William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Gadsden, Alabama state
non-domestic zip code exempt
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
STATE OF ALABAMA [sic] ) Case No. #CV-97-H-0022-M
)
Plaintiff [sic] ) 16th Cir. Case #CC-95-1083-DWS
)
v. ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
) Rules 201(d), 301, and 302,
WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP [sic], ) Federal Rules of Evidence;
) Rule 9(b), Federal Rules
Defendant [sic] ) of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")
_____________________________)
COMES NOW William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, Citizen of Alabama
state, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal
citizen"), and Defendant in the above entitled action
(hereinafter "Defendant"), to provide formal Notice to all
interested party(s), and to demand mandatory judicial notice by
this honorable Court, pursuant to Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, of this, Defendant's formal
Refusal, pursuant to FRCP Rule 9(b), of the alleged ORDER of the
honorable James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge,
issued erroneously and filed erroneously in the instant case on
January 17, 1997.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 1 of 12
Defendant refuses said ORDER for fraud, as has already been
amply demonstrated in Defendant's previously submitted NOTICE OF
REFUSAL FOR CAUSE OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF ETOWAH COUNTY, for all of the same reasons as stated
therein. Specifically, Defendant hereby makes a permanent,
standing objection to any and all decisions, actions, orders,
practices, policies, rules, statutes, regulations, procedures,
and customs which are associated in any way with the United
States District Court ("USDC"), as was true of the ORDER signed
by Judge Hancock on January 17, 1997. The USDC has no
jurisdiction whatsoever over the instant case, even though Judge
Hancock may be authorized to preside over the USDC for Article IV
matters. Orders issued from courts which have no jurisdiction
are null and void ab initio.
Defendant does wish to address an important footnote which
is found in said ORDER. In said footnote, Judge Hancock wrote
the following:
Two of the assertions made by Kemp are of particular
interest to the Court. Initially, Kemp continually refers
to the undersigned as "Chief Judge." The undersigned is not
happy with this promotion, and hopes he does not receive
word of it through official channels.
In addition, although a promotion (as viewed by some) would
be largess enough, Kemp raises another point that promises
possible pecuniary benefits for the undersigned. Kemp takes
the position that Article III judges are exempt from the
federal income tax because, as Kemp correctly points out,
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution protects judges'
salaries from being reduced during their tenure. Kemp
argues that the undersigned's payment of taxes is evidence
that the undersigned is not an Article III judge, and is
therefore unqualified to hear this case. The undersigned is
certainly an Article III judge, but would be positively
thrilled to learn from some authoritative source that he is
exempt from federal taxes.
[ORDER dated September 17, 1997 by James H. Hancock]
[Senior United States District Judge, Birmingham]
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 2 of 12
Defendant hereby wishes to apologize to Judge Hancock for
the obvious clerical error in Defendant's previous pleadings,
wherein Judge Hancock was incorrectly identified as the "Chief
Judge," instead of Senior Judge. For the record, Defendant
hereby makes a permanent correction, nunc pro tunc to the date on
which the instant case was first filed in the District Court of
the United States ("DCUS").
More importantly, Judge Hancock goes on to discuss Article
III of the Constitution for the United States of America, as
lawfully amended ("U.S. Constitution"). By way of further
elaboration of the important, even crucial, matters which arise
out of Article III in the instant case, Defendant respectfully
requests mandatory judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, of the attached letter dated
January 22, 1997, from Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
Defendant's Counsel of choice in the instant case, to the
Disclosure Officer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, One
Columbus Circle, N.E., Washington, D.C. This letter is
incorporated here by reference as if set forth fully herein.
Until such time as competent, certified evidence is
forthcoming from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, particularly from the Chief, Judges Compensation and
Benefits Branch, Article III Judges Division, which office is
currently occupied by one Carol S. Sefren, that Judge Hancock is,
indeed, an Article III judge, as alleged in the ORDER of January
17, 1997, Defendant expressly reserves His fundamental Right to
rebut said presumption for assuming facts which are not in
evidence.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 3 of 12
On the contrary, the USDC is an Article IV court, with
constitutional authority originating in Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution. Defendant submits that federal judges who preside
in the USDC are Article IV judges, not Article III judges.
Furthermore, Defendant argues that Article III judges cannot
preside over Article IV courts, without prior authorization;
likewise, Defendant argues that Article IV judges cannot preside
over Article III courts, without prior authorization.
Judge Hancock belies his claim to being an Article III judge
by effectively admitting that his judicial compensation is
currently being diminished by federal income taxes. Judge
Hancock is also keenly aware that Article III, Section 1, of the
U.S. Constitution protects judges' salaries from being reduced
during their tenure.
It is not clear to Defendant, however, that Judge Hancock
has actually reviewed and completely understood the key case of
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which is controlling in the
instant case in part because it has never been overturned, and
primarily because it held that the compensation of federal judges
cannot be diminished by federal income taxes, notwithstanding the
so-called 16th amendment. At that time, the high Court presumed
that said "amendment" had been properly and lawfully ratified,
because said Court had not yet been presented with evidence
proving that the ratification had failed.
Defendant also argues that the case of Lord v. Kelley, 240
F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965), is likewise important for the admission
made therein that federal judges are subject to the undue
influence of the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic].
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 4 of 12
By connecting these two points in time -- 1920 and 1965 --
Defendant submits to this honorable Court the proposition that
the quality of judicial decisions has deteriorated measurably in
the intervening years. Moreover, between 1965 and today (1997),
the quality of judicial decisions as deteriorated even further,
so much so, that the reputation of the federal judiciary is now
at an all-time historical low.
Defendant submits that one of the major reasons for this
deterioration is the fraud which Congress has perpetrated upon
all federal judges by imposing federal income taxes upon their
judicial compensation, in blatant violation of Article III,
Section 1, and in blatant violation of the holding in Evans, and
by manipulating the identities of the various federal district
courts so as to extend the jurisdiction of the USDC, unlawfully,
into the state zone and into the subject matters over which the
USDC has no jurisdiction whatsoever. See 18 U.S.C. 3231; 28
U.S.C. 1441 et seq.
Article III, Section 1, has never been amended or repealed.
Repeals by implication are not favored. The so-called 16th
amendment [sic] did not repeal Article III, Section 1, even if it
had been lawfully ratified; it was not. See People v. Boxer,
California Supreme Court case #S-030016, December 1992;
respondent Boxer fell totally silent, activating estoppel.
Defendant submits that further evidence of the Congressional
fraud upon all federal judges is to be found in the common
practice of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
in Washington, D.C., to prepare and mail written communications
on office stationery which bears the heading "Article III Judges
Division" [sic]. Defendant submits that the existence of such a
Division proves that Congress is well aware of Article III, and
yet all federal judges currently preside over the USDC, which is
an Article IV forum, and all federal judges currently pay federal
income taxes on their judicial compensation, in violation of
Article III, and in violation of Evans supra.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 5 of 12
Plaintiff argues that no federal judge can be an Article III
judge, if the judicial compensation of that federal judge is
currently being diminished by federal income taxes. This is the
case because the taxation of judicial compensation is conclusive
evidence of a dependent and biased judiciary. This bias and
dependence were openly and notoriously documented, for all the
world to see, in the case of Lord v. Kelley supra.
Defendant hereby asserts a fundamental Right to enjoy an
independent and unbiased judiciary, exercising lawful authority
in courts of competent jurisdiction over all matters arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
The DCUS is such a court, and payment of federal income taxes
upon his compensation is conclusive proof that Judge Hancock
cannot preside upon this honorable DCUS.
Until such time as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States shall certify that Judge Hancock has either
voluntarily rescinded his W-4 Employee's Withholding Allowance
Certificate, or has been ordered to do so by one or more of his
judicial superiors, if only for the duration of the instant case,
Judge Hancock is deemed unqualified to preside over said case,
notwithstanding his unsupported allegation that he is presently
an Article III judge, primarily because Judge Hancock's judicial
compensation is currently being diminished by federal income
taxes, in violation of Article III, Section 1, and Evans v. Gore
(never overturned).
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 6 of 12
To this end, Defendant wishes to remind this honorable Court
of Defendant's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF 3
JUDGES FROM THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER
THIS DCUS, which has been served on all interested party(s).
Although a single Article III judge is authorized by
Congress to handle case preliminaries, Defendant reserves his
right to convene a 3-judge panel here, in order to adjudicate
Defendant's claims:
(1) that the apportionment of congressional districts is
skewed, and thereby unconstitutional, for failing to
count Citizens of Alabama state who are not also
citizens of the United States ("federal citizens");
and,
(2) that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act
("JSSA") is unconstitutional for exhibiting prohibited
class discrimination against Citizens of Alabama state
who are not also federal citizens.
Defendant needs a competent and qualified Article III judge
to issue a valid warrant of removal of the instant case from the
Circuit Court of Etowah County into this honorable DCUS,
whereupon Defendant seeks an immediate and indefinite stay of the
instant proceedings, pending final review of his challenge, as
previously filed in the instant case, to the constitutionality of
the JSSA. See Defendant's MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 7 of 12
INCORPORATION OF MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Defendant hereby incorporates by reference, as if set forth
fully herein, the attached MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
PROVING THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES. If his
footnote is any indication, Judge Hancock will be positively
thrilled to learn from these authoritative sources that he is
exempt from federal taxes, as least as far as federal taxation of
his judicial compensation is concerned.
SUMMARY
Defendant is entitled to a response to His Petition for
Warrant of Removal from a competent and qualified District Court
of the United States ("DCUS"), said DCUS to consider Defendant's
proper petition for warrant of removal from the Circuit Court of
Etowah County. James H. Hancock, Senior United States District
Judge, is a judge of the United States District Court ("USDC"),
said USDC having been demonstrated to differ from the DCUS in
name, in territorial jurisdiction, and in subject matter
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Judge Hancock is not qualified to sit on a
proper DCUS, because his judicial compensation is currently being
diminished by federal income taxes, in violation of Article III,
Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of the
pivotal holding in Evans v. Gore supra, which requires competent,
qualified, independent and unbiased federal judges whose
compensation(s) are not currently being diminished by federal
income taxes, for the DCUS.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 8 of 12
VERIFICATION
I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby declare, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", and under knowledge of the
law forbidding false witness before God and men, attest and
affirm that I have read the foregoing and know the contents
thereof, and that the same is true of My own knowledge, except
those matters herein alleged on information and belief, and as to
those matters, I believe them to be true, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Executed on January 24, 1997:
/s/ Mike Kemp
________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 9 of 12
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least eighteen
years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
Rules 201(d), 301, and 302, Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
Solicitor General William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice Supreme Court of U.S.
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
James E. Hedgspeth, Jr. Clerk of Court
Etowah County Offices District Court of the U.S. [sic]
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue c/o 1729 Fifth Avenue North
Gadsden, Alabama state Birmingham, Alabama state
Clerk of Court Attorney General
Circuit Court of Etowah County Department of Justice
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue 10th and Constitution, N.W.
Gadsden, Alabama state Washington, D.C.
Clerk of Court Chief Judge
Court of Criminal Appeals 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o P.O. Box 301555 c/o 56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Montgomery, Alabama state Atlanta, Georgia state
Executed on January 24, 1997:
/s/ Mike Kemp
_________________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 10 of 12
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
January 22, 1997
Disclosure Officer
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
Subject: Hon. James H. Hancock
Dear Disclosure Officer:
Please provide Us, as soon as possible, with a certified copy of
the credentials of one James H. Hancock, employed as a federal
district judge in the United States District Court ("USDC") for
the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division.
Judge Hancock alleges that he is currently an Article III judge
[sic], but he is also paying federal income taxes on his judicial
compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1, in the U.S.
Constitution, which has never been repealed or amended. In a
recent ORDER issued from the wrong court, Judge Hancock stated
that he would be positively thrilled to learn from some
authoritative source that he is exempt from federal taxes.
Evidently, Judge Hancock does not consider the U.S. Constitution
to be an "authoritative source"; I do hope I have not drawn the
wrong inference from his ORDER.
We refer you (and Judge Hancock) to the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),
which held that judicial immunity from diminution of their
compensation must be sustained, notwithstanding the so-called
16th amendment [sic]. Our research informs Us that this decision
has never been formally overturned, notwithstanding allegations
to the contrary which have been published in the UCLA Law Review.
During calendar 1996, I did witness a copy of stationery from the
"Article III Judges Division" [sic] of your offices, which had
been transmitted through the United States Mail to Me from Carol
S. Sefren, Chief, Judges Compensation and Benefits Branch,
Article III Judges Division (see attached response).
Can it be that your office continues to misinform federal judges
that they are authorized under Article III, even though those
very same judges are paying federal income taxes on their
judicial compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1,
and in violation of the standing decision in Evans v. Gore, and
even though all federal district judges currently preside over
the USDC, and not over the District Court of the United States
("DCUS")? See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1921).
Such misinformation could be construed as mail fraud.
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 11 of 12
If this is the case, permit Us respectfully to request that you
cease and desist this practice at once, because it is misleading,
not only for all the judges on your payroll, but also for the
public at large whom those judges were appointed to serve, with
integrity and without undue influence, and upon whom the public
at large depend for independent and unbiased opinions. See also
Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965), to appreciate how
far our judiciary has deteriorated since the decision in Evans.
Please respond as quickly as possible. Until We receive your
certified response, important litigation must be put on hold.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness
email: supremelawfirm@altavista.net
website: http://supremelaw.com
copy: James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge
William H. Rehnquist, C.J., U.S. Supreme Court
parties listed in PROOF OF SERVICE, State v. Kemp
litigation files
Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 12 of 12
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Alabama v. Kemp