Memorandum in Support of Administrative Appeal
                      & Criminal Complaint


     In  accordance   with  rules  governing  the  administrative
appeals process,  set out  in 26 CFR § 601, et seq., the Internal
Revenue Service  district office  is incompetent  to make rulings
concerning the  law of  any given  case. The  district office  is
responsible primarily  for establishing  fact, with  the national
office responsible  for  making  determinations  concerning  law.
However, in  the present  context it  will be  useful to possibly
shorten  the   administrative  appeals   process  and  subsequent
initiatives in civil and/or criminal forums.

     This memorandum is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely
to provide  all parties with sufficient information to constitute
notice,  and   thereby  compel   due  diligence   necessity   for
determining law which governs the conduct of the various parties.
Each matter  at issue  will be  treated with  as much  brevity as
possible.  Should   it  be   necessary  to  independently  pursue
appropriate  remedies,   matters  set   out  below,  anchored  in
published law,  court cases  and other  government  publications,
will be  deemed accurate  and sufficient  cause for action should
Internal Revenue  Service  officers  or  agents  fail  to  rebut,
supporting  contentions   with  legal   authorities  adequate  to
overcome assertions herein.


            1.  IRS Identity & Principal of Interest

     In 1954,  the Internal  Revenue Service  was created  by the
stroke of  a pen  when the  Secretary of the Treasury changed the
name of  the Bureau  of Internal  Revenue. However,  there was no
congressional  or  presidential  authorization  for  making  this
change, so  the source  of authority  had to originate elsewhere.
Research unearthed  in the  last several months suggests that the
Secretary exercised his authority as trustee of Puerto Rico Trust
#62 (Internal Revenue) (see 31 U.S.C. § 1321).

     The solid  link between the Internal Revenue Service and the
Department of  the Treasury,  Puerto Rico, was first published in
the September  1995 issue  of Veritas Magazine, based on research
by William Cooper and Wayne Bentson, both of Arizona. In October,
a criminal  complaint was  filed in  the office  of  W.  A.  Drew
Edmondson, attorney  general for  Oklahoma, against an Enid-based
revenue officer,  and in  the time  since,  IRS  principals  have
failed to  refute the  allegation that  IRS is  an agency  of the
Department  of  Treasury,  Puerto  Rico.  In  November,  criminal
complaints were  filed simultaneously with the grand jury for the
United  States  district  court  for  the  District  of  Northern
Oklahoma, Tulsa,  and the  office of  Attorney General Edmondson,
and both  the office  of  the  United  States  Attorney  and  IRS
principals have yet to rebut the allegations in that instance.

     By consulting the index for title Chapter 3, Title 31 of the
United States  Code, one  finds that  IRS, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and  Firearms, and  Secret  Service  are  not  listed  as
agencies of the United States Department of the Treasury.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 1 of 9


     The fact  that Congress  never created a "Bureau of Internal
Revenue" is  confirmed by  publication in the Federal Register at
36 F.R.  849-890 [C.B.  1971 - 1,698], 36 F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 -
2,577], and  37 F.R. 489-490; and in Internal Revenue Manual 1100
at 1111.2.

     Implications are  condemning both  to IRS  and third parties
who knowingly  participate in IRS-initiated scams:  No legitimate
authority resides  in or  emanates from  an office  which was not
legitimately created  and/or ordained either by state or national
constitutions or  by legislative enactment. See variously, United
States v.  Germane, 99  U.S. 508 (1879), Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S.  425, 441,  6 S.Ct. 1121 (1866), etc., dating to Pope v.
Commissioner, 138  F.2d 1006,  1009 (6th  Cir. 1943);  where  the
state is  concerned, the  most recent  corresponding decision was
State v. Pinckney, 276 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1979).

     Another direct evidence of the fraud is found at 27 CFR § 1,
which prescribes  basic requirements  for securing  permits under
the Federal  Alcohol Administration Act. The problem here is that
Congress promulgated  the Act  in 1935,  and the  same year,  the
United States  Supreme Court  declared the  Act unconstitutional.
Administration of  the Act  was subsequently  moved off-shore  to
Puerto  Rico,  along  with  the  Federal  Alcohol  Administration
Authority, and  operation eventually  merged with  the Bureau  of
Internal Revenue,  Puerto Rico,  which until 1938, along with the
Bureau  of   Internal  Revenue,   Philippines,  created   by  the
provisional  government   via  Philippines   Trust  #2  (internal
revenue), administered  the China  Trade Act (licensing & revenue
collection relating to opium, cocaine & citric wines).

     Further verification that IRS does not have lawful authority
in  the  several  States  is  found  in  the  Parallel  Table  of
Authorities and  Rules, beginning  on page  751 of the 1995 Index
volume to  the Code of Federal Regulations. It will be found that
there are  no regulations  supportive of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7621, 7801,
7802 &  7803 (these  statute listings are absent from the table).
In other words, no regulations have been published in the Federal
Register, extending  authority to  the  several  States  and  the
population at  large, (1)  to establish  revenue districts within
the several  States, (2) extending authority of the Department of
the Treasury  [Puerto Rico]  to the  several States,  (3)  giving
authority to  the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and assistants
within the  several States,  or (4)  extending authority  of  any
other Department of Treasury personnel to the several States.

     To date  only three statutes in the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as  currently amended,  have been located that specifically
reference the  several States,  exclusive of  the federal  States
(District of  Columbia, Puerto  Rico, Guam,  the Virgin  Islands,
etc.): 26  U.S.C. §§  5272(b), 5362(c)  &  7462.  The  first  two
provide certain  exemptions to  bond and  import tax requirements
relating to  imported distilled  spirits for  governments of  the
several States  and their  respective political subdivisions, and
the last provides that reports published by the United States Tax
Court will  constitute evidence  of the  reports in courts of the
United States  and the several States. None of the three statutes
extend assessment or collections authority for IRS or BATF within
the several States.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 2 of 9


     IRS is  contracted to  provide collection  services for  the
Agency for  International Development,  and case law demonstrates
that the  true  principals  of  interest  are  the  International
Monetary Fund  and the  World Bank  (Bank of the United States v.
Planters Bank  of Georgia,  6 L.Ed (Wheat) 244; U.S. v. Burr, 309
U.S. 242;  see 22  USCA §  286, et  seq.). In  other  words,  IRS
seemingly provides  collection services  for undisclosed  foreign
principals  rather  than  collecting  internal  revenue  for  the
benefit of constitutional United States government operation.

     The Internal  Revenue Service, a foreign entity with respect
to the  several States,  is not  registered to do business in the
several States.


             2.  Preservation of Due Process Rights

     The Internal Revenue Service has for years been protected by
statutory courts  both of  the  United  States  and  the  several
States, with  the latter  operating in  the framework  of adopted
uniform laws  which ascribe  a federal  character to  the several
States. Both  operate under  the presumption of Congress' Article
IV  jurisdiction  within  the  geographical  United  States  (the
District  of  Columbia,  Puerto  Rico,  etc.),  both  accommodate
private  international   law  under   exclusively  United  States
treaties on  private international  law, and  both operate in the
framework of  admiralty rules  to  impose  Civil  Law  (see  both
majority &  dissenting opinions  variously, Bennis  v.  Michigan,
U.S. Supreme  Court No.  94-8729,  March  4,  1996)  ,  which  is
repugnant to both state and national constitutions. However, this
house of cards will shortly fall as Cooperative Federalism, known
as  Corporatism   well  into  the  1930's,  has  been  thoroughly
documented and  is rapidly  being exposed  via state  and  United
States appellate courts.

     In reality,  the Internal Revenue Code preserves due process
rights, but the statute has been dormant until recently:

                            [Sec. 7804(b)]

     (b) PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. -- Nothing
     in Reorganization Plan Numbered 26 of 1950 or Reorganization
     Plan Numbered  1 of  1952 shall  be considered to impair any
     right or  remedy, including  trial by  jury, to  recover any
     internal revenue  tax alleged  to have  been erroneously  or
     illegally assessed  or collected,  or any penalty claimed to
     have been collected without authority, or any sum alleged to
     have been  excessive or  in any  manner wrongfully collected
     under the  internal revenue  laws. For  the purpose  of  any
     action to  recover  any  such  tax,  penalty,  or  sum,  all
     statutes, rules,  and regulations referring to the collector
     of internal  revenue, the principal officer for the internal
     revenue district, or the Secretary, shall be deemed to refer
     to the  officer  whose  act  or  acts  referred  to  in  the
     preceding sentence  gave rise  to such  action. The venue of
     any such action shall be the same as under existing law.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 3 of 9


     The reorganization plans of 1950 & 1952 were implemented via
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which is presently codified as
title 26  of the United States Code. The statute set out above is
easier  to  comprehend  when  the  references  are  consolidated.
Further, the  dependent clause  "including trial by jury" relates
to a  constitutionally-assured right,  not a remedy, so it should
be moved  to the  proper location  in the  sentence. Finally, the
matter of  venue is important as "existing law" is constitutional
and common  law indigenous  to the several States. In the absence
of legitimate  federal law  which extends  to the several States,
those who  operate under  color of  law,  engage  in  oppression,
extortion, etc., are subject to the foundation law of the states.
Venue is determined by the law of legislative jurisdiction.

     Citing "including trial by jury" preserves the full slate of
due process  rights included in Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and
Fourteenth Amendments  to the  Constitution for the united States
of America  and corresponding  provisions in constitutions of the
several States. The example represents the class.

     Additionally, note that, (1) actions may issue against bogus
assessments as  well as  collections, and (2) § 7804(b), unlike §
7433,  does   not  presume   that  the  complaining  party  is  a
"taxpayer". Finally,  there is  26 CFR, Part 1 regulatory support
for §  7804 where  there are  no  regulations  published  in  the
Federal Register  in support  of §  7433 (see  Parallel Table  of
Authorities and  Rules,  cited  earlier).  Therefore,  §  7804(b)
preserves rights  and determines  the nature of civil actions for
remedies in the several States. When straightened out, applicable
portions of § 7804(b) read as follows:

     Nothing in  [the Internal  Revenue Code] shall be considered
     to impair  any right,  [including trial by jury], or remedy,
     [***], to  recover any  internal revenue tax alleged to have
     been erroneously  or illegally assessed or collected ... The
     venue of any such action shall be the same as under existing
     law.


     The necessity  of due  process is implicitly preserved by 28
U.S.C. §  2463, which  stipulates that  any seizure  under United
States revenue  laws will be deemed in the custody of the law and
subject solely to disposition of courts of the United States with
proper jurisdiction.  In other  words, even if IRS had legitimate
authority in  the several  States, the  agency would of necessity
have to  file a civil or criminal complaint prior to garnishment,
seizure or any other action adversely affecting the life, liberty
or property  of any  given person, whether a Fourteenth Amendment
citizen-subject of  the United  States or  a Citizen principal of
one of  the several  States. Due  process assurances in the Fifth
and Fourteenth  Amendments do  not equivocate  --  administrative
seizures without  due process  can be equated only to tyranny and
barbarian rule.  Further, even  regulations governing IRS conduct
acknowledge and  therefore preserve Fifth Amendment assurances at
26 CFR  § 601.106(f)(1).  And finally,  even officers, agents and
employees of United States agencies are assured due process where
garnishment is  concerned (5  U.S.C. § 5520a), so the notion that
IRS has  authority to  execute garnishment and other seizures via
the private  sector without  due process  is clearly  and  simply
absurd.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 4 of 9


     In sum,  the mandate  for due  process, meaning  initiatives
through judicial  courts with  proper  jurisdiction,  is  clearly
antecedent to imposition of administratively-issued liens, except
where licensing  agreements obligate assets, or seizures, whether
by  garnishment,  attachment  of  bank  accounts,  administrative
seizure and  sale of  real or  personal property,  or  any  other
initiative that compromises life, liberty or property.


                3.  Current Internal Revenue Code
            & Internal Revenue Code of 1939 Are Same

     Consult 26 U.S.C. §§ 7851 & 7852 to verify that the Internal
Revenue Code  of 1954,  as amended  in  1986  and  since,  simply
reorganized the  Internal Revenue  Code of 1939. Read § 7852(b) &
(c),  then   read  the  balance  of  §§  7851  &  7852  for  best
comprehension.

     The importance  of making  this connection rests on the fact
that the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was merely codification of
the Public  Salary Tax  Act of  1939. There was no general income
tax levied  against the population at large in 1939 or since. The
Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, which in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939  incorporated the  Social Security  tax  activated  after
1936, was  premised  on  the  notion  that  working  for  federal
government is a privilege. Income and related taxes prescribed in
Subtitles A  & C  of the current Internal Revenue Code have never
been  mandatory  for  anyone  other  than  officers,  agents  and
employees of  the United  States, as  identified at  26 U.S.C.  §
3401(c), and  agencies of  the United  States, identified  at   §
3401(d), particularized at 5 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 105.

     The privilege tax is an excise rather than direct tax -- the
Sixteenth Amendment,  fraudulently promulgated  in 1913,  did not
alter or  repeal  constitutional  provisions  which  require  all
direct  taxes   to  be   apportioned  among  the  several  States
(Constitution, Article  I §§  2.3 &  9.4). In Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S.  189 (1918),  Coppage v.  Kansas, and numerous decisions
since, the  United States  Supreme Court  has repeatedly affirmed
that for  purposes of  income tax,  wages and  other returns from
enterprise of  common right  are property,  not income.  In fact,
returns from  enterprise of  common right  are fundamental to all
property, and  the sanctity  is preserved as a fundamental common
law principle dating to signing of the Magna Charta in 1215.

     The nature  of Subtitle  A & C taxes is revealed at 26 CFR §
31.3101-1: "The  employee tax  is measured by the amount of wages
received after 1954 with respect to employment after 1936 ...."


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 5 of 9


     In other  words, the  wage is not the object, but merely the
measure of  the tax.  This is  obviously so  much legalese  in an
effort to  circumvent the  duck test,  but the  fact  that  taxes
collected by  the Internal  Revenue Service  fall into the excise
category  was  confirmed  by  the  Comptroller  General's  report
following the  initial effort  to audit IRS (GAO/T-AIMD-93-3). It
is further  suggested  at  26  CFR  §  106.401(a)(2),  where  the
regulation concedes  that, "The  descriptive terms  used in  this
section to  designate the  various classes  of taxes are intended
only to indicate their general character ...."

     Finally, by  referencing the  Parallel Table  of Authorities
and Rules, cited above, it is found that the definition of "gross
income" is  still preserved in Section 22 of the Internal Revenue
Code of  1939, thus  cementing the  link between the Code of 1939
and Subtitles  A  & C of the Code of 1954, as amended in 1986 and
since. The  Internal Revenue  Code of  1939 merely  codified  the
Public Salary  Tax Act of 1939. This link is further confirmed in
Senate Committee On Finance and House Committee On Ways and Means
reports on H.R. 8300 (1954, Internal Revenue Code), in which § 22
of the  Internal Revenue  Code of  1939 and  § 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code  of 1954  (current code)  were solidly  linked. Both
reports stipulate  that the  definitions of  "gross  income"  are
intended to be constitutional.

     This intent  is articulated  at 26  CFR §  1.61-1(a): "Gross
income means  all income  from whatever  source  derived,  unless
excluded by law."

     An "Act  of Congress" is policy, not law, and per definition
located in Rule 54, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has only
local application  in the  District of  Columbia and other United
States  territories   and  insular   possessions  unless  general
application is manifestly expressed. As demonstrated above, wages
and other returns from enterprise of common right are exempt from
direct tax by fundamental law, and the regulation for the current
Internal Revenue  Code  definition  for  "gross  income"  clearly
articulates the fundamental law exemption.

     The exemption  as it  pertains  to  the  several  States  is
clearly  demonstrated   by  referencing  the  Parallel  Table  of
Authorities and  Rules (Index  volume to  the CFR,  p. 751 of the
1995 edition): There are 26 CFR, Part 1 regulations listed for 26
U.S.C. §§  61 &  62, the latter being the definition for adjusted
gross income, but there is no 26 CFR, Part 1 or 31 regulation for
26 U.S.C. § 63, the definition for taxable income.

     While definitions  for gross  and adjusted  gross income are
clearly antecedent  to the definition of taxable income, they are
moot if  there is  no taxing  authority --  adjusted gross income
which  is  not  taxable  within  the  several  States  is  of  no
consequence where the federal tax system is concerned.

     Further, on examination of 26 CFR § 1.62-1, it is found that
subsections (a) & (b) are reserved so the published regulation is
incomplete, with  "temporary" regulation § 1.62-1T serving as the
current regulation  defining "adjusted  gross income."  Temporary
regulations have no legal effect.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 6 of 9


  4.  Lack of Regulations Supporting General Application of Tax

     Here again,  the Parallel  Table of Authorities and Rules is
useful as  it demonstrates  that Subtitle A & C taxes do not have
general  application   within  the  several  States  and  to  the
population at  large. The  regulation for 26 U.S.C. § 1 refers to
26 CFR  § 301,  but that  amounts to  a dead  end --  there is no
regulation under  26 CFR,  Part 1  or 31 which would apply to the
several States and the population at large. Further, there are no
supportive regulations  at all  for 26  U.S.C. §§  2 &  3, and of
considerable significance,  no regulations  supporting  corporate
income tax, 26 U.S.C. § 11, as applicable to the several States.

     Where  the   instant  matter   is   concerned,   regulations
supporting 26  U.S.C. §  6321, liens  for taxes, and § 6331, levy
and distraint,  are under 27 CFR, Part 70. The importance here is
that Title  27 of  the Code of Federal Regulations is exclusively
under Bureau  of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms administration for
Subtitle  E   and  related  taxes.  There  are  no  corresponding
regulations for  the Internal  Revenue Service, in 26 CFR, Part 1
or 31,  which extend  comparable authority  to the several States
and the population at large.

     The necessity  of regulations being published in the Federal
Register is variously prescribed in the Administrative Procedures
Act, at  5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., and the Federal Register Act, at
44 U.S.C.  § 1501 et seq.  Of particular note, it is specifically
set out  at 44  U.S.C. §  1505(a), that  when regulations are not
published in  the Federal  Register,  application  of  any  given
statute is  exclusively to  agencies of  the  United  States  and
officers, agents  and employees  of the  United States, thus once
again confirming  application of Subtitles A & C tax demonstrated
above. Further,  the need  for regulations  is detailed in 1 CFR,
Chapter 1,  and where  the Internal Revenue Service is concerned,
26 CFR § 601.702.

     The need for regulations has repeatedly been affirmed by the
Supreme Court  of the  United States,  as  stated  in  California
Bankers Ass'n.  v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500,
39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974): "Because it has a bearing on our treatment
of some  of the  issues  raised  by  the  parties,  we  think  it
important to  note that  the Act's  civil and  criminal penalties
attach only  upon violation  of regulations  promulgated  by  the
Secretary; if  the Secretary  were to  do nothing, the Act itself
would impose no penalties on anyone."

     Because  there  is  a  citation  supporting  these  statutes
applicable under  Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, it
is important  to point  out that,  "Each agency shall publish its
own regulations  in full  text," (1 CFR § 21.21(c)), with further
verification that  one agency  cannot use regulations promulgated
by another at 1 CFR § 21.40. To date, no corresponding regulation
has been  found for  26 CFR,  Part  1  or  31,  so  until  proven
otherwise, IRS  does not  have  authority  to  perfect  liens  or
prosecute seizures  in the  several States  as pertaining  to the
population at large.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 7 of 9


                 5.  Misapplication of Authority

     Regulations pertaining  to seized  property are  found at 26
CFR § 601.326:

     Part 72 of Title 27 CFR contains the regulations relative to
     the personal  property seized  by officers  of the  Internal
     Revenue Service  or  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and
     Firearms as subject to forfeiture as being used, or intended
     to be  used, to  violate certain Federal Laws; the remission
     or mitigation  of such  forfeiture; and  the  administrative
     sale or  other disposition,  pursuant to forfeiture, of such
     seized  property   other  than  firearms  seized  under  the
     National Firearms  Act and  firearms and  ammunition  seized
     under title  1 of  the Gun Control Act of 1968. For disposal
     of firearms  and ammunition under Title 1 of the Gun Control
     Act  of   1968,  see  18  U.S.C.  924(d).  For  disposal  of
     explosives under  Title XI of Organized Crime Control Act of
     1970, see 18 U.S.C. 844(c).


     The only  other comparable authority thus far found pertains
to windfall profits tax on petroleum (26 CFR § 601.405), but once
again, application  is not supported by regulations applicable to
the several States and the population at large.

     Where the  mandate for filing 1040 returns is concerned, the
only  regulatory  reference  presently  known  is  at  26  CFR  §
601.401(d)(4),  and   this   application   appears   related   to
"employees" who  work for  two  or  more  "employers",  receiving
foreign-earned income effectively connected to the United States.
The mandate  is mentioned  in instructions  applicable to  United
States citizens  and residents of the Virgin Islands, but to date
has not  been located  elsewhere. Reference  OMB  numbers  for  §
601.401,  listed  on  page  170,  26  CFR,  Part  600-End,  cross
referenced to Department of Treasury OMB numbers published in the
Federal Register, November 1995, for foreign application.

     The "notice  of levy"  instrument forwarded to various third
parties is not a "levy" which warrants surrender of property. The
Internal  Revenue  Code,  at  §  6335(a),  defines  the  "notice"
instrument by  use --  notice is to be served to whomever seizure
has been  executed against  after the  seizure  is  effected.  In
short, the notice merely conveys information, it is not cause for
action. The  term "notice"  is clarified by definition in Black's
Law Dictionary,  6th Edition,  and other law dictionaries. Use of
the "notice  of levy"  instrument to  effect seizure  is fraud by
design.

     Proper  use   of  the   "notice"   process,   administrative
garnishment, et  al., is specifically set out in 5 U.S.C. § 5514,
as being applicable exclusively to officers, agents and employees
of agencies  of the  United States  (26 U.S.C.  § 3401(c)).  Even
then, however,  the process  must comply  with provisions  of  31
U.S.C. §  3530(d), and  standards set forth in §§ 3711 & 3716-17.
In accordance with provisions of 26 CFR, Part 601, Subpart D, the
employer, meaning  the  United  States  agency  the  employee  is
employed by,  is responsible  for  promulgating  regulations  and
carrying out garnishment.


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 8 of 9


      6.  The Impossibility of Effective Contract/Election

     In order  for there  to be  an opportunity for a nonresident
alien of  the United  States to elect to be taxed or treated as a
citizen or  resident of  the United States, one or the other of a
married couple,  or the  single "individual" making the election,
must be  a citizen  or resident of the United States (26 U.S.C. §
6013(g)(3)). Some  party must  in some  way be  connected with  a
"United States  trade or  business" (performance of the functions
of a public office (26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(26)). A nonresident alien
never has self-employment income (26 CFR § 1.1402(b)-1(d). In the
event that  a nonresident  alien is  an "employee"  (26 U.S.C.  §
3401(c)), the  "employer" (26  U.S.C. §  3401(d)) is  liable  for
collection and  payment of income tax (26 CFR § 1.1441-1). And in
order for  real property  to be  treated as effectively connected
with a  United States  trade or  business by  way of election, it
must be  located within the geographical United States (26 U.S.C.
§ 871(d)).


                      Summary & Conclusion

     Again, this memorandum is not intended to be exhaustive, but
merely sufficient to support causes set out separately.  The most
conspicuous conclusions  of law are that Congress never created a
Bureau of  Internal Revenue,  the  predecessor  of  the  Internal
Revenue Service;  Subtitles A  & C  of the  Internal Revenue Code
prescribe excise  taxes, mandatory  only for  employees of United
States Government  agencies; the Internal Revenue Service, within
the geographical  United States  where the agency appears to have
colorable authority, is required to use judicial process prior to
or encumbering  assets; and  the law demonstrates that the people
of the  several States,  defined as  nonresident  aliens  in  the
Internal Revenue  Code, cannot  legitimately elect to be taxed or
treated as  citizens or  residents of  the United  States.  If  a
Citizen of  one of  the several States works for an agency of the
United States  or otherwise  receives income from a United States
"trade or  business" or  otherwise effectively connected with the
United States,  the employer or other third party responsible for
payment is  made liable  for withholding taxes at the rate of 30%
or 14%, depending on classification.


     To the  best of  my knowledge  and understanding, matters of
fact and law set out above are accurate and true.


Dan Meador


  Memo in Support of Administrative Appeal/Criminal Complaint:
                           Page 9 of 9


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