Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris

Private Attorney General

c/o Forwarding Agent

350 – 30th Street, Suite 444

Oakland 94609-3426



In Propria Persona


All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice











UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic],     )  No. 1:01-CR-74


          Plaintiff [sic],          )


     v.                             )





          Defendants [sic].         )



People of the United States         )       NOTICE AND

of America, ex relatione            )  APPLICATION FOR LEAVE

Paul Andrew Mitchell,               )  TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT


          Petitioners.              )


COME NOW the People of the United States of America (hereinafter “Petitioners”), ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of California State, expressly not a citizen of the United States (“federal citizen”), qualified Federal Witness and Victim, and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator”), to petition this honorable Court for leave to intervene by Right in the instant case, and to provide formal Notice to all interested Party(s) of same.

Petitioners now itemize Their meritorious and non-frivolous reasons for intervening in the instant case:

(1)           Petitioners formally object to the lack of an official IRS form for the Withholding Exemption Certificate (“Form WEC”) authorized by Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 3402(n).  “Internal” means “municipal”.  The implications are quite far-reaching for all W-4 Forms executed heretofore by all private-sector workers, particularly inside the United States of America (“State zone”).  The presiding judge in the instant case is already a witness to the practice of concealing Form WEC from all newly hired federal employees.  As a material witness, therefore, the presiding judge must either recuse himself on this ground, or rescind his Form W-4 for the duration of this case.  Taxing judicial compensation violates Article III, Section 1 (“3:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (“U.S. Constitution”);  this provision has never been amended or repealed.  See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).

(2)           Demonstrable and well documented vagueness in the income tax provisions of the IRC renders those provisions void for vagueness, for violating the Nature and Cause Clause in the Sixth Amendment.  The U.S. House of Representatives emphatically agreed on April 13, 2000 A.D., when a majority of that body voted in favor of the Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act.  Five of their seven findings pointed to the overly complex nature of the IRC.  The unavoidable conclusion is that the Code is far too complex to be justly administered or enforced.

(3)           There are no statutes which create a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A of the IRC, except for “withholding agents” as that term is defined at IRC § 7701(a)(16).  See IRC § 1461.  Defendant, like untold millions of other Americans, has been deceived –- by Congress and by His CPA -- and they have historically misunderstood the term “taxpayer” to refer to workers in the private sector.  This is not correct.  The tax “payer” is the withholding agent [sic], who is legally liable for payment of all taxes withheld, under the “power of attorney” granted by lawfully executed W-4 Forms.

A Form W-4 can be refused for cause, if private sector companies decide they do not wish to be withholding agents.  It is in this sense that federal income taxes are “voluntary”.  Private sector companies cannot be compelled into the role of collecting and paying an unapportioned direct tax.  Compensation for labor is not “income”.  The provisions at Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 (“1:2:3”), Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 (“1:9:4”), and Article III, Section 1 (“3:1”) have never been amended or repealed.

Moreover, private-sector companies should be presenting Form WEC to newly hired workers, as an alternative to, and in lieu of, Form W‑4.  The statute authorizing Form WEC is yet another reason why federal income taxes are voluntary for workers in the private sector.  They are legally not “employees”, as that term is defined in the IRC, until and unless they opt to be treated as if they are federal government employees, by executing a lawful Form W‑4.

The lack of any liability statute(s) for taxes imposed by subtitle A is tantamount to violating the Guarantee Clause, which guarantees a “rule of law” inside the State zone (not a “rule by regulation”).  The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 do create a specific liability;  as such, they are an overly broad extension of the underlying statutory authority at IRC § 1, which does not create any specific liabilities.

All legislative power is vested in the Congress of the United States, and none is vested in any executive or judicial offices.  See Article I, Section 1 (“1:1”).  Liability for taxes, and penalties for failure to pay taxes, must arise from constitutional statutes enacted by Congress, if those taxes are to conform to the Guarantee Clause.  [A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.”  See 2 Am Jur 2d, page 129  [bold emphasis added].

(4)           It necessarily follows that the Public Salary Tax Act is unconstitutional as applied to federal judges presiding on criminal cases inside the State zone.  Federal judges are not free to waive the fundamental immunity they enjoy under 3:1 in the U.S. Constitution.  No one can be “cunningly coerced into waiving a fundamental Right,” because such a concept (“coerced waiver”) is an oxymoron.  Lex non cogit impossibilia (the Law cannot compel the doing of impossibilities).

The fact that a federal judge has executed Form W-4, as a condition of employment with the federal judiciary, is evidence of a conflict of interest, undue influence, bias, and dependence.  See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965).  The Framers intended Article III judges to be unbiased, independent, and free of all conflicts of interest and all undue influence.  Such is not the case at the present time, due mainly to the Public Salary Tax Act as applied to all federal judges, without exception.  See the essay entitled “The Lawless Rehnquist” which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein.

(5)           The so-called Downes Doctrine is specious and cannot be used to justify the taxation of judicial compensation.  As of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), a Doctrine arose whereby the Constitution of the United States, as such, did not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it.  That Doctrine was later extended in Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), by ruling that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress makes those guarantees applicable –- by statutes.

Relator has now confirmed the re-discovery of two (2) Acts of Congress which expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into D.C. (16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34, 1871) and into all federal Territories (18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, 1873).  Thus, Congress has already extended all the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution into all federal Territories, into D.C. and, by necessary implication, into all of its political subdivisions (e.g. all federal enclaves and possessions).

These two Acts of Congress have never been litigated, to Relator’s knowledge.  They effectively require that all Acts of Congress, even those of the municipal variety, must conform to the Sixth Amendment’s Nature and Cause Clause.  Conversely, a statute is void for vagueness and unconstitutional ab initio, if any of its provisions violates the Nature and Cause Clause, whether or not that statute is municipal law.  See, in particular, the definition of “State” at IRC § 3121(e) and the corresponding advice of acknowledged experts from the offices of the Legislative Counsel, the Congressional Research Service, and U.S. Representative Barbara Kennelly (i.e. “includes” is restrictive).

(6)           All federal statutes which re-define any terms found in the U.S. Constitution are necessarily unconstitutional for violating the clear prohibition announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (hereinafter “Eisner Prohibition”).  The terms “State” and “United States” figure prominently throughout the U.S. Constitution, and both are re‑defined in several different and mutually exclusive ways throughout the IRC, depending on the context.  (Intent is not defined, however!)

Notably, when Congress is imposing a lawful excise tax throughout the 50 States, the legal definition of the term “United States” expressly mentions those 50 States.  See IRC § 4612(a)(4)(A).  In other cases, the 50 States are conspicuously absent from comparable definitions.  Pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, Petitioners rely heavily on the rule of construction:  inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, to wit:  an inference may be drawn that whatever was omitted, or excluded, was intended to be omitted or excluded from all definitions in federal statutes.

(7)           Accordingly, it follows that the United States District Court (“USDC”) is a territorial tribunal lacking any criminal jurisdiction whatsoever.  Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time.  The constitutional origin of the USDC issues from the Territory Clause at Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”).  See Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922), for a case directly on point.  Statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts must be strictly construed [cite omitted].  The Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) still exists, but has been concealed by means of further deceptive language.  See Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 895;  28 U.S.C. §§ 102 (DCUS) and 132 (USDC).  Title 28 of the United States Code has been enacted into positive law;  but, Title 26 has not been enacted into positive law.

The clear and unequivocal restriction against Ex post facto federal legislation prevents Congress from retroactively re‑defining the term “district court of the United States”, as that term was used prior to the Act of June 25, 1948.  For example, see Treasury Decision 2313 and Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), which originated in the DCUS, not the USDC.  This fundamental Law has enormous and far-reaching consequences, e.g. the Freedom of Information Act at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B);  Sherman Antitrust Act and the case against Microsoft Corporation (heard in the wrong court), to mention just two.

The DCUS must be restored to its proper status in the 3‑branch structure intended by the Framers, in order to guarantee proper balance, the Separation of Powers and the blessings of Liberty which that Separation was designed to ensure to Petitioners and to Their Posterity.



     All premises having been duly considered, Petitioners hereby request leave to intervene by Right in the instant case, for the purpose of joining Defendant as a separate, real Party of interest in all further proceedings.



     The Undersigned Relator hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of laws and facts is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause.




Signed:  ____________________________________________________


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris

         Private Attorney General


I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age and a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I served the following document(s):





by placing same in first class U.S. Mail, with proper postage affixed and prepaid, and directed to the following:


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Donald A. Davis

Assistant United States Attorney

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Signed:  ____________________________________________________


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris

         Private Attorney General