Pro Hac Vice

[ D R A F T ]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Lawrence J. Warfield, ) Case No. #01-10973

as receiver for )

Dennel Finance Limited, ) NOTICE OF CHALLENGE

) TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS AND

) REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATE

v. ) PROCEDURAL RELIEF:

)

David Edwards et al., ) Petition Clause;

) International Covenant on

Defendants, ) Civil and Political Rights;

) 28 U.S.C. 1292;

International Education Research ) FRAP Rule 44

Corporation, )

Pacific International Limited )

Partnership, )

Resource Development International,)

LLC, and )

Sound Financial Services, Inc., )

)

Defendants-Appellants. )

___________________________________)

COME NOW the Defendants-Appellants in the above entitled action (hereinafter “Appellants”), appearing via authorized Counsel of record, to question the constitutionality of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., and to provide timely written notice of same to all interested Parties and to the Circuit Clerk, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”).

Appellants also respectfully request specific and appropriate procedural relief, as a direct consequence of the NOTICE and discussion provided herein.

PROCEDURAL SETTING

On March 16, 1999 A.D., the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed an original complaint in the United States District Court (“USDC”) for the Northern District of Texas.

On the same date, that court entered an order alleging to appoint Lawrence J. Warfield as a Receiver (hereinafter “Appellee”).

On March 12, 2001 A.D., Appellee filed his complaint against David Edwards and Appellants, alleging claims for fraudulent transfer, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of securities laws, unjust enrichment, equitable disgorgement and a request for accounting.

Appellee filed said complaint in conjunction with the order from the United States District Court (“USDC”), Northern District of Texas, alleging to appoint Appellee as Receiver. See 28 U.S.C. 754.

Appellants received a summons and complaint in March 2001 A.D.

On April 17, 2001 A.D., Appellants filed their motion to dismiss under FRCP Rule 12(b), for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellee filed opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Appellants also filed supplemental points and authorities.

Appellee then filed a sur-response to the motion to dismiss, and further reply was filed by Appellants.

On June 15, 2001 A.D., a magistrate of the USDC issued findings and recommendations.

On July 5, 2001 A.D., Appellants filed objections to those findings and recommendations.

On July 11, 2001 A.D., their motion to dismiss was denied, and judgment was entered to that effect.

Appellants timely appealed on July 16, 2001 A.D.

Since final judgment has not been reached, this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed under the Final Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 1291.

Specific procedural relief is therefore appropriate. See RELIEF SOUGHT infra.

JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS

The SEC’s original complaint of March 16, 1999 A.D., cited the following federal statutes in its jurisdictional claims:

Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77t(b)]

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77t(d)]

Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77v(a)]

Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78u(d)]

Section 21(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78u(e)]

Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78aa ]

Appellee’s complaint of March 12, 2001 A.D., cited the following federal statutes in its jurisdictional claims:

28 U.S.C. 1331 (Federal question), 62 Stat. 930

Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933

Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934

28 U.S.C. 754

15 U.S.C. 78aa (uncodified)

Because Title 15 of the United States Code has not been enacted into positive law, Appellees performed a diligent search of the corresponding Statutes at Large, to confirm the exact text of all statutes granting original jurisdiction over the subject matter. Those statutes are now quoted verbatim as follows:

Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses

Sec. 20. (b) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United States, United States court of any Territory, or the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title. Any such criminal proceeding may be brought either in the district wherein the transmittal of the prospectus or security complained of begins, or in the district wherein such prospectus or security is received.

[May 27, 1933, Sec. 20(b), 48 Stat. 86]

[compare 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (uncodified)]

[bold emphasis added]

Jurisdiction of Offenses and Suits

Sec. 22. (a) The district courts of the United States, the United States courts of any Territory, and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this title and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title. Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in sections 128 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U.S.C., title 28, secs. 225 and 347). No case arising under this title and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States. No costs shall be assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding under this title brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such other courts.

[May 27, 1933, Sec. 22(a), 48 Stat. 86, 87]

[compare 15 U.S.C. 77v(a) (uncodified))

[bold emphasis added]

Investigations; Injunctions and

Prosecution of Offenses

Sec. 21. (e) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title.

[June 6, 1934, Sec. 21(e), 48 Stat. 900]

[compare 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(1) (uncodified)]

[bold emphasis added]

Sec. 21. (f) Upon application of the Commission the district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the Unites States, shall also have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person to comply with the provisions of this title or any order of the Commission made in pursuance thereof.

[June 6, 1934, Sec. 21(f). 48 Stat. 901]

[compare 15 U.S.C. 78u(e) (uncodified)]

[bold emphasis added]

Jurisdiction of Offenses and Suits

Sec. 27. The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in sections 128 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U.S.C., title 28, secs. 225 and 347). No costs shall be assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding under this title brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such other courts.

[June 6, 1934, Sec. 27, 48 Stat. 902-903]

[compare 15 U.S.C. 78aa (uncodified)]

[bold emphasis added]

Prohibitions Relating to Interstate Commerce

and the Mails

Sec. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ‑‑

(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to buy such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or

(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

[May 27, 1933, Sec. 5(a), 48 Stat. 77]

Sec. 5. (c) The provisions of this section relating to the use of the mails shall not apply to the sale of any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securities is a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.

[May 27, 1933, Sec. 5(c), 48 Stat. 77-78]

Fraudulent Interstate Transactions

Sec. 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly ‑‑

(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or

(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

[May 27, 1933, Sec. 17(a), 48 Stat. 84-85]

Regulation of the Use of

Manipulative and Deceptive Devices

Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ‑‑ ...

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

[June 6, 1934, Sec. 10(b), 48 Stat. 891]

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction over the instant case, nor do any of the courts domiciled in any of the federal Territories.

Texas is neither a United States Territory acquired under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”), nor is it an enclave acquired under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 (“1:8:17”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (“U.S. Constitution”).

It is clear from the original Statutes at Large quoted above, that the district courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are the only federal courts with jurisdiction competent to hear claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), when the venue is the judicial district of Texas (or any other State of the Union, for that matter). See 28 U.S.C. 124.

The district court of the United States (“DCUS”) and the United States District Court (“USDC”) are decidedly not one and the same.

Accordingly, Appellants hereby challenge the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., for containing provisions deliberately written and implemented to foster the false and misleading conclusion that ‑‑ in all matters arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States ‑‑ these two courts are synonymous and identical in all respects whatsoever. See Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) and the Supremacy Clause in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331 (Federal question).

THE ACT OF JUNE 25, 1948, 62 STAT. 869 et seq.,

IS VAGUE, DECEPTIVE AND THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Appellants’ Counsels tremble at the mere thought of challenging a comprehensive revision, codification, and enactment of all laws that have governed the conduct of the federal courts in this great nation for 53 years. However, a careful review of the relevant evidence, as found in various sections of Title 28, U.S.C., has rendered that challenge necessary and inevitable.

It is evident to Appellants, and Appellants hereby offer to prove, that:

(1) the district courts of the United States (“DCUS”) were never expressly abolished by Congress;

(2) Congress knows how to abolish federal courts when it intends to do so; and,

(3) the Act of June 25, 1948, attempted fraudulently to conceal the Article III district courts of the United States (“DCUS”), and to create the false impressions that they had been re‑defined as, replaced by, and/or rendered synonymous with, the United States District Courts (“USDC”).

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 132, 451, 610.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are decidedly not favored. U.S. v. United Continental Tuna, 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976).

As of this writing, Appellants’ Counsels are assembling an exhaustive list of all statutes in Title 28 that expressly mention either the USDC, the DCUS, or both. For the convenience and edification of all, Appellants wish to advise this honorable Court, and all interested Parties, that the results of this research have now been published at Internet URL’s:

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/dcus.in.28usc.bold.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/usdc.in.28usc.bold.htm

In any Act of Congress, words importing the plural include the singular, and words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things. See 1 U.S.C. 1.

Therefore, the rules of statutory construction strictly bar intermingling of “United States District Courts” with “district courts of the United States”. Noscitur a sociis.

On the other hand, the term “district courts” does embrace both the DCUS and the USDC, since there appears to be a hierarchical relationship between this term and the courts constituted by Chapter 5 of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. 451.

Without enumerating all other essential steps in Appellants’ proof here, this Court is respectfully requested to recognize, and take formal judicial notice, that the ex post facto restriction in the U.S. Constitution (“1:9:3”) emphatically bars Congress from retroactively re-defining the meaning of “district court of the United States” as that term was used in all federal legislation prior to June 25, 1948 A.D.

See, for example, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and all provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act as quoted supra. The Immunity from ex post facto legislation is a fundamental Right. See Privileges and Immunities Clause (“4:2:1”).

Moreover, in the opinions of recognized constitutional scholars, such as Justice Story, the Congress has affirmative obligations to create and to maintain constitutional district courts, proceeding in judicial mode. The reason for this is simple, if not immediately obvious:

The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is quite limited under Article III, as compared to its appellate jurisdiction under Article III. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III embraces matters that arise under the Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States). See also the Arising Under Clause at 3:2:1 in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331 supra.

Cases that arise under the Supremacy Clause, as mirrored by 3:2:1 and by 28 U.S.C. 1331, would need to originate first in an inferior constitutional court, before those cases could ever reach the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal.

The exact same argument can be extended to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction: specifically, a civil prosecution under the Securities Act, and/or the Exchange Act, must first originate in an inferior constitutional court, before such a case could ever reach the Fifth Circuit on appeal!

The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that Congress must first create constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode, and then it must also perpetuate them, in order to satisfy the Fifth Amendment. To do otherwise would constitute a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment, which mandates due process of law (among other things).

This mandate is also embodied in numerous provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a United States treaty rendered supreme Law by the Supremacy Clause. See Article 14 in that Covenant, for example.

The entire thrust of that Covenant is to guarantee independent, impartial and qualified judicial officers presiding upon courts of competent jurisdiction (and not Star Chambers, or other tribunals where summary proceedings are the norm, and where due process is not a fundamental Right but a privilege granted at the discretion of those tribunals).

In pari materia, compare the language in Rules 201(c) and 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: the former is discretionary (“may”); the latter is mandatory (“shall”).

Confer at “Fundamental right” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. (Appellants are protesting the Seventh Edition of Black’s, because it has conspicuously omitted any definition of the term “United States” ‑‑ a term which figures prominently throughout federal laws and throughout the U.S. Constitution!)

Appellants therefore assert a fundamental Right to due process of law, which necessarily mandates courts of competent jurisdiction in the first instance. Within the 50 States, these are the DCUS.

The district courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are constitutional courts vested by law with competent jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States. Statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts must be strictly construed [numerous cites omitted here]. Appellants argue that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed as well.

Inside the several States of the Union, the United States District Courts (“USDC”) are not constitutional courts vested by law with original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. Confer at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Sixth Edition.

Inside the several States of the Union, the courts vested by law with competent, original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Securities Act, or the Exchange Act, are the district courts of the United States (“DCUS”).

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to these courts have used language and terminology that enjoy a well established historic meaning. See Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (the term DCUS in its historic and proper sense). Noscitur a sociis.

Within Texas State, therefore, the DCUS is the only federal court with competent jurisdiction to originate the instant case.

To the extent that the Act of June 25, 1948, was written and enacted to justify or otherwise foster the assumption that all violations of Congressional acts predating that year can now be prosecuted in United States District Courts ‑‑ legislative courts that were broadcasted from the federal Territories into the several (48) States on that date ‑‑ then the Act of June 25, 1948, is demonstrably unconstitutional for at least three reasons:

(1) it exhibits vagueness on this obviously important point;

(2) it violates the ex post facto prohibition in the U.S. Constitution; and,

(3) it violates the well established principle that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed.

The 50 States of the Union are not “United States Districts”; they are judicial districts! Federal municipal law does not operate, of its own force, inside those judicial districts. Even though the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are likewise judicial districts, federal municipal law can operate there because neither is a Union State. 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 119.

Nevertheless, federal municipal law is likewise bound by all pertinent restrictions in the U.S. Constitution, because the U.S. Constitution was expressly extended into D.C. in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively (“extension statutes”).

In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled:

It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and even predates it.

[Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City]

[397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)]

Appellants allege that the nomenclature “United States District”, as found on the caption pages of all federal court pleadings, is now being used to trigger legislative mode without adequate notice to litigants, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments.

This dubious mechanism is called “silent judicial notice” [sic] ‑‑ surely a misnomer, if ever there was one. It would be entirely more accurate to call it “silent legislative notice”, since this practice is a deceptive device now rampant within legislative courts, and the DCUS are currently vacant. See Section 10(b), 48 Stat. 891.

But, has Congress been silent, or merely vague?

Vagueness, once fully documented wherever it occurs, will be shown to conflict directly with the stated legislative intent of the Act of June 25, 1948, to wit: “The provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United States Code, set out in section 1 of this Act, ... shall be construed as continuations of existing law ....” Moreover, “No loss of rights, interruption of jurisdiction, or prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.” [bold emphasis added] See Miscellaneous Provisions, Act of June 25, 1948, C. 646, sections 2 to 39, 62 Stat. 985 to 991, as amended.

In good faith, Appellants construct these Miscellaneous Provisions to read: “No loss of Rights and no interruption of jurisdiction shall result from its enactment.”

If Congress had intended to abolish the DCUS, they would (and they should) have said so. The period between 1789 A.D. and 1948 A.D. spans 159 years of judicial history! Hiding a herd of elephants under a rug would be easier than hiding the DCUS under a pretense.

To reiterate these all important points: repeals by implication (or magic carpets) are decidedly not favored. The law of jurisdiction is fundamental law. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law; without it, courts cannot proceed at all in any cause. Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., __ U.S. __ (1999), No. 98‑470, May 17, 1999 A.D.

The Securities Act and Exchange Act each vests original jurisdiction in the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. Inside the several States of the Union, the DCUS are the only federal courts with original jurisdiction to hear cases that arise under either Act.

The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (the USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.

Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

The extension statutes are monumentally important, in light of highly successful efforts by the federal government, since the year 1866 A.D., to create an absolute legislative democracy within the several States of the Union (now 50). See 1866 Civil Rights Act.

The Guarantee Clause does not require the United States to guarantee a Republic Form of government to itself, but only to those 50 States. Strictly speaking, Congress was free to create such a democracy, but only within the federal zone, and not within the State zone. See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2. The territorial reach of such a democracy is necessarily limited to the federal zone, and not beyond.

Legally speaking, the population of federal citizens now “residing” within the several States of the Union is an absolute legislative democracy, by Congressional intent. Confer at “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Sixth. The phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is correctly understood to mean “subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress”.

The U.S. Supreme Court has acquiesced to this questionable legislative intent. Under the Downes Doctrine, the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States that are united by, and under, it. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Harlan dissenting. This Doctrine is demonstrably specious, because it is contrary to Law. Another deceptive device?

The Downes Doctrine was later extended in the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guaranties [sic] of the U.S. Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guaranties applicable ‑‑ by enacting federal statutes.

Clearly, all guarantees in the U.S. Constitution have already been expressly extended into D.C. and into all federal Territories, without exception, effectively destroying the Downes Doctrine before the fact. Ignorance of the Law is no excuse for violating the Law.

It would only compound the ubiquitous errors that have already been made under the Downes Doctrine to treat the States of the Union as federal Territories in any manner whatsoever.

In this context, therefore, a legislative tribunal like the United States District Court is entirely out of place to entertain any cases that arise under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, when a State of the Union is the “district” where the violations are alleged to have occurred.

Texas is a judicial district, not a legislative district, and original jurisdiction over such cases is clearly vested in courts specifically created to exercise the judicial Power of the United States. This latter phrase is controlling, because it introduces Article III and forms the basis for all Clauses that Article contains.

Accordingly, for all of the substantive reasons stated above, the district court of the United States remains the only federal court with original jurisdiction legally competent to hear cases arising under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, when violations of those Acts are alleged to have occurred inside a State of the Union.

It necessarily follows that this United States Court of Appeals is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to entertain appellate review of interlocutory orders issued by district courts of the United States, but not by United States District Courts, within the Fifth Circuit. Statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed.

RELIEF SOUGHT

All premises having been duly considered, Appellants respectfully request that this honorable Court now proceed to a proper consideration of their challenge to the constitutionality of the Act of June 25, 1948.

Appellants also respectfully request that this Court modify the briefing schedule so as to afford Appellants ample opportunity to prepare a proper, timely and complete OPENING BRIEF on all the issues discussed above.

In particular, Appellants seek a published opinion:

(1) re-affirming that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed, and holding that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed;

(2) holding that this United States Court of Appeals is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to entertain appellate review of interlocutory orders issued by district courts of the United States within the Fifth Circuit;

(3) holding that this United States Court of Appeals is not authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to entertain appellate review of interlocutory orders issued by United States District Courts within the Fifth Circuit;

(4) vacating ab initio, under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(2), the underlying ORDER APPOINTING TEMPORARY RECEIVER, as filed on March 16, 1999 A.D., in SEC v. Cook et al., Civil Case No. 3:99‑CV‑0571‑R, for having been issued by a court lacking original jurisdiction over the subject matter, in the first instance;

(5) vacating ab initio, under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(2), the ORDER RE: PETITION NO. 63 AUTHORIZING RECEIVER TO INSTITUTE LAWSUIT AGAINST DAVID EDWARDS et al., as filed on March 12, 2001 A.D., in SEC v. Cook et al., Civil Case No. 3:99‑CV‑0571‑R, for having been issued by a court lacking original jurisdiction over the subject matter, in the first instance; and,

(6) dismissing the instant case with prejudice as to Appellee Lawrence J. Warfield and without prejudice as to Appellants.

Lastly, Appellants respectfully request all other relief which this honorable Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances that have occasioned the instant appeal.

VERIFICATION

I, Gary L. Huss, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause.

Dated: October ___, 2001 A.D.

Signed: ______________________________________________

Printed: Gary L. Huss, Attorney for Appellants

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Gary L. Huss, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):

NOTICE OF CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS AND

REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL RELIEF:

Petition Clause;

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

28 U.S.C. 1292; FRAP Rule 44

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:

Lawrence J. Warfield Clerk of Court

Warfield & Company, CPA’s Attention: Shea Pertuit

14555 North Scottsdale Road United States Court of Appeals

Suite 200 600 Camp Street

Scottsdale 85254 New Orleans 70130

ARIZONA, USA LOUISIANA, USA

Kelly M. Crawford Office of the Solicitor General

Scheef & Stone, L.L.P. U.S. Department of Justice

Attorney for Appellee 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

5956 Sherry Lane, Suite 1400 Room 5614

Dallas 75225 Washington 20530-0001

TEXAS, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

David Edwards Special Agent in Charge

c/o Forwarding Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation

11230 Gold Express Dr., #310-188 1801 N. Lamar Street

Gold River 95670 Dallas 75202-1795

CALIFORNIA, USA TEXAS, USA

Courtesy copies:

Hon. George W. Bush

President of the United States of America (2:1:1)

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington 20500

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

Lonnie G. Schmidt Prof. Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst

Private Attorney General UCLA School of Law

11230 Gold Express Dr., #310-188 P.O. Box 951476

Gold River 95670 Los Angeles 90095-1476

CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA

Dated: October ___, 2001 A.D.

Signed:

______________________________________________

Printed: Gary L. Huss, Attorney for Appellants