Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
zip code exempt

Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights







                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA


IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA      )       Case No. GJ-95-1-6
SERVED ON                      )      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY )   MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
                               )   FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
                               )  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
                               )  AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
                               )         CHALLENGE TO
                               )  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
                               )    28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518,
_______________________________)    1861, 1865, and 1867(d)


COMES NOW  Paul Andrew,  Mitchell,  Sui Juris, Sovereign Arizona

Citizen (hereinafter  "Counsel") and  Vice President  for  Legal

Affairs of  New Life  Health Center  Company, an  Unincorporated

Business Trust  domiciled in  the Arizona  Republic (hereinafter

the "Company"),  to Petition  this honorable Court for a stay of

the instant proceedings, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

1867(d), pending proper review of the Company's challenge to the

constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit:

     1865.  Qualifications for jury service

     (a)  The chief  judge of  the district court, or such other
          district court judge as the plan may provide ... shall
          determine solely  on the basis of information provided
          on the  juror qualification  form and  other competent
          evidence whether  a  person  is  unqualified  for,  or
          exempt, or to be excused from jury service. ...

     (b)  In making  such determination  the chief  judge of the
          district court,  or such other district court judge as
          the plan  may provide, shall deem any person qualified
          to serve  on grand  and petit  juries in  the district
          court unless he --

          (1)  is  not  a citizen of the  United States eighteen
               years old  who has  resided for  a period  of one
               year within the judicial district; ....

                                [28 U.S.C. 1865, emphasis added]


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 1 of 9


     In stark  contrast, it  is the  policy of the United States

that all  citizens shall  have the  opportunity to be considered

for service on grand juries in the district courts of the United

States.   To be  constitutional, and  to be  consistent with its

legislative intent,  the term  "all citizens",  as that  term is

used  in  28 U.S.C. 1861, must  be  construed  to  include  also

Citizens of  the freely  associated compact  states who  are not

also citizens of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizens"):

     1861.     Declaration of policy

     It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
     Federal courts  entitled to  trial by  jury shall  have the
     right to  grand and  petit juries selected at random from a
     fair cross  section of  the community  in the  district  or
     division wherein  the court  convenes.   It is  further the
     policy of  the United  States that  all citizens shall have
     the opportunity  to be  considered for service on grand and
     petit juries  in the  district courts of the United States,
     and shall  have an  obligation  to  serve  as  jurors  when
     summoned for that purpose.

                                [28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]


     Counsel hereby provides notice to all interested parties of

His sworn (verified) statement of law and facts which constitute

a substantial  failure to  comply with  the Constitution for the

United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S.

Constitution"), and  with the  provisions of  Title  28,  United

States Code,  Section 1861:   Declaration  of Policy.    See  28

U.S.C. 1867(d).   The  presently convened Grand Jury consists of

members all  of whom  are citizens  of the  United  States,  not

necessarily Citizens  of Arizona state.  See Dyett v. Turner and

State v.  Phillips infra;   52 Stat. 1034, Chapter 644, June 24,

1938,  in pari materia  with the  Tenth  Amendment;    Right  of

Election;  voter registration affidavits.


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 2 of 9


     By way  of introduction  to the crucial matters of fact and

law which  are discussed at length in Counsel's sworn (verified)

statement, which  is hereby  incorporated by reference as if set

forth fully  herein, this honorable Court is hereby respectfully

requested to  take formal  judicial  notice  of  the  additional

standing authorities on this question:

     We have  in our political system a Government of the United
     States and  a government  of each  of the  several  States.
     Each one  of these governments is distinct from the others,
     and each  has citizens  of its  own ....    Slaughter-House
     Cases
               [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
                                                [emphasis added]


     A person  who is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States**  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular state in which he
     resides.   But a  person may  be a  citizen of a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United  States.   To hold
     otherwise would  be  to  deny  to  the  state  the  highest
     exercise of  its sovereignty,  -- the  right to declare who
     are its citizens.
                              [State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                               [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]


     There are,  then, under  our republican form of government,
     two classes  of citizens,  one of the United States and one
     of the  state. One  class of  citizenship may  exist  in  a
     person, without  the other, as in the case of a resident of
     the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in
     the same person.

                  [Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
                         [48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]


     There are  over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in
     the United  States. ...  Each of these now has an invisible
     federal  zone   extending  1,000  feet  beyond  the  (often
     irregular) boundaries of the school property.

                          [U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)]


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 3 of 9


     As a  Party to the instant case, which is presently a civil

action proceeding  under the  Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure,

with the  possibility of  a criminal indictment issuing from it,

the Company  hereby challenges the presently convened Grand Jury

on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with

section 1861  of Title 28, because Citizens of Arizona state who

are not  also citizens  of  the  United  States  (a/k/a  federal

citizens) are  disqualified from  serving  by  virtue  of  their

chosen Citizenship  status.   See 28  U.S.C. 1867(e);   Right of

Election;   15 Statutes  at  Large,  Chapter  249  (Section  1),

enacted July 27, 1868;  jus soli;  jus sanguinis.  Specifically,

the offensive  statute  forces  the  following  unconstitutional

result upon  Citizens of Arizona state who choose not also to be

citizens of the United States (a/k/a federal citizens):

            citizen of         Citizen of         Qualified
          United States       Arizona state       to serve

               Yes                Yes                Yes
               Yes                No                 Yes
               No                 No                 No
               No                 Yes                No     **


This result ("**") violates the Tenth Amendment by disqualifying

Citizens of  Arizona state  from serving on federal grand juries

when they are not also federal citizens, thus denying to accused

Citizens of  Arizona state  a grand  jury of  Their Peers when a

grand jury consists only of federal citizens.

     An intentional  discrimination against  a class of persons,

solely because  of their  class, by  officers in  charge of  the

selection and summoning of grand jurors in a criminal case, is a

violation of  the fundamental Rights of an accused.  See Cassell

v. Texas,  339 U.S. 282;  Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398;  Pierre

v. Louisiana,  306 U.S. 354.  Such a violation is not excused by

the fact  that the  persons actually  selected for  jury service

otherwise possess  the necessary  qualifications for  jurors  as

prescribed by statute.  See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460.


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 4 of 9


     Discrimination  in  the  selection  of  a  grand  jury,  as

prohibited by  the  U.S.  Constitution,  means  an  intentional,

systematic noninclusion  because of  class.   There are  two (2)

classes of citizenship in America.  E.g. Gardina supra.

     28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically excludes those classes of

Citizens who  are not  mentioned.   Expressio unius est exclusio

alterius.   The following statute dramatically demonstrates that

Congress appreciates the difference between the two classes, and

knows how  to discriminate  against "citizens  of  the  American

republics" (a/k/a  State Citizens)  in favor of "citizens of the

United States" (a/k/a federal citizens):

                             AN ACT

     To authorize  the  President  to  permit  citizens  of  the
     American republics  to receive  instruction at professional
     educational  institutions   and  schools   maintained   and
     administered by  the Government  of the United States or by
     departments or agencies thereof.

     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
     the United  States of  America in  Congress assembled, That
     the President  be, and  he hereby  is, authorized,  in  his
     discretion and  under such  regulations as he may prescribe
     by Executive  order, to  permit citizens  of  the  American
     republics to  receive instruction,  with or  without charge
     therefor,  at  professional  educational  institutions  and
     schools maintained  and administered  by the  Government of
     the United States or by departments or agencies thereof:

     Provided, That such citizens shall agree to comply with all
     regulations for  the government  of  the  institutions  and
     schools at which they may be under instruction and to exert
     every effort  to accomplish  successfully  the  courses  of
     instruction prescribed:

     And provided  further, That  the regulations  prescribed by
     the President under the authority of this Act shall contain
     provisions  limiting  the  admission  of  citizens  of  the
     American  republics   to  primary  schools  maintained  and
     administered by the Government of the United States so that
     there will under no circumstances be any curtailment of the
     admission of  citizens of  the United  States  eligible  to
     receive instruction  therein and  not more than one citizen
     of any  American republic  shall receive instruction at the
     same time  in the  United States  Military Academy  and not
     more  than   one  in   the  United  States  Naval  Academy.
     Approved, June 24, 1938.

                     [52 Stat. 1034, Chapter 644, June 24, 1938]
                         [Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session]
                                           [bold emphasis added]


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 5 of 9


     Once a  prima facie  case for  the existence  of purposeful

discrimination is made out, the burden shifts to the prosecution

to prove  otherwise.   See Whitus  v.  Georgia,  385  U.S.  545.

Reliance on  the so-called  Fourteenth Amendment to resolve this

matter is  out of the question, because the Fourteenth Amendment

was never  lawfully ratified.   See  State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d

936, 941 (1975);  Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266,

270 (1968);  Full Faith and Credit Clause;  28 Tulane Law Review

22;   11 South  Carolina Law Quarterly 484;  House Congressional

Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.

     As such, there is no constitutional provision which makes a

federal citizen  also a citizen of the Union state in which s/he

resides, nor  is there any constitutional provision which states

that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned.

     The judicial  history of  American citizenship is a subject

which is rich in nuance and detail, as demonstrated in Counsel's

sworn (verified)  statement.   For example, at a time when those

Islands were  in the  federal zone,  the Supreme  Court  of  the

Philippine Islands  found that "citizenship," strictly speaking,

is a  term of  municipal law and, according to that Court, it is

municipal  law   which  regulates   the  conditions   on   which

citizenship is acquired:


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 6 of 9


     Citizenship, says  Moore  on  International  Law,  strictly
     speaking, is  a term  of  municipal  law  and  denotes  the
     possession within  the particular  state of  full civil and
     political rights subject to special disqualifications, such
     as minority, sex, etc.  The conditions on which citizenship
     are [sic]  acquired are  regulated by municipal law.  There
     is  no   such  thing   as  international   citizenship  nor
     international law (aside from that which might be contained
     in treaties) by which citizenship is acquired.

                                   [Roa v. Collector of Customs]
                                 [23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912)]


Indeed, international  law is  divided roughly  into two groups:

(1) public  international law and (2) private international law.

Citizenship is  a term  of private international law (also known

as municipal  law) in  which the  terms  "state",  "nation"  and

"country" are all synonymous:

     Private international  law assumes  a more important aspect
     in the  United States  than elsewhere,  for the reason that
     the  several   states,  although   united  under  the  same
     sovereign authority  and governed  by the same laws for all
     national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, are
     otherwise, at  least so far as private international law is
     concerned, in  the same  relation as foreign countries. The
     great majority  of questions  of private  international law
     are therefore  subject to  the same  rules when  they arise
     between two  states of the Union as when they arise between
     two foreign  countries, and  in the ensuing pages the words
     "state," "nation,"  and "country" are used synonymously and
     interchangeably, there  being no  intention to  distinguish
     between  the  several  states  of  the  Union  and  foreign
     countries by the use of varying terminology.

                        [16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 2]
                                                [emphasis added]


Congress does  refer to the Union states as "countries."  See 28

U.S.C. 297.  The reference to "citizens of the United States" at

26 C.F.R.  1.1-1(b)  and  (c)  is  material  evidence  that  the

Internal Revenue  Code ("IRC") is a municipal law.  See also IRC

3121(e).   Furthermore, a  leading legal  encyclopedia leaves no

doubt that  the terms  "municipal law"  and "internal  law"  are

equivalent:


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 7 of 9


     International law and Municipal or internal law.

     ... [P]ositive  law is classified as international law, the
     law which  governs  the interrelations  of soverign states,
     and municipal law, which is, when used in contradistinction
     to international law,  the  branch of the law which governs
     the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

          However,  the   term  "municipal   law"  has   several
     meanings,  and in order  to avoid  confusing these meanings
     authorities have  found more  satisfactory Bentham's phrase
     "internal law,"  this being  the equivalent  of the  French
     term  "droit interne,"  to express the  concept of internal
     law of a sovereign state.

          The phrase  "municipal law"  is derived from the Roman
     law,  and when employed as indicating the internal law of a
     sovereign  state  the  word  "municipal"  has  no  specific
     reference  to  modern  municipalities,  but  rather  has  a
     broader, more extensive meaning, as discussed in the C.J.S.
     definition Municipal.
                                   [52A C.J.S. 741, 742 ("Law")]
                                                [emphasis added]


                         RELIEF SOUGHT

     Wherefore,  Counsel  petitions  this  honorable  Court,  on

behalf of the Company, for an indefinite stay of the proceedings

in the  instant case,  pending proper  review of the substantial

issues of  law and  fact which  are alleged  in this  Motion and

which are  contained in  Counsel's  sworn  (verified)  statement

which is attached hereto and incorporated herewith.


Respectfully submitted on May 24, 1996.


/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 8 of 9


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Linda  H. Burns,  hereby certify,  under penalty  of perjury,

under the  laws of  the United  States of  America, without  the

United States,  that I am at least 18 years of age and a Citizen

of  one of the United States of America, that I am not currently

a Party  to this  action,  and  that  I  personally  served  the

following document:

                      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
     MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
                  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
            AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO
                  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE

by placing  said document in first class U.S. Mail, with postage

prepaid and properly addressed to the following individuals:


ROBERT L. MISKELL                  John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

JANET NAPOLITANO                   Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Grand Jury Foreperson              Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co.  U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway                     Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Judge Alex Kozinski                Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200     300 West Congress
Pasadena, California               Tucson, Arizona

Attorney General                   Solicitor General
Department of Justice              Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. !      10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.


Dated:  May 24, 1996


/s/ Linda Burns
________________________________________
Linda H. Burns, Citizen of Arizona state

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


                  Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 9 of 9


                             #  #  #
      


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In Re Grand Jury Subpoena