Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
and Vice President for Legal Affairs
c/o General Delivery at
2509 North Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without prejudice
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
In Re: ) Case No. #93-06051-PHX-GBN
)
New Life Health Center Company, ) MOVANT'S REBUTTAL TO
Debtor ) ATTORNEYS' RESPONSE TO
) APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION
) OF RIGHT, RELIEF FROM
) AUTOMATIC STAY, AND
________________________________) DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS;
) MOVANT'S OPPOSITION TO
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) ATTORNEYS' MOTION TO DISMISS:
)
Movant, ) Full Faith and Credit Clause
v. )
)
New Life Health Center Company )
et al., )
Respondents. )
________________________________)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state, expressly not a citizen of the United States, federal
witness (hereinafter "Movant"), and Vice President for Legal
Affairs of New Life Health Center Company, an unincorporated
business trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic (hereinafter
"Debtor"), to rebut all issues raised in DEBTOR'S RESPONSE TO
APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT, RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND MOTION TO DISMISS SAME, served upon
Movant by persons alleging to be authorized counsel for Debtor
(hereinafter "Debtors' attorneys").
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 1 of 15
For the convenience of this honorable Court, Movant
addresses the issues in the order of their appearance in said
RESPONSE, as follows (quotes in bold):
1. Debtor's attorneys allege that Movant was an
independent consultant [sic] for an extremely brief period [sic]
prior to June, 1996 [sic]. Quoting:
Applicant was, for an extremely brief period, an independent
consultant who did perform certain services, on an "as
needed basis", for Debtor prior to June, 1996.
Movant will now show that this claim is false, constructs a
fraudulent misrepresentation, and should be disregarded for
attempting to mislead this honorable Court, and for violating the
prohibition against same at 18 U.S.C. 157: bankruptcy fraud.
First, Movant was appointed to the office of Vice President
for Legal Affairs by means of an appointment which was witnessed,
and represented to be bona fide, by Dr. and Mrs. Eugene A. Burns,
by Mr. Neil T. Nordbrock, and by other accessories and co-
conspirators who thereby aided and abetted an act of outright
fraud upon Movant and upon the United States District Court,
Judicial District of Arizona. See 28 U.S.C. 82, 132.
Acting in Movant's capacity as Debtor's Vice President for
Legal Affairs, Movant prepared and either filed, or assisted in
filing, at least twenty-five (25) separate pleadings and other
documents In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health
Center Company, USDC Arizona, Tucson, case number #GJ-95-1-6
(hereinafter "grand jury case"). One of these 25 documents
contained a verified copy of Movant's appointment to said office,
in the form of an exhibit. See 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 2 of 15
At the second hearing on that matter, United States District
Judge John M. Roll admitted said appointment into evidence and,
on the strength of same, permitted Movant to address the USDC in
Movant's capacity as Vice President for Legal Affairs. Said
second hearing occurred on May 3, 1996.
Moreover, Movant's work for Debtor continued well into July
of 1996, and well beyond the false and misleading termination
date implied by Debtor's attorneys when they allege that Movant
did perform certain services prior to June, 1996. This would
necessarily imply that all pleadings submitted in the grand jury
case were prepared on, or before, May 31, 1996. The record is
quite otherwise, as will now be demonstrated.
As proof that the pleadings prepared and filed by Movant
necessitated work which was performed after May 31, 1996, Movant
attaches a true and correct copy of Movant's AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT
AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE, signed, dated, served, and filed in said
case, and incorporates same as if set forth fully herein (see
Exhibit "A"). This honorable Court will please take formal
judicial notice of the numerous entries which begin in Exhibit
"A" at page 7 of 10, line 15, showing a date of "06/03/96", and
which end at page 9 of 10, line 12, showing a date of "06/18/96".
Said AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT was executed by Movant on July 3, 1996.
Moreover, Movant continued to perform additional services
for Debtor, as evidenced by the draft PETITION FOR REHEARING EN
BANC which was completed pursuant to a verbal authorization by
Dr. Eugene A. Burns. Said PETITION was originally completed on
July 10, 1996, but Dr. Burns experienced an unexpected change of
heart and decided, at the last possible moment, against filing
said PETITION with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Said PETITION is attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth fully herein (see Exhibit "B").
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 3 of 15
July 25, 1996, was Movant's last working day on the premises
of the Debtor's administrative offices at 4500 East Speedway,
Suite 27, Tucson, Arizona state. This date is exhibited on
Movant's NOTICE AND DEMAND to Dr. Eugene A. Burns, a verified
copy of which has already been filed in the official record of
the instant case. See Movant's 3rd SUPPLEMENT TO APPLICATION FOR
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT, FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND
DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Accordingly, the record before this Court exhibits a clear
preponderance of documentary evidence which refutes the false and
misleading implication by Debtor's attorneys that Movant did not
perform any services for Debtor after May 31, 1996.
Furthermore, it is a gross distortion and misrepresentation
by Debtor's attorneys to state that Movant performed certain
services as an "independent consultant" [sic]. Movant's
appointment to the office of Vice President for Legal Affairs
gave Movant good cause to assume much greater responsibility for
the legal affairs of Debtor, than would ever be assumed, or even
implied, by the position of an "independent consultant" [sic].
On the other hand, if their use of the term "independent
consultant" is an oblique admission by Debtor's attorneys that
Movant was not lawfully appointed to the position of Debtor's
Vice President for Legal Affairs, Movant respectfully requests
this honorable Court to take specific judicial Notice of such an
important admission. Movant argues that such an admission should
figure centrally in future and final declaratory judgments which
this honorable Court has been requested to issue in the matter of
Movant's appointment to said office.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 4 of 15
2. As Vice President for Legal Affairs, Movant was
specifically retained by Debtor to counsel Debtor in the conduct
of Debtor's legal affairs, and Movant continues to serve others,
and to be retained by others, in His capacity as a Counselor at
Law. Confer at "Counsellor at Law" in Bouvier's Law Dictionary
(1856); at "Attorn" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
The Virginia Legislature was the last Union state required
to ratify the original Thirteenth Amendment (1819), and the
Commonwealth of Virginia did, in fact, approve that proposal.
See Full Faith and Credit Clause. The U.S. Secretary of State is
prohibited from ignoring facts in evidence, and from issuing
declarations which presume facts which are not in evidence.
Movant believes, based on 7+ years of intensive constitutional
research, that Movant would forfeit His state Citizenship and His
eligibility to serve in any public office anywhere in America,
should Movant accept a bar license of any kind. See Legislative
History of the original Thirteenth Amendment.
3. Debtor's attorneys make an even more absurd statement
by misreading the pleadings which Movant has already filed in a
related civil case in the Pima County Consolidated Justice Court,
Mitchell v. Nordbrock, #CV-97-3438. Said statement reads:
... Applicant has filed certain papers ... apparently
seeking to have certain Arizona federal judges, United
States attorneys (including Janet Reno and Janet Napolitano)
and others (including one of the undersigned) involuntarily
committed to an unspecified alcohol rehabilitation program.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 5 of 15
Movant now briefly demonstrates to this honorable Court why
the statement immediately above is totally and completely false.
Because Movant has witnessed habitual alcohol abuse by
Debtor's accountant, one Neil T. Nordbrock, and because Mr.
Nordbrock embezzled approximately $3,000 which Movant entrusted
to Mr. Nordbrock's care and management, Movant sued Mr. and Mrs.
Neil T. Nordbrock for embezzlement and other specified damages.
See Mitchell v. Nordbrock, Pima County Consolidated Justice
Court, Tucson, case number #CV-97-3438.
After filing and serving the original complaint in that
case, Movant filed in said Justice Court a PETITION TO ORDER
DEFENDANTS INTO INVOLUNTARY ALCOHOL REHABILITATION, AND TO SEAL
THE CASE FILE FOR REASONS OF PRIVACY. Movant thereby sought an
order instructing Mr. and Mrs. Neil T. Nordbrock to enter
involuntary alcohol rehabilitation, supervised by Pima County
Adult Probation Services. A true and correct copy of said
PETITION is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if
set forth fully herein (see Exhibit "C").
At no time has Movant ever petitioned the Pima County
Consolidated Justice Court, or any other court in America,
"seeking to have certain Arizona federal judges, United States
attorneys (including Janet Reno [sic] and Janet Napolitano), and
others ... involuntarily committed to an unspecified alcohol
rehabilitation program" [sic]. This is a lie!
On the contrary, Movant has been rather specific about the
two (2) individuals whom Movant wished to enter alcohol
rehabilitation, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Neil T. Nordbrock, and no
others.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 6 of 15
Moreover, Movant was also specific by requesting an order
instructing same to enter an involuntary alcohol rehabilitation
program, supervised by Pima County Adult Probation Services.
4. Debtor's attorneys allege that they are unable to
respond to Movant's application for relief from the automatic
stay and for declaratory relief, because the relief sought is
largely unintelligible. The statement in question now follows:
While Applicant's request for intervention is self-
explanatory, the Debtor is unable to respond to Applicant's
motion for relief from stay and request for declaratory
relief because the relief sought is largely unintelligible.
Movant is truly perplexed by this statement, because the
relief sought is rather clear and straightforward. Movant
intends to sue Debtor, and all of its officers, employees,
trustees, co-workers, subcontractors, counsels, accessories, and
co-conspirators, for a number of specified and unspecified
damages which were inflicted upon Movant prior to vacating the
Debtors' administrative offices on July 25, 1996, and afterwards,
continuing right up to the present time. The automatic stay is
usually presumed to bar any legal action against the Debtor,
unless the automatic stay is lifted by order of this Court.
Accordingly, Movant intends to amend the original complaint
in Mitchell v. Nordbrock supra, so as to name the Debtor and
others including, but not limited to, Ms. Sheryl Smith, Ms.
Rachel Saull, Dr. and Mrs. Eugene A. Burns, Dr. and Mrs. Sheldon
C. Deal, Mr. Tim Hay, and Ms. Susan Shew, who were previously or
are presently associated with the Debtor in one way or another,
as additional co-defendants in a case now required by Arizona
state law to be transferred to the Superior Court of Arizona.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 7 of 15
Therefore, Movant respectfully requests this honorable Court
to lift the automatic stay, so as to allow such an amended
complaint to proceed in the Superior Court of Arizona. Such a
goal should be rather intelligible, particularly to persons who
claim to be licensed attorneys, and possibly also college
graduates. Movant presumes Debtor's attorneys went to college.
5. Debtor's attorneys make an important admission, namely,
that Movant is a "party of interest" pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
1109(b). By now, that should obvious to this honorable Court,
and to all other interested party(s).
6. Debtor's attorneys perform the obligatory denials, as
follows:
To the extent relevant, the Debtor denies that Cheryl Smith
is a fictitious person whose name has been used for
fraudulent purposes. Debtor further denies that Applicant
has incurred any damages or that Applicant has any claim
against the Debtor.
Movant submits that Debtor's attorneys have made this
statement, because it is the only way Debtor can avoid inevitable
summary judgments which Movant will respectfully request this
Court to issue, in the face of the preponderance of adverse
evidence which Movant has already filed in the instant case.
To this end, Movant provides formal Notice to all interested
party(s), and demands mandatory judicial Notice by this honorable
Court, of Movant's intent to issue a proper and lawful subpoena
to "Sheryl Smith" [sic], to compel her appearance before this
honorable Court and to compel her sworn testimony concerning
Movant's claims, but only after obtaining leave of this honorable
Court formally to intervene in the instant case.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 8 of 15
Further on, Debtor's attorneys made another false and
misrepresentative statement concerning the docket fee:
Finally, upon information and belief, Applicant has failed
to pay the requisite filing fee and, therefore, Applicant's
request for relief from the automatic stay should be denied.
Movant wishes this honorable Court to take special notice of
another lie from Debtor's attorneys. Their Response to Movant's
Application is dated May 27, 1997. Movant's filing fee was paid
via United States Postal Money Order purchased and mailed on
April 26, 1997, one whole month before their Response was signed.
Accordingly, this honorable Court should order Debtor's
attorneys to show cause why they should not be charged with
barratry, for demonstrating negligence and unethical conduct by
failing to make a simple telephone call to the Clerk of Court, to
confirm whether or not Movant's filing fee had been paid before
May 27, 1997. Confer at "Barratry" in Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition (with pronunciations).
7. Debtor's attorneys also allege that Movant's
application for declaratory relief is procedurally improper, in
that it can only be brought as an adversary proceeding pursuant
to Rule 7001 et seq. Quoting now:
With respect to Applicant's apparent motion for declaratory
relief, such relief is procedurally improper in that it
could only be brought as an adversary proceeding pursuant to
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 et seq.
By simultaneously requesting intervention of Right,
declaratory judgments, and relief from the automatic stay, Movant
by no means intends to imply that Movant has any procedural Right
to prosecute an adversary proceeding, until and unless this Court
should grant Movant's applications for relief from the automatic
stay and for intervention of Right, in the first instance. Only
then could this Court properly consider granting, or denying,
Movant's application for declaratory judgments and other relief.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 9 of 15
Specifically, should this honorable Court grant Movant's
application to lift the automatic stay, there is no procedural
reason known to Movant why this Court could not then consider
Movant's applications for intervention of Right, for declaratory
judgments, and for all other relief which this Court deems just
and proper, including, but not limited to, requests to
consolidate the instant case with the personal bankruptcy of Dr.
and Mrs. Eugene A. Burns, #96-01624-TUC, and/or to dismiss both
bankruptcy cases with prejudice, for their having committed fraud
upon both courts (U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Phoenix and Tucson).
In summary, this Court should first rule on Movant's
applications to lift the automatic stay and for intervention of
right. Assuming that the automatic stay is lifted and the
intervention of right is granted, this Court should then consider
Movant's application for declaratory judgments and all other
relief which this Court deems just and proper.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, all premises having been considered, Movant
respectfully requests this honorable Court to enter orders:
(1) denying the request by Debtor's attorneys that Movant's
Application be dismissed;
(2) lifting the automatic stay;
(3) granting Movant leave to intervene by Right in the
instant case; and,
(4) requiring Debtor's attorneys to show cause why they
should not be charged with barratry and fraud, for
their unethical, false, and fallacious statements now
filed in the instant case. See Article VI, Clause 3.
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 10 of 15
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the "United States" (federal government), that the above
statements of fact are true and correct, according to the best of
My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: May 30, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without prejudice
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 11 of 15
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States" (federal government), that I
am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of one of the United
States of America, and that I personally served the following
document(s):
MOVANT'S REBUTTAL TO ATTORNEYS' RESPONSE
TO APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT,
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY, AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS;
MOVANT'S OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEYS' MOTION TO DISMISS:
Full Faith and Credit Clause
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
New Life Health Center Company Christopher H. Bayley
c/o 4500 E. Speedway, #27 Todd V. Jones
Tucson 85712/tdc c/o 400 E. Van Buren
ARIZONA STATE One Arizona Center
Phoenix 85004-0001/tdc
ARIZONA STATE
United States Trustees
c/o P.O. Box 36170
Phoenix 85067-6170/tdc
ARIZONA STATE
Creditors' Committee
In re: New Life Health Center Company
c/o United States Trustee
P.O. Box 36170
Phoenix 85067-6170/tdc
ARIZONA STATE
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Executed on May 30, 1997:
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 12 of 15
Exhibit "A":
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on
New Life Health Center Company
USDC Arizona, Tucson, #GJ-95-1-6
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 13 of 15
Exhibit "B":
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC:
U.S.A. v. Eugene Arthur Burns
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, #96-16145
[draft: not filed]
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 14 of 15
Exhibit "C:"
PETITION TO ORDER DEFENDANTS INTO
INVOLUNTARY ALCOHOL REHABILITATION,
AND TO SEAL THE CASE FILE
FOR REASONS OF PRIVACY:
Mitchell v. Nordbrock,
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Tucson, #CV-97-3438
Rebuttal to Attorneys' Response and Motion to Dismiss:
Page 15 of 15
# # #
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