upon such a declaration, the political branches and the judiciary hold that the treaty is no longer domestic law. The dubious constitutionality of this course of action is discussed below. I conclude that an examination of declarations of non-self-execution reveals that many of them should be construed only as eliminating one avenue of relief for the treaty’s violation: namely, a private cause of action to enforce the treaty’s substantive guarantees. To the extent that a declaration of non-self-execution truly seeks to eliminate any domestic legal effect of a treaty containing a duty of domestic implementation, it is of dubious legality, both as a matter of international and domestic law. However, I conclude that such a declaration can,

133 See generally The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
134 As will be explained below, a “declaration” that purports to modify a
in limited circumstances, obviate the duty of domestic implementation where it can be considered part of the treaty the U.S. has ratified.

A. The Treaty Making Process and Declarations of Non-Self-Execution

The Constitution’s Treaty Clause gives the President the power to make treaties, provided that he obtains the Senate’s “advice and consent.” The Senate often attaches conditions to its consent in the form of reservations, understandings, or declarations (“RUDs”). The President may then ratify the treaty subject to the Senate’s conditions, or reject the conditions, in which case the treaty cannot be ratified.

One common RUD the Senate has imposed with regard to international human rights treaties is a declaration of non-self-execution (“NSE declaration”). Such a declaration does not, contrary to the common misunderstanding of many courts and commentators, automatically render the treaty a domestic nullity. Rather, the presumed effect of such a declaration should be the same as a finding of non-self-execution in a treaty lacking such a declaration. An NSE declaration is a statement by the Senate that the treaty itself shall not provide a private cause of action. Where an individual relies upon some other source of law to provide his cause of action – whether the mandamus action suggested in this Article or otherwise – it does not run afoul of an NSE declaration.

The United States’ RUDs to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) clearly demonstrate the difference between a declaration of non-self execution providing that the treaty itself shall not create a cause of action and a reservation that purports to provide that the treaty, despite the Supremacy Clause, is not domestic law. In providing its consent to ratification of the ICCPR, the Senate entered a declaration stating that “[t]he United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1

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state party’s legal obligations under a treaty is more properly analyzed as a reservation rather than a declaration.

135 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”

The Senate explained the purpose of the declaration as follows: “For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.”

The Senate did not state that the declaration meant the ICCPR would lack the force of domestic law. The Senate did not even purport to limit the treaty’s use in private lawsuits. The stated purpose was only to clarify that the treaty itself would not create a private cause of action.

To be sure, it is possible that the Senate intends an NSE declaration to mean that a treaty will not, despite the Supremacy Clause, become domestic law until further action by the full Congress and the President. With regard to the Torture Convention, for example, the evidence is mixed. In explaining the purpose of the NSE declaration for the Torture Convention, the Senate stated that it was intended “to clarify that the provisions of the Convention would not of themselves become effective as domestic law.” However, the Senate later stated that its NSE declaration to the ICCPR was intended to have the same effect as its earlier NSE declaration to the Torture Convention: to wit, that neither treaty would create a private cause of action.

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138 Id. (emphasis added).
139 Where that is the case, as explained below, an NSE declaration is more properly analyzed for Supremacy Clause purposes as a reservation. See Section V.B., infra. With regard to the ICCPR, however, even if what the Senate meant was that the ICCPR would not become domestic law until implementing legislation was enacted, that is not what the declaration says. Additionally, the quoted portion of the Senate Report makes clear that what the Senate indeed meant was that the ICCPR would not create a private cause of action.
141 The Senate stated:

The intent [of the NSE declaration] is to clarify that the ICCPR will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts. As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated. We recommend the following declaration, virtually identical to ... the one adopted by the Senate with respect to the Torture Convention....
Even if there is ambiguity with regard to a particular NSE reservation, three principles of legislative interpretation counsel against construing it as stating that the treaty shall not be effective as domestic law upon ratification. The first is the principle that Congress is presumed to legislate against the background of the common law, with knowledge of the common law terms it uses. A declaration that certain provisions of a treaty “are not self-executing” should be read against the common law background beginning with Foster, under which such a treaty remains domestic law but is not enforceable in a private cause of action.

The second interpretive principle, commonly known as the Charming Betsy canon, is that ambiguous federal statutes should be construed so as not to violate international law. Reading an


Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles. Thus, where a common-law principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

There is a reasonable argument that the relevant “common law background” here is the widely held, but incorrect, view among lower courts that “non-self-executing” means “not domestic law.” See Section II.B., supra. In other words, perhaps the Senate intends to incorporate this mistaken common law interpretation when it declares a treaty to be non-self-executing. The canon assumes, however, that Congress knows the common law correctly. In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804), the Court held that where a statute is ambiguous, “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” An NSE declaration is not, of course, an “act of Congress.” Nevertheless, the Charming Betsy canon is relevant. The reasons for the canon seem equally applicable whether construing the intent of the full Congress with regard to a statute or that of the Senate with regard to a declaration. In either case, the primary concern is avoiding inadvertently placing the United States in breach of its international legal obligations. See, e.g., Macleod v. United States,
NSE declaration as providing that the treaty shall have no domestic legal effect would put the United States in breach of the treaty if it contains a duty of domestic implementation. Reading an NSE declaration in such a manner would also principles of international law regarding treaty interpretation. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), 145 which the United States regards as authoritative, 146 treaty parties obligate themselves to perform in good faith the treaty’s obligations and may not invoke domestic law as a justification for failure to perform the treaty. 147 This conflict with international law can be avoided if NSE declarations are read as stating only that the treaty does not create a domestic cause of action, since human rights treaties are generally silent as to what method of domestic implementation is appropriate in each country.

The third interpretive principle is the canon of constitutional avoidance. That canon of construction “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” 148 An NSE declaration, unlike a reservation to a treaty, 149

229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913) (“it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of this country to other nations”). See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115 cmt. a (1987) (stating that “[i]t is generally assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United States”).


146 Although the U.S. is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the political branches, the courts and the American Law Institute have all recognized that the Convention states authoritative principles regarding treaty interpretation. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’T L. 281, 285-87 (1988).

147 Vienna Convention art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”). Id. art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”). While Article 27 states that it is without prejudice to Article 46, that article only provides that a state party’s domestic law may be invoked under limited circumstances to invalidate its consent to a treaty where the treaty-making process was not conducted in accordance with domestic law. Article 46 is not at issue here because the issue is failure to perform the treaty to which the U.S. validly consented, not the validity of its consent to the treaty.

is not “part of” the treaty. It is instead a unilateral statement that purports to control domestic implementation of the international obligation. Reading an NSE declaration as rendering a ratified treaty not part of the law of the United States conflicts with the Supremacy Clause, which makes ratified treaties part of the “supreme law of the land.” Because of this conflict, several scholars have suggested that NSE declarations may be unconstitutional. While I tend to agree with that view, the canon of constitutional avoidance would suggest that judges should not construe NSE declaration to raise this constitutional conflict if

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149 A reservation to a treaty modifies a state party’s legal obligation under the treaty. Vienna Convention art. 2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) and 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 875 (1969). If accepted by the other states parties and valid as a matter of international law, it becomes part of the treaty as to the member state that has entered it. Vienna Convention art. 19-23. A true reservation stating that the treaty will have no domestic legal effect would not raise the Supremacy Clause conflict discussed here, because the Supremacy Clause would incorporate the treaty as modified by the reservation into domestic law.

150 Rosati, supra note ___ at 564 (stating that a declaration “may not be a part of the treaty at all, and, thus, would not be part of U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause . . . . ‘Understandings’ and ‘declarations’ . . . are unilateral statements by a State concerning its interpretation of a treaty provision and do not modify the State’s international obligations.”)

151 Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 677-78. As discussed below, a declaration may functionally be a reservation in certain circumstances. However, the U.S.’s NSE declarations have not been entered as part of the treaty-making process and therefore cannot functionally be reservations.

152 Where the U.S. has modified the treaty (regardless of whether the modification is denominated as a reservation or declaration) to deny it any domestic legal status, such a modification is “part of” the treaty as to the U.S. In Section V.B., infra, I consider the effect such a modification would have on the mandamus analysis presented in this Article.

153 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: the Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349-50 (1995). It has also been suggested that NSE declarations may be unconstitutional for other reasons. See, e.g., Rosati, supra note ___ at 565-66 (“while the Constitution granted the Senate the power to withhold consent to a treaty, it does not contemplate a power in the Senate to impose terms not contained in the treaty as negotiated by the President. The Senate enjoys a veto power, not a power of revision. Moreover, because [a] non-self-executing declaration concerns the domestic effect of a treaty, it may be, in effect, domestic legislation without the [constitutionally required] participation of the House of Representatives.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
another construction is reasonably available. Construing NSE declarations to mean only that the treaty shall not create a domestic cause of action avoids the Supremacy Clause conflict, because the Supremacy Clause does not necessarily require that “the supreme law of the land” must create a private cause of action.\textsuperscript{154} It does, however, require that ratified treaties be treated as domestic law.

**B. NSE Declarations as Reservations to the Duty of Domestic Treaty Implementation**

The discussion above demonstrates that courts should neither assume that NSE declarations are intended to deny ratified treaties domestic legal status nor that such declarations obviate the duty of domestic implementation. However, when the United States enters a reservation to that effect, or when an NSE declaration can be fairly read as such a reservation,\textsuperscript{155} a different result follows. If the U.S. enters an explicit or functional reservation denying a treaty any domestic legal status until implementing legislation is enacted, such a reservation, if valid under international law, can obviate the duty of domestic implementation. But the conflict with the Supremacy Clause can only be avoided where the reservation is part of the treaty; that is, where it modifies the supreme domestic law that the U.S. has created upon the treaty’s ratification.

A reservation to a treaty modifies a state party’s legal obligation under the treaty.\textsuperscript{156} The United States can enter reservations to treaties, including a reservation that the treaty shall not become domestically effective until implementing legislation is

\textsuperscript{154} Indeed, as Professor Vazquez points out, direct judicial enforcement in the sense of a private cause of action is not necessarily even required as a matter of international law. Carlos Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of Self-Execution, 122 Harv. L. Rev. at 679 n.357 (citing the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s interpretation that Article 2 of the ICCPR “does not require that the [ICCPR] be directly applicable in the courts . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{155} What the provision is called is not determinative. Rather, the intended effect of the provision is key to determining whether it is a declaration or reservation. See Vienna Convention art. 2(1)(d).

\textsuperscript{156} Vienna Convention art. 2(1)(d) (defining a reservation as a statement that “purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of any treaty provision.”)
adopted.  

In order for such a reservation to nullify the treaty’s domestic legal status, however, two conditions would have to exist, with the second condition flowing from the first.

The first condition is that the reservation would have to become, under principles of international law, part of the treaty as to the United States. A full discussion of the international legal principles governing validity of reservations is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note that a reservation will be considered valid under international law where the following circumstances exist: (1) the reservation in question is not barred by the treaty itself; (2) the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty; and (3) the other states parties have accepted (or at least not objected to) the reservation.  

While I have grave doubts that a reservation stating that the U.S. will take no action to implement a human rights treaty could be consistent with the object and purpose of such a treaty, I am willing to assume for present purposes that a valid reservation could be crafted. If such a reservation becomes part of the treaty as to the United States, the second condition follows: the treaty becomes domestic law upon ratification, but with the modification. In short, what would be assimilated into domestic law under the Supremacy Clause is not a treaty containing a duty of domestic implementation, but a treaty without such a duty.

An example may prove useful. When the United States ratifies a treaty containing a duty of domestic implementation, that

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157 Such a reservation may be a perfectly legitimate effort to meet our international legal obligations in a way that comports with our domestic law. For example, the Genocide Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) requires that the states parties may genocide a domestic crime. Since conduct can only be criminalized by statute in our legal system, separate legislation is required before this treaty obligation can be given any domestic effect.

158 Vienna Convention art. 19-21.

159 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated that a state party may not validly “reserve an entitlement not to take the necessary steps at the domestic level to give effect to the rights of the Covenant” because such a reservation would be incompatible with the object and purpose of Article 2 of the ICCPR. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 24: General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereo, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
duty becomes domestic law. It is the same as if Congress had enacted a federal statute requiring the government to undertake action to implement the statute. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a substantive prohibition of racial discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title VI also provides that “[e]ach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of [Title VI] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders” necessary to achieve the statutory objectives. This federal law therefore creates a legal duty of implementation by requiring the issuance of rules, regulations, or orders by the appropriate federal agencies.

By contrast, where a treaty is ratified with a valid reservation providing that the treaty shall have no domestic legal effect until further legislative action, the treaty no longer imposes any duty of implementation. It would be as if Title VI, instead of stating a substantive rule and then requiring implementation of that rule, stated the substantive rule and then stated that “this statute shall not be effective as federal law until so made by a federal statute to be enacted later.” While Title VI with this hypothetical provision is still law, it is fairly well accepted that the courts cannot order the legislature to legislate. Accordingly, the decision of whether to implement the law would functionally rest solely with the political branches.

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162 See, e.g., Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1384 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.) (stating that the legislative history of the federal mandamus statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1361) demonstrates that “Congress was thinking solely in terms of the Executive Branch” in enacting the statute). That does not mean, however, that Congressional action or inaction is automatically immune from judicial review. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (holding that equal protection claim that the state legislature’s failure to reapportion voting districts based on population changes presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action).
163 It should be noted that the principles articulated here are consistent with the premise of this Article regarding the availability of mandamus to enforce the duty to domestically implement non-self-executing treaties. Where the United States ratifies a treaty, the Supremacy Clause makes the treaty domestic law. Where the treaty contains a duty of implementation, then regardless of whether it is self-executing in the sense of creating a private cause of action, it must be
IV. Conclusion

The United States has voluntarily chosen to ratify international human rights treaties. Having done so, the Supremacy Clause makes such treaties part of the supreme law of the land. Whether ratifying such treaties is wise or the rights contained in a specific treaty are desirable is the subject of legitimate debate. That debate ends, however, once the treaty is ratified. Under our Constitution, once the choice is made to create supreme domestic law, the political branches cannot choose to ignore that law. The “non-self-executing treaty” doctrine has been stretched far beyond its proper application and original meaning to provide support for a theory under which treaties have no domestic legal force, despite the clear textual command of the Supremacy Clause to the contrary. Those who would imply a power of our government to disregard the duty to domestically implement treaties requiring such implementation undermine the goals of the international human rights system. Perhaps more importantly, they undermine the rule of law and notions of constitutionalism under which the government is bound by the laws it creates. The government undoubtedly has a variety of legitimate means at its disposal to modify its international legal obligations or to deprive them of domestic applicability. Ignoring the Constitution is not one of them.

implemented. This duty, as supreme federal law, may be enforced by mandamus. In other words, what has become domestic law is the treaty and the treaty contains a duty of implementation that cannot be ignored by the political branches. By contrast, the proposition in this section is that the United States can, through an appropriate reservation, change the treaty to obviate any duty of domestic implementation. Because the treaty no longer says that it must be domestically implemented, such implementation could not be compelled.