Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and Federal Witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state, USA
zip code exempt (formerly DMM 122.32)
Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA ) Case No. GJ-95-1-6 (JMR)
SERVED ON )
NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
) AND RECONSIDERATION,
) AND CHALLENGE TO HOLDINGS
______________________________ ) OF U.S. SUPREME COURT
COMES NOW Paul Andrew, Mitchell, Sui Juris, Sovereign Arizona
Citizen (hereinafter "Counsel") and Vice President for Legal
Affairs of New Life Health Center Company, an Unincorporated
Business Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic (hereinafter the
"Company"), to file this emergency petition to this honorable
for: (1) a continuance of the hearing in the instant case,
currently scheduled for June 10, 1996, (2) for reconsideration
of its Order, dated May 24, 1996, a copy of which is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully
herein, (3) and formally to challenge controlling cases of the
United States Supreme Court which have an immediate bearing on
the case at hand. We herein prove the Supreme Court has erred.
On behalf of the Company, Counsel strenuously objects to the
lack of proper and adequate notice of the hearing now scheduled
for June 10, 1996, and of the Order dated May 24, 1996. The
Company's first inkling that a hearing might have been scheduled
for this date was its receipt of Mr. Robert L. Miskell's MOTION
TO CONTINUE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, dated June 3, 1996, and mailed
on the same date to "NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY, 4841 EAST
SPEEDWAY, TUCSON, ARIZONA 85712." A copy of this MOTION TO
CONTINUE is also attached and incorporated by reference as if set
forth fully herein. In it, Mr. Miskell (hereinafter "Miskell")
raises the issue of fairness de novo: "... [I]t would be unfair
to ask another Assistant U.S. Attorney to handle the matter."
How now, Miskell? See definitions of "fair" in Black's.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 1 of 29
As Miskell already well knows, "4841 EAST SPEEDWAY, TUCSON,
ARIZONA 85712" is NOT the correct location, and NOT the "last
known address" for service of process to the Company. The
Company hereby refuses mail service of said MOTION TO CONTINUE on
grounds of improper service. Prior to eventually receiving said
MOTION TO CONTINUE from a Company co-worker, the Company had
received absolutely no notice whatsoever of any hearing which had
allegedly been scheduled for June 10, 1996.
Then, by means of a facsimile transmission begun at
approximately 13:34 hours on Saturday, June 8, 1996, Counsel
quite by chance received a copy of this Court's ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE why Eugene Burns and New Life Health Center Company shall
not be found in contempt for New Life Health Center Company's
"failure to comply" [sic] with the Court's order of May 3, 1996.
This was the first moment at which the Company had ever received
any notice of the hearing scheduled for June 10, 1996, and this
occurred at most two (2) days before the hearing. How generous.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 2 of 29
The Company strenuously objects to this lack of proper or
adequate notice, and demands to know why it was that the Company
received no prior written notice of the hearing scheduled for
June 10, 1996, and why it was that this Court's Order dated May
24, 1996, was not presented to the Company until June 8, 1996,
some fourteen (14) calendar days after said Order was signed.
Furthermore, said Order dated May 24, 1996, exhibits a
serious error for alleging that Dr. Burns and the Company are
ordered "Upon application of the United States ...." This is not
correct. The Court will please take special notice of the fact
that Miskell's SECOND APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, and
his MOTION TO CONTINUE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, both allege that the
Plaintiff here is the "United States of America" (see first
paragraphs). The Company strenuously objects to the error in
this inconsistency, for the following substantive reasons:
Congress has not granted standing to the "United States of
America" to bring the instant action before this Court in the
first instance. The "United States of America" and the "Union"
are synonymous terms which refer to the several states which are
united by and under the Constitution for the United States of
America (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"):
UNION. A popular term for the United States of America:
as, the Union must and shall be preserved.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. The nation occupying the
territory between British America on the north, Mexico on
the south, the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico on the
east, and the Pacific Ocean on the west; being the republic
whose organic law is the constitution adopted by the people
of the thirteen states which declared their independence of
the government of Great Britain on the fourth day of July,
1776.
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1870]
[emphasis added]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 3 of 29
Congress has not granted standing to the "United States of
America" to bring the instant action. Congress has granted
standing to the "United States" to bring the instant action, upon
proper application alleging probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation. Said "application" continues unlawfully to be
withheld from the Company and its Counsel, for reasons which
remain unknown to Them at the present time. See FOIA requests to
JANET NAPOLITANO and ROBERT L. MISKELL, already filed in the
official record of this case. This explicit grant of authority
is found in 28 USC 1345, to wit:
1345. United States as plaintiff
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United
States, or by an agency or officer thereof expressly
authorized to sue by Act of Congress.
[emphasis added]
There is a clear distinction between the meanings of the
term "United States" and the term "United States of America".
See 28 USC 1746. The People of America have been fraudulently
and purposely misled to believe, by a criminal syndicate of
government "agents" and certain other unnamed impostors acting
under color of law to conceal their principals (The Bank and The
Fund), that these terms are completely synonymous in every
context, when they are not, as will now be demonstrated
conclusively for the record, as follows, right here and now:
In Law, the "United States of America" (plural) refer to the
several states which are "united by and under the Constitution";
the "United States" (singular) refers to the federal government
and to that geographical area defined in Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 17 ("1:8:17") and in Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2
(4:3:2) of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution for the
United States of America, as such, does not extend beyond the
limits of the states which are united by and under it. See
Preamble; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); also author
Langdell in 12 Harvard Law Review 371, to wit:
... [T]he Constitution of the United States as such does not
extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by
and under it, -- a proposition the truth of which will, it
is believed, be placed beyond doubt by an examination of the
instances in which the term "United States" is used in the
Constitution.
[Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories" ]
[12 Harvard Law Review 365, 371, emphasis added]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 4 of 29
On behalf of the Company, Counsel formally objects to the
majority holding in Downes, for all the reasons stated in Justice
Harlan's eloquent and prescient dissent in said decision. The
specific limits on the concurrent as well as the exclusive
legislative jurisdiction granted by the U.S. Constitution
restrain the United States to the farthest reaches of the entire
Universe created by Our Almighty Father in Heaven, by His Son,
Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, and by the Holy Spirit, and
this shall remain the supreme Law of this Land until such time as
the states united, and no one else, decide otherwise by true Law.
See the Harvard Law Review's laudable criticisms of The Insular
Cases, including Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories,"
12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371; Thayer, "Our New Possessions,"
12 Harvard Law Review, 464; Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in
the Supreme Court," 15 Harvard Law Review 164; and Littlefield,
"The Insular Cases," 15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281
Accordingly, the Hooven case must, therefore, be overturned
also for holding, incorrectly, that the guarantees of the U.S.
Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress has made
those guarantees applicable. Congress is not empowered by the
U.S. Constitution to withhold, at its arbitrary legislative
discretion, the guarantees of that Constitution from the Peoples
or the Territory within the federal zone, no matter how different
their histories or customs, just because They are not (yet) Union
states. See Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The term "exclusive" at
1:8:17 does not mean, and was never meant to mean, "unrestricted"
or "unrestrained" by the fundamental guarantees -- the blessings
of Liberty -- which that sacred document was specifically
ordained and established to ensure. See Preamble for intent.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 5 of 29
In 1802, the "Congress Assembled" incorporated a
geographical area known as the "United States". The "United
States" is, therefore, a nation-state which is separate and
unique unto itself. Furthermore, even though the "United States"
is not a member of the "Union of states united by and under the
U.S. Constitution", it is bound by that Constitution to restrict
its activities in dealing with the several states and with the
Common Law Citizens of those freely associated compact states
(assuming they are not also citizens of the United States by
Right of Election, or worse, by virtue of any rebuttable
presumptions which this Court might incorrectly base upon
fraudulent voter registration affidavits and/or other similarly
fraudulent documentary evidence, like signed 1040 Forms or any
other such Information Collection Request ("ICR") forms).
Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress
claims exclusive authority to legislate and regulate the
inhabitants of its geographical territory and its statutory
"citizens" under the so-called 14th Amendment, wherever they are
"resident", even if they do inhabit one of the 50 sovereign, free
and independent states of the Union.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 6 of 29
The term "United States" has always referred to the
"Congress Assembled", or to those geographical areas defined in
1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. The proof of this
fact is found in the Articles of Confederation, to wit:
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America in
Congress Assembled did on the fifteenth day of November in
the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy
Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America
agree to certain Articles of Confederation and perpetual
union between the States ....
ARTICLE I. The title of this confederacy shall be "The
United States of America".
ARTICLE II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which
is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress Assembled.
[emphasis added]
The term "United States", as used in Article II above,
refers expressly to "Congress Assembled" on behalf of (not the
same as) the several states which comprise the Union of states
united by and under the U.S. Constitution (now 50 in number,
counting also Hawaii and Texas, arguably).
As can readily be seen from the Hooven quote infra, with
three (3) separate and distinct definitions for the term "United
States", it becomes absolutely necessary to separate and define
each use of this term in Law. It is equally as necessary to
distinguish and define to whom the Law applies when there are two
(2) classes of citizenship existing side-by-side, with separate
and distinct rights, privileges, and immunities for each.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 7 of 29
Such a separate distinction is not made in the Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC"). Citizens of the Arizona Republic are
nowhere defined in this Code, nor in its regulations, but are
expressly omitted as such and identified indirectly at best (see
IRC 7701(b)(1)(B)). At present, the term "United States" has
three separate and distinct meanings in law:
The term "United States" may be used in any one of several
senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in a
family of nations. It may designate territory over which
sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the
collective name of the States which are united by and under
the Constitution.
[Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
[65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89 L.Ed. 1252, emphasis added]
The term "United States", when used in its territorial or
geographical meaning, encompasses the areas of land defined in
1:8:17 and 4:3:2, and nothing more. In this respect, the "United
States" is a separate Nation which is foreign with respect to the
States which united by and under the U.S. Constitution, because
the "United States" as such has never applied for admission to
the Union of states known as the "United States of America"!
Accordingly, statutory "citizens of the United States", who
are "subject to the jurisdiction thereof", are defined in the
wording of the so-called 14th Amendment and of the Civil Rights
Act (1866). At best, this so-called amendment is a "private
act", rather than a Public Law, which designates a class of
people who are unique to the territorial jurisdiction of the
District of Columbia, to the federal territories and possessions,
and to the limited areas of land which have been ceded by the
Legislatures of the 50 states to the foreign nation-state of the
"United States" for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,
dock-yards and "other needful buildings" (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 8 of 29
Collectively, this territorial jurisdiction is now termed
"The Federal Zone" to distinguish it uniquely from the Nation as
a whole, and from the 50 states of the Union. The whole "Nation"
can, therefore, be defined as the mathematical union of the
federal zone and of the 50 states (using the language of set
theory). See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), in which
Kennedy and O'Connor concurring utilized the term "federal zone"
as a common, household term only 3 years after first publication
of a book by the same name (i.e. The Federal Zone: Cracking the
Code of Internal Revenue, San Rafael, Account for Better
Citizenship, 1992).
The District of Columbia is technically a corporation and is
only defined as a "State" in its own codes and under
International Law (e.g., see IRC 7701(a)(10)). The several Union
states which are united by and under the U.S. Constitution are
guaranteed a "Republican" (or "rule of Law") form of government
by Article 4, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution. However, the
foreign nation-state created by Congress and called the "United
States", in its territorial sense, is a "legislative democracy"
(or "majority rule" democracy) which is governed by International
Law, rather than the Common Law. Congress rules there.
It is for this latter reason that the "United States" must
rely upon admiralty and maritime law (a/k/a "inland admiralty")
to move against Citizens of the freely associated compact states,
a/k/a Citizens of one of the states United. However, the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as
mentioned in FRCP 9(h), have not yet been properly published and
are the subject matter of a Freedom of Information Act request
which is presently pending in the instant case. Unpublished
rules have no legal force or effect. See Federal Register Act.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 9 of 29
Therefore, proceeding further in the instant case, without
first producing said Supplemental Rules for the benefit of the
Company and its Counsel, constitutes a clear deprivation of due
process of law. Are these rules secret, for some reason, like
the regulations which implement the Buck Act?
The Company hereby denies ever having elected to reside
within any fictional "State within a state" created by the Buck
Act, see 4 U.S.C. 104-113, Howard v. Sinking Fund of Louisville,
344 U.S. 624 (1953), Schwartz v. O'Hara T. P. School Dist., 100
A.2d 621, 625 (1953). There are no regulations in the CFR
imposing these statutes, see CFR Index and Finding Aids, 1/1/93,
p. 937, "Referrals to Department of Justice or GAO". Counsel
reserves His Right to compel discovery of these regulations and
to stay the instant proceedings pending their discovery. Are We
the People dealing here with more "secrets" again and, if so,
why? Why? WHY? Do we even need to ask at this point?
Now, when the Congress specifies certain conditions under
which the United States can bring a civil action in a district
court of the United States, such as this honorable Court, then
this Court must satisfy those conditions; otherwise, it proceeds
without jurisdiction and thereby places all government players in
imminent danger of personal liabilities for their unlawful and
unconstitutional acts, including the presiding Judge.
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is
unconstitutional, because "immunity" is nowhere mentioned as a
privilege of any federal public offices. See Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which does reserve Immunities for Citizens of
the several states. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. We
are allowed to infer that the omission was intentional.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 10 of 29
Remember, the United States as such is also bound by several
international treaties which explicitly guarantee to Counsel and
to the Company effective judicial remedies for violations of
fundamental Rights even if those violations were committed by
persons acting in their official capacities. Specifically, the
record in the instant case does not evidence the written
authorizations required for this action to proceed beyond the
garage door. Lack of jurisdiction is fatal to any action.
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
record does not exhibit the authorizations required by Section
7401 of the IRC, to wit:
Sec. 7401. Authorization.
No civil action for the collection or recovery of
taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be
commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or sanctions the
proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs
that the action be commenced.
[IRC 7401, emphasis added]
Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. There is
no evidence on the record that the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, or his delegate, nor that the
Attorney General, or her delegate, ever authorized or sanctioned
these proceedings. Mere allegations or presumptions of
jurisdiction will not be sustained against proper challenges.
No such evidence was ever served on Counsel or the Company,
because the actors who claim to be "United States Attorneys" and
a "Special Agent: Internal Revenue Service" in the instant case
have, to date, failed to produce certified evidence of their
authority to exercise the powers of the office(s) they claim to
occupy (such as delegations of authority), even weeks after they
were formally challenged to do so. See the STATUS REPORT of FOIA
requests and appeals now on file in this case. Thus, the failure
to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically denied is fatal
to the maintenance of this action:
Thus, where the Congress prohibits the commencement of a
civil action unless certain specific acts are performed,
this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter until
the requisite conditions are met in fact and such compliance
is shown by the pleadings and, where necessary, established
by proof. ... [B]ut the mere allegation of facts necessary
for jurisdiction without supporting proof is fatally
defective. ... This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. Section 7401
requirements constitute facts essential to jurisdiction.
The failure to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically
denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action.
[U.S.A. v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe de Ville]
[355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973), emphasis added]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 11 of 29
This Court will please take specific notice that the alleged
Plaintiff in the Cadillac case was the "U.S.A.", i.e. the United
States of America! The failure to prove jurisdictional facts
when specifically denied is fatal to the maintenance of this
action. Congress has not given standing to the several states of
the Union to bring this civil action in this forum. The
Attorneys General of the several Union states were never notified
of this action; they did not bring this action; and they cannot
bring this as an original action without a specific grant of
jurisdictional authority for them to do so in this district
court.
As one of the "inferior Courts," as that term is utilized in
Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, the district
courts are creatures of Congress: "... [S]uch inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", using
the same language as found in the Preamble [emphasis added].
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 12 of 29
Moreover, there is serious doubt as to whether or not IRC
7401 has ever taken effect (other than being treated as a
private, equitable contract clause). This Court will also please
take specific notice of the "General rule" at IRC 7851(a)(6)(A),
wherein Congress has, quite clearly (We might add), defined the
moment at which all of the provisions within subtitle F of the
IRC shall take effect (but not before):
(6) Subtitle F.
(A) General rule. The provisions of subtitle F shall
take effect on the day after the date of enactment of
this title and shall be applicable with respect to any
tax imposed by this title.
[IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), emphasis added]
The bad news is that Title 26, as such, has never been
enacted into positive law. One necessary inference, therefore,
is that none of the provisions of subtitle F, including IRC
Section 7401, has yet taken effect! The further bad news is that
IRC 7851 is a self-referencing statute with recursive effects
(Section 7851 is in subtitle F), thus rendering it null and void
for vagueness. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee Our
fundamental Right to clear and unambiguous laws, both inside and
outside the federal zone. The doctrine of territorial
heterogeneity (state zone/federal zone) violates the very
principles on which the U.S. Constitution was founded.
The "void for vagueness" doctrine, on the other hand, is
deeply rooted in our right to due process (under the Fifth
Amendment) and our right to know the nature and cause of any
accusation (under the Sixth Amendment). The latter right goes
quite far beyond the contents of any criminal indictment. The
right to know the nature and cause of any accusation starts with
the statute which a defendant is accused of violating. A statute
must be sufficiently specific and unambiguous in all its terms,
in order to define and give adequate notice of the kind of
conduct which it forbids. What is "adequate notice"?
The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness doctrine"
with respect to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to
warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their
conduct. ... Criminal statutes which fail to give due
notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done
are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.
[U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952)]
[emphasis added]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 13 of 29
If it fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just what
conduct the legislature prohibits, a statute is necessarily void
for uncertainty, or "void for vagueness" as the doctrine is
called. In the De Cadena case, the U.S. District Court listed a
number of excellent authorities for the origin of this doctrine
(see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451) and for the
development of the doctrine (see Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, and Jordan v. De
George, 341 U.S. 223). Any prosecution which is based upon a
vague statute must fail, together with the statute itself. A
vague criminal statute is unconstitutional for violating the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The U.S. Supreme Court has
emphatically agreed:
[1] That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.
[Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.]
[269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 14 of 29
The historical record documents undeniable proof that the
confusion, ambiguity and jurisdictional deceptions now built into
the IRC were deliberate. This historical record provides the
"smoking gun" that proves the real intent was deception (read
"fraud"). The first Internal Revenue Code was Title 35 of the
Revised Statutes of June 22, 1874. On December 5, 1898, Mr.
Justice Cox of the D.C. Supreme Court delivered an address before
the Columbia Historical Society. In this address, he discussed
the history of the District of Columbia as follows:
In June 1866, an act was passed authorizing the
President to appoint three commissioners to revise and bring
together all the statutes .... [T]he act does not seem, in
terms, to allude to the District of Columbia, or even to
embrace it .... Without having any express authority to do
so, they made a separate revision and collection of the acts
of Congress relating to the District, besides the collection
of general statutes relating to the whole United States.
Each collection was reported to Congress, to be approved and
enacted into law .... [T]he whole is enacted into law as
the body of the statute law of the United States, under the
title of Revised Statutes as of 22 June 1874. ...
[T]he general collection might perhaps be considered,
in a limited sense as a code for the United States, as it
embraced all the laws affecting the whole United States
within the constitutional legislative jurisdiction of
Congress, but there could be no complete code for the entire
United States, because the subjects which would be proper to
be regulated by a code in the States are entirely outside
the legislative authority of Congress.
[District of Columbia Code, Historical Section]
[emphasis added]
More than half a century later, the deliberate confusion and
ambiguity were problems that not only persisted; they were
getting worse by the minute. In the year 1944, during
Roosevelt's administration, Senator Barkley made a speech from
the floor of the U.S. Senate in which he complained:
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 15 of 29
Congress is to blame for these complexities to the extent,
and only to the extent, to which it has accepted the advice,
the recommendations, and the language of the Treasury
Department, through its so-called experts who have sat in on
the passage of every tax measure since I can remember.
Every member of the House Ways and Means Committee and every
member of the Senate Finance Committee knows that every time
we have undertaken to write a new tax bill in the last 10
years we have started out with the universal desire to
simplify the tax laws and the forms through which taxes are
collected. We have attempted to adopt policies which would
simplify them. When we have agreed upon a policy, we have
submitted that policy to the Treasury Department to write
the appropriate language to carry out that policy; and
frequently the Treasury Department, through its experts, has
brought back language so complicated and circumambient that
neither Solomon nor all the wise men of the East could
understand it or interpret it.
[Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session]
[Vol. 90, Part 2, February 23, 1944, pages 1964-5]
[emphasis added]
You have, no doubt, heard that ignorance of the law is no
excuse for violating the law. Because it has been so
advantageous for the United States, Congress has allowed only
rare exceptions to this maxim of the Common Law, e.g. the case
history of P.L. 93-579, Section 7 (attached as an exhibit);
Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F.Supp. 1343 (1982):
... [A]ssuming that plaintiff's refusal to disclose his
social security number was a clearly established right,
where defendants could not as reasonable persons have been
aware of that right and could not have recognized that any
effort to compel disclosure of number or to deny plaintiff
his refund violated federal law, damages against defendants
were barred ....
Here, Congress "hid" P.L. 93-579 by failing to codify it anywhere
within 5 USC, which has been enacted into positive law.
The general maxim is explicitly stated in the case law which
defines the legal force and effect of administrative regulations.
But, ambiguity and deception in the law are an excuse, and the
ambiguity and deception in the IRC is a major cause of our
ignorance. Caveat emptor (more applicable to "judicial sales").
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 16 of 29
Moreover, this principle applies as well to ambiguity and
deception in the case law, the Downes majority being a premier
example. See 15 Harvard Law Review 220, quoted infra. Lack of
specificity leads to uncertainty, which leads in turn to court
decisions which are also void for vagueness. In addition to
guaranteeing the fundamental Right to effective assistance of
Counsel of choice, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees Our
fundamental Right to ignore vague and ambiguous laws, and this
must be extended to vague and ambiguous case law as well.
Courts cannot alter the U.S. Constitution by syntax or
grammatical sophistry, any more than Congress can do so by
legislation. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205-206
(1919):
Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution,
from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and
within whose limitations that power can be lawfully
exercised.
[emphasis added]
In light of their enormous influence in laying the
foundations for territorial heterogeneity and a legislative
democracy for the federal zone (cf. in The Federal Zone,
electronic fourth edition available on the Internet), The Insular
Cases, as exemplified by Downes (the wild pack leader), have been
justly criticized by peers for lacking the minimum judicial
precision required in such cases:
The Absence of Judicial Precision. -- Whether the
decisions in the Insular Cases are considered correct or
incorrect, it seems generally admitted that the opinions
rendered are deficient in clearness and in precision,
elements most essential in cases of such importance.
Elaborate discussions and irreconcilable differences upon
general principles, and upon fascinating and fundamental
problems suggested by equally indiscriminating dicta in
other cases, complicate, where they do not hide, the points
at issue. It is extremely difficult to determine exactly
what has been decided; the position of the court in similar
cases arising in the future, or still pending, is entirely a
matter of conjecture. ...
It is still more to be regretted that the defects in
the decision under discussion are by no means exceptional.
From our system of allowing judges to express opinion upon
general principles and of following judicial precedent, two
evils almost inevitably result: our books are overcrowded
with dicta, while dictum is frequently taken for decision.
Since the questions involved are both fundamental and
political, in constitutional cases more than in any others
the temptation to digress, necessarily strong, is seldom
resisted; at the same time it is strikingly difficult, in
these cases, to distinguish between decision, ratio
decidendi, and dictum. Yet because the questions involved
are both extensive and political, and because the evils of a
dictum or of an ill-considered decision are of corresponding
importance, a precise analysis, with a thorough
consideration of the questions raised, and of those
questions only, is imperative. The continued absence of
judicial precision may possibly become a matter of political
importance; for opinions such as those rendered cannot be
allowed a permanent place in our system of government.
[15 Harvard Law Review 220]
[anonymous]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 17 of 29
One can only speculate why the author(s) of this searing
criticism felt it necessary to withhold their name(s) from such
exacting language. Can it be that the United States has been
retaliating against "tax protestors" for a long time now, and the
authors were justifiably fearful of possible reprisals?
Specifically, the United States does not hesitate to order its
overwhelming firepower against helpless children and nursing
mothers (Waco, Ruby Ridge, OKC); how much harder could it be to
justify liquidating a few naive law students who dared to
question a contrived decision of the U.S. Supreme Court?
When you have exhausted all moral authority you might
otherwise have had, the only persuasive power you have left is
gun power. "All political power issues from the barrel of a
gun," wrote Chairman Mao Tse Tung, from a country where aborted
fetus organs are now appearing on high-class restaurant menus.
It's BIG money (yummy too; just ask the communists who know).
Those babies never had a chance, because these vultures prey on
the weak and the helpless like starving piranha in a drought
(Serrasalminae rhombeus, length to 1.5 feet).
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 18 of 29
The Third Reich burned books in the public square at noon;
in America, the Fourth Reich simply robs the bank accounts
reserved for printing and publication, and nobody sees it.
Achtung! See pages 8-9, "Return to Constitutional Money," by Dr.
Edwin J. Vieira, Jr., an Author this time brave enough to put His
name on a definitive critique of our fascist banking system,
which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth fully herein. "The Courts will do anything to sustain this
system," writes Bill Conklin, author, illegal tax protestor, and
proud of it (see "Mission Against Deception" (MAD)). Anything?
The average American cannot be expected to have the skill
required to navigate the verbal swamp that exists within the
bowels of the Internal Revenue Code, nor does the average
American have the time or the motivation required to make such a
journey. Who would really want to, anyway? Chicanery does not
make good law or good reading. The rules of statutory
construction fully support this unavoidable conclusion:
... [I]f it is intended that regulations will be of a
specific and definitive nature then it will be clear that
the only safe method of interpretation will be one that
"shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance
of the mischief ...."
[Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G. Sutherland]
[3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)]
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 19 of 29
The Supreme Court has also agreed, in no uncertain terms, as
follows:
... [K]eeping in mind the well settled rule that the citizen
is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear
and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of
a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor
of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.
[Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain]
[192 U.S. 397 (1903), emphasis added]
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the
established rule not to extend their provisions, by
implication, beyond the clear import of the language used,
or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are
construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor
of the citizen.
[United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369]
[emphasis added]
On what basis, then, should the Internal Revenue Service be
allowed to extend the provisions of the IRC beyond the clear
import of the language used? On what basis can the IRS act when
that language has no clear import? On what basis is the IRS
justified in enlarging their operations so as to embrace matters
not specifically pointed out? The answer is tyranny. The
"golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing up the
neighborhood to fetch the gold. What a service!
Consider for a moment the sheer size of the class of people
now affected by the fraudulent 16th Amendment. First of all,
take into account all those Americans who have passed away, but
who paid taxes into the Treasury after the year 1913. How many
of those correctly understood all the rules, when people like
Frank R. Brushaber were confused as early as 1914? See original
pleadings in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
Add to that number all those Americans who are still alive
today and who have paid taxes to the IRS because they thought
there was a law, and they thought that law was the 16th
Amendment. After all, they were told as much by numerous federal
officials and possibly also their parents, friends, relatives,
school teachers, scout masters, colleagues, and baseball buddies.
Don't high school civics classes now spend a lot of time teaching
students how to complete IRS 1040 forms and schedules, instead of
teaching the U.S. Constitution? It would be wrong not to protest
this putrid swamp, overpopulated with slithering reptiles.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 20 of 29
Donald C. Alexander, when he was Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, published an official statement in the Federal Register
of March 29, 1974, that the 16th Amendment was the federal
government's general authority to tax the incomes of individuals
and corporations [emphasis added]. Courts must take judicial
notice of the Federal Register. In the section entitled
"Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service,
Organization and Functions," his statement reads in part:
(2) Since 1862, the Internal Revenue Service has undergone
a period of steady growth as the means for financing
Government operations shifted from the levying of import
duties to internal taxation. Its expansion received
considerable impetus in 1913 with the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution under which Congress
received constitutional authority to levy taxes on the
income of individuals and corporations.
[Vol. 39, No. 62, page 11572]
[emphasis added]
Sorry, Donald, you were wrong. (See People v. Boxer,
California Supreme Court case number S-030016, December, 1992, to
which Senator-elect Boxer fell totally and completely silent.)
At this point in time, it is impossible for us to determine
whether you were lying, or whether you too were a victim of the
fraud. Silence activates estoppel by acquiescence.
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 21 of 29
Just how many people are in the same general class of those
affected by the fraudulent 16th Amendment? Is it 200 million?
Is it 300 million? Whatever it is, the number just boggles the
imagination. It certainly does involve a very large number of
federal "employees" who went to work for Uncle Sam in good faith,
thereby becoming subject to the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.
The United States is the party liable for this fraud, and there
is no statute of limitations on fraud.
It is now so clear, there is a huge difference between the
area covered by the federal zone, and the area covered by the 50
States (a/k/a the state zone). Money is a powerful motivation
for all of us. Congress and its creditors had literally
trillions of dollars to gain by convincing most Americans they
were inside its revenue base when, in fact, most Americans were
outside its revenue base, and remain outside even today. This is
deception on a grand scale, and the proof of this deception is
found in the statutes themselves.
It is no wonder why public relations "officials" of the IRS
cringe in fear when dedicated Patriots bravely admit, out loud
and in Person, that they have read the "laws". It is quite
stunning how the carefully crafted definitions of "United States"
and "its" jurisdiction do appear to unlock a "Code" that is
horribly complex and deliberately so.
As fate would have it, these carefully crafted definitions
also expose perhaps the most sophisticated fiscal fraud that has
ever been perpetrated upon any People at any time in the history
of the world. It is now time for a shift in the wind, at long
last. Will we ever find a Judge who will right the sails on Our
Ship of State, and lead us to navigate the stars?
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 22 of 29
The Company hereby objects strenuously to the existence of
any contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or
implied in fact, between the presiding Judge in this Court and
the "Internal Revenue Service" or any other controlling interest,
on grounds of conflict of interest. A completed IRS Form 1040 is
an expressed, written contract. The Company is guaranteed the
fundamental Right to an independent and unbiased judiciary.
The existence of a contract between the presiding Judge and
the IRS is evidence of a conflict of interest and proof of a
dependent and biased judiciary, see Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp.
167, 169 (1965). The "Internal Revenue Service" is a proven
alias of the Federal Alcohol Administration domiciled in Puerto
Rico (inside the federal zone); it is not a part of the United
States Department of the Treasury. See all the positive law in
31 USC in toto.
Respectfully submitted on June 9, 1996
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state,
Counselor at Law, and
Federal Witness
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 23 of 29
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Neil Thomas, Nordbrock, hereby certify, under penalty of
perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without
the "United States", that I am at least 18 years of age and a
Citizen of one of the United States of America, that I am not
currently a Party to this action, and that I personally served
the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AND CHALLENGE TO HOLDINGS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
by placing said document(s) with exhibits in first class United
States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the
following individuals:
ROBERT L. MISKELL John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310 U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue 55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
JANET NAPOLITANO Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310 U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue 55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
Grand Jury Foreperson Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co. U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
Judge Alex Kozinski Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200 300 West Congress
Pasadena, California Tucson, Arizona
Attorney General Solicitor General
Department of Justice Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. ! 10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Dated: June 9, 1996
/s/ Neil Nordbrock
________________________________________________
Neil Thomas, Nordbrock, Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 24 of 29
Facsimile Containing
Court's Order of May 24, 1996
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 25 of 29
MOTION TO CONTINUE
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 26 of 29
RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL MONEY
by
Dr. Edwin J. Vieira, Jr., Director
National Alliance for Constitutional Money
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 27 of 29
Definitions of "Union"
and "United States of America"
in Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
Philadelphia (1870)
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 28 of 29
Text of Section 7,
Public Law 93-579
(not codified in Title 5, United States Code)
Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
Page 29 of 29
# # #
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In Re Grand Jury Subpoena