A Special Definition of "State":

Fraud Confirmed in the Internal Revenue Code




             Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

        Private Attorney General (18 U.S.C. 1964)



When we were first exposed to the possibility of fraud

built into the Internal Revenue Code, we were also very aware

that proving any such fraud would require a lot more than

repetition of stories overheard in local bars and restaurants.


In legal circles, proving fraud is a burden that falls on the

person making that claim.


In particular, the word "conspiracy" often occurred during

conversations about the Federal government and its "Codes",

but we also observed that many interested Americans

were often allowing their own theories to "morph" into facts:


Once they had convinced themselves that a particular

conspiracy did exist, it was almost impossible to change

their minds with contrary facts.  This tendency has now

acquired two descriptive labels:  confirmation bias

and cognitive dissonance.


Before arriving at any objective conclusions, we knew

going into such an endeavor that the proof would need

to be readily available somewhere -- without needing

to resort to magic, mythology, or self-serving assumptions.


In particular, if fraud did exist anywhere in Acts of Congress

that were ultimately codified anywhere in the U.S. Code,

the evidence of such fraud should be visible in that Code

without too much additional effort beyond the correct citation,

common sense, and comfortable familiarity with legalese.


With that stated objective foremost in our minds,

we set about examining numerous claims that

ended up in U.S. Mail that started to flood our mail box.


This effort began before the Internet became popular and,

as such, communications were not nearly as instantaneous

as they are now.  Visiting a law library required a 2-hour

round trip by automobile;  and, as we discovered much later,

some of the most valuable evidence was hidden in locked archives!


I can remember acquiring a hard copy of the book

entitled "The Omnibus" by Ralph F. Whittington

in Houston, Texas.  This was an odd title for a

difficult treatise that never made it onto any

"best seller" lists at The New York Times

or anywhere else, for that matter.


In retrospect, it's now not difficult to understand

why it never received the attention it deserved:

it contained positive proof that Congress had

officially admitted using a special definition of "State"

in key sections of the Internal Revenue Code.


One of those key sections contained the legal

definitions which govern that entire Code.


In "The Federal Zone" we re-published the

Omnibus Acts in Appendix "B", and you are

encouraged to locate each "special definition"

in this electronic version of that Appendix,

now archived in the Supreme Law Library:




After we started to distribute printed hard copies

of the First Edition of "The Federal Zone", our mail box

started to fill up even faster with tons of relevant and

irrelevant documentation.


One of the most satisfying documents we received

was a fax copy of a letter which had been written by a

U.S. Representative from Connecticut, in response

to a question asked by a man in San Diego, California.


That letter ended up being profoundly accurate

confirmation of the very same point which had

already been well documented in "The Omnibus":


The special definition of "State" included ONLY

the District of Columbia, Guam, Virgin Islands,

American Samoa and Puerto Rico.


What made the letter from that Connecticut Congresswoman

all the more valuable was her admission that she initially

did not know the answer.  So, she referred the question

to government "legal experts" in the Federal offices of the

Legislative Counsel and Congressional Research Service.


As such, we now have it on the authority of "legal experts"

in the Federal government that the legal definition of "State"

in the Internal Revenue Code does NOT include any of

the 50 States.


It is true that the Internal Revenue Code does define "State"

and "United States" differently in several scattered places.

Nevertheless, the legal definitions codified at IRC Section 7701(a)

are intended to be used "where not otherwise distinctly expressed".


To minimize any lingering doubts about Ralph Whittington's

monumental finding, we now incorporate an electronic copy

of that Connecticut Congresswoman's important letter.





It isn't often that such monumentally important discoveries

are exposed by a single sheet of paperwork.


Do enjoy yourself by having a widely popular Internet

and high-speed telecommunications which can now

display that verifiable evidence right before your eyes.


Seeing is believing, I always say!



Further reading:  Electronic 11th Edition of

"The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue":




p.s.  The Preface was later expanded after an astute reader

pointed out that there was no liability statute for subtitle A.


We left our references to the guilty Regulation in later Editions,

to demonstrate how deliberately deceptive that Code truly is.


And, of course, we went the extra mile by serving a proper SUBPOENA

on the Secretary of the Treasury for the missing statute(s):




Instead of answering that proper SUBPOENA, the story we heard

was that O'Neill was fired by G.W. Bush for objecting to Cabinet meetings

where they were planning to attack Iraq BEFORE 9/11/2001.



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