Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General
c/o P.O. Box 370
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
tel: (562) 592-9047
fax: (562) 592-4917
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CR No. 02-0372
)
Plaintiffs, ) (in legislative mode)
)
v. )
)
LYNNE MEREDITH, )
aka Lynne Meridith, )
aka Lynn Meridith, )
GAYLE BYBEE, )
GREGORY PAUL KARL, )
TERESA MANHARTH GIORDANO, )
WILLIE WATTS, )
BETTY ERICKSON, )
NORA MOORE, and )
TONI SMITH SILVA, )
)
Defendants. )
---------------------------------)
) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
United States ) MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
ex relatione ) OF RIGHT:
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) 3:2:1 (in judicial mode);
) 28 U.S.C. 530B, 2403;
Movant. ) FRCP 24(a), (c)
_________________________________) (United States not a party).
COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Movant”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator”) to move this honorable Court for intervention of right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), and to provide timely Notice to all interested parties of same, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 24(c) (United States not yet a party); and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”).
OF
THE ACT OF JUNE 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869
Pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), this Court will please certify to the Office of the Attorney General that the constitutionality of an Act of Congress affecting the public interest is herein drawn in question.
Likewise, this Court will please certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled cases, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, presently codified as Title 28, U.S.C.
Subject to all applicable provisions of Law, Movant hereby expressly reserves all rights of a party and shall be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs, to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and laws relating to the question of the constitutionality of said Act.
See Article II, Articles of Confederation (“United States, in Congress Assembled”); 28 U.S.C. 530B (willful misrepresentation); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (United States as plaintiff); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); 18 U.S.C. 3231 (Article III constitutional court has original jurisdiction); 3:2:1 (“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;”).
The “United States” and the “United States of America” are not one and the same. Congress is expressly prohibited from re‑defining any terms found in the U.S. Constitution. See Preamble (“Constitution for the United States of America”); Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“2:1:1”) (“President of the United States of America”); Article VII (“Independence of the United States of America”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920):
Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations that power can be lawfully exercised.
The U.S. Department of Justice does not enjoy general power(s) of attorney to represent the United States of America. Compare 28 U.S.C. 547(1), (2) (Duties). Willful misrepresentation by officers employed by that Department is actionable under the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B (Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government).
Whenever the United States proceeds as party plaintiff, an Article III constitutional court, exercising the judicial power of the United States, is a prerequisite under 3:2:1 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (United States as plaintiff).
Whenever the United States proceeds as a party defendant, the sovereign must grant permission to be sued. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (United States as defendant). In this mode, a legislative court is permitted. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933):
... [C]ontroversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of the judicial power vested by article 3 in the constitutional courts. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645, 646 S., 12 S.Ct. 488.
A private Citizen may move a federal court on behalf of the United States ex relatione. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
The federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 3231 confers original jurisdiction on the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), 62 Stat. 909 (1948). See also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (term DCUS in its historic and proper sense); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate).
The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (The USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III.) See 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.
Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); 49 Stat. 1921.
All guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were expressly extended into the District of Columbia in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively. Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (only as Congress has made those guaranties [sic] applicable).
REMEDY REQUESTED
All premises having been duly considered, Relator
now moves this honorable Court, on behalf of the United States:
(1) to certify to the Office of the Attorney
General that the constitutionality of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869,
has been drawn into question; and,
(2) to certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled cases, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of said Act.
Thank you for your professional consideration.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: April 16, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE
OF MOTION AND
MOTION
FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:
3:2:1 (in judicial mode);
28 U.S.C. 530B, 2403; FRCP 24(a), (c)
(United States not a party).
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
John
S. Gordon
U.S. Department of Justice
1300 United States Couthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles 90012
CALIFORNIA, USA
Lynne
Meredith
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Gayle
Bybee
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Gregory
Paul Karl
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Teresa
Manharth Giordano
c/o 40960 California Oaks Road
Murrieta 92562
CALIFORNIA,USA
Willie
Watts
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Betty
Erickson
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Nora
Moore
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
Toni
Smith Silva
c/o P.O. Box 370 (temporary forwarding address)
Sunset Beach 90742
CALIFORNIA, USA
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Dated: April 16, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
Attachment “A”:
PRESS RELEASE
“Private Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States Code”
November 26, 2001 A.D.
Private Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States Code
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
and Private Attorney General
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 26, 2001 A.D.
Sacramento. Paul Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney General at the Supreme Law Firm and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title 28 –- the set of American laws that govern the federal court system.
In a brief but direct application of this knowledge, written for a trainee in federal litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the federal courts lacked original jurisdiction in the anti-trust case against the Microsoft Corporation.
That case was allegedly brought by the “United States of America” (or “USA”), but attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have no powers of attorney to represent the “USA”, as such. Willful misrepresentation is a violation of the McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B, which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar disciplinary guidelines:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/530B.html
The federal government recently reversed its policy in the case against the Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable settlements across the board.
The term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 –- at section 1746 –- and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” –- the proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title 28:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1746.html
Mitchell’s findings have consequences that reach far beyond the anti-trust case against Microsoft. It is now painfully apparent that DOJ are pretending to represent the “USA” in all civil and criminal cases, intentionally to avoid exercising the judicial power of the United States.
Under Article III in the U.S. Constitution, this power must be exercised in constitutional courts that guarantee cherished fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Article III courts must be convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party (singular).
To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also erred by ruling that the term “Party” as used in Article III means “Plaintiff” but not “Defendant”. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the term “Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants.
By substituting the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative courts where fundamental Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges granted (or denied) at the discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on legislative tribunals. Mitchell describes these courts as operating in legislative mode as opposed to constitutional mode.
Glaring proof of this fraud can be seen at section 132 of Title 28. In this section, Congress attempted to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal –- the United States District Court (“USDC”). Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/132.html
More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which the U.S. Constitution did not extend into U.S. Territories and Possessions. Mitchell later refuted this doctrine, after discovering two Acts of Congress that expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871 A.D., and then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively.
In the year 1992 A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a popular classic book entitled The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue. The Federal Zone is now in its eleventh edition.
In that book, he proved that federal municipal law governs U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal municipal law does not extend into any of the 50 States of the Union. The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code are federal municipal law.
Because they are not yet States of the Union, Congress is the state legislature for all Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like military bases –- an area now collectively called the federal zone. In the year 1995 A.D., Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
Section 132 of Title 28 is even more deceptive for creating the false notion that the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was abolished, but nothing could be further from the truth. A careful reading of section 132 reveals that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.
The DCUS was never expressly abolished by any Act of Congress, and it is still mentioned in numerous other places throughout Title 28. Congress knows how to abolish a court when it wants to do so. The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that repeals by implication are not favored. Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear Act of Congress would be required to effect that result. Whatever Congress creates, Congress must destroy.
Another stunning application of this knowledge came recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC. An interlocutory order is one that occurs before final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.
In response to Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit cited a case which ruled that final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence. That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24 F.3d. 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994). Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Under Mitchell’s expert guidance, the defendant proved that the Ninth Circuit has no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the legislative USDC. However, the Ninth Circuit does have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional DCUS. The proof is found at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1):
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1292.html
Mitchell then persuaded the defendant to request a published opinion holding that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed also. It is already well decided that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Such a holding is a logical extension of existing federal case law.
Clearly, these findings expose the USDC in all 50 States as a summary tribunal that compels criminal defendants to endure lengthy trials, conviction and sentencing before any U.S. Court of Appeals can take jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1291.html
In closely related developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the Act of June 25, 1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire federal court system. This is the Act of Congress that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50 States of the Union. This Act has now been formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore unconstitutional.
By attempting to re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act also violates the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, in the U.S. Constitution. This prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that have any retroactive effect. Without a clear amending statute, Congress cannot later re-define the term “District Court of the United States” in statutes that predate June 25, 1948 A.D.
For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in the year 1890 A.D., and that Act granted original jurisdiction to the DCUS. Subsequently, the Act of June 25, 1948, did not change or otherwise amend that grant of original jurisdiction to the DCUS. Therefore, cases enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not the “USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional mode. Identical results obtain from many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.
Other sections of Title 28 have already been challenged properly in court for violating the U.S. Constitution. In 1996 A.D., in the case of a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury, Mitchell was allowed to prove that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act is also unconstitutional. That Act expressly discriminates against Citizens of the 50 States –- the only class of Citizens contemplated when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D. For definitive authority on this crucial point, see Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914.
There are now two (2) classes of citizens under American laws that have never been repealed ‑‑ State Citizens and federal citizens ‑‑ but only State Citizens are qualified to be federal lawmakers. See the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution; the “United States” in those provisions means “States united”.
Moreover, those Citizens who are qualified to make federal laws cannot vote or serve on any juries, State or federal. And, those who can vote and serve on juries are not qualified to make federal laws.
This seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to the Act of June 25, 1948, and related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative democracy upon all 50 States. These efforts violate the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.
Paul Andrew Mitchell can be reached at email address:
He is currently available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in American constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.
# # #
Attachment “B”:
Relator’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Executed on February 27, 2002 A.D.
Against Alicia Villarreal and Andrew Erath
Served upon Judge Alex Kozinski
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
February 28, 2002 A.D.