[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris
Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state
c/o [MAILING-LOCATION]
[CITY], [UNION-STATE] state
zip code exempt
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) NOTICE OF APPLICATION,
) AND APPLICATION FOR
Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:
)
v. ) FRCP Rule 24(a)
) Article III, Section 1
United States et al., )
)
Respondents. )
________________________________)
COMES NOW [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, Citizen of [UNION-
STATE] state (hereinafter "Applicant"), to apply to this
honorable Court for Intervention of Right, and to provide formal
notice of same to all interested parties.
Applicant hereby sets forth the causes for this Application
for Intervention of Right, to wit:
1. Applicant is not one of the named Persons or persons
identified among the Respondents, or the Relator, in the record
before this Court.
2. Applicant claims interests relating to the Rights and
properties which are the subject of the action.
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 1 of 18
3. Applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede Applicant's
ability to protect the interests of the Applicant.
4. To the best of the Applicant's current information,
knowledge, and belief, the interests of the Applicant are not
adequately represented by the existing Parties to the action.
5. Applicant requires unbiased, competent, and qualified
federal judges whose compensation is not being diminished by
federal income taxes, thus eliminating a major source of undue
influence upon the judges who are appointed to preside over this
honorable Court.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, Applicant prays that this Application for
Intervention of Right be granted.
Executed on [MM/DD/YY3]
Respectfully submitted,
[SIGNATURE-OF-APPLICANT]
_____________________________________
[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris
Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
_____________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 2 of 18
[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris
Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state
c/o [MAILING-LOCATION]
[CITY], [UNION-STATE] state
zip code exempt
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
) APPLICATION FOR
Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT,
) WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES:
v. )
) FRCP Rule 24(a)
United States et al., )
)
Respondents. )
________________________________)
COMES NOW [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, Citizen of [UNION-
STATE] state (hereinafter "Applicant"), to plead the grounds upon
which this Application for Intervention is sought, to wit:
1. Applicant has previously filed a Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") request with the Office of the United States
Attorneys in Billings, Montana state, requesting certified and
admissible copies of the implementing regulations, as published
in the Federal Register, for the following federal statutes:
(a) 18 United States Code ("U.S.C.") Section 3231
(b) Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") Section 7402
(c) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. (Jury Selection and Service Act)
(d) 4 U.S.C. 105 et seq. (Buck Act)
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 3 of 18
2. The language of 18 U.S.C. 3231 very clearly and
expressly states, "The district courts of the United States shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."
Under the rule of statutory construction known as inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the
exclusion of all other things not expressly mentioned), the
United States District Courts [sic] are not mentioned, as such.
Thus, their omission can be irrefutably inferred as intentional.
See above rule defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States has already
clarified the important, even crucial, distinction between United
States District Courts ("USDC"), and the District Courts of the
United States ("DCUS"). The latter Courts are Article III
judicial forums; the former Courts are Article IV territorial
tribunals, with no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever.
4. The courts of appropriate jurisdiction for violations
of Title 18, United States Code, are designated at Section 3231,
specifically naming them as "district courts of the United
States" [sic].
5. There is a distinct and definite difference between a
USDC and a DCUS. The words "District Court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III
of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long
been the federal courts for enclaves, territories and possessions
within the federal zone. See International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 at 241
(1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska 536.
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 4 of 18
6. The term "District Court of the United States" commonly
describes Article III courts or "courts of the United States",
and not legislative courts for the Territories. See American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed
242; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,
69 S.Ct. 936.
7. Though the judicial system set up in a Territory of the
United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase
"court of the United States", when used in a federal statute, is
generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts."
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.
343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the high Court stated:
The United States District Court is not a true United States
court established under Article III of the Constitution to
administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3,
of that instrument, of making all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
United States courts in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
influence, does not change its character as a mere
territorial court.
[emphasis added]
8. The distinction within the dual nature of the federal
court system is also noted in Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3241,
which states that the United States District Court [sic] for the
Canal Zone shall have jurisdiction "concurrently with the
district courts of the United States, of offenses against the
laws of the United States committed upon the high seas."
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 5 of 18
9. The distinction between "district courts of the United
States" and "United States district courts" is readily apparent
in the Section of Title 18 dealing with civil remedies for
activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962 (i.e. racketeering).
Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the
Article III "district courts of the United States", as follows:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section
1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders ....
[emphasis added]
Subsection (c) of 28 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the
Article IV "United States district court", as follows:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
....
[emphasis added]
The language of these two subsections is almost identical in
scope, with the important difference resulting from an apparent
need to legislate separate and distinct court authorities for the
Article III and for the Article IV forums, respectively.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; also 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.
10. The Jury Selection and Service Act at 28 U.S.C. 1861
declares the policy of the United States (federal government)
with respect to jury selection and service, to wit:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes. It is further the
policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the
opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit
juries in the district courts of the United States, and
shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose.
[28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 6 of 18
11. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly reserves to litigants the fundamental Right to trial by
jury as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
for the United States of America, as lawfully amended
(hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as
given by statute of the United States shall be preserved to
the parties inviolate.
[FRCP Rule 38]
12. It is well established that there are two (2) classes
of citizenship in America today: (1) state Citizenship and (2)
"Federal citizenship" (confer in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition). A Person may be a state Citizen without also being a
federal citizen, even after the so-called Fourteenth Amendment
was forced upon the southern states after the Civil War, e.g.:
There are, then, under our republican form of government,
two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one of
the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a person,
without the other, as in the case of a resident of the
District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in the
same person.
[Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
[48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]
13. Although the organic U.S. Constitution does utilize a
capital "C" in all references to state Citizens, and although the
so-called Fourteenth Amendment and all of the Internal Revenue
Code ("IRC") do consistently utilize a lower-case "c" in all
references to federal citizens, Congress does not appear to have
adopted a similar convention in the Jury Selection and Service
Act ("JSSA"). The term "all citizens" as that term is used in
section 1861 of that Act must, therefore, be construed to mean
and include both state Citizens and federal citizens, without
prejudice to any one particular class.
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 7 of 18
14. However, in a subsequent section of said Act, Congress
clearly stipulates that only federal citizens are currently
qualified to serve on federal grand and petit juries. See 28
U.S.C. 1865, to wit:
... [T]he chief judge of the district court, or such other
district court judge as the plan may provide, shall deem any
person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the
district court unless he --
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years
old who has resided for a period of one year within the
judicial district; ....
[emphasis added]
15. Thus, there is a clear and irreconcilable conflict
between section 1861 and section 1865 in Title 28, United States
Code. If Congress did intend to embrace all citizens, both state
and federal, within its policy for qualifying candidates for jury
service, then section 1865 clearly discriminates against state
Citizens, in favor of federal citizens, for grand and petit jury
service, and does so with an unconstitutional result, namely,
such class discrimination proves that federal grand and petit
juries are not legal bodies which have no power to issue
indictments or verdicts of any kind whatsoever. Applicant hereby
stipulates that federal citizens do not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the JSSA; state Citizens do.
16. Furthermore, it is the policy of Congress that all
citizens shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when
summoned for that purpose. See 28 U.S.C. 1861. The respective
Civil Codes of the several states of the Union, united by and
under the U.S. Constitution, contain explicit provisions which
restrict the kinds of obligations which can be imposed by the
operation of law. For example, in California state, the only
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 8 of 18
obligation that arises from the operation of law is to abstain
from injuring the Person or property of another, or infringing
upon any of His Rights, pursuant to section 1708 of the
California Civil Code ("CCC"). All other obligations derive from
the contract of the Parties, under the CCC and under the Civil
Codes of similar Union states.
17. Therefore, there are currently many cases in which the
respective Civil Codes of the several Union states are in direct
conflict with the JSSA, because said Act imposes a legal
obligation upon all citizens to serve on grand and petit juries
when summoned to do so. Traditionally, the normal means of
resolving such conflicts is to rely entirely upon the Supremacy
Clause in the U.S. Constitution, that is, when conflicts arise,
federal law(s) prevail(s). See Article VI, Clause 2 ("6:2").
18. Furthermore, Congress has failed to mention any
District Courts of the United States [sic] anywhere in its "Plan
for Random Jury Selection" at 28 U.S.C. 1863, to wit:
1863. Plan for random jury selection
(a) Each United States district court [sic] shall devise
and place into operation a written plan for random selection
of grand and petit jurors that shall be designed to achieve
the objectives of sections 1861 and 1862 of this title, and
that shall otherwise comply with the provisions of this
title.
One is entirely justified in concluding that the omission of any
mention of District Courts of the United States was intentional.
This raises some very important questions concerning the intent
of Congress, if any, with respect to jury selection in the DCUS,
as distinct from the USDC. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 9 of 18
19. Evidently, it is the current intent of Congress to
discriminate actively against state Citizens when qualifying
candidates for service on grand and petit juries convened by
United States District Courts. See 28 U.S.C. 1861, 1865.
However, Congress is presently silent about federal policy with
respect to jury selection and service in the District Courts of
the United States. The JSSA contains the following qualifying
definition of the term "district court of the United States":
1869. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter -- ...
(f) "district court of the United States", "district
court", and "court" shall mean any district court
established by chapter 5 of this title, and any court which
is created by Act of Congress in a territory and is invested
with any jurisdiction of a district court established by
chapter 5 of this title.
20. The Declaration of Policy at section 1861 refers
specifically to "district courts of the United States" [sic].
See supra. Chapter 5 of Title 28 contains the following section
concerning the "creation and composition of district courts":
132. Creation and composition of district courts
(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district
court which shall be a court of record known as the United
States District Court [sic] for the district.
21. Therefore, there is a policy for jury selection and
service, and there is a plan for random jury selection, within
the United States District Courts [sic]; but there is,
evidently, no such policy for jury selection and service, and
there is no such plan for random jury selection, within the
District Courts of the United States [sic].
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 10 of 18
22. Moreover, the JSSA is currently lacking any regulations
which have been duly promulgated and published in the Federal
Register. See 44 U.S.C. 1505(a). Applicant submits that the
absence of regulations for the JSSA restricts the application of
said Act to federal officers, employees, and agents only, and
cannot be enforced upon the inhabitants of the several Union
states, whether they be state Citizens or federal citizens. This
dearth of regulations undermines the applicability of the
Supremacy Clause (6:2), in the event that Union state laws should
conflict with said Act with respect to the kinds of "obligations"
which can be imposed upon state Citizens by the operation of law.
23. Applicant claims a fundamental Right to presiding
judges who are unbiased, competent, and qualified to preside over
this Article III judicial forum. Pursuant to Article III,
Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, the compensation of federal
judges shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office. See also 28 U.S.C. 461(b). The basis for this guarantee
was more fully explained by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore,
253 U.S. 245 (1920):
[T]he primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution
was ... to attract good and competent men to the bench and
to promote that independence of action and judgment which is
essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations
and pervading principles of the Constitution.
In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), the high Court explained
which amount of compensation is protected against diminution:
The words and history of the clause indicate that the
purpose was to impose upon Congress the duty definitely to
declare what sum shall be received by each judge out of the
public funds and the times for payment. When this duty has
been complied with the amount specified becomes the
compensation which is protected against diminution during
his continuance in office.
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 11 of 18
However,
Evans and Miles were not the last words that the Court was
to express on the issue of taxation of judicial incomes. In
O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), the Court
repudiated both Evans and Miles and held that a non-
discriminatory general income tax may be applied to federal
judges without diminishing judicial compensation within the
meaning of the compensation clause.
["The Constitutional Guaranty Against]
[Diminution of Judicial Compensation,"]
[UCLA Law Review, Vol. 24, pgs. 308-350]
After reviewing O'Malley v. Woodrough supra, Applicant submits
that the holding in that case is based on a faulty premise,
namely, that there is only one (1) class of citizenship in
America. O'Malley should be overturned: in light of the
preponderance of cases which demonstrate two (2) classes of
citizenship; in light of newly found evidence; and in light of
the notable and demonstrable decline in the American judiciary
since 1939, the year the Public Salary Tax Act was first enacted.
24. The basis for the O'Malley decision is the high Court's
mistaken belief that a federal judge can be taxed in his (her)
capacity as a citizen, without violating Article III, Section 1,
and without compromising the judge's competence and independence.
However, there is nothing in this decision to indicate that the
high Court adequately understood how two classes of citizenship
bear on this question (taxing the pay of federal judges).
25. The uncontroverted evidence establishing the failed
ratification of the so-called Sixteenth Amendment casts this
entire debate in an entirely new light. See People v. Boxer,
California Supreme Court, Case Number S-030016, December 1992.
The fundamental guarantees against direct taxation of all
citizens without apportionment, and against diminution of the
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 12 of 18
compensation of federal judges, remain as operative today as they
were on the day the U.S. Constitution was first adopted. See
1:2:3, 1:9:4, and 3:1 in the U.S. Constitution, which have never
been repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored.
26. Applicant submits that the only logical basis on which
these guarantees can now be avoided is the doctrine of
territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal Zone: Cracking
the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition, available on the
Internet via the Alta Vista search engine; see also U.S. v.
Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):
Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone
[sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular)
boundaries of the school property.
[emphasis added]
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as
a common noun, without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine
of territorial heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows
in the Conclusions of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of
Internal Revenue, to wit:
In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone,
Congress is not subject to the same constitutional
limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this
reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal
zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This
difference results in a principle of territorial
heterogeneity: the areas within the federal zone are
subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside)
the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules.
The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50
States. The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the
50 States. The 50 States are, therefore, in one general
class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress
are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to
any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a
different general class, because these same constitutional
restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.
[The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions]
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 13 of 18
27. In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine
whereby the Constitution for the "United States", as such, does
not extend beyond the limits of the states which are united by
and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."
28. This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court
ruled that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution extend to the
federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees
applicable. The United States District Courts are currently
established by Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts,
with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section
3, Clause 2, to wit:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; ....
[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]
[emphasis added]
29. Applicant wishes to litigate the instant case against
the United States, and against Does 1 thru 1000, in an Article
III Court of competent jurisdiction, and with judicial power
appropriate to the subject matter. In particular, Applicant
wishes to invoke the judicial power of the United States of
America, among several reasons, in order to enjoin the
Respondent(s) from withholding the agency records which Applicant
has requested in lawful and proper requests under the FOIA, and
to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld
from the Applicant. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), to wit:
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 14 of 18
On complaint, the district court of the United States ...
has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.
[5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), emphasis added]
30. In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health
Center Company, USDC, Tucson, Arizona, case number GJ-95-1-6,
United States District Judge John M. Roll did rule that the USDC
is not the proper forum to bring a request under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"). See ORDER dated May 21, 1996. If the
USDC is not the proper forum to bring a request under the FOIA,
then neither is it the proper forum for prosecuting any criminal
violations of Title 18, U.S.C. See 18 U.S.C. 3231 quoted supra
and the rules of statutory construction in Title 1, U.S.C.
Singular and plural refer to the same entity always. Title 1,
U.S.C., has been enacted into positive law.
31. Applicant hereby specifically complains that Congress
knew, or should have known, that the federal court of original
jurisdiction to enforce the FOIA is the District Court of the
United States ("DCUS"), not the United States District Court
("USDC"), when Congress published A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON USING THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 TO REQUEST
GOVERNMENT RECORDS, First Report by the House Committee on
Government Operations, Subcommittee on Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agriculture, 1993 Edition, House Report 103-
104, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Union Calendar No. 53. Said
CITIZEN'S GUIDE incorrectly cited the United States District
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 15 of 18
Court ("USDC") as the federal court of original jurisdiction for
judicial enforcement of FOIA requests. See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B). There is no statute of limitations on fraud,
whether actual or constructive.
32. In order for this case to proceed forward, and it is
Petitioners' fundamental Right under the Fifth Amendment that it
do so, this honorable Court must be seated with unbiased,
competent, and qualified Judges who are not subject to any
outside executive (or other) controls whatsoever. This means,
among other things, that Article III judges must be designated
and temporarily appointed to preside over the instant case, whose
compensation is not being diminished by federal income taxes, and
whose integrity and independence from all other governments and
all other government branches are unassailable and beyond
question. Fundamental Rights are unalienable.
33. Applicant hereby objects strenuously to the existence
of any contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or
implied in fact, between any currently seated United States
District Judge or any currently seated Judge of the Court of
International Trade, on the one hand, and the "Internal Revenue
Service" [sic] or any other controlling interests, on the other
hand, on grounds of conflicts of interest. Completed "IRS" Forms
W-4 and 1040 are expressed, written contracts.
34. Applicant is guaranteed the fundamental right to an
independent and unbiased judiciary. See Evans v. Gore supra.
The existence of any contract between any presiding Judges and
any other branch of the federal government, or any of its
agencies, assigns, or instrumentalities, is evidence of a
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 16 of 18
conflict of interest and proof of a dependent and biased
judiciary. See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) and
compare with Evans v. Gore supra, to measure how far our
civilization has degenerated under the Downes Doctrine. This
honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the
holding and the dicta in Evans, which case proves that American
courts have an obligation to rule on matters which properly come
before them.
Executed on [MM/DD/YY3]
Respectfully submitted,
[SIGNATURE-OF-APPLICANT]
_____________________________________
[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris
Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
_____________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
# # #
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 17 of 18
[NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui JurisCitizen of [UNION-STATE] state
c/o [MAILING-LOCATION]
[CITY], [UNION-STATE] state
zip code exempt
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
People of the United States ) Case No. CV 96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, )
) ORDER TO ALLOW
Petitioners, ) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:
)
v. ) FRCP Rule 24(a)
)
United States et al., )
)
Respondents. )
________________________________)
Good cause having been shown by [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris,
Citizen of [UNION-STATE] state in the above-entitled proceeding,
it is hereby:
ORDERED that [NAME-OF-APPLICANT], Sui Juris, be allowed to
intervene in the above-entitled case.
ORDERED this ________ day of ____________________, 19 _____,
at Billings, Montana state, United States of America.
__________________________________________
Judge, District Court of the United States
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution
Application for Intervention of Right:
Page 18 of 18
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state,
federal witness and Counselor at Law, do hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE AND APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:
FRCP Rule 24(a)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT,
WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES:
FRCP Rule 24(a)
ORDER TO ALLOW INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:
FRCP Rule 24(a)
by placing one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S.
Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice Supreme Court of the United States
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Solicitor General Office of the U.S. Attorneys
Department of Justice Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. c/o 316 North 26th Street
Washington, D.C. Billings, Montana state
James M. Burns Chief Judge
United States District Court Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o 316 North 26th Street c/o P.O. Box 193939
Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California state
Warren Christopher Judge J. Clifford Wallace
U.S. Secretary of State Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Department of State c/o P.O. Box 193939
Washington, D.C. San Francisco, California state
LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer Judge Alex Kozinski
Yellowstone County Jail Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o 3165 King Avenue East c/o P.O. Box 193939
Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California state
Dated: _________________________________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
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Instructions for Intervention