In Propria Persona

without Prejudice

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Amy Alden et al., ) Case No. C-88-4306-SBA

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

United States of America [sic], )

)

Defendants. )

---------------------------------)

) NOTICE OF MOTION AND

United States ) MOTION FOR INTERVENTION

ex relatione ) OF RIGHT: 18 U.S.C. 1964;

Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) 3:2:1 (in judicial mode);

) 28 U.S.C. 530B, 2403;

Movant. ) FRCP Rules 24(a), 24(c)

_________________________________) (United States not a party).

COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Movant”), ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator”). Movant hereby moves this honorable Court for intervention of right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), and provides formal Notice to all interested parties of same, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 24(c) (United States not yet a party) and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America as lawfully amended (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”).

NOTICE OF CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF SUBTITLE A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

Pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), this Court will please certify to the Office of the Attorney General that the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress affecting the public interest is herein drawn in question.

Likewise, this Court will please certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled case, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of all statutes in subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).

INCORPORATION OF CERTIFIED DOCUMENTS

In support of the instant MOTION, Movant hereby attaches a true and correct copy of the pleading entitled NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION REQUESTING CLERK TO CERTIFY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL INTERVENOR’S FORMAL CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CERTAIN ACTS OF CONGRESS, as filed in Meredith et al. v. Erath et al., Ninth Circuit docket number #01-56873, and incorporates same by reference to Attachment “A” infra, as if set forth fully here.

Likewise, Movant United States also attaches a true and correct copy of the Press Release entitled “U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Falls Silent in Face of SUBPOENA for Tax Liability Statutes” and related documents, and incorporates same by reference to Attachment “B” infra, as if set forth fully here.

In contrast to discretionary judicial notice, mandatory judicial notice leaves no room whatsoever for discretion on the part of this honorable United States District Court (“USDC”).

See Rule 201(d), Federal Rules of Evidence; 28 U.S.C. 2072.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Subject to all applicable provisions of Law, Movant hereby expressly reserves all rights of a party, and shall be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs, to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and laws relating to the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress, i.e. IRC subtitle A.

See Article II, Articles of Confederation (“United States, in Congress Assembled”); 28 U.S.C. 530B (willful misrepresentation); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (United States as plaintiff); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) (the DCUS ‑‑ an Article III constitutional court ‑‑ has original jurisdiction); and 3:2:1 (“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”).

The “United States” and the “United States of America” are not one and the same. Congress is expressly prohibited from re‑defining any terms found in the U.S. Constitution. See Preamble (“Constitution for the United States of America”); Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“2:1:1”) (“President of the United States of America”); Article VII (“Independence of the United States of America”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920):

Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.

The U.S. Department of Justice does not enjoy general power(s) of attorney to represent the United States of America. Compare 28 U.S.C. 547(1), (2) (Duties). Willful misrepresentation by officers employed by that Department is actionable under the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B (Ethical standards for U.S. Attorneys). See also Tenth Amendment.

Whenever the United States proceeds as a party plaintiff, an Article III constitutional court, exercising the judicial Power of the United States, is a prerequisite under 3:2:1 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (United States as plaintiff).

Whenever the United States proceeds as a party defendant, the sovereign must grant permission to be sued. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (United States as defendant). In this mode, a legislative court is permitted. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933):

... [C]ontroversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of the judicial power vested by Article III in the constitutional courts. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645‑646, 12 S.Ct. 488.

A private Citizen may move a federal court on behalf of the United States ex relatione. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); also Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504.

Strictly construed, the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) authorizes civil RICO remedies and confers original jurisdiction on the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”).

These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. See Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), 62 Stat. 909 (1948); also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (term DCUS in its historic and proper sense); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate); and U.S. v. King, 119 F.Supp. 398, 14 Alaska 500, headnote 8 (1954) (in re meaning of “district courts”).

The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (the USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.

Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See American Insurance supra; Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242‑243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

All guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were expressly extended into the District of Columbia in 1871, and then into all federal Territories in 1873, also including all future federal Territories. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively; and Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (the guaranties [sic] of the U.S. Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guaranties applicable ‑‑ by statutes).

REMEDY REQUESTED

All premises having been duly considered, Relator now moves this honorable Court, on behalf of Movant United States:

(1) to certify to the Office of the U.S. Attorney General that the constitutionality of all federal statutes in subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code has been drawn into question; and,

(2) to certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled case, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of all federal statutes in subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.

Thank you for your professional consideration.

VERIFICATION

I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).

Dated: April 22, 2003 A.D.

Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

______________________________________________

Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):

NOTICE OF MOTION AND

MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:

18 U.S.C. 1964;

3:2:1 (in judicial mode);

28 U.S.C. 530B, 2403;

FRCP Rules 24(a), 24(c)

(United States not a party)

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following: