Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state, USA
zip code exempt (formerly DMM 122.32)
Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA ) Case No. GJ-95-1-6 (JMR)
SERVED ON )
NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY ) COMPANY'S OPPOSITION TO
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,
) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, AND
) CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
) OF "ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTOR"
) CLASSIFICATIONS
_______________________________)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew, Mitchell, Sui Juris, Sovereign Arizona
Citizen (hereinafter "Counsel") and Vice President for Legal
Affairs of New Life Health Center Company, an Unincorporated
Business Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic (hereinafter the
"Company"): (1) to file this statement in opposition to Robert
L. Miskell's MOTION TO STRIKE certain pleadings already filed on
behalf of the Company, (2) to demand a jury trial of certain
substantial issues of law and fact which have arisen as a result
of his MOTION TO STRIKE, (3) to challenge the constitutionality
of all "illegal tax protestor" classifications, and (4) to
provide notice of same to all interested parties. Mr. Miskell is
hereinafter identified as "Miskell."
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 1 of 20
Miskell's rationale for striking certain pleadings is
founded on false and suspicious premises. His faulty logic goes
like this: First, he alleges that the Company is an "artificial
entity," like a corporation, partnership, or association. Such
entities can only appear in federal court through a licensed
attorney, citing Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194
(1993). Neither Dr. Eugene A. Burns, D.C., N.D., the Company's
General Manager, nor its Counsel of record, Mr. Paul Andrew,
Mitchell, B.A., M.S., is a licensed attorney. The Company's
pleadings to date were filed by Counsel. Therefore, in Miskell's
opinion, they should be stricken from the record, because they
can only be filed on behalf of the Company by a licensed
attorney. So goes Miskell's illogic.
The Company will now prove that Miskell's logic is faulty,
that his true motives are suspect and, for these reasons, his
MOTION TO STRIKE should be tabled until such time as a competent
and lawful trial jury can be polled on certain issues of law and
fact which weigh heavily on this MOTION TO STRIKE.
The Rowland case very specifically dealt with a corporation,
but noted that "... [T]he lower courts have uniformly held that
28 U.S.C. 1654 ... does not allow corporations, partnerships, or
associations to appear in federal court other than through a
licensed attorney." See Miskell's accurate quotation on page 2
of his MOTION TO STRIKE. Since the Company is neither a
corporation, partnership, or an association, this ruling has
absolutely no bearing on the question now before us.
As has been repeatedly stated by the Company -- in the
opening paragraphs of almost every pleading, in affidavits, and
in open testimony before this honorable Court -- both Counsel and
Dr. Eugene A. Burns (hereinafter "Dr. Burns") have made it
abundantly clear to this Court that the Company is an
Unincorporated Business Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic.
An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth of the case.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 2 of 20
When Miskell attempted to argue in open Court that the
Company has no Fifth Amendment Immunity, he based his argument on
the faulty presumption that it is a corporation. Dr. Burns
rebutted this presumption at the podium and Miskell fell silent,
failing to provide any additional evidence or arguments in
support of his faulty presumption. No affidavit(s) have been
forthcoming from the United States to rebut any of the Company's
affidavits. Counsel now argues that Miskell has been estopped
from raising this issue again, because his silence at that moment
created an estoppel by acquiescence, given everything that has
already occurred in this case:
Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied
representation of the existence of the state of facts in
question, and the estoppel is accordingly a species of
estoppel by misrepresentation. [cite omitted] When silence
is of such a character and under such circumstances that it
would become a fraud upon the other party to permit the
party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has
induced the other to believe and act upon, it will operate
as an estoppel.
[Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906)]
[emphasis added]
Miskell goes on incorrectly to cite United States of America
v. Stepard et al., 876 F.Supp. 214, 215 (D.Ariz., Oct. 4, 1994).
In this case, a motion to strike answers filed on behalf of
trusts by a non-attorney trustee was granted. A copy of this
two-page decision is attached, for the Court's convenience.
Because Stepard may appear to be controlling in the instant case,
on behalf of the Court and the Company, its chosen Counsel of
record will analyze Stepard carefully to show that it, too, has
no real application to the instant case.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 3 of 20
First of all, under separate cover, Counsel has already
filed the Company's NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AND RECONSIDERATION, AND CHALLENGE TO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT, served via mail on June 9, 1996. This pleading is now
incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein; it goes
into great depth to explain the crucial distinction that must be
made between the "United States of America," on the one hand, and
the "United States," on the other hand.
Miskell misquotes the Stepard case by listing the "United
States" as the Plaintiff in that case; however, close
examination of the published opinion reveals that the real
Plaintiff was the "United States of America." Counsel argues
that the Stepard court was improperly convened because Congress
has not granted standing to the "United States of America" to
bring the action described in that decision.
Furthermore, the Stepard case makes no distinction between a
statutory trust, on the one hand, and a pure (or Common Law)
trust, on the other hand. Counsel has already briefed this Court
in depth on the crucial distinction between the two kinds of
trusts. See the Company's NOTICE OF OFFER WITHDRAWAL; PETITION
FOR CLARIFICATION, FOR RECONSIDERATION, FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND
FOR ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE; WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES,
particularly pages 16 thru 23 inclusive. The law and facts as
stated in said pages also remain unrebutted by Miskell, again
activating the operation of estoppel against his faulty premises.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 4 of 20
Specifically, the Company consists of Individuals who are
Citizens of Arizona state, and who, therefore, are entitled to
certain fundamental Rights, Privileges, and Immunities such as
those guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities clause [Art.
IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 1] of the U.S. Constitution, which do not apply
to corporations or other "artificial entities." See 296 U.S.
344, 56 S.Ct. 289. Again, Miskell's silence in the face of this
pleading has activated estoppel by acquiescence.
The Stepard Court may have been correct for applying
statutory rules to the trust defendants in that case, if indeed
they were statutory trusts; however, the Company is not in the
same class as a statutory trust. The Company hereby makes this
offer to prove, conclusively, that it is not a statutory trust by
placing into evidence the original trust indenture document, but
only on the condition that its disclosure is first authorized by
the individual(s) currently empowered to do so. Dr. Burns is
presently not authorized to disclose said indenture without prior
written permission of the Trustee, and He is subject to criminal
sanction if He does disclose such a document without prior
written permission. See "Non-Disclosure Agreement" already filed
in the official Court record of the instant case.
Finally, the Stepard case is short, lacks erudition, and
flies in the face of the mountain of law and history which have
already been presented to this Court in the Company's previously
filed NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL OF CHOICE, and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF COMPANY'S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING THE
FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Sixth
Amendment (hereinafter "COUNSEL DEMAND").
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 5 of 20
Counsel submits that the Stepard court was biased by an
organized syndicate of prejudice within all branches of the
federal and state governments against trusts like International
Tax Strategies because they are classified as "illegal tax
protestor" schemes.
The Stepard court made a big deal of an isolated and generic
paragraph from C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d
696 (1987) in which Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gushed forth
concerning the "reciprocal relationship between the bar and the
bench," as follows:
The reciprocal relationship between the bar and the bench
permits an exception only for a person acting personally. A
federal court rightly expects a lawyer to represent a
litigant. By its supervision of the bar and through it
[sic] reliance on lawyers before it, the court is enabled to
function. Professional competence and professional
responsibility are the sine qua non of federal litigation
and effective judicial response.
[U.S.A. v. Stepard, 876 F.Supp. 214, 215 (D.Ariz. 1994)]
[quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696 (1987)
It may be true that a federal court "expects" a lawyer or
attorney to represent a litigant, but the Faretta case proves
that there is no such requirement. See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), a landmark case in American constitutional
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Company's COUNSEL DEMAND goes into
great detail to frame this "reciprocal relationship" in terms
which are closer to the truth, namely, the bar associations have
become a closed-shop monopoly bent on self-aggrandizement.
The purpose of this monopoly has not really changed since
the ratification of the original Thirteenth Amendment in 1819.
By the time this Amendment had become Law, the abusive business
and questionable legal practices of this monopoly had become
unbearable, even to American lawmakers. "By its supervision of
the bar and through its reliance on lawyers before it, the court
is enabled to function," all the better to perpetuate the
restraint of trade and the impairment of contracts which are
repeatedly perpetrated by this monopoly, not to mention a host of
other serious, even criminal abuses. See the Company's COUNSEL
DEMAND for details, filed separately and incorporated herewith.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 6 of 20
Furthermore, the ratification of the original Thirteenth
Amendment raises another host of serious questions having to do
with the forfeiture of citizenship and the disqualification from
serving in any state or federal public offices. The organic U.S.
Constitution does contain a specific prohibition against Titles
of Nobility. See Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. However, this
provision failed to define any penalties for exercising Titles of
Nobility. The Thirteenth Amendment cured this failure by
reiterating the ban on Titles of Nobility, and by carefully
defining two penalties for their exercise: (1) the loss of
citizenship and (2) the disqualification from serving in public
office anywhere in America. That Amendment reads:
Article XIII.
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim,
receive, or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall,
without the consent of congress, accept and retain any
present, pension, office or emolument of any kind whatever,
from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such
person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and
shall be incapable of holding any office or profit under
them, or either of them.
[Thirteenth Amendment, emphasis added]
The Exhibits attached to this pleadings are incorporated here by
reference as if set forth fully herein. These include a
certified copy of the Constitution of the United States as found
in the Colorado State Archives and Public Records as of the year
1867 (one year before the so-called Fourteenth Amendment). It is
very revealing that these archives also show a Fourteenth
Amendment which bans slavery; it is not the so-called Fourteenth
Amendment which has generated so much litigation, and so much
controversy, since it was forced down the throats of 10 Southern
States immediately after the Civil War:
Article XIV.
1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
[Amendments to the Constitution of the United States]
[Colorado State Archives and Public Records]
[Printed 1867]
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 7 of 20
The attached essay entitled "Esquires" by author John E.
Trumane, all rights reserved, goes into some of the many
astounding (even shocking) implications that can, and must, be
drawn from the relatively recent discovery that the original
Thirteenth Amendment was, indeed, lawfully ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article V in the U.S. Constitution. It
was in the year 1819 that Virginia's passage of this Amendment
put it over the top and into the U.S. Constitution.
The essay by author Joyce Rosenwald entitled "Bar
Associations Maintain Monopoly through the 'Unauthorized Practice
of Law,'" raises a number of complementary issues, including a
provision in the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") which
allows any person compelled to appear before an administrative
agency to be accompanied, represented, or advised by counsel or
by other qualified representative. See 5 U.S.C. 555(b). In
particular:
This subsection does not grant or deny a person who is not a
lawyer the right to appear for or represent others before an
agency or in an agency proceeding.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 8 of 20
Rosenwald describes how this law was challenged by the Bar
Association in the case of Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. the
Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963).
This case involved a non-attorney (i.e. unlicensed) authorized to
represent clients before the U.S. Patent Office. The Florida Bar
claimed he was violating that state's practice-of-law statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Supremacy Clause in the
U.S. Constitution gave federal laws supremacy over conflicting
state laws. The High Court ruled:
... [D]espite protests of the bar, Congress in enacting the
Administrative Procedure Act refused to limit the right to
practice before the administrative agencies to lawyers:
Article IX of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in 1776
guaranteed "[t]hat in all prosecutions for criminal
offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himself and his
council ...." The Vermont Declaration of Rights (Art. X) in
1777 protected the right of self-representation with
virtually identical language. The Georgia Constitution
(Art. LVIII) in 1777 declared that its provisions barring
the unauthorized practice of law were "not intended to
exclude any person from that inherent privilege of every
freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause." In 1780 the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Art. XII, provided that
the accused had a right to be heard "by himself, or his
counsel at his election." The New Hampshire Bill of Rights
(Art. XV) in 1783 affirmed the right of the accused "to be
fully heard in his defence by himself, and counsel." In
1792 the Delaware Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 7) preserved
the right in language modeled after Art. IX of the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights. Similarly, in 1798
Georgia included in its Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 8) a
provision that protected the right of the accused to defend
"by himself or counsel, or both."
[Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. the Florida Bar]
[373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963)
[emphasis added]
It is notable that the Stepard case cited supra bases its holding
on Rule 31(a)(3) of the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, to
wit:
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 9 of 20
Except as hereinafter provided in subsection 4 of this
section (a), no person shall practice law in this state or
hold himself out as one who may practice law in this state
unless he is an active member of the state bar.
It is revealing that the Stepard court did not take the time
to investigate the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Sperry case cited above, or any of the many authorities cited in
the Company's COUNSEL DEMAND. One could argue that Sperry
concerned non-licensed counsels appearing before administrative
agencies (executive branch), whereas Stepard concerned non-
licensed trustees appearing in a courtroom (judicial branch).
Counsel argues that the U.S. Constitution is the last word in
this debate, and that the Sixth and original Thirteenth
Amendments are the supreme controlling Law in the instant case.
The etymology of the word "attorney" is also extremely
revealing for demonstrating the hidden agenda of the monopolistic
bar associations. The word "attorney" is derived from the word
"attorn" which, in feudal law, is to turn or transfer homage and
service from one lord to another:
ATTORN. v.i. ... In the feudal law, to turn, or transfer
homage and service from one lord to another. This is the
act of feudatories, vassals or tenants, upon the alienation
of the estate. Blackstone. Encyc.
ATTORNEY. n. [ ... One who takes the turn or place of
another. See Attorn and Turn.]
[American Dictionary of the English Language]
[Noah Webster, First Edition, 1828]
[emphasis added]
This same meaning has been preserved right up to the present
time. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, a similar
definition is found:
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 10 of 20
ATTORN. To turn over; to transfer to another money or
goods; to assign to some particular use or service.
Hemminger v. Klaprath, 15 N.J. Misc. 163, 189 A. 363, 364.
To consent to the transfer of a rent or reversion. To agree
to become tenant to one as owner or landlord of an estate
previously held of another, or to agree to recognize a new
owner of a property or estate and promise payment of rent to
him. Hurley v. Stevens, 220 Mo.App. 1057, 279 S.W. 720,
722.
Feudal Law
To turn over; to transfer to another money or goods;
to assign to some particular use or service. 2 Bla.Comm.
288; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 137.
Where a lord aliened his seigniory, he might, with the
consent of the tenant, and in some cases without, attorn or
transfer the homage and service of the latter to the alienee
or new lord. Bract. fols. 81b, 82.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1951]
And, in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, published in the year 1870, we
find almost identical language:
ATTORN. To turn over; to transfer to another money or
goods; to assign to some particular use or service.
Kennet, Paroch. Antiq. 283.
Used of a lord's transferring the homage and service of
his tenant to a new lord. Bract. 81, 82; 1 Sullivan, Lect.
227.
To transfer services or homage.
Thus, it appears that "attorneys" who are licensed to
"practice law" in "feudal" courts by the State Bar of Arizona are
actually involved in a monopoly whose main purpose is to oversee
the transfer of money or other goods from clients to themselves
and to the members of their "association." This is particularly
the case when the money or other goods (the "estate") are to be
transferred from the homage and service of one lord to a new and
completely different lord. Simply substitute "The Bank" and "The
Fund" for "a new and completely different lord," and you have
solved the riddle of contemporary feudal "laws."
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 11 of 20
Indeed, since The Bank and The Fund now claim to have
perfected a multi-trillion dollar "lien" against the American
People and their assets:
$5,000,000,000,000.00
it is completely consistent with "feudal" law that "attorneys"
are "expected" to facilitate the transfer of property into the
ownership and control of those foreign principals. This is,
indeed, the reciprocal relationship between the bar and the bench
to which the Stepard case referred: "By its supervision of the
bar and through its reliance on lawyers before it, the court is
enabled to function" (read "collect money"). Can it be that
American courts are now unduly influenced by The Bank and The
Fund, in a rolling rehypothecation imposed by an artificial
"bankruptcy" begun in 1933 with FDR'S "Bank Holiday"?
Of course, we are actually operating now under FEUDAL LAW,
also known as FEDERAL LAW, also known as inland admiralty. For
proof, see the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(h), which
mentions (but does not show) the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. You must work hard to get access
to these rules, because they are a well kept secret, very much
like the regulations which implement the Buck Act. Witness the
following language, found in the private library of a bankruptcy
attorney in Phoenix, Arizona:
It is quite possible that a financially troubled taxpayer,
who has deferred payment of an assessed tax, will not know
whether or when a tax lien has been imposed upon all his
property because initially the general tax lien is usually
of the secret variety. It arises automatically on the
occurrence of certain events and without express
notification to the taxpayer. ... The fact that the
Government may or may not file a notice of its lien in
appropriate public records has nothing whatever to do with
the validity of the lien against the taxpayer himself. With
a so-called secret lien, the Government's rights against the
taxpayer's property will be preserved against all but
subsequent purchasers, mechanics' lienors, judgement lien
creditors, holders of security interests, and a trustee in
bankruptcy.
[Federal Tax Liens, William T. Plumb, Jr.]
[American Law Institute, 1972, page 10]
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 12 of 20
The federal Constitution makes a careful distinction between
natural born Citizens of the states, and citizens of the United
States (compare 2:1:5 with Section 1 of the so-called 14th
Amendment). One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth,
who is endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights;
the other has been granted the revocable privileges of federal
citizenship, endowed by the Congress of the United States. See
"Federal citizenship" in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.
One is a Citizen, the other is a subject. One is a Sovereign,
the other is a subordinate. One is a Citizen of Our
constitutional Republic; the other is a citizen of a legislative
democracy (the feudal zone), where Roman Civil Law prevails.
Notice the superior/subordinate relationship between these
two statuses. We are forever indebted to M. J. "Red" Beckman,
co-author of The Law That Never Was with Bill Benson, for clearly
illustrating the important difference between the two. Red
Beckman has delivered many eloquent lectures based on the
profound simplicity of the following table:
Chain of command and authority in a:
Majority Rule Constitutional
Democracy Republic
X Creator
Majority Individual
Government Constitution
Public Servants Government
Case & Statute Law Public Servants
Corporations Statute Law
individual Corporations
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 13 of 20
In this illustration, a democracy ruled by the majority
places the individual at the bottom, and an unknown elite, Mr.
"X" at the top. The majority (or mob) elects a government to
hire public "servants" who write laws primarily for the benefit
of corporations. These corporations are either owned or
controlled by Mr. X, a clique of the ultra-wealthy who seek to
restore a two-class "feudal" society. They exercise their vast
economic power so as to turn all of America into a "feudal zone".
The rights of individuals occupy the lowest priority in this
chain of command. Those rights often vanish over time, because
democracies eventually self-destruct. The enforcement of laws
within this scheme is the job of administrative tribunals, who
specialize in holding individuals to the letter of all rules and
regulations of the corporate state, no matter how arbitrary and
with little if any regard for fundamental human Rights which are
normally guaranteed by "democratic" institutions:
A democracy that recognizes only manmade laws perforce
obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right.
[A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition]
[page 146, emphasis added]
In the Constitutional Republic, however, the Rights of
Individuals are Supreme. Individuals delegate their Sovereignty
to a written contract, called a Constitution, which empowers
government to hire public servants to write laws primarily for
the benefit of Individuals. The corporations occupy the lowest
priority in this chain of command, since their primary objectives
are to maximize the enjoyment of Individual Rights, and to
facilitate the fulfillment of Individual responsibilities.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 14 of 20
The enforcement of laws within this scheme is the
responsibility of Sovereign Individuals, who have created a
system of government which reserves to them the fundamental
Rights to exercise power in three arenas: the voting booth, the
trial jury, and the grand jury. Without a jury verdict of
"guilty", for example, no law can be enforced, no penalty
exacted, no punishment imposed. The behavior of public servants
is tightly restrained by contractual terms, as found in the
written Constitutions, both state and federal. Statutes and case
law are created primarily to limit and define the scope and
extent of public servant power.
This brings us full circle to Mr. Robert L. Miskell, a man
who purports to be a conscientious public servant, but whose
behavior has already implicated him in several counts of mail
fraud, jury tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, and
contempt of court. See all prior pleadings.
The evidence of these overt acts is found, of course, in the
very pleadings and voluminous documentary exhibits which he now
seeks to strike, forever, from the official court record in the
instant case. But of course, "Professional competence and
professional responsibility are the sine qua non of federal
litigation and effective judicial response." See Stepard supra,
one of the "controlling" cases upon which Miskell is basing his
MOTION TO STRIKE.
Are we to believe that multiple felonies are the mark of
professional competence and professional responsibility, the
"sine qua non" of federal litigation (without which there is
nothing)? We think not.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 15 of 20
Would Miskell have us believe that effective judicial
response is measured by the number of times he can get away
conspiring with named and unnamed accomplices to transfer (read
"attorn") property from Citizens of Arizona state, like Dr. Burns
and His colleagues, into the hands of his principals, whoever
they might be? After all, he works for the office of the United
States Attorn-ees.
These, indeed, are questions which should and MUST be
presented to a competent and lawful trial jury, to decide whether
Miskell's real motives for his MOTION TO STRIKE are not, in fact,
criminal to the core, and to decide whether or not he is using
his "licensed attorney" argument as a cloak and dagger to
continue what he has been making quite a profit doing for many
years now, at least since being fined $4,797 for repeatedly lying
to a federal Court in Phoenix. Such a fine is quite
extraordinary, at a low point in the integrity of the Justice
Department (some are calling it the "Just-US" Department).
The jury needs to examine, for example, the testimony and
evidence indicating that U.S. Attorneys (attorn-ees) are now
routinely receiving $25,000 from the "Internal Revenue Service"
(and the President $35,000) for each grand jury indictment they
succeed in obtaining against "illegal tax protestors," whatever
that might be.
Counsel submits that Dr. Burns and His associates have been
so classified by Miskell and his accomplices within the "Internal
Revenue Service" and the Department of Justice, both here in
Arizona and also in Washington, D.C. See the JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. AND MRS. EUGENE BURNS AND DR. AND MRS. SHELDON DEAL, recently
filed in the instant case (too recently for rebuttal).
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 16 of 20
Accordingly, Counsel hereby provides formal notice to all
interested parties of His formal challenge to each and every last
statute, regulation, rule, custom, practice, policy and procedure
which relies, either directly or indirectly, on this unlawful and
unconstitutional mis-classification.
Specifically, "protest" has never ever been "illegal" or
unlawful in this country. See the First Amendment. Moreover,
"protest" is a formal, legal declaration which is recognized by
the Uniform Commercial Code for explicitly reserving all Rights
which a Person then possesses, and prevents the loss of any of
those Rights by application of the concepts of waiver or
estoppel. The late Howard Freeman explained it this way:
U.C.C. 1-207:4 Sufficiency of reservation.
Any expression indicating any intention to preserve rights
is sufficient, such as "without prejudice," "under protest,"
"under reservation," or "with reservation of all our
rights."
The Code states an "explicit" reservation must be made.
"Explicit" undoubtedly is used in place of "express" to
indicate that the reservation must not only be "express" but
it must also be "clear" that such a reservation was
intended.
The term "explicit" as used in U.C.C. 1-207 means "that
which is so clearly stated or distinctively set forth that
there is no doubt as to its meaning." ...
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 17 of 20
U.C.C. 1-207:7 Effect of reservation of rights.
The making of a valid reservation of rights preserves
whatever rights the person then possesses and prevents the
loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or
estoppel ....
U.C.C. 1-207:9 Failure to make reservation.
When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to
make a reservation thereof causes a loss of the right and
bars its assertion at a later date ....
U.C.C. 1-103:6 Common law.
The Code is "Complementary" to the common law which remains
in force except where displaced by the Code ....
A statute should be construed in harmony with the common law
unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the
common law. ... "The Code cannot be read to preclude a
common law action."
["The Two United States and the Law"]
[undated essay by Howard Freeman]
In order for statutes and regulations utilizing the term
"illegal tax protestor" to be constitutional in the first
instance, the adjective "illegal" cannot modify the noun
"protestor"; it must modify the noun "tax", thus providing a
telling admission on the part of our vaulted Congress of what
many Americans have known for a long time, namely, that the tax
is illegal, not the protest, nor the protestors.
To brand human beings with this unconstitutional mis-
classification is bad enough; the "Internal Revenue Service"
then goes on to persecute such People, financially and otherwise,
by every means available in their arsenal of summary punishments,
without due process of law, and completely outside the restraints
which were put in place specifically to prevent this very kind of
thing from happening.
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 18 of 20
Let's call it for what it is: EXTORTION, and the syndicate
sponsoring it is a RACKET. It is, indeed, a return to low
fascism, and it is high time that Congress and the Courts put a
stop to it, if the President won't (remember, he gets money --
lots of it -- from this very same syndicate, if what we allege
about PMRS turns about to be true, in fact).
RELIEF SOUGHT
On behalf of the Company, Counsel hereby respectfully
demands this honorable Court to table the Motion to Strike, and
to order a jury trial to resolve substantial issues of law and
fact now in controversy, including but not limited to Miskell's
real motives for moving to strike material evidence implicating
him and other accomplices in a conspiracy of mail fraud, jury
tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury and contempt of court.
Counsel also respectfully requests an Order to the office of
the United States Attorney to show cause why the term "illegal
tax protestor" should not be stricken completely from all federal
laws, regulations, forms, schedules, rules, policies, practices,
procedures, and customs for being an oxymoron and an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.
Executed on June 10, 1996
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 19 of 20
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years
of age and a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
COMPANY'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, AND
CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
"ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTOR" CLASSIFICATIONS
by placing said document(s) with exhibits in first class United
States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
ROBERT L. MISKELL John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310 U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue 55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
JANET NAPOLITANO Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310 U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue 55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
Grand Jury Foreperson Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co. U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona Tucson, Arizona
Judge Alex Kozinski Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200 300 West Congress
Pasadena, California Tucson, Arizona
Attorney General Solicitor General
Department of Justice Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. ! 10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Dated: June 10, 1996
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
________________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Oppose Strike Motion, Demand Jury Trial, Challenge ITP Class:
Page 20 of 20
# # #
Return to Table of Contents for
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena