Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]
MINNESOTA STATE
 
In Propria Persona
 
Under Protest and
by Special Visitation
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 
                         EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 97-2099-MNST
          Plaintiff [sic]/      )
          Appellees,            )  USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
     v.                         )
                                )
EVERETT C. GILBERTSON [sic],    )
          Defendant [sic]/      )
          Appellant.            )
________________________________)
                                )
Everett C. Gilbertson,          )  DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
          Plaintiff/Appellant,  )
     v.                         )  NOTICE OF MOTION,
                                )  MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY
United States,                  )  JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND
James M. Rosenbaum,             )  APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
and Does 2-99,                  )  TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF:
          Respondents.          )  FRAP Local Rule 28A(e),(j);
                                )  Rule 201(c), Federal Rules
________________________________)  of Evidence
 
COMES NOW  Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Minnesota
 
state, expressly  not a  citizen of  the United  States ("federal
 
citizen"),  and   Appellant  in   the   above   entitled   matter
 
(hereinafter  "Appellant"),  to  provide  formal  Notice  to  all
 
interested  party(s),   to  move   this   honorable   Court   for
 
discretionary judicial  notice, pursuant  to Rule  201(c) of  the
 
Federal Rules  of Evidence,  and to  apply for  leave to  file an
 
enlarged  REPLY BRIEF, pursuant  to Local Rules 28A(e) and (j) of
 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP").
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 1 of 6

     Appellant respectfully  requests  judicial  notice  by  this
 
honorable Court  of the  pleading entitled  DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
 
AND DEMAND  TO STAY  PROCEEDINGS PENDING  FINAL REVIEW  OF FORMAL
 
CHALLENGE TO  JUROR AND VOTER REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS, as filed
 
July 8,  1997, in Mitchell v. Nordbrock, Pima County Consolidated
 
Justice Court,  Tucson, Arizona,  case number  #CV-97-3438.  Said
 
pleading (hereinafter  "Arizona Pleading") is attached hereto and
 
incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein.  Arizona
 
state is in the Ninth Circuit.
 
     The two exhibits attached to the Arizona Pleading are nearly
 
identical in  form, and substance, to the corresponding MOTION TO
 
STAY PROCEEDINGS  and the VERIFIED STATEMENT, as previously filed
 
by Appellant, more than once, in the trial court below.
 
     The  Complaint of  Judicial  Misconduct  which  follows  the
 
VERIFIED STATEMENT  infra was  filed  by  Paul  Andrew  Mitchell,
 
Counselor  at   Law,  against  U.S.  District  Judge  William  D.
 
Browning, who  presided over  the trial  of Sheila  T. Wallen  in
 
U.S.A. v. Wallen, USDC, Arizona, case number #95-484-WDB.
 
     Appellant requests  discretionary judicial  notice  of  said
 
Complaint of  Judicial Misconduct,  in part  to  demonstrate  the
 
consistent lack  of professionalism  which the  federal judiciary
 
has exhibited, when presented with the uncontested facts and laws
 
previously documented,  under penalty  of perjury and outside the
 
United States,  in  Appellant's  MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS   and
 
requisite VERIFIED STATEMENT.  See 28 U.S.C. 1746(1) in chief.
 
     Appellant hereby  directs the  attention of  this  honorable
 
Court to  the following key points of law which are elaborated in
 
some detail in the Arizona Pleading, to wit:
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 2 of 6

     (1)  The  "Right of Election"  is established and recognized
          by the  Maine Supreme  Court, Appleton concurring at 44
          Maine  528-529  (1859).    The  Maine  Legislature  had
          requested that court's judicial opinion, in response to
          the  holding  in  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19  How.  393
          (1856).
 
     (2)  The  existence  of two (2) classes of citizenship under
          American law,  never repealed,  is also  recognized  by
          numerous authorities infra, both state and federal.
 
     (3)  The proper construction and common understanding of the
          Qualifications Clauses  are also  explored  thoroughly,
          with pertinent  citations dating back to the California
          Constitution of 1849,  and subsequently in People v. De
          La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870) infra.
 
     (4)  The cases  recognize that  one may  be a citizen of the
          United States  ("federal citizen") without also being a
          Citizen of  any particular Union state.  See e.g. Hough
          v. Societe  Electrique Westinghouse  de Russie,  231 F.
          341, (USDC, NY, 1916).
 
     (5)  The cases also recognize that Americans may be Citizens
          of a  Union state  without also being federal citizens.
          See McDonel  v. State,  90 Ind.  320 (1883);  Crosse v.
          Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431 (1966);
          11 C.J.,  Section 3,  page 777  and cases cited therein
          (Harding, McDonel, Fowler).
 
     (6)  The cases  also recognize  that, both  before and after
          the so-called  Fourteenth amendment  [sic], it  has not
          been necessary for one to be a federal citizen in order
          to be a Citizen of a Union state.
 
     (7)  The failure to capitalize the "C" in "Citizen", as that
          term is used in the Qualifications Clauses, has created
          an immense,  nearly immeasurable,  amount of  confusion
          among references  to state  and federal  citizenship in
          all federal  and state  laws which  utilize the  phrase
          "citizen of the United States" [sic].
 
     (8)  It is  also clear  that this confusion was intentional,
          in order to co-opt the American People into associating
          with a political jurisdiction which is not protected by
          the  Guarantee Clause.    The  United  States  (federal
          government) is  not required  to guarantee a Republican
          Form of  Government to  the federal  zone, only  to the
          state zone [sic].  See Guarantee Clause.
 
     (9)  Congress cannot  by legislation alter the Constitution,
          from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and
          within  whose  limitations  alone  that  power  can  be
          lawfully exercised.   See  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
          189 (1919)  (holding predicated  on ratification of the
          16th amendment [sic] as applied to the term "income").
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 3 of 6

     (10) The  Qualifications Clauses have  never  been  amended,
          despite recent efforts to impose limits on the terms of
          federal Representatives  and/or  Senators.    Appellant
          agrees that  limits upon the terms of federal lawmakers
          would require  an amendment  to the  U.S. Constitution.
          See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842,
          131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995).
 
     (11) It  is   a  cardinal   rule  in  dealing  with  written
          instruments that  they  are  to  receive  an  unvarying
          interpretation, and  that their  practical construction
          is to  be uniform.   See Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind.
          327, 335 (1874);  Qualifications Clauses, 3:2:1, 4:2:1.
 
     (12) Citizenship is  a term  of municipal law.  Prior to the
          1866  Civil   Rights  Act,   which  legislated  federal
          citizenship into  existence as  a municipal  franchise,
          one and only one class of citizenship was recognized by
          the  U.S. Constitution.    Thus,  prior  to  1866,  all
          constitutional references  to "Citizen  of  the  United
          States"  and   "citizen  of  the  United  States"  were
          identical  in  all respects.   See  Roa v. Collector of
          Customs,  23 Philippine 315,  332  (1912);    Murphy v.
          Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);  People v. De La Guerra, 40
          Cal. 311, 342 (1870) infra.
 
 
                        REMEDY REQUESTED
 
     Appellant respectfully requests this honorable Court to take
 
formal judicial  Notice of all authorities cited herein, pursuant
 
to Rule  201(c) of  the Federal  Rules of  Evidence, and to grant
 
Appellant leave to file an enlarged REPLY BRIEF, pursuant to FRAP
 
Local Rules  28A(e) and  (j).   Appellant also  requests leave to
 
incorporate the instant application into Appellant's REPLY BRIEF,
 
now in preparation, as if set forth fully therein.
 
 
                          VERIFICATION
 
I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
 
of perjury,  under the  laws of  the United  States  of  America,
 
without the "United States", that the above statement of facts is
 
true  and  correct,  to  the  best  of  My  current  information,
 
knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, per 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 4 of 6

Dated: ______________________________
 
 
Respectfully submitted,
 
 
 
______________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 5 of 6

                        PROOF OF SERVICE
 
I,  Everett  C.  Gilbertson,  Sui Juris,  hereby  certify,  under
 
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of
 
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
 
of age,  a Citizen  of one  of the  United States of America, and
 
that I personally served the following document(s):
 
   NOTICE OF MOTION, MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL NOTICE,
        AND APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF:
                  FRAP Local Rules 28A(e), (j);
             Rule 201(c), Federal Rules of Evidence
 
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
 
class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
 
Attorney General                   James M. Rosenbaum
Department of Justice              United States District Court
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               MINNESOTA STATE
 
Solicitor General                  Henry Shea
Department of Justice              United States Attorneys
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               MINNESOTA STATE
 
Courtesy copies to:
 
William H. Rehnquist, C.J.         Clarence Thomas, J.
U.S. Supreme Court                 U.S. Supreme Court
One First Street N.E.              One First Street N.E.
Washington [zip code exempt]       Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA               DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell               Alex Kozinski (supervising)
Counselor at Law, federal witness  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Ave., #1776   125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200
Tucson [zip code exempt]           Pasadena [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE                      CALIFORNIA STATE
 
[See USPS Publication 221 for addressing instructions.]
 
 
Dated:  ______________________________________
 
 
______________________________________________
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
 
    Requests for Judicial Notice/Leave to File Enlarged Brief:
                          Page 6 of 6

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Attachment "A":
 
 
                    DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
                 DEMAND FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
            PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL CHALLENGE
          TO JUROR AND VOTER REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS:
            ARS 21-201, ARS 16-101;  Guarantee Clause
 
                      Mitchell v. Nordbrock
 
             Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
                   Pima County, Arizona state
                     Case Number #CV-97-3438

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
c/o General Delivery at:
2509 North Campbell Avenue
Tucson, Arizona state
 
In Propria Persona
 
All Rights Reserved
Without Prejudice
 
 
 
 
 
             PIMA COUNTY CONSOLIDATED JUSTICE COURT
 
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell,           )  Case Number #CV-97-3438
          Plaintiff,            )
                                )  DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
     v.                         )  DEMAND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
                                )  PENDING FINAL REVIEW OF FORMAL
Neil and Evelyn Nordbrock,      )  CHALLENGE TO JUROR AND VOTER
Lawrence E. Condit,             )  REGISTRANT QUALIFICATIONS:
W. U. Weber, and                )
Does 1 to 100,                  )  ARS 21-201, ARS 16-101;
          Defendants.           )  Guarantee Clause
________________________________)
 
COMES NOW  Paul Andrew  Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen  of  Arizona
 
state, expressly  not a  citizen of  the United  States ("federal
 
citizen") and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
 
"Plaintiff"), to  demand a trial by jury in the instant case, and
 
also to  demand an  indefinite stay of proceedings, pending final
 
review of  Plaintiff's formal  challenge to the constitutionality
 
of Arizona  Revised Statutes 16-101 and 21-201, for violating the
 
Guarantee Clause  in the  Constitution for  the United  States of
 
America, as  lawfully amended,  and to  provide formal  Notice of
 
same to  all interested party(s).  Pursuant to the Full Faith and
 
Credit Clause,  and Rule 201(d) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence,
 
Plaintiff incorporates  by reference  the following documents, as
 
if set  forth fully herein, and demands mandatory judicial notice
 
of the following related cases, to wit:
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 1 of 16

     (1)  MOTION TO  STAY PROCEEDINGS  FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
          GRAND JURY  SELECTION POLICY,  AND NOTICE  OF CHALLENGE
          AND  CHALLENGE   TO   CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF   STATUTE,
          executed, served  and filed  in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
          United States  District  Court,  District  of  Arizona,
          Tucson,  case  number  #95-484-WDB.    Said  MOTION  is
          attached hereto  as  Exhibit "A"  and  incorporated  by
          reference as if set forth fully.
 
     (2)  VERIFIED STATEMENT  IN SUPPORT  OF CHALLENGE  TO  GRAND
          JURY  SELECTION   POLICY  AND   ITS  FEDERAL   STATUTE,
          executed, served  and filed  in U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen,
          United States  District  Court,  District  of  Arizona,
          Tucson, case  number #95-484-WDB.   Said  STATEMENT  is
          attached hereto  as  Exhibit "B"  and  incorporated  by
          reference as if set forth fully.
 
     (3)  OPENING BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson and Gilbertson v.
          U.S. et  al., filed  on June  18, 1997,  United  States
          Court of  Appeals for  the Eighth  Circuit, case number
          #97-2099-MNST, containing  a formal  challenge  to  the
          federal Jury  Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861
          et  seq.,   for  exhibiting  prohibited  discrimination
          against the  class of  People known  as Citizens of the
          United States of America, also known as state Citizens,
          who are  not also  citizens of  the United States, also
          known  as  federal  citizens,   by  Right  of Election.
          Confer at "Federal citizenship" in Black's supra.
 
     (4)  MOTION  TO   STAY  MANDATE   AND  PROCEEDINGS,  PENDING
          DISCOVERY OF  DOCUMENTS REQUESTED  UNDER THE  FOIA, AND
          FINAL RESOLUTION  OF CHALLENGE  TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
          THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT in U.S.A. v. Pixley,
          filed on June 25, 1997,  United States Court of Appeals
          for  the   Second  Circuit,   case   number   #96-1476,
          containing a  formal  challenge  to  the  federal  Jury
          Selection and  Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., for
          exhibiting prohibited  discrimination against the class
          of People  known as  Citizens of  the United  States of
          America, also known as state Citizens, who are not also
          citizens of  the United  States, also  known as federal
          citizens, by Right of Election.
 
     Pursuant to  the  Full Faith and  Credit  Clause,  and  Rule
 
201(d) of  the  Arizona  Rules  of  Evidence,  Plaintiff  demands
 
mandatory judicial  notice, and  provides formal  Notice  to  all
 
interested party(s),  of the  following authorities  and analysis
 
which prove  that there  is, in  American Law  never repealed,  a
 
Right of Election  whereby  American  Citizens  are  entitled  to
 
choose between state Citizenship and/or federal citizenship.
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 2 of 16

      Additional Citations Establishing a Right of Election
 
     That the  general principle  of such a right of electing, to
     remain under  the old  or to  contract a new allegiance, was
     recognized, is  apparent from the case of Com. v. Chapman, 1
     Dal., 53,  and other  cases cited.  Those who adhered to the
     new government  and transferred  their  allegiance  thereto,
     became citizens  of the  same.   All who were free, had this
     right of  election, else  they were not free.  No particular
     color nor  descent was  required to  confer  this  right  of
     election.   It resulted  from  freedom,  and  the  necessity
     resting upon all to make an election.  When it was made, and
     the individual determined to adhere to the new state, he was
     necessarily a  member  and  a  citizen  of  the  same.    He
     sustained the same relation to the new government by choice,
     which he had sustained to the old by birth.
 
                   [44 Maine 528-529 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]
 
     Mr. Kelley [of North Carolina]  ... "contended for the broad
     principle that  all men  are entitled  to equal  rights  and
     privileges;   that nothing  but arbitrary  power can  forbid
     their free  exercise, and  that it  is contrary  to all  the
     principles of  free government to tax a man and refuse him a
     right to  vote for a member to the legislature."  Debates on
     the Constitution of North Carolina in 1835, 357.
 
                       [44 Maine 533 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]
 
     Slavery is  therefore regarded  as a  condition imposed upon
     the individual by the municipal law.
 
                       [44 Maine 525 (1859), Appleton concurring]
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     ... [F]or it is certain, that in the sense in which the word
     "citizen" is  used in  the federal constitution, "citizen of
     each  state,"  and  "citizen  of  the  United  States,"  are
     convertible terms;   they  mean the  same thing;   for  "the
     citizens of  each state  are entitled  to all privileges and
     immunities of citizens in the several states," and "citizens
     of the  United States"  are, of  course, citizens of all the
     United States.
                       [44 Maine 518 (1859), Hathaway dissenting]
                          [italics in original, underlines added]
 
The following  additional citations  prove the  existence of  two
 
classes of citizenship:
 
     It does  not by  any means  follow, because  he has  all the
     rights and  privileges of a citizen of a state, that he must
     be a citizen of the United States.
 
                     [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405 (1856)]
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 3 of 16

     Under our  complex system  of  government  there  may  be  a
     citizen of a state who is not a citizen of the United States
     in the  full sense  of the  term.  This result would seem to
     follow unavoidably  from the  nature of  the two  systems of
     government.
                              [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 (1863)]
 
     This distinction between citizenship of the state and of the
     United States  is  also  very  clearly  implied  in  several
     provisions both  of the constitution and laws of this state.
     There, wherever  the full right of citizenship of the United
     States is intended, it is so expressed, as in respect to the
     office of  governor, lieutenant  governor or  judge,  it  is
     provided that  no person  shall be  eligible who  is  not  a
     "citizen of  the United  States."   This form  of expression
     would never  have been  used if it had been supposed that no
     person could  be a citizen of the state without being also a
     citizen of  the United  States.   In  that  case,  the  word
     "citizen" alone would have been used.
 
                       [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443 at 474 (1863)]
 
     ... [T]herefore, the militia law drops the language which is
     used when  a  full  citizenship  of  the  United  States  is
     intended, and provides that all able bodied "citizens" shall
     be liable  to military duty.  This change of phraseology was
     not accidental or unmeaning, but was entirely based upon the
     well understood  distinction between  a citizen of the state
     merely, and a citizen of the United States.
 
                         [In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 478 (1863)]
 
     The  first  clause of  the fourteenth amendment made negroes
     citizens of  the United States, and citizens of the State in
     which they  reside,  and  thereby  created  two  classes  of
     citizens, one  of the  United States  and the  other of  the
     state.
                      [Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874)]
                                     [headnote 8, emphasis added]
 
     Judge  Cooley,   in  his   great  work   on   Constitutional
     Limitations, on  page 54, says:  "A cardinal rule in dealing
     with written  instruments is  that they  are to  receive  an
     unvarying   interpretation,   and   that   their   practical
     construction is to be uniform."
 
                 [Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 335 (1874)]
 
     Is a  voter under  the constitution of the State of Indiana,
     though not  a citizen of the United States, eligible to hold
     the office  of township  trustee?   ... The constitution [of
     Indiana], and its fair interpretation, therefore, conduct us
     to the  conclusion that  the contestee  was eligible  to the
     office of  township trustee, and that he is entitled to hold
     it, and exercise its functions.
 
               [McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507, 509-511 (1878)]
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 4 of 16

     One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the
     United States.   Thomasson  v. State,  15 Ind. 449;  Cory v.
     Carter, 48  Ind. 327  (17 Am. R. 738);  McCarthy v. Froelke,
     63 Ind. 507;  In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.
 
                      [McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883)]
                                               [underlines added]
 
     For it  would seem  incompatible with the spirit of our laws
     to exclude  one from the jury box who was eligible to act as
     jury commissioner  in selecting  jurors;   or as  sheriff in
     empanneling a jury;  or as judge to preside at the trial.
 
                      [McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 324 (1883)]
 
     One may  be a  citizen of  a state, and yet not a citizen of
     the United States -- McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320.
 
       [4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
                                               [underlines added]
 
     The first  clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
     Constitution made negroes citizens of the United States, and
     citizens of  the state  in which  they reside,  and  thereby
     created two  classes of  citizens, one  of the United States
     and the  other of  the state -- Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327,
     17 Am. Rep. 738.
 
       [4 Dec. Dig. '06 -- Page 1197 (1906), "Citizens", Sec. 11]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]
 
     ... Rights  and privileges  of a  citizen of the state or of
     the United States.
 
                                [Harding v. Standard Oil Company]
                                   [182 F. 421 (USCC, Ill. 1910)]
 
     One may  be a  citizen of  the United  States, and yet not a
     citizen of any state.
 
             [Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse de Russie]
                                    [231 F. 341 (USDC, NY, 1916)]
 
     The following  letter to  Mr. Ray Feyereisen also contains a
 
wealth of  additional citations,  which not  only  establish  the
 
existence of  two classes of citizenship, but they also establish
 
that an  American may  be a  state Citizen  without also  being a
 
federal  citizen,  by  Right of Election.    The  letter  to  Mr.
 
Feyereisen now follows, to wit:
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 5 of 16

                                     c/o General Delivery
                                     San Rafael [zip code exempt]
                                     California state
 
                                     September 10, 1993
 
Ray Feyereisen
c/o General Delivery
Houston, Texas Republic
Postal Code 77253/tdc
 
Dear Ray:
 
     I did some more research today, to explore some of the cases
which support  the position  that one  can  be  a  State  Citizen
without necessarily  being a  citizen of  the United States.  You
already knew about Crosse;  here are the relevant paragraphs:
 
     Both  before  and  after  the  Fourteenth Amendment  to  the
     federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person
     to be  a citizen  of the  United States  in order  to  be  a
     citizen of  his state.  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
     542, 549,  23 L.Ed.  588 (1875);   Slaughter-House Cases, 83
     U.S. (16  Wall.) 36,  73-74, 21  L.Ed. 394  (1873);  and see
     Short v.  State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895).  See
     also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). ...
 
     [B]ut we  find nothing in Reum [City of Minneapolis v. Reum,
     56 F.  576, 581  (8th Cir.  1893)] or  any other  case which
     requires that a citizen of a state must also be a citizen of
     the United  States, if  no question  of  federal  rights  or
     jurisdiction is involved.  As the authorities referred to in
     the first  portion of  this opinion  evidence, the law is to
     the contrary.
                    [Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections]
             [221 A.2d 431 (1966), emphasis and underlines added]
 
Corpus Juris  is another source of authorities which support this
position:
 
     So a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a
     citizen of the United States46 ....
 
                                        [11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]
 
Footnote 46 lists the following cases:
 
     Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)
     McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)
     State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)
 
     The reference  librarian at  the County  Law Library  and  I
searched  in  vain for  McDonel v. State;   they're going  to put
their special  legal beagle  on that search.  Here's what Harding
said:
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 6 of 16

     In the  Constitution and  laws of the United States the term
     ["citizenship"] is  generally, if  not  always,  used  in  a
     political sense  to designate  one who  has the  rights  and
     privileges of  a citizen of a state or of the United States.
     Baldwin v.  Franks, 120  U.S. 678,  7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed.
     766.   A person  may be  a citizen of a state but not of the
     United States;   as, an alien who has declared his intention
     to become  a citizen,  and who  is by  local law entitled to
     vote in  the state  of his residence, and there exercise all
     other local  functions of local citizenship, such as holding
     office, right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen
     of  the  United States.    Taney,  C.J.,  in  Dred Scott  v.
     Sandford, 19  How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691;  Slaughterhouse Cases,
     16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.
 
       [Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al., 182 Fed. 421 (1910)]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]
 
I really love the pertinent quote from State v. Fowler, which was
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:
 
     A  person   who  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular  state in which he
     resides.   But  a person may  be a  citizen of  a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United  States.   To  hold
     otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise
     of its  sovereignty, --  the right  to declare  who are  its
     citizens.  The sovereignty of the citizens of a republic has
     its highest  assertion in  representative government, and is
     constituted in  its political order in the representation of
     persons, and not of classes or of interests.
 
                 [State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                                [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
 
The Crosse  court cites Short v. State, which came to essentially
the same conclusion in the following long passage:
 
     And then,  as to  the  objection  that  this  local  law  is
     repugnant to  that clause in the fourteenth amendment of the
     federal constitution  which declares  that "no  state  shall
     make or  enforce any  law which shall abridge the privileges
     or immunities  of citizens  of the  United  States,"  it  is
     sufficient to  say that the interpretation of that clause by
     the supreme  court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
     is a  complete  answer  to  this  objection.    There  is  a
     distinction, says Justice Miller, between citizenship of the
     United States and citizenship of a state.
 
          [Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895)]
                                  [emphasis and underlines added]
 
     The Crosse  court cites  Short v. State, but I could find in
the latter  decision no  statements which took the exact position
we are  seeking;   nevertheless, it  does cite the Slaughterhouse
Cases and  also Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.  In the Bradwell
case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, says:
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 7 of 16

     The  protection   designed  by  that  clause,  as  has  been
     repeatedly held,  has no  application to  a citizen  of  the
     state whose laws are complained of.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     Also, I  think I  have already mentioned this book, but it's
worth mentioning  again.  See if you can get your hands on a copy
of A  Treatise on  Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by
Alexander Porter Morse, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881.
Buried near  the end  of this  voluminous treatise  is a  section
entitled "State  Citizenship --  Its Existence".   In addition to
the big  cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank, he
mentions the following in his footnotes:
 
     Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
     Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591
     Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411
     Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536
     Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162
     Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267
     Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 344
 
He also  writes, "That there is a state citizenship, see Registry
Act of  California of  1865-1866, sect. 11."  I pulled it;  check
it out.
 
     So, you  thought you  were caught up with all your work, did
you?
 
     Carry on, and peace be with you.
 
Sincerely yours,
 
/s/ John E. Trumane
 
[end of letter to Mr. Feyereisen]
 
 
            Analysis of California state Constitution
 
     Plaintiff quotes  here from  the  California Constitution of
 
1849, signed  by Judge Pablo De La Guerra,  who  later identified
 
the proper  construction  of  the Qualifications Clauses, in  his
 
case  as  a  Respondent  in People v. De La Guerra,  40 Cal.  311
 
(1870).   Here is  a pertinent  paragraph  from  that  California
 
Constitution of 1849:
 
     Sec. 5.  Every citizen of California, declared a legal voter
     by this  Constitution,  and  every  citizen  of  the  United
     States, a  resident of  this state  on the  day of election,
     shall be  entitled to  vote at  the first  general  election
     under this Constitution, and on the question of the adoption
     thereof.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 8 of 16

     At first  glance, this  section appears  to refer to two (2)
 
separate classes  of American  citizens:  citizens of California,
 
and citizens of the United States.
 
     However,  having  reviewed  People v. De La Guerra,  we  now
 
understand that,  prior to  the Civil War and its ugly aftermath,
 
the term  "Citizen of the United States", as that term is used in
 
the  Qualifications Clauses, means  "Citizen of ONE OF the States
 
united", that is, Citizen of ONE OF the Union states.
 
     We also  have the  construction by  the  California  Supreme
 
Court, soon  after that 1849 Constitution was ratified.  In 1855,
 
that Court  ruled that there is no such thing as a citizen of the
 
United States,  if the  latter term refers to a class of citizens
 
different from Citizens of ONE OF the States united.
 
     Judge Pablo  De La  Guerra's profound construction is worthy
 
of very  close scrutiny  and study, because it provides a way out
 
of the  confusion and controversy that swirls about this subject,
 
even now.   In  light of  De La  Guerra's pivotal insight, we are
 
justified  in  constructing the  1849 California Constitution  as
 
follows:
 
     Every Citizen  of California state declared a legal voter by
     this Constitution,  and every  Citizen of  ONE OF  the other
     Union states  who is  a resident  of California state on the
     day of election, shall be entitled ....
 
     In other  words, in  1849, the  lower-case "c"  in "citizen"
 
appears to  have been  the preferred  convention.   Nevertheless,
 
this lower-case  "c" did  not render  that term a legal franchise
 
which was  subject to  the municipal authority of Congress, as is
 
now the case with federal citizenship.
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 9 of 16

     On the  contrary, in  the year  1855, the California Supreme
 
Court, in Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855), made it very clear
 
that there  was  no such thing as a citizen of the United States,
 
if by  that term  is meant  a second class of citizens, different
 
from the primary class of state Citizens, i.e. Citizens of ONE OF
 
the States united.
 
     The  1849  California  Constitution   is  merely  trying  to
 
establish who would be entitled to vote in general elections, and
 
to vote  on the  question of  adopting that  Constitution.  Those
 
People would  be either Citizens of California state, or Citizens
 
of ONE  OF the  other states  of the Union, as long as the latter
 
Citizens were  resident in  California state  on the  day of  the
 
election.
 
     This logic  appears to  explain the apparent anomaly that is
 
found in  Section 5 of the 1849 California Constitution as quoted
 
above.   Despite appearances  of two  classes of  citizens, which
 
appearances  arise   from  a   faulty  construction,  the  proper
 
construction yields  only a single class of state Citizens.  This
 
proper construction  conforms to  the decisions of the California
 
Supreme  Court  in  Ex parte Knowles  supra  and  People v. De La
 
Guerra supra.
 
 
             Analysis of Arizona state Constitution
 
     Now Plaintiff performs a comparable analysis of a noteworthy
 
provision in the Constitution of Arizona state.
 
     Under the  section entitled  "Eligibility to state offices",
 
we find another passage which also appears to acknowledge two (2)
 
separate  classes   of  citizenship,   but  only   if  a   faulty
 
construction is  again placed  upon the  language.    Here's  the
 
pertinent section:
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 10 of 16

     Section 2.   No  person shall  be eligible  to  any  of  the
     offices mentioned  in section  1 of  this article  except  a
     person of  the age  of not  less than twenty-five years, who
     shall have  been for ten years next preceding his election a
     citizen of  the United  States,  and  for  five  years  next
     preceding his election a citizen of Arizona.
 
     Clearly, this  section  makes  a  very  obvious  distinction
 
between being  a citizen  of the  United States  for at least ten
 
years, and  a citizen  of Arizona for at least five years.  It is
 
very tempting  to conclude  from this  section that there are two
 
separate classes of citizenship.  However, using the construction
 
which was  so well established by the California Supreme Court in
 
Ex parte Knowles  supra,  we are  again justified  in making  the
 
following  proper construction of  this section  from the Arizona
 
state Constitution:
 
     No person  shall be eligible to any of the offices mentioned
     ... except  a person who shall have been a Citizen of ONE OF
     the Union  states for  at least 10 years, and who shall have
     been a Citizen of Arizona state for at least five years.
 
     This construction  conforms perfectly  to  the  construction
 
established in California state, at least by 1855, if not before.
 
 
                         REMEDY DEMANDED
 
     Wherefore, all  premises having been duly considered by this
 
honorable Court,  Plaintiff hereby  demands a  trial by competent
 
and qualified  jury, and  also an  indefinite stay of the instant
 
proceedings, pending final review of Plaintiff's formal challenge
 
to the  constitutionality of  Arizona Revised Statutes 16-101 and
 
21-201, and  to the corresponding provisions in the Arizona state
 
Constitution,  for   violating  the   Guarantee  Clause   in  the
 
Constitution for  the  United  States  of  America,  as  lawfully
 
amended.
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 11 of 16

                          VERIFICATION
 
I, Paul  Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
 
of perjury,  under the  laws of  the United  States  of  America,
 
without the  "United States" (federal government), that the above
 
statements of  fact are  true and  correct, to  the  best  of  My
 
current information,  knowledge, and  belief,  so  help  Me  God,
 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause.
 
 
Dated:  July 8, 1997
 
 
Respectfully submitted,
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 12 of 16

                        PROOF OF SERVICE
 
[redacted for privacy]
 
 
Executed on July 8, 1997:
 
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
 
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
       Demand for Jury Trial and for Stay of Proceedings:
                          Page 14 of 16

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Exhibit "A":
 
        MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY
                WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
                     AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE
          AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
 
                     U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
                  United States District Court
                   District of Arizona, Tucson
                     Case Number #95-484-WDB
 

Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
 
In Propria Persona
 
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 
                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,       )  Case No. 95-484-WDB
                                )
     Plaintiff,                 )  NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                                )  MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
     v.                         )  FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
                                )  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
Sheila Terese, Wallen,          )  AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
                                )  CHALLENGE TO
     Defendant.                 )  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
                                )  28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518,
                                )  1861, 1865, and 1867(d),(e),
________________________________)  F.R.Cr.P. Rule 6(b)(2)
 
COMES NOW  Sheila Terese,  Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
 
state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter (hereinafter
 
"Defendant"), to Petition this honorable Court for a stay of the
 
instant proceedings,  pursuant to  the provisions  of 28  U.S.C.
 
1867(d), pending  proper review  of the Defendant's challenge to
 
the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit:
 
     1865.  Qualifications for jury service
 
     (a)  The chief  judge of  the district court, or such other
          district court judge as the plan may provide ... shall
          determine solely  on the basis of information provided
          on the  juror qualification  form and  other competent
          evidence whether  a  person  is  unqualified  for,  or
          exempt, or to be excused from jury service. ...
 
     (b)  In making  such determination  the chief  judge of the
          district court,  or such other district court judge as
          the plan  may provide, shall deem any person qualified
          to serve  on grand  and petit  juries in  the district
          court unless he --
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 1 of 8

          (1)  is  not  a citizen of the  United States eighteen
               years old  who has  resided for  a period  of one
               year within the judicial district; ....
 
                                [28 U.S.C. 1865, emphasis added]
 
     In stark  contrast, it  is the  policy of the United States
 
that all  citizens shall  have the  opportunity to be considered
 
for service on grand juries in the district courts of the United
 
States.   To be  constitutional, and  to be  consistent with its
 
legislative intent,  the term  "all citizens",  as that  term is
 
used in  28 U.S.C.  1861, must  be  construed  to  include  also
 
Citizens of  the freely  associated compact  states who  are not
 
also citizens of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizens"):
 
     1861.     Declaration of policy
 
     It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
     Federal courts  entitled to  trial by  jury shall  have the
     right to  grand and  petit juries selected at random from a
     fair cross  section of  the community  in the  district  or
     division wherein  the court  convenes.   It is  further the
     policy of  the United  States that  all citizens shall have
     the opportunity  to be  considered for service on grand and
     petit juries  in the  district courts of the United States,
     and shall  have an  obligation  to  serve  as  jurors  when
     summoned for that purpose.
 
                                [28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]
 
     Defendant hereby  provides notice to all interested parties
 
of Her  sworn  (verified)  statement  of  law  and  facts  which
 
constitute a substantial failure to comply with the Constitution
 
for  the   United  States   of  America,   as  lawfully  amended
 
(hereinafter  "U.S. Constitution"), and  with the  provisions of
 
Title 28,  United States  Code, Section  1861:   Declaration  of
 
Policy.   See  28 U.S.C. 1867(d)  and (e).   The indicting Grand
 
Jury consisted  of members  all of  whom were  citizens  of  the
 
United States,  not necessarily  Citizens of Arizona state.  See
 
Dyett v. Turner and State v. Phillips infra;  Right of Election;
 
voter registration affidavits.
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 2 of 8

     By way  of introduction  to the crucial matters of fact and
 
law  which   are  discussed   at  length  in  Defendant's  sworn
 
(verified) statement,  which is hereby incorporated by reference
 
as if  set forth  fully herein,  this honorable  Court is hereby
 
respectfully requested  to take  formal judicial  notice of  the
 
additional standing authorities on this question:
 
     We have  in our political system a Government of the United
     States and  a government  of each  of the  several  States.
     Each one  of these governments is distinct from the others,
     and each  has citizens  of its  own ....    Slaughter-House
     Cases
               [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     A person  who is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States**  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular state in which he
     resides.   But a  person may  be a  citizen of a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United  States.   To hold
     otherwise would  be  to  deny  to  the  state  the  highest
     exercise of  its sovereignty,  -- the  right to declare who
     are its citizens.
                              [State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                               [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
 
     There are,  then, under  our republican form of government,
     two classes of citizens,  one  of the United States and one
     of the  state. One  class of  citizenship may  exist  in  a
     person, without  the other, as in the case of a resident of
     the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in
     the same person.
 
                  [Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
                         [48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]
 
     There are  over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in
     the United  States. ...  Each of these now has an invisible
     federal  zone   extending  1,000  feet  beyond  the  (often
     irregular) boundaries of the school property.
 
                          [U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)]
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 3 of 8

     As a  Party to  the  instant  case,  the  Defendant  hereby
 
challenges the indicting Grand Jury on the ground that such jury
 
was not  selected in  conformity with  section 1861 of Title 28,
 
because Citizens  of Arizona  state who are not also citizens of
 
the United States (a/k/a federal citizens) are disqualified from
 
serving by  virtue of  their chosen  Citizenship status.  See 28
 
U.S.C. 1867(e);   Right  of Election;   15  Statutes  at  Large,
 
Chapter 249  (Section 1), enacted July 27, 1868;  jus soli;  jus
 
sanguinis.   Specifically,  the  offensive  statute  forces  the
 
following unconstitutional result upon Citizens of Arizona state
 
who choose  not also  to be citizens of the United States (a/k/a
 
federal citizens):
 
            citizen of         Citizen of         Qualified
          United States       Arizona state       to serve
 
               Yes                Yes                Yes
               Yes                No                 Yes
               No                 No                 No
               No                 Yes                No     **
 
This result ("**") violates the Tenth Amendment by disqualifying
 
Citizens of  Arizona state  from serving on federal grand juries
 
when they are not also federal citizens, thus denying to accused
 
Citizens of  Arizona state  a grand  jury of  Their Peers when a
 
grand jury consists only of federal citizens.
 
     An intentional  discrimination against  a class of persons,
 
solely because  of their  class, by  officers in  charge of  the
 
selection and summoning of grand jurors in a criminal case, is a
 
violation of  the fundamental Rights of an accused.  See Cassell
 
v. Texas,  339 U.S. 282;  Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398;  Pierre
 
v. Louisiana,  306 U.S. 354.  Such a violation is not excused by
 
the fact  that the  persons actually  selected for  jury service
 
otherwise possess  the necessary  qualifications for  jurors  as
 
prescribed by statute.  See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460.
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 4 of 8

     Discrimination  in  the  selection  of  a  grand  jury,  as
 
prohibited by  the  U.S.  Constitution,  means  an  intentional,
 
systematic noninclusion  because of  class.   There are  two (2)
 
classes of  citizenship in  America.   E.g. Gardina  supra.  The
 
statute 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically excludes those classes
 
of Citizens who are not mentioned.  Expressio unius est exclusio
 
alterius.   The following statute dramatically demonstrates that
 
Congress appreciates the difference between the two classes, and
 
knows how  to discriminate between "white citizens" (read "state
 
Citizens") and  "citizens of  the United  States" (a/k/a federal
 
citizens).   The Act of Congress called the Civil Rights Act, 14
 
U.S. Statutes  at Large,  p. 27, which was the forerunner of the
 
so-called 14th Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
 
follows:
 
     ... [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject
     to any  foreign power,  excluding Indians  not  taxed,  are
     hereby declared  to be  citizens of the United States;  and
     such citizens,  of every  race and color ... shall have the
     same right,  in every  State and  Territory in  the  United
     States ...  to full  and equal  benefit  of  all  laws  and
     proceedings for  the security of person and property, as is
     enjoyed by white citizens.
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     Once a  prima facie  case for  the existence  of purposeful
 
discrimination is made out, the burden shifts to the prosecution
 
to prove  otherwise.   See Whitus  v.  Georgia,  385  U.S.  545.
 
Reliance on  the so-called  Fourteenth Amendment to resolve this
 
matter is  moot, because  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  never
 
lawfully ratified, and because the authorities cited supra allow
 
for the possibility that a Person can be a state Citizen without
 
also being  a federal  citizen, whether  or not  the  Fourteenth
 
Amendment was  lawfully ratified.   See  State v.  Phillips, 540
 
P.2d 936, 941 (1975);  Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 5 of 8

266, 270  (1968);   Full Faith and Credit Clause;  28 Tulane Law
 
Review 22;    11  South  Carolina  Law  Quarterly  484;    House
 
Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.
 
     As such, there is no constitutional provision which makes a
 
federal citizen  also a citizen of the Union state in which s/he
 
resides, nor  is there any constitutional provision which states
 
that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned.
 
     The judicial  history of  American citizenship is a subject
 
which  is   rich  in  nuance  and  detail,  as  demonstrated  in
 
Defendant's sworn  (verified) statement.  For example, at a time
 
when those  Islands were  in the federal zone, the Supreme Court
 
of the  Philippine Islands  found that  "citizenship,"  strictly
 
speaking, is  a  term  of municipal law and,  according to  that
 
Court, it  is municipal  law which  regulates the  conditions on
 
which citizenship is acquired:
 
     Citizenship, says  Moore  on  International  Law,  strictly
     speaking, is  a term  of  municipal  law  and  denotes  the
     possession within  the particular  state of  full civil and
     political rights subject to special disqualifications, such
     as minority, sex, etc.  The conditions on which citizenship
     are [sic]  acquired are  regulated by municipal law.  There
     is  no   such  thing   as  international   citizenship  nor
     international law (aside from that which might be contained
     in treaties) by which citizenship is acquired.
 
                                   [Roa v. Collector of Customs]
                                 [23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912)]
 
Indeed, international  law is  divided roughly  into two groups:
 
(1) public  international law and (2) private international law.
 
Citizenship is  a term  of private international law (also known
 
as  municipal law) in  which the  terms  "state",  "nation"  and
 
"country" are all synonymous:
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 6 of 8

     Private international  law assumes  a more important aspect
     in the  United States  than elsewhere,  for the reason that
     the  several   states,  although   united  under  the  same
     sovereign authority  and governed  by the same laws for all
     national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, are
     otherwise, at  least so far as private international law is
     concerned, in  the same  relation as foreign countries. The
     great majority  of questions  of private  international law
     are therefore  subject to  the same  rules when  they arise
     between two  states of the Union as when they arise between
     two foreign  countries, and  in the ensuing pages the words
     "state," "nation,"  and "country" are used synonymously and
     interchangeably, there  being no  intention to  distinguish
     between  the  several  states  of  the  Union  and  foreign
     countries by the use of varying terminology.
 
                        [16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 2]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
Congress does  refer to the Union states as "countries."  See 28
 
U.S.C. 297.
 
                         RELIEF SOUGHT
 
     Wherefore, Defendant  petitions this honorable Court for an
 
indefinite stay  of the proceedings in the instant case, pending
 
proper review  of the  substantial issues  of law and fact which
 
are  alleged   in  this   Motion  and  which  are  contained  in
 
Defendant's sworn  (verified) statement which is attached hereto
 
and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
 
 
Executed on: _________________________
 
 
Respectfully submitted,
 
/s/ Sheila Wallen
 
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 7 of 8

                        PROOF OF SERVICE
 
I,  Sheila  Terese, Wallen,  Sui Juris,  hereby  certify,  under
 
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of the  United  States  of
 
America, without  the "United  States," that  I am  at least  18
 
years of  age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
 
and that I personally served the following document(s):
 
        NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
    FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
   AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
  OF STATUTE: 28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518, 1861, 1865, and 1867(d)
 
by placing  one true  and correct  copy of  said document(s)  in
 
first  class  United  States  Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and
 
properly addressed to the following:
 
 
Office of the United States Attorney
110 South Church Avenue, Suite 8310
Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
 
Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
Executed on: _____________________________
 
 
/s/ Sheila Wallen
__________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 8 of 8

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Exhibit "B":
 
           VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
     TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE
 
                     U.S.A. [sic] v. Wallen
                  United States District Court
                   District of Arizona, Tucson
                     Case Number #95-484-WDB
 

Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
 
In Propria Persona
 
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 
                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 95-484-WDB
                                )
     Plaintiff,                 )  VERIFIED STATEMENT
                                )  IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO
     v.                         )  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY
                                )  AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE:
Sheila Terese, Wallen,          )  28 U.S.C. 1746(1), 1861,
                                )  1865
     Defendant.                 )
________________________________)
 
COMES NOW  Sheila Terese,  Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
 
state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter (hereinafter
 
"Defendant"), to  record Her  Verified Statement  in Support  of
 
Challenge  to  Grand  Jury  Selection  Policy  and  its  Federal
 
Statute.  "We are no longer subjects of a government."  See "The
 
Meaning  of   American  Citizenship"   by  the  Commissioner  of
 
Immigration and Naturalization infra and EXHIBIT "A" attached.
 
 
                          VERIFICATION
 
     The Undersigned  hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury,
 
under the  laws of  the United  States of  America, without  the
 
"United States,"  that  the  following  Statement  is  true  and
 
correct, to  the best  of My current information, knowledge, and
 
belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1):
 
 
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                          Page 1 of 36

                          Chapter 11:
                          Sovereignty
 
     The issue of sovereignty as it relates to jurisdiction is a
major key  to understanding  our system  of government under the
Constitution.     In  the   most  common   sense  of  the  word,
"sovereignty" is  autonomy, freedom  from external control.  The
sovereignty of  any government  usually extends  up to,  but not
beyond, the  borders of  its jurisdiction.    This  jurisdiction
defines a  specific territorial  boundary  which  separates  the
"external" from the "internal", the "within" from the "without".
It may  also define  a specific  function, or  set of functions,
which a  government may  lawfully perform  within  a  particular
territorial boundary.   Black's  Law Dictionary,  Sixth Edition,
defines sovereignty to mean:
 
     ... [T]he  international independence  of a state, combined
     with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs
     without foreign dictation.
 
On a  similar theme,  Black's defines  "sovereign states"  to be
those which are not under the control of any foreign power:
 
     No  foreign  power  or  law  can  have  control  except  by
     convention.   This power  of independent action in external
     and internal relations constitutes complete sovereignty.
 
     It is  a well  established principle  of law  that  the  50
States are  "foreign" with  respect to  each other,  just as the
federal zone  is "foreign"  with respect  to each of them (In re
Merriam's Estate,  36 NE  505 (1894)).    The  status  of  being
foreign is  the same  as "belonging  to" or  being "attached to"
another  state  or  another  jurisdiction.    The  proper  legal
distinction between  the terms  "foreign" and "domestic" is best
seen  in   Black's   definitions   of   foreign   and   domestic
corporations, as follows:
 
     Foreign corporation.   A  corporation doing business in one
     state though  chartered or incorporated in another state is
     a foreign  corporation as to the first state, and, as such,
     is  required   to  consent   to  certain   conditions   and
     restrictions in order to do business in such first state.
 
     Domestic corporation.   When a corporation is organized and
     chartered  in  a  particular  state,  it  is  considered  a
     domestic corporation of that state.
 
     The federal  zone is  an area over which Congress exercises
exclusive legislative  jurisdiction.   It is the area over which
the federal  government exercises  its sovereignty.  Despite its
obvious importance, the subject of federal jurisdiction had been
almost entirely  ignored outside the courts until the year 1954.
In that  year, a  detailed study  of  federal  jurisdiction  was
undertaken.   The occasion  for the  study arose  from a  school
playground, of  all places.   The  children of federal employees
residing on  the grounds  of a Veterans' Administration hospital
 
 
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were not  allowed to attend public schools in the town where the
hospital was  located.   An administrative  decision against the
children was  affirmed by  local courts, and finally affirmed by
the State supreme court.  The residents of the area on which the
hospital was  located were  not "residents"  of the State, since
"exclusive legislative  jurisdiction" over  this area  had  been
ceded by the State to the federal government.
 
     A committee  was  assembled  by  Attorney  General  Herbert
Brownell,  Jr.     Their   detailed  study  was  reported  in  a
publication entitled  Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the
States, April  1956 (Volume  I) and  June 1957 (Volume II).  The
committee's report  demonstrates, beyond  any  doubt,  that  the
sovereign States  and their laws are outside the legislative and
territorial  jurisdiction   of  the   United  States**   federal
government.   They are  totally outside  the federal  zone.    A
plethora of evidence is found in the myriad of cited court cases
(700+) which  prove that  the United  States**  cannot  exercise
exclusive legislative jurisdiction outside territories or places
purchased from,  or ceded  by,  the  50  States  of  the  Union.
Attorney General Brownell described the committee's report as an
"exhaustive  and  analytical  exposition  of  the  law  in  this
hitherto little  explored field".   In his letter of transmittal
to President  Dwight D.  Eisenhower, Brownell summarized the two
volumes as follows:
 
     Together, the  two parts of this Committee's report and the
     full implementation  of its  recommendations will provide a
     basis for  reversing  in  many  areas  the  swing  of  "the
     pendulum of  power *  * *  from our  states to  the central
     government" to  which you  referred in  your address to the
     Conference of State Governors on June 25, 1957.
 
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                 [Letter of Transmittal, page V, emphasis added]
 
     Once a  State is  admitted into  the Union,  its  sovereign
jurisdiction is  firmly established over a predefined territory.
The federal  government  is  thereby  prevented  from  acquiring
legislative jurisdiction,  by means  of unilateral  action, over
any area  within the  exterior  boundaries  of  this  predefined
territory.   State assent  is necessary to transfer jurisdiction
to Congress:
 
     The Federal  Government cannot, by unilateral action on its
     part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within
     the exterior  boundaries of a State.  Article 1, Section 8,
     Clause 17,  of the  Constitution, provides that legislative
     jurisdiction may  be transferred pursuant to its terms only
     with the  consent of  the legislature of the State in which
     is located the area subject to the jurisdictional transfer.
 
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                            [Volume II, page 46, emphasis added]
 
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     Under Article  1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution,
States of  the Union  have enacted  statutes consenting  to  the
federal acquisition  of any land, or of specific tracts of land,
within those  States.  Secondly, the federal government has also
made  "reservations"  of  jurisdiction  over  certain  areas  in
connection with  the admission  of a  State into  the Union.   A
third means  for transfer  of legislative  jurisdiction has also
come into  considerable use  over time,  namely,  a  general  or
special statute  whereby a  State makes  a cession  of  specific
functional   jurisdiction    to    the    federal    government.
Nevertheless, the  Committee  report  explained  that  "...  the
characteristics of  a legislative  jurisdiction status  are  the
same  no  matter  by  which  of  the  three  means  the  Federal
Government acquired such status"  [Volume II, page 3].  There is
simply no  federal legislative jurisdiction without consent by a
State, cession  by  a  State,  or  reservation  by  the  federal
government:
 
     It scarcely  needs to  be said that unless there has been a
     transfer of  jurisdiction (1)  pursuant to  clause 17  by a
     Federal acquisition  of land  with State consent, or (2) by
     cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless
     the Federal  Government has  reserved jurisdiction upon the
     admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no
     legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such
     jurisdiction being for exercise entirely by the State ....
 
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                            [Volume II, page 45, emphasis added]
 
     The areas  which the  50 States  have properly ceded to the
federal government are called federal "enclaves":
 
     By this  means some  thousands of areas have become Federal
     islands, sometimes  called  "enclaves,"  in  many  respects
     foreign to  the States  in which  they are  situated.    In
     general, not State but Federal law is applicable in an area
     under the  exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United
     States**,  for   enforcement  not   by  State  but  Federal
     authorities, and  in many  instances not  in State  but  in
     Federal courts.
 
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                             [Volume II, page 4, emphasis added]
 
These federal  enclaves are  considered foreign  with respect to
the States  which surround  them, just  as  the  50  States  are
considered foreign with respect to each other and to the federal
zone:    "...[T]he  several  states  of  the  Union  are  to  be
considered as  in this  respect  foreign  to  each  other  ...."
Hanley v.  Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885).  Once a State surrenders
its sovereignty  over a  specific area  of land, it is powerless
over that land; it is without authority; it cannot recapture any
of its  transferred jurisdiction  by unilateral  action, just as
the federal  government cannot  acquire jurisdiction  over State
area by  its unilateral  action.   The State has transferred its
sovereign authority to a foreign power:
 
 
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     Once a  State has,  by one  means or  another,  transferred
     jurisdiction to  the United  States**, it  is,  of  course,
     powerless to  control many  of the  consequences;   without
     jurisdiction, it is without the authority to deal with many
     of the problems, and having transferred jurisdiction to the
     United States**,  it cannot unilaterally capture any of the
     transferred jurisdiction.
 
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                             [Volume II, page 7, emphasis added]
 
     Once sovereignty  has been  relinquished, a State no longer
has the  authority to  enforce criminal  laws in areas under the
exclusive jurisdiction  of the United States**.  Privately owned
property in  such areas  is beyond  the taxing  authority of the
State.   Residents of  such areas  are not  "residents"  of  the
State, and hence are not subject to the obligations of residents
of the  State, and  are not  entitled to any of the benefits and
privileges conferred by the State upon its residents.  Residents
of federal enclaves usually cannot vote, serve on juries, or run
for office.   They  do not,  as matter  of right, have access to
State  schools,   hospitals,  mental  institutions,  or  similar
establishments.
 
     The acquisition  of exclusive  jurisdiction by  the Federal
Government renders  unavailable to the residents of the affected
areas the  benefits of  the laws and judicial and administrative
processes of  the State  relating to  adoption, the  probate  of
wills and  administration of  estates, divorce,  and many  other
matters.  Police, fire-fighting, notaries, coroners, and similar
services performed  by, or  under, the  authority of a State may
result in  legal sanction  within a  federal enclave.  The "old"
State laws  which apply are only those which are consistent with
the laws  of the  "new" sovereign authority, using the following
principle from international law:
 
     The vacuum  which would  exist because  of the  absence  of
     State law  or Federal  legislation with  respect  to  civil
     matters  in   areas  under  Federal  exclusive  legislative
     jurisdiction has  been  partially  filled  by  the  courts,
     through extension to these areas of a rule of international
     law that[,]  when one  sovereign takes  over  territory  of
     another[,] the  laws of the original sovereign in effect at
     the time  of the  taking[,] which are not inconsistent with
     the laws  or policies  of the second[,] continue in effect,
     as laws  of the succeeding sovereign, until changed by that
     sovereign.
     
             [Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]
                   [Volume II, page 6, commas added for clarity]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
 
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     It is  clear, then,  that only one "state" can be sovereign
at any  given moment in time, whether that "state" be one of the
50 Union  States,  or  the  federal  government  of  the  United
States**.  Before ceding a tract of land to Congress, a State of
the Union exercises its sovereign authority over any land within
its borders:
 
     Save only  as they  are subject  to the prohibitions of the
     Constitution, or  as their action in some measure conflicts
     with the  powers delegated  to the  national government  or
     with congressional  legislation enacted  in the exercise of
     those powers,  the governments  of the states are sovereign
     within  their   territorial  limits   and  have   exclusive
     jurisdiction over persons and property located therein.
 
                       [72 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 4]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
After a  State has  ceded a  tract  of  land  to  Congress,  the
situation is  completely different.  The United States**, as the
"succeeding sovereign",  then exercises  its sovereign authority
over that land.  In this sense, sovereignty is indivisible, even
though the  Committee's report documented numerous situations in
which jurisdiction  was  actually  shared  between  the  federal
government and  one of  the 50  States.  Even in this situation,
however, sovereignty  rests either  in  the  State,  or  in  the
federal  government,   but  never  both.    Sovereignty  is  the
authority to  which there  is politically  no superior.  Outside
the federal  zone, the States of the Union remain sovereign, and
their laws  are completely  outside  the  exclusive  legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government of the United States**.
 
     This understanding  of the separate sovereignties possessed
by each  of the State and federal governments was not only valid
during the  Eisenhower administration;  it has  been endorsed by
the U.S.  Supreme Court  as recently as 1985.  In that year, the
high Court  examined the  "dual sovereignty  doctrine"  when  it
ruled that  successive prosecutions  by two  States for the same
conduct were  not barred  by the  Double Jeopardy  Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.   The "crucial determination" turned on whether
State and  federal powers  derive from  separate and independent
sources.   The Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of dual
sovereignty has been uniformly upheld by the courts:
 
     It has  been uniformly  held that  the States  are separate
     sovereigns with  respect to  the Federal Government because
     each State's  power to  prosecute derives from its inherent
     sovereignty, preserved  to it  by the  Tenth Amendment, and
     not from  the  Federal  Government.    Given  the  distinct
     sources of  their powers to try a defendant, the States are
     no less  sovereign with respect to each other than they are
     with respect to the Federal Government.
 
                   [Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985)]
 
 
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     Now, if a State of the Union is sovereign, is it correct to
say that  the State  exercises an  authority to  which there  is
absolutely no  superior?   No, this  is not a correct statement.
There is  no other  organized body  which  is  superior  to  the
organized body  which retains  sovereignty. The  sovereignty  of
governments is  an authority  to which  there  is  no  organized
superior, but  there is  absolutely a  superior body,  and  that
superior body is the People of the United States*** of America:
 
     The words  "people of the United States" and "citizens" are
     synonymous terms,  and mean  the same  thing.    They  both
     describe  the   political  body   who,  according   to  our
     republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
     the  power   and  conduct   the  government  through  their
     representatives.   They are  what we  familiarly  call  the
     "sovereign people,"  and  every  citizen  is  one  of  this
     people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.
 
                    [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
The source  of all sovereignty in a constitutional Republic like
the 50  States, united  by and  under the  Constitution for  the
United States  of America,  is the People themselves.  Remember,
the States,  and the  federal  government  acting  inside  those
States, are  both bound  by the terms of a contract known as the
U.S. Constitution.  That Constitution is a contract of delegated
powers which  ultimately originate  in the  sovereignty  of  the
Creator, who  endowed creation,  individual People  like you and
me, with  sovereignty in  that  Creator's  image  and  likeness.
Nothing stands  between us  and the Creator.  I think it is fair
to say  that the  Supreme Court  of the  United States was never
more eloquent  when it  described the  source of  sovereignty as
follows:
 
     Sovereignty itself  is, of  course, not subject to law, for
     it is  the author  and source  of law;   but in our system,
     while sovereign  powers are  delegated to  the agencies  of
     government, sovereignty  itself remains with the people, by
     whom and  for whom all government exists and acts.  And the
     law is  the definition  and limitation  of power.    It  is
     indeed, quite  true,  that  there  must  always  be  lodged
     somewhere, and  in some  person or  body, the  authority of
     final decision;   and  in many cases of mere administration
     the responsibility is purely political, no appeal except to
     the ultimate  tribunal of  the public  judgement, exercised
     either in  the pressure  of opinion  or  by  means  of  the
     suffrage.  But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
     the  pursuit   of  happiness,   considered  as   individual
     possessions, are  secured by those maxims of constitutional
     law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress
     of  the   race  in   securing  to   men  the  blessings  of
     civilization under  the reign  of just  and equal laws,  so
     that,  in  the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of
     Rights, the  government  of  the  commonwealth  "may  be  a
     government of  laws and  not of  men."   For, the very idea
 
 
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     that one  man may  be compelled  to hold  his life,  or the
     means of  living, or  any material  right essential  to the
     enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
     intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
     the essence of slavery itself.
 
                  [Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental
importance of  US the  People as  the source of sovereignty, and
the subordinate  status which  Congress occupies  in relation to
the sovereignty  of the People.  The following language is terse
and right on point:
 
     In the  United States***, sovereignty resides in the people
     who act through the organs established by the Constitution.
     [cites omitted]   The  Congress as  the instrumentality  of
     sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on
     behalf of  the people in the manner and with the effect the
     Constitution ordains.    The  Congress  cannot  invoke  the
     sovereign power  of the  people to  override their  will as
     thus declared.
 
              [Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     No discussion  of sovereignty would be complete, therefore,
without considering  the sovereignty  that resides  in  US,  the
People.   The Supreme  Court has  often identified the People as
the source  of sovereignty in our republican form of government.
Indeed, the  federal Constitution  guarantees to  every State in
the Union a "Republican Form" of government, in so many words:
 
     Section 4.   The  United States  shall guarantee  to  every
     State in  this Union  a Republican  Form of Government, and
     shall protect each of them against Invasion; ....
 
              [United States Constitution, Article 4, Section 4]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
What exactly is a "Republican Form" of government?  It is one in
which the  powers of  sovereignty are  vested in  the People and
exercised by the People.  Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
makes  this   very  clear   in  its   various   definitions   of
"government":
 
     Republican government.   One  in   which  the   powers   of
     sovereignty are  vested in  the people and are exercised by
     the people,  either directly,  or  through  representatives
     chosen by  the people,  to whom  those powers are specially
     delegated.   In re  Duncan, 139  U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35
     L.Ed. 219;  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22
     L.Ed. 627.
 
 
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The  Supreme   Court  has   clearly  distinguished  between  the
operation of  governments in  Europe, and  government  in  these
United States*** of America, as follows:
 
     In Europe,  the executive  is almost  synonymous  with  the
     sovereign  power  of  a  State;    and  generally  includes
     legislative  and   judicial  authority.  ...  Such  is  the
     condition of  power in  that quarter of the world, where it
     is too  commonly acquired  by force  or fraud, or both, and
     seldom by compact.  In America, however, the case is widely
     different.     Our  government  is  founded  upon  compact.
     Sovereignty was, and is, in the people.
 
                    [Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall 6 (1794)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     The  federal   Constitution  makes  a  careful  distinction
between  natural  born  Citizens  and  citizens  of  the  United
States** (compare  2:1:5 with  Section 1  of the  so-called 14th
Amendment).  One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth,
who is  endowed by  the Creator with certain unalienable rights;
the other  has been  granted the  revocable privileges of U.S.**
citizenship, endowed  by the  Congress of  the United  States**.
One is  a Citizen,  the other is a subject.  One is a Sovereign,
the  other   is  a  subordinate.    One  is  a  Citizen  of  our
constitutional  Republic;     the   other  is  a  citizen  of  a
legislative  democracy   (the  federal   zone).     Notice   the
superior/subordinate relationship between these two statuses.  I
am forever indebted to M. J. "Red" Beckman, co-author of The Law
That Never  Was with  Bill Benson,  for clearly illustrating the
important difference between the two.  Red Beckman has delivered
many eloquent  lectures based  on the profound simplicity of the
following table:
 
          Chain of command and authority in a:
 
          Majority Rule            Constitutional
          Democracy                Republic
 
          X                        Creator
          Majority                 Individual
          Government               Constitution
          Public Servants          Government
          Case & Statute Law       Public Servants
          Corporations             Statute Law
          individual               Corporations
 
     In this  illustration, a  democracy ruled  by the  majority
places the  individual at  the bottom, and an unknown elite, Mr.
"X" at  the top.   The  majority (or mob) elects a government to
hire public  "servants" who write laws primarily for the benefit
of  corporations.    These  corporations  are  either  owned  or
controlled by  Mr. X,  a clique of the ultra-wealthy who seek to
restore a  two-class "feudal" society.  They exercise their vast
economic power  so as  to turn  all of  America into  a  "feudal
zone".   The rights of individuals occupy the lowest priority in
 
 
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this chain  of command.   Those  rights often  vanish over time,
because democracies  eventually self-destruct.   The enforcement
of  laws  within  this  scheme  is  the  job  of  administrative
tribunals, who  specialize in  holding individuals to the letter
of all  rules and  regulations of the corporate state, no matter
how arbitrary  and with  little if  any regard  for  fundamental
human rights:
 
     A democracy  that recognizes  only  manmade  laws  perforce
     obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right.
 
          [A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 146]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     In the  constitutional Republic,  however,  the  rights  of
individuals are supreme.  Individuals delegate their sovereignty
to a  written contract,  called a  constitution, which  empowers
government to  hire public  servants to write laws primarily for
the benefit  of individuals.  The corporations occupy the lowest
priority  in   this  chain   of  command,  since  their  primary
objectives are  to maximize  the enjoyment of individual rights,
and   to    facilitate    the    fulfillment    of    individual
responsibilities.  The enforcement of laws within this scheme is
the responsibility  of sovereign individuals, who exercise their
power in  three arenas:   the  voting booth, the trial jury, and
the grand  jury.   Without  a  jury  verdict  of  "guilty",  for
example, no  law can  be enforced  and no  penalty exacted.  The
behavior of public servants is tightly restrained by contractual
terms, as  found in the written Constitution.  Statutes and case
law are  created primarily  to limit  and define  the scope  and
extent of public servant power.    
 
     Sovereign individuals  are subject  only to  a Common  Law,
whose primary  purposes are  to protect  and  defend  individual
rights, and  to  prevent  anyone,  whether  public  official  or
private person,  from violating the rights of other individuals.
Within this  scheme, Sovereigns  are never  subject to their own
creations, and  the constitutional  contract is such a creation.
To quote  the Supreme Court, "No fiction can make a natural born
subject."   Milvaine v.  Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. 598 (1808).  That
is to say, no fiction, be it a corporation, a statute law, or an
administrative regulation,  can mutate  a natural born Sovereign
into someone  who is  subject to  his own creations.  Author and
scholar Lori Jacques has put it succinctly as follows:
 
     As each  state is  sovereign and  not a  territory  of  the
     United States**,  the meaning  is clear that state citizens
     are not  subject to  the legislative  jurisdiction  of  the
     United States**.   Furthermore,  there is not the slightest
     intimation in  the Constitution  which created  the "United
     States" as  a political  entity that the "United States" is
     sovereign over its creators.
 
           [A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 32]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
 
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     Accordingly, if  you choose  to investigate the matter, you
will find  a very  large body  of legal  literature which  cites
another fiction,  the so-called  14th Amendment,  from which the
federal government presumes to derive general authority to treat
everyone in America as subjects and not as Sovereigns:
 
     Section 1.   All  persons born or naturalized in the United
     States**, and  subject to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are
     citizens of  the United  States** and  of the State wherein
     they reside.
 
        [United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [sic]]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
A  careful  reading  of  this  amendment  reveals  an  important
subtlety which  is lost on many people who read it for the first
time.  The citizens it defines are second class citizens because
the "c" is lower-case, even in the case of the State citizens it
defines.  Note how the amendment defines "citizens of the United
States**" and "citizens of the State wherein they reside"! It is
just uncanny how the wording of this amendment closely parallels
the Code  of Federal Regulations (CFR) which promulgates Section
1 of  the Internal  Revenue Code  (IRC).   Can it  be that  this
amendment had  something to do with subjugation, by way of taxes
and other  means?  Yes, it most certainly did.  Section 1 of the
IRC  is   the  section   which  imposes   income  taxes.     The
corresponding section  of the  CFR defines who is a "citizen" as
follows:
 
     Every person born or naturalized in the United States** and
     subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
 
                               [26 CFR 1.1-1(c), emphasis added]
 
Notice the  use of  the term "its jurisdiction".  This leaves no
doubt that  the "United  States**" is  a singular entity in this
context.  In other words, it is the federal zone.  Do we dare to
speculate why  the so-called  14th Amendment was written instead
with the  phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof"?  Is this
another case of deliberate ambiguity?  You be the judge.
 
     Not only  did this  so-called "amendment"  fail to  specify
which meaning  of the term "United States" was being used;  like
the 16th  Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by
15  of  the  37  States  which  existed  in  1868.    The  House
Congressional  Record  for  June  13,  1967,  contains  all  the
documentation  you   need  to  prove  that  the  so-called  14th
Amendment was  never ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.).
For example,  it itemizes  all States  which voted  against  the
proposed  amendment,   and  the   precise   dates   when   their
Legislatures did  so.  "I cannot believe that any court, in full
possession of  its  faculties,  could  honestly  hold  that  the
amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips,
540 P.2d.  936, 941 (1975).  The Utah Supreme Court has detailed
the  shocking   and  sordid  history  of  the  14th  Amendment's
"adoption" in  the case  of Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439
P.2d 266, 270 (1968).
 
 
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     A great  deal of written material on the 14th Amendment has
been assembled  into computer  files by  Richard McDonald, whose
mailing  address   is  585-D   Box  Canyon  Road,  Canoga  Park,
California Republic  (not "CA").  He requests that ZIP codes not
be used on his incoming mail (use "ZIP code exempt (DMM 122.32)"
instead).   Richard  McDonald  has  done  a  mountain  of  legal
research and writing on the origins and effects of the so-called
14th Amendment.   He  documents how key court decisions like the
Slaughter House Cases,  among  many others, all found that there
is a  clear distinction  between a  Citizen of  a  State  and  a
citizen of  the  United  States**  .    A  State  Citizen  is  a
Sovereign, whereas a citizen of the United States** is a subject
of Congress.  The exercise of federal citizenship is a statutory
privilege which  can be  taxed with  excises.   The exercise  of
State Citizenship  is a  Common Law Right which simply cannot be
taxed because  governments cannot  tax the  exercise of a right,
ever.
 
     The case  of U.S.  v. Cruikshank  is famous,  not only  for
confirming this  distinction between  State Citizens  and U.S.**
citizens, but  also for establishing a key precedent in the area
of  due   process.  This   precedent  underlies  the  "void  for
vagueness" doctrine  which can  and should be applied to nullify
the IRC.   On  the issue  of citizenship,  the Cruikshank  court
ruled as follows:
 
     We have  in our political system a government of the United
     States** and  a government  of each  of the several States.
     Each one  of these governments is distinct from the others,
     and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and
     whose rights,  within its  jurisdiction, it  must  protect.
     The same  person may  be at  the same time a citizen of the
     United States** and a citizen of a State, but his rights of
     citizenship  under   one  of   these  governments  will  be
     different from  those he  has under  the other.  Slaughter-
     House Cases
 
               [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
The  leading  authorities  for  this  pivotal  distinction  are,
indeed, a  series of  U.S. Supreme  Court decisions known as the
Slaughter  House  Cases,   which  examined  the  so-called  14th
Amendment in  depth.  An exemplary paragraph from these cases is
the following:
 
     It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the
     United States**  and a  citizenship of  a State,  which are
     distinct from  each other  and which  depend upon different
     characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
 
                [Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36]
                           [21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), emphasis added]
 
 
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A  similar  authority is  found in  the case  of  K. Tashiro  v.
Jordan, decided  by the Supreme Court of the State of California
almost fifty  years later.    Notice,  in  particular,  how  the
California Supreme Court again cites the Slaughter House Cases:
 
     That there  is a  citizenship of  the United States** and a
     citizenship of  a state,  and the privileges and immunities
     of one are not the same as the other is well established by
     the decisions  of the  courts of this country.  The leading
     cases upon  the subjects  are those  decided by the Supreme
     Court of  the United States and reported in 16 Wall. 36, 21
     L. Ed. 394, and known as the Slaughter House Cases.
 
                  [K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 256 P. 545, 549 (1927)]
                                  [affirmed 278 U.S. 123 (1928)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     The Slaughter  House Cases are quite important to the issue
of citizenship,  but the  pivotal case  on the  subject  is  the
famous Dred  Scott decision, decided in 1856, prior to the Civil
War.   In this  case, the  U.S. Supreme  Court wrote  one of the
longest  decisions   in   the   entire   history   of   American
jurisprudence.   In  arriving  at  their  understanding  of  the
precise meaning  of Citizenship, as understood by the Framers of
the Constitution, the high Court left no stone unturned in their
search for relevant law:
 
     We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and
     of the  Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain
     words of  the Constitution itself:  we have the legislation
     of the  different States, before, about the time, and since
     the Constitution  was adopted;   we have the legislation of
     Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period;
     and  we  have  the  constant  and  uniform  action  of  the
     Executive Department,  all concurring together, and leading
     to the  same result.   And  if anything  in relation to the
     construction  of   the  Constitution  can  be  regarded  as
     settled, it is that which we now give to the word "citizen"
     and the word "people."
 
                    [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     In the  fundamental law,  the notion  of a  "citizen of the
United States"  simply did  not exist before the 14th Amendment;
at best,  this notion  is  a  fiction  within  a  fiction.    In
discussing the power of the States to naturalize, the California
State Supreme  Court put  it rather  bluntly when  it ruled that
there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States":
 
     A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is held to
     be, and  called a  citizen of  the United  States, although
     technically and  abstractly there  is no  such thing.    To
     conceive a  citizen of  the United  States  who  is  not  a
     citizen of  some one  of the  States, is totally foreign to
     the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and
     common understanding  of the  expression  as  used  in  the
     Constitution, which  must be deduced from its various other
 
 
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     provisions.   The  object  then  to  be  attained,  by  the
     exercise of  the  power  of  naturalization,  was  to  make
     citizens of the respective States.
 
                           [Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
This decision has never been overturned!
 
     What is the proper construction and common understanding of
the term  "Citizen of the United States" as used in the original
Constitution, before  the so-called  14th Amendment?  This is an
important question, because this status is still a qualification
for the  offices of  Senator, Representative  and President.  No
Person can  be a  Representative unless he has been a Citizen of
the United  States for  seven years (1:2:2);  no Person can be a
Senator unless  he has  been a  Citizen of the United States for
nine years  (1:3:3);   no Person can be President unless he is a
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States (2:1:5).
If these  requirements had  been literally  obeyed, there  could
have been  no elections  for Representatives  to Congress for at
least seven years after the adoption of the Constitution, and no
one would  have been  eligible as a Senator for nine years after
its adoption.  Author John S. Wise, in a rare book now available
on Richard  McDonald's electronic  bulletin board  system (BBS),
explains away the problem very simply as follows:
 
     The language  employed by  the convention  was less careful
     than that  which had  been used  by Congress in July of the
     same year,  in framing  the ordinance for the government of
     the  Northwest   Territory.     Congress   had   made   the
     qualification rest  upon citizenship  of "one of the United
     States***,"  and  this  is  doubtless  the  intent  of  the
     convention which  framed the  Constitution, for  it  cannot
     have meant anything else.
 
                                 [Studies in Constitutional Law:
                            [A Treatise on American Citizenship]
                   [by John S. Wise, Edward Thompson Co. (1906)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
This quote  from the  Northwest Ordinance  is  faithful  to  the
letter and  to the  spirit of  that  law.    In  describing  the
eligibility  for  "representatives"  to  serve  in  the  general
assembly for  the Northwest Territory, the critical passage from
that Ordinance reads as follows:
 
     ... Provided,  That no  person be  eligible or qualified to
     act as  a representative,  unless  he  shall  have  been  a
     citizen of  one of the United States*** three years, and be
     a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided
     in the district three years; ....
 
                 [Northwest Ordinance, Section 9, July 13, 1787]
                      [The Confederate Congress, emphasis added]
 
 
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     Without citing  the case  as such, the words of author John
S. Wise sound a close, if not identical parallel to the argument
for the  Respondent filed in the case of People v. De La Guerra,
decided by  the California Supreme Court in 1870.  The following
long passage  elaborates the  true meaning of the Constitutional
qualifications for President and Representative:
 
     As  it   was  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  by  the
     Conventions of nine States that established and created the
     United States***,  it is  obvious there could not then have
     existed any  person who  had been  seven years a citizen of
     the United  States***, or  who possessed  the  Presidential
     qualifications of being thirty-five years of age, a natural
     born citizen,  and fourteen  years a resident of the United
     States***.  The United States*** in these provisions, means
     the States united.  To be twenty-five years of age, and for
     seven years  to have  been a  citizen of  one of the States
     which   ratifies the Constitution,  is the qualification of
     a representative.   To  be a natural born citizen of one of
     the States  which shall ratify the Constitution, or to be a
     citizen  of  one  of  said  States  at  the  time  of  such
     ratification, and  to have  attained the age of thirty-five
     years, and  to have  been fourteen  years a resident within
     one   of    the   said   States,   are   the   Presidential
     qualifications,  according  to  the  true  meaning  of  the
     Constitution.
 
               [People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
Indeed, this  was the  same exact understanding that was reached
by the  U.S. Supreme  Court in  the Dred Scott decision.  There,
the high  Court  clearly  reinforced  the  sovereign  status  of
Citizens of  the several  States.   The sovereigns are the Union
State Citizens, i.e. the Citizens of the States United:
 
     It is  true, every  person, and every class and description
     of persons,  who were  at the  time of  the adoption of the
     Constitution recognized  as citizens in the several States,
     became also  citizens of this new political body;  but none
     other;   it was  formed by  them,   and for  them and their
     posterity, but  for no  one else.   And the personal rights
     and privileges  guarantied [sic]  to citizens  of this  new
     sovereignty were  intended to  embrace those  only who were
     then members  of the  several  state  communities,  or  who
     should  afterwards,  by  birthright  or  otherwise,  become
     members, according  to the  provisions of  the Constitution
     and the principles on which it was founded.
 
               [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404 (1856)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
 
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     Thus, the phrase "Citizen of the United States" as found in
the original Constitution is synonymous with the phrase "Citizen
of one  of the  United States***",  i.e., a Union State Citizen.
This simple explanation will help to cut through the mountain of
propaganda  and   deception  which  have  been  foisted  on  all
Americans by government bureaucrats and their high-paid lawyers.
With this understanding firmly in place, it is very revealing to
discover that  many reprints  of the  Constitution now utilize a
lower-case "c" in the sections which describe the qualifications
for the  offices of Senator, Representative and President.  This
is definitely  wrong, and  it is  probably deliberate,  so as to
confuse everyone  into equating  Citizens of  the United  States
with citizens  of the  United States,  courtesy of the so-called
14th Amendment.   There is a very big difference between the two
statuses, not  the least of which is the big difference in their
respective liabilities for the income tax.
 
     Moreover, it is quite clear that one may be a State Citizen
without also  being a "citizen of the United States", whether or
not the  14th Amendment was properly ratified!  According to the
Louisiana Supreme  Court, the  highest  exercise  of  a  State's
sovereignty is the right to declare who are its own Citizens:
 
     A person  who is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States**  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular state in which he
     resides.   But a  person may  be a  citizen of a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United States**.  To hold
     otherwise would  be  to  deny  to  the  state  the  highest
     exercise of  its sovereignty,  -- the  right to declare who
     are its citizens.
 
                              [State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                               [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
 
In a book to which this writer has returned time and time again,
author Alan  Stang faithfully recites some of the other relevant
court authorities,  all of  which ultimately  trace back  to the
Slaughter House Cases and the Dred Scott decision:
 
     Indeed, just as one may be a "citizen of the United States"
     and not  a citizen  of a State;  so one apparently may be a
     citizen of  a State  but not of the United States.  On July
     21, 1966,  the Court  of Appeal of Maryland ruled in Crosse
     v. Board  of Supervisors  of Elections,  221 A.2d  431;   a
     headnote in  which tells  us:   "Both before  and after the
     Fourteenth Amendment  to the  federal Constitution,  it has
     not been  necessary for  a person  to be  a citizen  of the
     United States  in order to be  a citizen of his state ...."
     At   page   434, Judge Oppenheimer cites a Wisconsin ruling
     in which  the court said  this:   "Under our complex system
     of government,  there may  be a  citizen of a state, who is
     not a citizen of the United States in the full sense of the
     term ...."
                         [Tax Scam, 1988 edition, pages 138-139]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
 
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Conversely, there may be a citizen of the United States** who is
not a  Citizen of  any of  the 50  States.   In People  v. De La
Guerra quoted above,  the  published decision  of the California
Supreme  Court   clearly  maintained  this  crucial  distinction
between the  two classes  of citizenship,  and did  so only  two
years after  the alleged  ratification  of  the  so-called  14th
Amendment:
 
     I have  no doubt  that those born in the Territories, or in
     the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle
     them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United
     States**  in   the  Constitution,  and  to  the  shield  of
     nationality abroad;   but  it is evident that they have not
     the political  rights which  are vested  in citizens of the
     States.   They are  not constituents  of any  community  in
     which is  vested any  sovereign power of government.  Their
     position partakes more of the character of subjects than of
     citizens.   They are  subject to  the laws  of  the  United
     States**, but have no voice in its management.  If they are
     allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived
     from the  sanction of  a Government  in which  they are not
     represented.   Mere citizenship  they  may  have,  but  the
     political rights  of citizens  they cannot enjoy until they
     are organized into a State, and admitted into the Union.
 
                [People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 342 (1870]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
Using language  that  was  much  more  succinct,  author  Luella
Gettys, Ph.D.  and "Sometime  Carnegie Fellow  in  International
Law" at  the University  of Chicago,  explained it  quite nicely
this way:
 
     ... [A]s  long as  the  territories  are  not  admitted  to
     statehood no state citizenship therein could exist.
 
                   [The Law of Citizenship in the United States]
                   [Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7]
 
     This clear  distinction between  the Union  States and  the
territories is  endorsed officially  by the  U.S. Supreme Court.
Using language  very similar  to that  of the California Supreme
Court in  the De  La Guerra  case, the  high Court explained the
distinction this way in the year 1885, seventeen years after the
adoption of the so-called 14th amendment:
 
     The people  of the United States***, as sovereign owners of
     the national  territories, have supreme power over them and
     their inhabitants. ... The personal and civil rights of the
     inhabitants of  the territories  are secured to them, as to
     other  citizens,   by  the   principles  of  constitutional
     liberty, which  restrain all  the agencies  of  government,
     state and  national;  their political rights are franchises
     which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion
     of the  congress of the United States**.  This doctrine was
 
 
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     fully  and   forcibly  declared   by  the   chief  justice,
     delivering the  opinion of  the court  in  National Bank v.
     County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129.
 
                          [Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)]
                           [italics in original, emphasis added]
 
The  political   rights  of  the  federal  zone's  citizens  are
"franchises" which  they hold  as "privileges" at the discretion
of the  Congress of  the United  States**.  Indeed, the doctrine
declared earlier  in the National Bank case leaves no doubt that
Congress is the municipal authority for the territories:
 
     All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States*
     not included in any State must, necessarily, be governed by
     or under  the authority  of Congress.   The Territories are
     but political  subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the
     United States**.   They  bear much the same relation to the
     General Government  that counties  do to  the  States,  and
     Congress may  legislate for  them as  States do  for  their
     respective municipal  organizations.   The organic law of a
     Territory  takes  the  place  of  a  constitution,  as  the
     fundamental law  of the local government.  It is obligatory
     on and  binds the territorial authorities;  but Congress is
     supreme and,  for the  purposes of  this department  of its
     governmental authority, has all the powers of the People of
     the United States***, except such as have been expressly or
     by  implication   reserved  in   the  prohibitions  of  the
     Constitution.
 
           [First National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1880)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     This knowledge  can be  extremely valuable.   In one of the
brilliant text  files on  his electronic  bulletin board  system
(BBS), Richard  McDonald utilized  his voluminous  research into
the so-called 14th Amendment and related constitutional law when
he made  the following  pleading  in  opposition  to  a  traffic
citation, of all things, in Los Angeles county municipal court:
 
     17.   The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [Defendant]  hereby
     places all  parties and the court on NOTICE, that he is not
     a "citizen of the United States**" under the so-called 14th
     Amendment, a juristic person or a franchised person who can
     be compelled  to perform  to the  regulatory Vehicle  Codes
     which are  civil in  nature, and challenges the In Personam
     jurisdiction of  the Court with this contrary conclusion of
     law.  This Court is now mandated to seat on the law side of
     its capacity  to hear evidence of the status of the Accused
     Citizen.
 
          [see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]
          [see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]
 
 
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     You might  be wondering  why someone  would go  to so  much
trouble to oppose a traffic citation.  Why not just pay the fine
and get  on with your life?  The answer lies, once again, in the
fundamental and  supreme Law  of our  Land, the Constitution for
the United  States of  America.   Sovereign State  Citizens have
learned to  assert  their  fundamental  rights,  because  rights
belong to  the belligerent claimant in person.  The Constitution
is the  last bastion  of the Common Law in our country.  Were it
not for the Constitution, the Common Law would have been history
a long  time ago.   The  interpretation of  the Constitution  is
directly influenced  by the  fact that its provisions are framed
in the language of the English common law:
 
     There is,  however, one  clear exception  to the  statement
     that there  is no  national common law.  The interpretation
     of the  constitution of  the United  States is  necessarily
     influenced by  the fact  that its  provisions are framed in
     the language  of the English common law, and are to be read
     in the light of its history.
 
       [United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 891, 893 (1898)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     Under the  Common Law,  we are  endowed by our Creator with
the right  to travel.   "Driving", on the other hand, is defined
in  State   Vehicle  Codes  to  mean  the  act  of  chauffeuring
passengers for  hire.  "Passengers" are those who pay a "driver"
to be  chauffeured.   Guests, on  the other  hand, are those who
accompany  travelers  without  paying  for  the  transportation.
Driving, under this definition, is a privilege for which a State
can require  a license.   Similarly, if you are a citizen of the
United States**,  you are  subject to  its jurisdiction,  and  a
State government  can prove  that you  are obligated  thereby to
obey all  administrative statutes  and regulations to the letter
of  the   law.    These  regulations  include,  of  course,  the
requirement that  all subjects apply and pay for licenses to use
the State  and federal highways, even though the highways belong
to the  People.   The land  on which  they were  built, and  the
materials and  labor expended  in their  construction, were  all
paid for with taxes obtained from the People.  Provided that you
are not  engaged in  any "privileged" or regulated activity, you
are free  to travel  anywhere you  wish within  the  50  States.
Those States  are real  parties  to  the  Constitution  and  are
therefore bound by all its terms.
 
     Another one  of your  Common Law rights is the right to own
property free and clear of any liens.  ("Unalienable" rights are
rights against  which  no  lien  can  be  established  precisely
because they are un-lien-able.)  You enjoy the right to own your
vehicle  outright,  without  any  lawful  requirement  that  you
"register" it  with the State Department of Motor Vehicles.  The
State governments  violated your  fundamental rights  when  they
concealed the  legal "interest"  which  they  obtained  in  your
vehicle, by making it appear as if you were required to register
the vehicle  when you  purchased it, as a condition of purchase.
This is  fraud.  If you don't believe me, then try to obtain the
manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO) the next time you buy a
 
 
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new car or truck.  The implications and ramifications of driving
around without  a license,  and/or without registration, are far
beyond the scope of this book.  Suffice it to say that effective
methods have already been developed to deal with law enforcement
officers and  courts, if  and when you are pulled over and cited
for traveling  without a  license or  tags.  Richard McDonald is
second to  none when  it comes to preparing a successful defense
to the  civil charges that might result.  A Sovereign is someone
who enjoys  fundamental, Common  Law rights, and owning property
free and clear is one of those fundamental rights.
 
     If you  have a DOS-compatible personal computer and a 2400-
baud modem,  Richard McDonald  can provide you with instructions
for accessing his electronic bulletin board system (BBS).  There
is a  mountain of  information, and  some of  his computer files
were rather large when he began his BBS.  Users were complaining
of long  transmission times  to "download" text files over phone
lines from  his BBS  to  their  own  personal  computers.    So,
McDonald used a fancy text "compression" program on all the text
files available  on his  BBS.   As a consequence, BBS users must
first download a DOS program which "decompresses" the compressed
files.   Once this program is running on your personal computer,
you are  then free  to download  all other  text  files  and  to
decompress them  at your  end.  For example, the compressed file
"14AMREC.ZIP" contains  the documentation  which proves that the
so-called 14th  Amendment was  never ratified.   If you have any
problems or  questions, Richard  McDonald is  a very patient and
generous man.   And please tell him where you read about him and
his computer  bulletin board (voice: 818-703-5037, BBS: 818-888-
9882).
 
     As you  peruse through McDonald's numerous court briefs and
other documents,  you will  encounter many gems to be remembered
and shared  with your  family, friends and associates.  His work
has confirmed  an attribute  of sovereignty that is of paramount
importance.   Sovereignty is  never  diminished  in  delegation.
Thus,  as   sovereign  individuals,   we  do  not  diminish  our
sovereignty in  any  way  by  delegating  our  powers  to  State
governments, to  perform services  which are  difficult, if  not
impossible for  us to perform as individuals.  Similarly, States
do not  diminish their  sovereignty by  delegating powers to the
federal government,  via the Constitution.  As McDonald puts it,
powers delegated do not equate to powers surrendered:
 
     17.   Under the  Constitutions, "... we the People" did not
     surrender our individual sovereignty to either the State or
     Federal Government.   Powers  "delegated" do  not equate to
     powers surrendered.   This  is a Republic, not a democracy,
     and the  majority cannot  impose its will upon the minority
     because the "LAW" is already set forth.  Any individual can
     do anything  he or  she wishes to do so long as it does not
     damage,  injure,  or  impair  the  same  Right  of  another
     individual.   This is where the concept of a corpus delicti
     comes from to prove a "crime" or a civil damage.
 
          [see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]
          [see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]
 
 
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     Indeed, to  be a Citizen of the United States*** of America
is to  be one  of the Sovereign People, "a constituent member of
the sovereignty,  synonymous with the people" [see 19 How. 404].
According to  the 1870  edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the
People are  the  fountain  of  sovereignty.    It  is  extremely
revealing that there is no definition of "United States" as such
in this  dictionary.   However, there is an important discussion
of the  "United States  of America",  where  the  delegation  of
sovereignty clearly originates in the People and nowhere else:
 
     The great  men who  formed it  did not undertake to solve a
     question that  in its  own nature  is insoluble.    Between
     equals it  made neither superior, but trusted to the mutual
     forbearance of  both parties.    A  larger  confidence  was
     placed in  an  enlightened  public  opinion  as  the  final
     umpire.  The people parcelled out the rights of sovereignty
     between the states and the United States**, and they have a
     natural right  to determine what was given to one party and
     what to the other.  ... It is a maxim consecrated in public
     law as  well as common sense and the necessity of the case,
     that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to his God
     and to his own conscience.
 
                  [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 14th Edition, 1870]
                           [defining "United States of America"]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     We don't  need to  reach far  back into  another century to
find proof  that the  People are  sovereign.  In a Department of
Justice manual  revised in  the 1990  (Document No.  M-230), the
meaning  of   American  Citizenship  was  described  with  these
eloquent and moving words by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization:  "You are no longer a subject of a government!"
 
                  The Meaning of American Citizenship
             Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
 
          Today you  have become  a citizen of the United States
     of America.   You are no longer an Englishman, a Frenchman,
     an Italian,  a Pole.  Neither are you a hyphenated-American
     -- a  Polish-American, an  Italian-American.   You  are  no
     longer a  subject of  a government.  Henceforth, you are an
     integral part of this Government -- a free man -- a Citizen
     of the United States of America.
 
          This citizenship, which has been solemnly conferred on
     you, is  a thing  of the  spirit -- not of the flesh.  When
     you took  the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the
     United States,  you  claimed  for  yourself  the  God-given
     unalienable rights which that sacred document sets forth as
     the natural right of all men.
 
          You have  made sacrifices  to reach this desired goal.
     We, your  fellow citizens,  realize this, and the warmth of
     our welcome  to you is increased proportionately.  However,
     we would tincture it with friendly caution.
 
 
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          As you have learned during these years of preparation,
     this great  honor carries  with it the duty to work for and
     make secure  this  longed-for  and  eagerly-sought  status.
     Government   under    our   Constitution   makes   American
     citizenship the  highest privilege and at the same time the
     greatest responsibility of any citizenship in the world.
 
          The important rights that are now yours and the duties
     and  responsibilities   attendant  thereon  are  set  forth
     elsewhere in this manual.  It is hoped that they will serve
     as a constant reminder that only by continuing to study and
     learn about your new country, its ideals, achievements, and
     goals, and by everlastingly working at your citizenship can
     you enjoy  its fruits  and assure  their  preservation  for
     generations to follow.
 
          May you  find in  this Nation  the fulfillment of your
     dreams of  peace and  security, and  may America,  in turn,
     never find  you wanting  in your  new  and  proud  role  of
     Citizen of the United States.
 
                 [Basic Guide to Naturalization and Citizenship]
                        [Immigration and Naturalization Service]
                                    [U.S. Department of Justice]
                                      [page 265, emphasis added]
 
 
Executed on ___________________________
 
 
/s/ Sheila Wallen
_______________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
 
 
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                          EXHIBIT "A":
 
               "The Day Our Country Was Stolen:"
 
                 "How the 14th Amendment" [sic]
                       "Enslaved Us All"
                     "Without a Shot Fired"
 

                 The Day Our Country Was Stolen:
 
                  How the 14th Amendment [sic]
                        Enslaved Us All
                      Without a Shot Fired
 
                               by
 
                           L. C. Lyon
 
 
     Most Americans  would agree  that  we,  as  a  people,  are
treated by  our public  servants -- the judges, politicians, law
enforcement and  bureaucrats who  are paid their salaries by our
taxes --  as if  we were  in complete  bondage to them.  When we
joke about being slaves to the Government, we don't realize that
we are  exactly correct, joke or not.  In fact, all those 99% of
Americans who  call  themselves  "U.S.  citizens"  are  actually
subjects of  the corporate  United States  Government -- not the
sovereign states  of the  Union.   The moment  you uttered  your
first cry  on American  soil, you became the chattel property of
the corporation  known as  the United  States of  America which,
because of the federal debt, handed title (Birth Certificate) to
your body  and soul  to the  Federal Reserve Bank, to be held in
the archives of the Department of Health and Human Services.
 
     As incredible  as this  sounds, it is sadly true.  The next
question is:   How  did I  automatically  become  subject  to  a
government, when  I'm supposedly  a free American?  How did this
all come  about, that  I should  be made  to register myself, my
family, and  all that  I own;   be made to obey oppressive laws;
and forfeit  almost half  of my  earnings upon  threat of  jail?
Only those  who are  "subject" to a government can be made to do
these things.   Free  American Inhabitants are subject to no one
but God, and all the laws and responsibilities which that Divine
allegiance entails.
 
 
             Which "United States" Do You Live In?
 
     The answer to the above questions goes back to the American
Civil War.   The  war that  was supposedly  fought to  free  the
slaves from  bondage actually  did just  the opposite -- for all
Americans then  and  in  the  future.    By  enacting  the  14th
Amendment  (which   technically  is   an  Article,  not  a  true
amendment, but  that's a  topic for another discussion), a whole
nation of  newly  freed  slaves  and  free-born  white  American
Inhabitants became  "citizens of  the United  States", i.e. of a
federal government  corporation, at  the stroke  of  a  pen  and
without a shot being fired.
 
     Because we  Americans are  a different breed and demand the
right to  personal freedom, those who had planned decades ago to
enslave us  (even if it took generations to do so) knew that, as
long as  we were  armed and  willing to  fight to  maintain  our
freedom, the  only way  to accomplish  this enslavement  was  by
deception.
 
 
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     To proceed  further, we  must understand that there are two
"United States".   There  is the "united States" (note the small
"u"  in   "united")  which   describes   the   ideological   and
geographical position  of the  sovereign states  of America.  An
individual was the voluntary inhabitant of the state in which he
resided.   If he  did not  like the  laws or  practices of  that
state, he  could simply  move to  another state.  Each state was
sovereign to  itself, and could not be forced to accept the laws
and practices of any other state.
 
     The "United States of America", however, is the name of the
corporate entity  (note the capital "U" in "United") that exists
to carry out the functions delegated to it by the States for the
protection of  the Union.   This corporate entity's jurisdiction
is supposed  to be  (according to  the Constitution) confined to
the District  of  Columbia,  the  federal  territories  and  the
federal  enclaves.     Enclaves   are  areas  within  a  State's
boundaries which  are ceded  to the  Federal Government  by  the
State Legislature.
 
     Anyone can  come  under  the  direct  jurisdiction  of  the
corporate United  States in three ways:  (1) by living in one of
its territories  (Guam, Puerto  Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc.),
(2) by  living in  the District  of Columbia,  or (3)  simply by
choice.   Back when  America still had vast territories not-yet-
become states  and several  thousands of  people lived  in these
territories, these  people had  no  rights  protected  by  state
sovereignty.   They lived  under federal jurisdiction, which was
the reason  why people  living in territories were so anxious to
achieve statehood.   The  President could  order federal  troops
into any  territory and  enact any  edicts he  wanted.   Once  a
territory became  a state,  it had  sovereignty and,  from  that
point on, the state's rights prevailed.
 
     So, if  you don't  live in  a territory or enclave, and you
don't live  in the  District of  Columbia, then the only way you
could have  fallen under  the jurisdiction  of the United States
Government is  by choice.   But  neither I,  nor anyone  I know,
voluntarily or  knowingly surrendered their personal sovereignty
to the  Government, which  means that  it (our  sovereignty) was
taken from us by deception.
 
     This deception,  which took place in the year 1868, is what
this article  will explain -- how our ancestors were tricked and
coerced  into   giving  up  their  rights  (and  ours!)  to  the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
 
 
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             Civil War Sets the Stage for Takeover
 
     The Constitution for the United States of America specifies
in the  opening paragraph  that the Constitution was written for
the newly  formed corporation,  not for us, the People living in
America.  Our rights come from God and are inalienable.  They do
not come  from a  piece of  paper.   And,  because  the  Federal
Government exists  only on  paper --  a man-created entity -- it
can also  be dismantled  anytime We  the People  decide  it  has
become  a   threat  to   our  inalienable  God-given  rights  of
sovereignty.
 
     The  Constitution   is  the   contract  between  those  who
administer the Government's affairs and the People of the united
States.   In essence,  it states  that the  People will give the
Government certain powers necessary to administer the defense of
the States,  and control  the  commerce  into  the  States  from
foreign countries.   In exchange, the State governments (not the
individual people  -- direct  taxation by the Federal Government
is unconstitutional)  would provide  the Federal  Government the
money it  needs to  operate.  The Federal Government had limited
powers;   in fact,  the Bill  of Rights was hotly debated at the
time of its passage because there were several people who wisely
cautioned that  the Bill of Rights would eventually be construed
as rights  endowed by  the Constitution,  not  protected  by  it
(which is exactly what has happened).
 
     How often  do you  hear patriots  mistakenly vow  to defend
"their Constitutional  rights"?    This  thinking  reflects  the
decades of  public school brainwashing to which we have all been
subjected.   We need  to correct  each other and understand that
our rights are God-given, not constitutional.
 
     So, how  does the  Civil War  enter into  this  present-day
power struggle between the Federal Government and Us the People?
Slavery was  not the true underlying reason for the war.  It was
an emotional,  social issue that was used as an excuse to incite
people to  go to  war, people  who did  not realize that foreign
agencies were  responsible for  that  conflict.    International
bankers, seeing  the slavery issue as an opportunity not only to
divide the country, but make millions of dollars as well, fanned
the flames  of debate  until, under cover of the most bloody war
in the  history of  the world, they were to accomplish that very
objective --  the complete  takeover of  America.   They  almost
succeeded years  sooner, except  for the intervention of one man
-- President Abraham Lincoln.
 
 
                  "Honest Abe" Knew the Truth
 
     President Lincoln  was against  slavery, but  he understood
that it  was wrong  to force  the southern  States  to  give  up
slavery --  to force  Federal jurisdiction  over  the  issue  of
States' Rights.   Four  of  the  southern  States  were  already
considering the  abolition of  slavery, but  they couldn't  just
abandon it  overnight.   It would  take time.   After all, their
whole economy was built upon slavery;  a sudden disruption would
bankrupt the  South.   Lincoln understood  this.  But, it wasn't
until Lincoln  got into  office that  he began  to see the whole
 
 
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picture.  He learned that the war was begun by the International
Bankers as  a means of dividing the country in two, forcing both
sides to  borrow heavily  from the  Bankers to  pay  war  debts.
Then, when  failing to  repay those  loans, the  divided America
would be  forced into  bankruptcy.   The Rothschilds  and  other
bankers could then simply foreclose on the corporations known as
the United  States of  America and  the  Confederate  States  of
America.   President Lincoln  knew he  had to  keep  the  nation
together at all costs -- including war.
 
                  Saved by the National Banks
 
     Near the end of the war, the South was on its knees and the
U.S. Government  was nearly bankrupt.  Seeing their opportunity,
the Bankers offered to loan the U.S. Government enough to see it
through.  Lincoln said no.  He would find another way.
 
     What he  did then  was to  ask Congress  for permission  to
print paper  money.  Even though he knew it was unconstitutional
(only gold  and silver  are lawful  U.S. money), it was the only
way he  knew to  buy provisions  for the Army -- but only if the
U.S. banks  would accept  it.   They did.  When Lincoln gave his
word that  the Government  would redeem those notes for gold and
silver at a later time, they believed him and honored the notes.
By doing  this, the  planned takeover by the Bankers was averted
-- at that time.
 
             The Bankers' Revenge -- Assassination
 
     Because he  had given  his word  to the  nation's  bankers;
because he  had promised  the South  that, upon  surrender,  the
Government would help them rebuild;  and because he had promised
the Southerners  there would be no recriminations or punishments
if they again swore loyalty to the Union, Lincoln knew he had to
get re-elected,  though he  was  tired,  tormented  by  migraine
headaches, and  worried about his suffering family life.  He had
to make sure those promises were kept.
 
     Lincoln's complete  thwarting of the International Bankers'
plans doomed  him to assassination at their hands.  Papers found
in Booth's locker show communications with an agent hired by the
Rothschild family.
 
     Weeks before  he was  killed, Lincoln  knew he would die in
office.   His spies  were reporting  plots to  kill him;  it was
only a  matter of  who got  to him  first.  So, he met regularly
with his  Vice President,  Andrew Johnson,  and educated  him as
quickly as he could so that he could follow through on Lincoln's
promises.   Johnson listened  carefully and  understood what was
expected of  him, and why.  Then, after Lincoln's murder, he did
exactly as he was supposed to do.
 
     In school,  when we  were  taught  this  part  of  American
history, we  were told  that Andrew  Johnson was  uneducated and
ignorant,  and   fumbled  continuously   in  office,  which  was
supposedly why  he was impeached.  Johnson was of humble origin,
but he  was an  honest, self-educated  man who  stood firmly for
what he  saw clearly  were the  best interests  of his  country.
This is what got him impeached.
 
 
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                          Impeachment!
 
     At  this   time,  the  only  men  in  Congress  were  those
representing the  northern States.   After  Fort Sumter, all the
southern States  had seceded.   After  Lincoln's death, Congress
began passing  laws to  punish the  South, in  contradiction  to
Lincoln's promise.   Johnson began vetoing them, sometimes three
and four times, until Congress began passing them over his veto.
One particular  bill that  he vetoed, the Civil Rights Bill, was
intended to  make all  former slaves  automatic citizens  of the
Federal Government,  and  under  its  direct  jurisdiction  (and
protection).   This seemed  like a  compassionate  and  generous
gesture to  the newly  freed slaves but, as Johnson pointed out,
it would have serious consequences for the Negroes.  In his veto
message in  March of  1866, Johnson  pointed out the pitfalls of
this bill:
 
          He [the  Negro] must,  of necessity, from his previous
     unfortunate condition  of servitude, be less informed as to
     the nature  and character  of our institutions than he who,
     coming  from   abroad,  has   to  some   extent  at  least,
     familiarized himself with the principles of a government to
     which he  voluntarily  entrusts  "life,  liberty,  and  the
     pursuit of happiness".
 
          The  1st   Section  of   the  bill  also  contains  an
     enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes so
     made citizens  "in every  state and territory in the United
     States".   These rights are "to make and enforce contracts;
     to sue,  be  parties,  and  give  evidence;    to  inherit,
     purchase, lease,  sell, hold,  and convey real and personal
     property";  and to have "full and equal benefit of all laws
     and proceedings  for the security of person and property as
     is enjoyed  by white  citizens".   So too,  they  are  made
     subject to  the same  punishment, pains  and penalties,  in
     common with white citizens ....
 
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     Johnson could  clearly see  that  to  immediately  place  a
string of  governmental "rights  and benefits"  upon  a  totally
naive and uneducated people as the Negroes, would also make them
easy prey  for every  carpetbagger who  would  trick  them  into
contracts, in  which they  would have  no knowledge of the legal
ramifications.   This bill  would, in  effect, make  the  former
slaves as  slaves again  to  different  masters:    unscrupulous
businessmen, attorneys and judges.
 
     Johnson saw  that this  bill was  also a  means of foisting
unconstitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Government in every
state:
 
 
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          Thus a perfect equality of the white and colored races
     is attempted  to be  fixed by federal law in every state of
     the Union over the vast field of state jurisdiction covered
     by these enumerated rights.
 
          If Congress   can declare  by law who shall hold lands,
     who shall   testify, who  shall  have  capacity  to  make  a
     contract in   a state, then Congress can by law also declare
     who, without   regard to color or race, shall have the right
     to sit   as a  juror or  as a judge, to hold any office, and
     finally, to   vote "in  every state  and  territory  of  the
     United States".
 
          The legislation   thus proposed  invades  the  judicial
     power of  the state.  It says to every state court or judge:
     if you   decide that  this act  is unconstitutional;  if you
     refuse, under   the prohibition  of a  state law, to allow a
     Negro to   testify;   if you  hold that  over such a subject
     matter the   state  law  is  paramount  ...  your  error  of
     judgment, however   conscientious, shall  abject you to fine
     and imprisonment.
 
          The Legislative   Department of  the government  of the
     United States   thus takes  from the  Judicial Department of
     the states   the  sacred  and  exclusive  duty  of  judicial
     decision   and   converts  the   state  judge  into  a  mere
     ministerial officer,   bound to decide according to the will
     of Congress.
                                                 [emphasis added]
 
     Johnson then continued  with an additional warning as to the
virtually unlimited power given to appointed agents:
 
          The Section   of the  bill provides  that officers  and
     agents of   the Freedman's Bureau shall be empowered to make
     arrests and   also that  other  officers  may  be  specially
     commissioned for   that purpose  by  the  President  of  the
     United States.    It  also authorizes  circuit courts of the
     United States  and the superior courts of the territories to
     appoint, without   limitation, commissioners,  who are to be
     charged with the performance of quasi-judicial duties.
 
          These numerous  agents are made to constitute a sort of
     police, in   addition to the military, and are authorized to
     summon a   posse comitatus,  and even  to call  to their aid
     such portion   of the  land and  naval forces  of the United
     States or of the militia ....
 
          This extraordinary   power  is  to  be  conferred  upon
     agents irresponsible   to the  government and to the people,
     to whose   number the discretion of the commissioners is the
     only limit   and in whose hands such authority might be made
     a terrible engine of wrong, oppression and fraud.
 
          The 7th   Section provides that a fee ... shall be paid
     to each   commissioner in every case brought before him, and
     a fee   ... to  his deputy or deputies for each person he or
     they may arrest and take before any such commissioner ....
 
 
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          All those  fees are to be "paid out of the Treasury of
     the United  States" whether  there is  a conviction or not;
     but in  the case  of conviction  they are to be recoverable
     from the  defendant.    It  seems  to  me  that  under  the
     influence of  such temptations,  bad men  might convert any
     law, however  beneficent, into an instrument of persecution
     and fraud.
 
          To me, the details of the bill seem fraught with evil.
     It is another step, or rather stride, toward centralization
     and the  concentration of  all legislative  powers  in  the
     national government.
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     It is plain to see here that President Johnson saw far into
the future  as to the potential for legal and political abuse of
such arbitrary  powers --  powers that  had  never  before  been
placed into  the hands  of  a  bureaucracy  that  had  not  been
subjected to referendum by the people or constitutional question
by any  federal  court.    This  bill  (which  was  passed  over
Johnson's veto)  did, in fact, set the precedent for hundreds of
federal, state  and local  bureaucracies that  have since choked
the lifeblood of millions of Americans.
 
     Also, this  bill blatantly  usurped all  States Rights  and
opened a  very wide  door for  the further  usurpation of  these
rights, using other social agendas.
 
     The reason  Andrew Johnson  was impeached  was  because  he
fought so  hard  against  this  bill  and  the  subsequent  14th
Amendment.   His enemies  purposely did not mention to the press
(nor to  the public)  the legal  and political  ramifications of
this bill  which Johnson  had so  succinctly pointed  out;   but
instead they  broadcasted the  notion that  he was  reneging  on
Lincoln's promises  to  "heal  the  wounds"  of  the  nation  by
fighting full  rights  for  the  Negro  --  thus  making  it  an
emotional social issue.
 
     In fact,  Johnson was  keeping Lincoln's promises by trying
to protect  the rights of the newly freed slaves, as well as the
rights of those states which knew their own former slaves better
than anyone,  and knew  the Negroes  were not  yet ready for the
responsibilities of  citizenship.   As  Johnson  had  predicted,
after passage  of the  bill, so  many of  the Negroes had indeed
been robbed  of goods  and property  by white  charlatans and/or
thrown into  jails for  breaking commercial  laws they  did  not
understand that,  when the Negroes did come to full awareness of
the massive  duplicity perpetrated by these scoundrels, a racial
hatred and mistrust of all whites became a nationwide phenomenon
that has never been erased to this day.
 
 
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                      The Final Axe Falls
 
     After the  bill was  passed over  Johnson's veto, and there
was no  general hue  and cry  from  the  public,  Congress  then
proceeded with the next step -- the 14th Amendment.  In order to
understand the ramifications of this heinous act of Congress, it
must be analyzed section-by-section:
 
     ARTICLE XIV.   Section  1.  All persons born or naturalized
     in the  United States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction
     thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
     wherein they  reside.   No State  shall make or enforce any
     law which  shall abridge  the privileges  or immunities  of
     citizens of the United States;  nor shall any State deprive
     any person  of life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due
     process of  law;    nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its
     jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
 
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     In the  very first  line, the  amendment  states  that  all
persons born (all babies from this point on) or naturalized (the
newly freed  slaves who  were then  just inhabitants of America)
are now  citizens of  the United States (the Federal Government)
and of  the State (the State Government) where they lived.  From
the Declaration  of Independence  on, all  people in America who
lived here were Americans, residing in a particular geographical
state, and  free to move from state to state, or even to another
country.  The Federal Government, according to the Constitution,
is a  corporate fiction  that does  the bidding  of the  body of
collective states  called Congress.   At  this time,  the  state
governments  had   similar  limited   jurisdiction  over   their
inhabitants,  as   did  the   federal  government.    The  state
government's primary  function was  to act as a collective voice
of all  its inhabitants  to convey  their  wishes  to  Congress.
Congress controlled the federal government.
 
     The rule  of Common  Law, which  was the law of the land at
that time,  was carried out exclusively by the County Sheriff --
the Common  Law concept  of Posse  Comitatus.  Neither the State
nor the  Federal Government  had any jurisdiction in the County,
where Home  Rule was  the law.  Only by permission or invitation
by the  Sheriff could  either of  the other two governments step
foot in  his County.   The  Civil Rights  Bill, in one bold act,
forced Federal  Government jurisdiction  into  the  sanctity  of
State rule.   But  Posse Comitatus  still reigned in each state,
and the  conspirators found  the way  to usurp jurisdiction here
through the 14th Amendment.
 
                 Citizens, Subjects  =  Slaves
 
     In order  for any government to grab power and maintain it,
it must have "subjects" or "citizens".  According to Black's Law
Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "Citizens are members of a political
community who, in their associated capacity, have established or
submitted themselves  to the  dominion of  a government  for the
promotion of  their general  welfare and the protection of their
individual as  well as  collective rights.   (Herriot v. City of
Seattle, 81 Wash.2d. 48, 500 P.2d. 101, 109)"
 
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 31 of 36

     So, by  declaration of the 14th Amendment, all persons born
from that  point forward,  and all  naturalized people, had just
become citizens (i.e. subjects) of the United States Government,
obviously without their knowledge (babies) or understanding (the
Negroes).   The Federal  Government had  just reached  past  the
jurisdictional boundaries  of the  state and  county  lines  and
claimed all its babies and all Negroes.
 
     In Section  2, it  then states  that only males 21 years of
age who are citizens of the United States may be allowed to vote
in Federal  and State elections.  That means that only those men
who willingly  claimed U.S.  citizenship on voter's registration
cards (though  they didn't  realize the  implications) were also
brought in  as subjects of the Federal Government.  (The Federal
Government's power  and control  are growing fast!)  However, it
stipulated that  those who  had participated  in rebellion  (the
South) were excluded.
 
                         The Back Door
 
     At this  point, any  intelligent person can figure out that
the Conspirators  who were  using this  Amendment to  claim  all
Americans as  its citizens  -- by  deception --  were  obviously
performing  an   illegal  and   unconstitutional   act.      The
conspirators in  Congress (and  every Congressman  knew what was
being perpetrated,  and either  promoted it  or simply pretended
not to  notice) established  a "loophole"  for themselves and to
cover themselves  in case  people  began  to  catch  on.    This
loophole was  15 Statutes  at Large,  Chapter 249  (Section  1),
enacted July  27, 1868,  one day  before the  14th Amendment was
declared "ratified".   You  will not  see this statute published
anywhere except in very old books.  The Conspirators do not want
their "citizens"  to know  it exists,  and  it  has  never  been
repealed.  The text follows:
 
         CHAP. CCXLIX. -- An Act concerning the Rights
             of American Citizens in foreign States
 
          Whereas the  right of  expatriation is  a natural  and
     inherent  right   of  all   people,  indispensable  to  the
     enjoyment of  the rights  of life, liberty, and the pursuit
     of happiness;   and  whereas in  the  recognition  of  this
     principle this  government has  freely  received  emigrants
     from all  nations, and  invested them  with the  rights  of
     citizenship;   and whereas it is claimed that such American
     citizens, with  their descendants,  are subjects of foreign
     states, owing  allegiance to  the governments thereof;  and
     whereas it  is necessary to the maintenance of public peace
     that this  claim of  foreign allegiance  should be promptly
     and finally disavowed:  Therefore,
 
          Be  it   enacted  by  the  Senate  and  the  House  of
     Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
     assembled,  That  any  declaration,  instruction,  opinion,
     order, or decision of any officers of this government which
     denies, restricts,  impairs,  or  questions  the  right  of
     expatriation, is  hereby  declared  inconsistent  with  the
     fundamental principles of this government.
 
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 32 of 36

     On the  surface, this  seems to guarantee that "foreigners"
who live  in the  borders of  America cannot  be forced to claim
citizenship.  But, what this also says is that anyone who wishes
to expatriate  (i.e. renounce their U.S. citizenship) may do so,
by inherent right, and no one can deny him this right.
 
     The Conspirators  knew that, the "letter of the law" having
been satisfied  with this  exemption from  compelled performance
(having U.S.  citizenship thrust  upon us), they could then hide
the exemption  from general view, start promoting the "benefits"
of U.S.  citizenship in the media (and later, in public schools)
and begin setting up all of us for manipulation to obey millions
of codes, statutes, and laws;  exacting fines for breaking these
laws;   and extracting  license fees  and taxes  upon penalty of
seizure or jail.
 
     Free American  Inhabitants are  not subject  to the Federal
Government by  virtue of  their not  claiming U.S.  citizenship.
Those of us who have renounced our U.S. citizenship and declared
our status  as American  Inhabitants, using 15 Statutes at Large
as the  legal foundation for this Declaration of Status, are the
only ones  living in  the united States of America.  The rest of
America (U.S.  citizens --  about  99%)  are  living  in  a  4th
dimension, i.e.  in a  fictitious corporation  called the United
States of  America.  As far as America is concerned (except that
1%), there's nobody home!
 
                      Slavery by Election
 
     We can  see that,  in the 14th Amendment, those Southerners
who had  participated in  the Civil  War were excluded from this
"benefit" (U.S.  Citizenship) on  purpose --  to punish  them so
severely with  sanctions, punishing fines and terrorism from the
newly formed  Freeman's Bureau,  that a  few  years  later,  the
Southerners would  be grateful for any consideration the Federal
Government would extend to them.  When the opportunity was ripe,
such a  consideration was  enacted --  the 15th  Amendment.   It
reads (in part):
 
     Section 1.   The  right of citizens of the United States to
     vote shall  not be  denied or abridged by the United States
     or by  any State  on account  of race,  color, or  previous
     condition of servitude.
 
     By  this   gracious   gesture,   Congress   extended   full
forgiveness to  the South,  and restored their right to vote (at
that time,  considered  to  be  the  most  sacred  right  of  an
American).  At the next national election after the enactment of
this amendment,  there was  the largest  turnout of  voters this
nation had  ever seen.   The  South  wanted  desperately  to  be
restored to  the Union  and heal  their wounds.  When they heard
that, in  order to  vote, they  had to  swear allegiance  to the
United States  of America  and thus  become a  "citizen  of  the
United States"  (as required by the 14th Amendment), they did so
willingly and  without a  clue as  to what they had just done to
themselves and to their posterity.
 
     With the  stroke of  a pen,  the 14th  Amendment,  and  the
subsequent 15th  Amendment, had  just enslaved  an entire nation
without a shot being fired.
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 33 of 36

                     The "Forgotten" Clause
 
     Obviously, this  treacherous act  by Congress was enough to
have all  of them  hanged as  traitors;  but, there was one more
act of  treachery that  has  been  overlooked  by  most  people.
Section 4 of the 14th Amendment reads:
 
     The validity  of the  public debt  of  the  United  States,
     authorized by  law, including debts incurred for payment of
     pensions  and   bounties  for   services   in   suppressing
     insurrection or  rebellion, shall  not be  questioned.  But
     neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
     any debt  or obligation  incurred in aid of insurrection or
     rebellion against  the United  States, or any claim for the
     loss or  emancipation of  any slave;   but  all such debts,
     obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
 
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     At that time, a hue and cry was raised concerning Lincoln's
promises  to   "forgive"  the   South's   debts   as   part   of
Reconstruction, with good reason.  But mainly overlooked was the
first part  of Section  4, which says that the debts incurred by
the  U.S.  government  were  not  to  be  questioned,  that  the
enforcers  whom  the  Government  hired  to  quell  insurrection
(today, the  CIA, FBI,  BATF, DEA, U.S. Marshals, etc.) would be
paid by the Government.  And where was the Government's money to
come from?   Answer:    Its  newly  acquired  subjects  --  U.S.
citizens.   The  States  had  just  signed  into  constitutional
amendment the  permission for  the Federal  Government  to  hire
thugs and thieves to control us, to pay them with our own money,
and that  no question  could  be  brought  to  court  about  the
constitutionality of  these actions.   This is why any effort to
bring a  suit against the Government about the Federal debt will
never be entertained by the Supreme Court!
 
 
                        A Dangerous Game
 
     In Europe,  Africa and  other places in the world, a despot
simply took  over a  country by  waging war.   Here  in America,
however, as  long as  Americans  were  armed  and  prepared  for
hostile armed  takeover, the  Conspirators knew that a different
technique --  a grand deception by manipulation of the laws, the
courts, the schools, the media -- must be employed to obtain the
same results.  They waged war on us long ago, but we've been too
naive to see it.  There are many who are waking up now, but they
don't see  the whole picture.  They think that if they reverse a
certain portion  of Government  abuse, we  can take  our country
back.  Tax protestors (as IRS calls them) have perfectly correct
reasons to  point out  that they are not required to file -- but
they forget  they are still U.S. citizens (i.e. subjects).  Home
schoolers  fight  bravely  for  their  right  to  protect  their
children against  Government control -- but they forget they are
still U.S.  citizens.   Legal eagles  have found  many statutory
"loopholes" to  win a  few battles  in court  -- but they forget
they are still U.S. citizens.
 
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 34 of 36

     Playing the  "patriot game" without fully understanding the
constitutional hold  the Federal,  State and  local  governments
have over  them is playing a dangerous game.  They may win a few
skirmishes in  their battles  with  Government  (the  Government
allows these  "wins" to  encourage us  to continue  wasting  our
energies in  useless effort),  but they  will never win the war,
and will  only bring  the wrath of Government down upon the head
of yet another one of its subjects.
 
     For now,  at least, the Government is respecting the status
of American  Inhabitants.   We (your  publisher L.  C. Lyon  and
writer George  Sibley) have  not had  any legal hassles from any
Government entity,  because we  are no longer U.S. citizens.  We
are the  same as  George Washington,  Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin
Franklin and  all the  other patriots were in their time -- free
American Inhabitants.    Any  U.S.  citizen  can  give  up  this
enslaving status at any time, but it must be done properly.
 
     If everyone  in America  were to  take back their rights as
free  Americans  again,  through  the  revocation  process,  the
Government would have no more subjects, and no more power!
 
 
              IT'S TIME TO TAKE OUR COUNTRY BACK!
 
 
[Minor grammatical and spelling edits were done to this essay by
John E.  Trumane.   These edits  were done without permission of
the author,  because Mr.  Trumane  did  not  have  the  author's
mailing address at the time the edits were done.]
 
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 35 of 36

                        PROOF OF SERVICE
 
I,  Sheila  Terese, Wallen,  Sui Juris,  hereby  certify,  under
 
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of the  United  States  of
 
America, without  the "United  States," that  I am  at least  18
 
years of  age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
 
and that I personally served the following document(s):
 
           VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
                 TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY
                    AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE:
                 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), 1861, 1865
 
by placing  one true  and correct  copy of  said document(s)  in
 
first  class  United  States  Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and
 
properly addressed to the following:
 
 
Office of the United States Attorney
110 South Church Avenue, Suite 8310
Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
 
Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 
 
Executed on: _____________________________
 
 
/s/ Sheila Wallen
__________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
   Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:
                          Page 36 of 36

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Attachment "B":
 
 
                COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
 
             (with Complainant's Supporting Letter)
 
                               by
 
                      Paul Andrew Mitchell
                           Complainant
 
                             versus
 
                       William D. Browning
                  United States District Judge
                      Tucson, Arizona state

                         COMPLAINT FORM
              JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
         COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY
 
 
MAIL THIS FORM TO THE CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, P.O.
BOX 193939,  SAN FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA 94119-3939/tdc.  MARK THE
ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL  MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR "JUDICIAL DISABILITY
COMPLAINT".   DO NOT  PUT THE  NAME OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE ON
THE ENVELOPE.
 
 
SEE RULE 2(e) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED FOR FILING.
 
 
1.   Complainant's name: Paul Andrew, Mitchell
 
     Address:            c/o 2509 North Campbell Avenue, #1776
                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                         ARIZONA STATE
 
     Daytime telephone:  [redacted]
                         (leave message on voice mail)
 
 
2.   Judge or magistrate complained about:
 
     Name:               William D. Browning
                         United States District Judge
 
     Court:              United States District Court
                         Tucson, Arizona state
 
 
3.   Does this  complaint concern  the behavior  of the  judge or
     magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?
 
          ( X ) Yes  (  ) No
 
     If "yes"  give the  following information about each lawsuit
     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):
 
     Court:              United States District Court
 
     Docket Number:      95-484-TUC
 
     Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?
 
          (   ) Party    ( X ) Counsel  (   ) Neither
 
     If party,  give the  name, address,  and telephone number of
     your Counsel:
 
                         n/a
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 1 of 6

     Docket numbers of any appeals to the Ninth Circuit:
 
          Notice of  appeal  was  filed  before  trial,  but  Mr.
          Browning refused  to stay  the trial,  and  ruled  that
          Notice of  Appeal could  not be  processed until  after
          sentencing.  Defendant Sheila Wallen objected timely.
 
 
4.   Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge or magistrate?
 
          (   ) Yes      ( X ) No  (Client has, however.)
 
     If yes,  give the  following information  about each lawsuit
     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):
 
     Court:    District Court of the United States
               Judicial District of Arizona
 
     Present status of suit:
 
          My client,  Sheila Terese  Wallen, served Formal Notice
          and Demand  upon  Judge  Alex  Kozinski  of  the  Ninth
          Circuit Court of Appeals, to prepare and present to the
          Chief Justice  of the  United States  a certificate  of
          necessity that  the Chief  Justice designate and assign
          temporarily a  competent and  qualified judge  from the
          Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties
          in the District Court of the United States, pursuant to
          authorities in  28 U.S.C.  293, 296,  297, 461(b),  and
          Evans v.  Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).  Her action cannot
          proceed without  a competent and qualified judge to sit
          on the District Court of the United States.
 
     Name, address, and telephone number of your Counsel:
 
          n/a
 
     Court to which any appeal has been taken:
 
          (see above)
 
     Docket number of appeal:
 
          none
 
     Present status of appeal:
 
          none
 
 
5.   On separate  sheets of  paper, no larger than the paper this
     form is  printed on, describe the conduct or the evidence of
     disability that  is the subject of this complaint.  See rule
     2(b) and  2(d).   Do not  use more  than 5  pages (5 sides).
     Most complaints do not require that much.
 
          see attached
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 2 of 6

6.   You should either:
 
          (1)  check the  first box  below and  sign this form in
               the presence of a notary public;  or
 
          (2)  check the  second box  and sign  the form.  You do
               not need  a notary  public if you check the second
               box.
 
          ( )  I swear (affirm) that --
 
          (X)  I declare under penalty of perjury --
 
               I have  read rules  1 and  2 of  the Rules  of the
               Judicial Council  of the  Ninth Circuit  Governing
               Complaints of  Judicial Misconduct  or Disability,
               and the  statement made in this complaint are true
               and correct to the best of my knowledge.
 
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
________________________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and
Counselor at Law
 
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
 
Executed on:  September 16, 1996
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copies:   Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
          U.S. Marshals, Tucson, Arizona
          Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
          Attorney General, State of Arizona
          Governor Fife Symington, State of Arizona
          Sheila Terese Wallen, Arivaca, Arizona state
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 3 of 6

         Attachment to Complaint of Judicial Misconduct
 
1.   Mr. Browning agreed -- before trial, on record, and before a
     gallery of  witnesses -- to guarantee all of Sheila Wallen's
     fundamental Rights  during said  trial.   He then refused to
     allow Her  to enjoy the assistance of Her Counsel of Choice,
     by ordering Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell to the back seat of the
     gallery, where  Mr. Mitchell  was forced  to stay during the
     entire course  of  the  trial  and  was  prevented  by  U.S.
     Marshals from  communicating with Miss Wallen.  Mr. Mitchell
     was allowed  to speak  with Miss  Wallen only  during recess
     periods.   Mr. Browning  had  been  previously  briefed,  in
     detail, as  to the  holding of  the U.S.  Supreme  Court  in
     Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), which held that
     a criminal  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  assistance  of
     Counsel at  every step  in the proceedings, and if the trial
     court fails  to ensure  that this assistance is available at
     every step  in the  proceedings, then  the trial court ousts
     itself of  jurisdiction.   Mr. Browning  did not  care about
     this Supreme Court precedent;  Mr. Browning does not believe
     that  U.S.   Supreme  Court   decisions   have   any   legal
     significance.   Denial of effective assistance of Counsel is
     a criminal deprivation of a fundamental Right under color of
     law, in  violation of 18 U.S.C. 242, and perjury of oath, in
     violation of  18 U.S.C. 1621.  In My opinion, this matter is
     serious enough to be brought to the attention of a qualified
     federal grand  jury, one  whose members  are chosen randomly
     from a  pool that  includes State  Citizens  too,  not  just
     federal citizens.
 
2.   When  presented   with   an   Affidavit   of   Circumstances
     Surrounding the  Arrest of  Sheila Wallen,  and also  with a
     comprehensive  Motion  to  Stay  Proceedings  pending  final
     resolution   of    Sheila   Wallen's    challenge   to   the
     constitutionality of  the Jury  Selection and  Service  Act,
     complete with  a very  detailed  Sworn  Statement  of  facts
     supporting  said   Motion,  Mr.   Browning  received   these
     pleadings at approximately 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon,
     July 17,  1996;  Mr. Browning then ruled on these pleadings,
     wrote his  Order on  the same  day, placed his Order in U.S.
     Mail, and it was delivered to Sheila Wallen's post office 70
     miles away  in Arivaca, Arizona, by 11:00 a.m. the following
     morning, Thursday, July 18, 1996.  It was impossible for Mr.
     Browning to  have read  all of  these pleadings  in such  an
     extremely short period of time.  Furthermore, Mr. Browning's
     Order ruled  that Wallen's  Affidavit was  hearsay, and that
     there was  nothing in the Stay Motion and accompanying Sworn
     Statement of  any legal  significance, despite the fact that
     the latter  pleadings  contained  numerous  authorities  and
     rulings by  the United  States Supreme  Court.  For example,
     see U.S.  v. Mason,  412 U.S.  391, 399-400 (1973),  to wit:
     nobody should be punished unnecessarily for relying upon the
     decisions of  the U.S.  Supreme Court.   Refusing  to file a
     proper and  correctly executed  Affidavit  violates  Federal
     Rules of  Evidence, Rule  201(d), Mandatory Judicial Notice,
     and constitutes  obstruction of  justice in  violation of 18
     U.S.C. 1506.   Miss  Wallen's Affidavit contained proof that
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 4 of 6

     the  alleged   officers  of   the  United  States  proceeded
     criminally  to   trespass  upon  Wallen's  private  property
     without a  valid warrant  to search and seize said property,
     and to  arrest Her  without a  valid warrant for Her arrest.
     This Affidavit also contained material evidence which proves
     the lack of jurisdiction of the United States District Court
     over which  Mr.  Browning  presided,  since  a  warrant  was
     absolutely necessary to execute the search, seizure & arrest
     in the  first instance;   without  said warrants, Browning's
     court was  denied jurisdiction over the subject matter.  See
     Rule C  of the  Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
     Maritime Claims.   This  Affidavit also contains evidence of
     threats, duress,  extortion, and  coercion by  said  alleged
     agents of  the United  States, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
     872 (extortion),  making Mr. Browning an accessory to all of
     these crimes after the fact, in violation 18 U.S.C. 3.  This
     matter should  be brought  before a  competent and qualified
     federal grand jury.
 
3.   As of 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996, Mr. Browning had
     failed to  answer Wallen's Final Notice and Demand for Proof
     of Power,  Standing, and  Jurisdiction in  the  Particulars.
     His failure  to do so is competent evidence that neither he,
     nor the  court over which he was presiding, had any criminal
     jurisdiction whatsoever to proceed over the case before him.
     Specifically, Miss  Wallen demanded:   (1)  proof  that  the
     alleged U.S.  Attorneys who  were prosecuting Her had powers
     of attorney  to represent  the Plaintiff  "UNITED STATES  OF
     AMERICA";   (2) proof  of  the  statutory,  regulatory,  and
     constitutional authority  which grants legal standing to the
     "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" to bring a criminal action before
     a "UNITED  STATES DISTRICT  COURT";   and (3)  proof of  the
     statutory, regulatory,  and constitutional  authority  which
     grants jurisdiction  to a  "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT" as
     opposed to a "DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES" to hear a
     criminal case against a Union State Citizen when the alleged
     crime was  committed inside  the state  zone and outside the
     federal  zone.    It  is  a  principle  of  law  that,  once
     challenged, the  one asserting  jurisdiction must prove that
     jurisdiction exists  as a matter of law.  The proponent of a
     rule carries  the burden  of proving  its application in the
     instant case.  See 5 U.S.C. 556(d).  For judicial support of
     this principle,  see  in  particular  the  following  cases:
     Hagans v.  Lavine, 415  U.S. 533;   Griffin v. Matthews, 310
     F.Supp. 341,  423 F.2d  272;  McNutt vs. G.M., 56 S.Ct. 789,
     80 L.Ed  1135;   Basso vs. U.P.L., 495 F.2d 906;  Thomson v.
     Gaskiel, 62  S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed. 111;  Albrecht v. U.S., 273
     U.S. 1;   Louisville R.R. v. Motley,  211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct.
     42.   Proceeding without  jurisdiction, particularly after a
     formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been
     completely ignored,  is a  criminal denial of due process of
     law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242.
     This  matter  should  be  brought  before  a  competent  and
     qualified federal grand jury.
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 5 of 6

4.   Mr. Browning  also "DENIED"  two pleadings  by  Miss  Wallen
     filed in  the form  of a  Notice and  Demand  for  Mandatory
     Judicial Notice,  pursuant to  Rule 201(d)  of  the  Federal
     Rules of  Evidence.   A  federal  judge  has  absolutely  no
     discretion in  the matter of mandatory judicial notice.  The
     rule itself  is very clear on this point:  "when MANDATORY."
     Refusing to file material evidence, and proper and correctly
     executed demands  for  mandatory  judicial  notice  of  said
     evidence, violates  Federal Rules  of Evidence, Rule 201(d),
     Mandatory Judicial  Notice, and  constitutes obstruction  of
     justice in  violation of  18 U.S.C.  1506.   Miss Wallen was
     forced to refuse Mr. Browning's DENIAL Order for fraud.  The
     proper  method  for  excluding  said  evidence  is  for  the
     opposing party  to move  the court  to strike  the evidence;
     this was  not done by the opposing party, or by any of their
     officers, agents,  or employees.   Claiming to have "DENIED"
     Miss Wallen's  Notices and  Demands for  Mandatory  Judicial
     Notice, absent  a proper  Motion to  Strike by  the opposing
     party, is proof that Mr. Browning engaged in the practice of
     law, a high misdemeanor in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454.  This
     matter should  be brought  before a  competent and qualified
     federal grand jury.
 
5.   Criminal conduct  by a  United States  District Judge, while
     presiding over any case, whether it be civil or criminal, is
     conduct  which   is  prejudicial   to  the   effective   and
     expeditious administration  of the  business of  the federal
     courts.  "No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert
     its  full   authority  to   prevent  all  violation  of  the
     principles of  the  Constitution."    Harlan  dissenting  in
     Downes v.  Bidwell, 182  U.S. 244 (1901), emphasis added.  A
     competent and  qualified federal  grand jury should be given
     the opportunity  to investigate probable criminal conduct by
     William D. Browning in  this case,  and in others of which I
     am aware.
 
 
         Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:
                          Page 6 of 6

                                      c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
                                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                                                    ARIZONA STATE
 
                                                    July 25, 1996
 
Mr. William D. Browning
44 East Broadway
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
 
Re:  U.S.A. v. Wallen, Case No. 95-484-WDB
 
 
                 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND DEMAND
 
 
Dear Mr. Browning:
 
     I am  Citizen of  Arizona state,  a Counselor  at Law, and a
part-time student  of comparative  economic history.   I recently
had a  lawful contract  obligation to  attend a  court trial over
which you  presided.   That obligation  arose from a contract for
consideration paid  in lawful money, i.e. silver dollars.  During
that trial,  the question  of your  authority was raised, and you
answered that your authority was the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
 
     It is  My understanding that the Constitution for the United
States of  America, as  lawfully amended,  contains  a  provision
which prevents  federal officers from impairing the obligation of
contracts.  This provision is in the Constitution as published in
federal depository  libraries, and in the official law books upon
which district courts rely for conclusive evidence of the Law.
 
     This Constitution  clearly forbids  titles of nobility.  See
Article I,  Section 10,  Clause 1.  It is My contention, based on
diligent research,  that any  license is  construed  by  American
courts to  be a  title of  nobility, which  is forbidden  by this
provision.     However,  no  penalties  were  mentioned  by  this
provision and it is for this reason, I believe, that no penalties
currently attach  to the exercise of licenses issued by the state
and federal  governments.   It was  the lack  of penalties  which
motivated Congress  to cure  this oversight  with a  proposal  to
amend the  Constitution with  penalties for  exercising titles of
nobility.
 
     My research  has also  uncovered a constitutional amendment,
ratified by  the Union  states in  the year 1819, which penalizes
the  exercise   of  titles  of  nobility  with  a  forfeiture  of
citizenship and  with a disqualification from ever serving in any
public office  in America  (see attached).  This Amendment is the
main reason  why I  am not now a licensed bar member, and have no
intention of  ever becoming  a licensed  bar member, because I do
not want  to forfeit  My Arizona  state Citizenship,  and I would
like to serve in public office some day.
 
 
                 Constructive Notice and Demand:
                          Page 1 of 4

     This  Amendment  supersedes  any  state  "practice  of  law"
statutes, pursuant  to the  Supremacy Clause,  to the extent that
those statutes  require the  exercise of  any titles of nobility.
Moreover, with  or without  this Amendment, it is My opinion that
membership in  a bar association would require that I violate not
only My personal code of conduct, but also numerous provisions in
the Constitution  for the  United States  of America, as lawfully
amended, including  but  not  limited  to  the  Sixth  and  Tenth
Amendments, and  other laws  of the  United States, including but
not limited to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
 
     Such membership  prevents me  from diligently protecting the
fundamental Rights  of My  clients.   My first  loyalty is  to My
Creator, to  Myself, My  Family, the Citizenship of My state, and
then to  My clients  and their fundamental Right to maintain that
very same  loyalty.  Bar membership reverses these priorities and
flatly violates  this loyalty, because it requires loyalty to the
court, to the bar, to public policy contrary to the Constitution,
and lastly  to My  clients, in  that  order.    These  priorities
violate  the   doctrine  of   separation  of   powers  and,  more
importantly, My clients' fundamental Rights.
 
     Accordingly, I  have the  following important  questions for
you, sir:   Was  the original Thirteenth Amendment a provision in
the Constitution  which you  took an  oath to  support, or was it
not?   Under rules  of equity,  I assert  My fundamental Right to
know what  provisions are  in the  Constitution which you took an
oath to support.  This is matter of your contract with Me.
 
     If you  have ever  exercised a title of nobility in America,
e.g.  esquire,   lawyer,  attorney,   Honor,  then  the  original
Thirteenth Amendment  is a  constitutional  authority  which  has
disqualified you  from ever  serving in  the  office  of  federal
judge, is it not?  Judges occupy public offices, do they not?
 
     I am  asking this  question  specifically  because  of  your
decisions to  bar me  from assisting  My  client,  Sheila  Terese
Wallen, at  all times during Her recent criminal trial on charges
of illegal  marijuana possession  with intent to distribute same.
In fact, you ordered me to the back row of the gallery, with U.S.
Marshals standing  between  Me  and  My  client,  preventing  any
communication with My client.
 
     If  you  have,  in  fact,  taken  an  oath  to  support  the
Constitution,  and  the  administrative  record  does  appear  to
support this  fact, does  that Constitution  not also  contain  a
provision  which  bars  you  from  impairing  the  obligation  of
contracts?   See Contracts  Clause.  I had a lawful contract with
Sheila Terese Wallen, and you impaired that contract.
 
     My contract  with Sheila  was predicated upon My belief that
your oath  of office  placed you in a valid contract with Me.  By
what specific  lawful authority  do you claim any Right to impair
the obligations of My contract with Sheila Terese Wallen?  If you
are upholding the U.S. Constitution, then My contract with Her is
valid and  enforceable,  under  rules  of  equity,  and  you  are
forbidden from doing anything to impair that contract.
 
 
                 Constructive Notice and Demand:
                          Page 2 of 4

     I will  look forward to your timely response to this letter.
If I do not hear from you in writing within ten (10) working days
from the  date of this letter, I will proceed on the basis of the
conclusive presumption that the original Thirteenth Amendment was
not in the Constitution which you took an oath to support.
 
     I will  stipulate that your oath predates the publication of
recent research  proving that  the original  Thirteenth Amendment
has  been   well  hidden  from  public  knowledge  (i.e.  fraud).
Nevertheless, the  original  Thirteenth  Amendment  was  lawfully
ratified, pursuant  to Article  V.   This ratification  has  been
proven conclusively.
 
     Therefore, you  are now  in  the  wrong  contract  with  the
American People,  because the Constitution which you took an oath
to support does not contain the original Thirteenth Amendment, as
evidenced by  the Constitution  as it  was published  in  federal
depository libraries, and as it was published in the official law
books upon  which district  courts relied for conclusive evidence
of the Law, on the day you took your original oath of office.
 
     Furthermore, you  are disqualified from serving as a federal
judge for these and other reasons, because you have exercised one
or more  titles of  nobility or  honor (e.g.  "Honor", "Esquire")
since ratification  of that  Amendment.   The original Thirteenth
Amendment does  not contain  any provisions  for  curing  such  a
disability or  regaining your Citizenship.  Your only defense now
is that  you, too,  were victimized  by fraudulent concealment of
this Amendment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1001.
 
     Whether or  not the  original  Thirteenth  Amendment  was  a
provision in  the Constitution which you took an oath to support,
the Contracts  Clause has  been in  the organic U.S. Constitution
since its  original ratification.  You, sir, simply cannot impair
the Right  of Contract, pursuant to an explicit prohibition which
is in that Constitution.
 
     One last  point:  when exactly did the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court  become "hearsay,"  without any legal significance?
You ruled  as such  on July 17, 1996, in Sheila's case.  I really
would like to know, for reasons which should be obvious to anyone
who claims  to be  a federal judge with expertise in federal law.
Are these  decisions which  you heard Supreme Court Justices say?
Does that  make them  "hearsay", in  your opinion?   If not, then
what does?   Before  I take  any remedial action on this point, I
must have  your explanation  for what  now appears  to  be  gross
judicial misconduct on your part.
 
     If you wish to rebut the presumptions which I have presented
to you  in this letter, then please do so.  I would welcome them,
sincerely.   For the record, I am presenting these facts and laws
to you, pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1986.
 
     Thank you  very much  for your  careful consideration, and I
will look  forward to  your timely  response to this CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE AND DEMAND, before 10 days transpire.
 
 
                 Constructive Notice and Demand:
                          Page 3 of 4

Respectfully yours,
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
 
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copies:   Clerk of Court
          Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
          Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
          Joelyn Marlowe, Esquire
          U.S. Marshal's office
          Federal Bureau of Investigation
 
 
                 Constructive Notice and Demand:
                          Page 4 of 4

MEMO
 
TO:       Cathy A. Catterson
          Clerk of Court
          Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
          P.O. Box 193939
          San Francisco, California state
 
FROM:     Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
          Counselor at Law
 
DATE:     March 14, 1997
 
SUBJECT:  Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. #96-80337
          against William D. Browning, USDC, Tucson
 
Please incorporate  this letter, My attached letter to USDC Judge
William D.  Browning dated July 25, 1996, and My Notice of Intent
to File  a Criminal  Complaint dated September 20, 1996, into the
docket file which has been assigned judicial misconduct complaint
number #96-80337 against Judge Browning.
 
Because I  have heard  absolutely nothing from the Ninth Circuit,
or  from  any  other  government  personnel  in  this  matter,  I
respectfully request  some action on this complaint, which is now
six months old.
 
As I  have already written in a previous letter to you, inquiring
about  the   unexplained  delay(s)   in  processing  My  judicial
complaint against  John M.  Roll, the  Chief Judge is required to
give such  complaints his  expeditious attention.  I do not think
you could  find anyone  in America to preside on a jury who would
conclude that one-half year is expeditious.  Do you?
 
 
Sincerely yours,
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
 
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copy:     Procter Hug, Chief Judge
 
p.s. Please have  someone tell Judge Browning to stop picking his
     nose during court proceedings.

                                      c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
                                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                                                    ARIZONA STATE
 
                                               September 20, 1996
 
 
                        NOTICE OF INTENT
                  TO FILE A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
                   AGAINST WILLIAM D. BROWNING
 
 
Clerk of Court
United States District Court
55 East Broadway
Tucson, Arizona state
 
Subject:  Criminal Complaint against
          Mr. William D. Browning
 
Dear Clerk:
 
     This is  My formal  Notice of  Intent  to  File  a  Criminal
Complaint against  Mr. William D. Browning, currently employed by
the United  States federal  government, for  criminal  misconduct
described in  the attached  Judicial  Complaint  form  which  has
already been  transmitted to the Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (see attached).
 
     Please notify  the  appropriate  person(s)  of  this  formal
Notice of Intent.
 
            NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS.
 
            NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS.
 
     Thank you very much for your consideration.
 
 
Sincerely yours,
 
/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
 
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
and Counselor at Law
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copies:   Governor Fife Symington, Tucson, Arizona
          Attorney General, State of Arizona, Tucson
          Attorney General, United States, Washington, D.C.
          Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
          Judicial Conduct Commission, State of Arizona, Phoenix
          Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, San Francisco
          Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.
          Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
          President, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Attachment "C":
 
 
                COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
 
             (with Complainant's Supporting Letter)
 
                               by
 
                      Paul Andrew Mitchell
                           Complainant
 
                             versus
 
                          John M. Roll
                  United States District Judge
                      Tucson, Arizona state

                         COMPLAINT FORM
              JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
         COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY
 
 
MAIL THIS FORM TO THE CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, P.O.
BOX 193939,  SAN FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA 94119-3939/tdc.  MARK THE
ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL  MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR "JUDICIAL DISABILITY
COMPLAINT".   DO NOT  PUT THE  NAME OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE ON
THE ENVELOPE.
 
 
SEE RULE 2(e) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED FOR FILING.
 
 
1.   Complainant's name: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
 
     Address:            c/o 2509 North Campbell Avenue, #1776
                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                         ARIZONA STATE
 
     Daytime telephone:  [redacted]
 
 
2.   Judge or magistrate complained about:
 
     Name:               John M. Roll [sic]
                         United States District Judge [sic]
 
     Court:              United States District Court
                         Tucson, Arizona state
 
 
3.   Does this  complaint concern  the behavior  of the  judge or
     magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?
     
          ( X ) Yes  (  ) No
 
     If "yes"  give the  following information about each lawsuit
     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):
 
     Court:              United States District Court
 
     Docket Number:      GJ-95-1-6 (JMR)
 
     Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?
 
          ( X ) Party    ( X ) Counsel  (   ) Neither
 
     If party,  give the  name, address,  and telephone number of
     your Counsel:
 
                         n/a
 
 
             Judicial Complaint Against John M. Roll:
                          Page 1 of 3

     Docket numbers of any appeals to the Ninth Circuit:
 
          Ninth Circuit No. 96-16145
 
          (case file is incorporated by reference
           as if set forth fully herein)
 
 
4.   Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge or magistrate?
 
          (   ) Yes      ( X ) No  (not yet)
 
     If yes,  give the  following information  about each lawsuit
     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):
 
     Court:    n/a
 
     Present status of suit:  n/a
 
     Name, address, and telephone number of your Counsel:
 
          n/a
 
     Court to which any appeal has been taken:
 
          (see above)
 
     Docket number of appeal:
 
          (see above)
 
     Present status of appeal:
 
          dismissed by 3-judge panel on June 28, 1996,
          by Order of Circuit Judges Noonan, Leavy and Tashima
 
 
5.   On separate  sheets of  paper, no larger than the paper this
     form is  printed on, describe the conduct or the evidence of
     disability that  is the subject of this complaint.  See rule
     2(b) and  2(d).   Do not  use more  than 5  pages (5 sides).
     Most complaints do not require that much.
 
          see attached letter to Federal Bureau of Investigation
          (incorporated by reference as if set forth fully)
 
 
6.   You should either:
 
          (1)  check the  first box  below and  sign this form in
               the presence of a notary public;  or
 
          (2)  check the  second box  and sign  the form.  You do
               not need  a notary  public if you check the second
               box.
 
          ( )  I swear (affirm) that --
 
 
             Judicial Complaint Against John M. Roll:
                          Page 2 of 3

          (X)  I declare under penalty of perjury --
 
               I have  read rules  1 and  2 of  the Rules  of the
               Judicial Council  of the  Ninth Circuit  Governing
               Complaints of  Judicial Misconduct  or Disability,
               and the  statement made  in this complaint is true
               and correct to the best of my knowledge.
 
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
________________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Vice President for Legal Affairs,
New Life Health Center Company
 
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
 
Executed on:  November 30, 1996
 
 
Note:  Complainant was never terminated from his position as Vice
President for  Legal Affairs of New Life Health Center Company, a
pure trust,  by lawful  action of  a Trustee authorized to do so,
and therefore  He continues  to assert  His lawful  claim to that
office, protestations  by Dr.  Eugene A.  Burns to  the  contrary
notwithstanding.
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copies:   Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
          Kenneth Starr, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
          U.S. Marshals, Tucson, Arizona
          Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
          Attorney General, State of Arizona
          Governor Fife Symington, State of Arizona
          Speaker, Arizona House of Representatives
          President, Arizona State Senate
 
 
             Judicial Complaint Against John M. Roll:
                          Page 3 of 3

                                      c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
                                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                                                    ARIZONA STATE
 
                                               September 13, 1996
Mr. Thomas H. Basham
Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
201 East Indianola
Phoenix, Arizona 85012/tdc
 
Subject:  Criminal Misconduct by John M. Roll,
          United States District Court, Tucson
 
Dear Mr. Basham:
 
     Thank you  very much  for your letter to Me, dated September
9, 1996,  concerning alleged  criminal misconduct  by  a  Federal
District Court Judge in Tucson, Arizona.
 
     In your  letter, you  stated that  My letter to the FBI does
not contain  sufficient detail  to determine  whether a  criminal
investigation is warranted.  You also requested that I submit, to
the Tucson  office of  the  FBI,  further  documentation  of  the
alleged misconduct,  to include names, dates, and any other facts
that may be pertinent.  To this end, enclosed please find all the
pertinent materials currently in My possession and control.
 
     The thread of evidence you should follow concerns the events
which occurred  immediately after  a federal  grand jury subpoena
was first  served on  New Life  Health Center  Company in Tucson,
Arizona state ("New Life").  Pay particular attention to the fate
of all  the U.S.  Mail which We transmitted directly to the grand
jury Foreperson in response to their subpoena.
 
     I was  retained by  New Life  at that  time  to  answer  the
subpoena (see  enclosed PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, dated March 20,
1996) and  to assist  New Life  with their  civil defense.   This
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION  was mailed to the Grand Jury Foreperson
via Registered  U.S. Mail, return receipt and restricted delivery
both requested.   The  enclosed  evidence  will  show  that  this
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION  was illegally  intercepted by  John  M.
Roll, who  handed it  to Robert  L. Miskell  in the office of the
United States Attorney in Tucson.
 
     After investigating on Our own, and with the able assistance
of the  Postmaster, We  decided to  prepare  and  mail  a  FORMAL
REQUEST FOR  INVESTIGATION to  the same federal grand jury.  This
request was  mailed to  the Foreperson  on April  28,  1996  (see
enclosed).   This FORMAL  REQUEST was also intercepted by John M.
Roll, who also handed it to Robert L. Miskell.  We have reason to
believe that the federal grand jury never saw this FORMAL REQUEST
either.

     At  a  subsequent  hearing  on  the  matter,  John  M.  Roll
admitted, on  the official  court record, that he had intercepted
this FORMAL REQUEST.  He also said that he had not opened it, but
that he had given it to Robert L. Miskell.  At that same hearing,
Robert L.  Miskell admitted, on record, that he had received this
FORMAL REQUEST  from John  M. Roll, and that the mail in question
simply contained  a formal  request that  the federal  grand jury
investigate possible  violations of  federal  law  by  Robert  L.
Miskell.   We inferred  from  Miskell's  comments  that  he  had,
indeed, opened  this mail,  because  he  was  correct  about  its
contents.
 
     At this  point, We  felt  it  was  necessary  to  place  the
Foreperson of the federal grand jury on the Proof of Service list
for all  subsequent pleadings  which We  planned to  file in that
case.   All together,  some twenty-five  (25) different pleadings
were then  filed under  My signature, or under signatures of Mine
and Dr. Eugene A. Burns.  Some of these pleadings are affidavits.
All  pleadings   currently  in  My  possession  and  control  are
enclosed, for your review.
 
     Counting all  25  pleadings,  the  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATION
(26), and  the FORMAL  REQUEST FOR  INVESTIGATION (27),  none  of
which were ever delivered to the federal grand jury Foreperson to
whom they  were mailed,  We count  27 counts  of mail  fraud,  27
counts of  jury tampering,  27 counts  of obstruction of justice,
and 27 counts of conspiracy to commit all of the above, committed
by a conspiracy of persons including, but not limited to, John M.
Roll,  Janet   Napolitano,  Robert  L.  Miskell,  and  Evangelina
Cardenas.   Other likely  accessories  to  these  crimes  include
Robert A. Johnson, Richard H. Weare, and William M. McCool.
 
     At another  hearing on  the matter,  John M. Roll complained
that he  had some  14 inches  of pleadings  to read in this case.
But then,  he immediately  called a recess, and huddled for quite
some time  with his staff, both inside and outside the courtroom.
When he  came back  into session,  John  M.  Roll  qualified  his
earlier statement by saying that he really had only 6 or 7 inches
of pleadings  in this  case, but  that he  guaranteed, if  We had
filed them, he had read them.  This statement was witnessed by Me
and by My assistant Counsel, Neil Thomas Nordbrock, who is also a
federal witness  to perjury  of oath  by  Robert  L.  Miskell  in
another case.   Neil  Nordbrock and  I took  his qualification to
mean that John M. Roll had, in fact, intercepted all 25 pleadings
which We  had mailed  to the  grand jury  Foreperson.    You  can
measure their thickness yourself.
 
     I hope this response to your letter is satisfactory.  If you
should need  any additional  information, permit  Me to recommend
that you  first contact Dr. Eugene A. Burns, Managing Director of
New Life  Health Center  Company, 4500  East Speedway,  Suite 27,
Tucson, Arizona  state.   As of the moment I vacated the premises
at New  Life, Dr.  Burns was in possession and control of all the
documentary  exhibits   which  were   attached  to  the  enclosed
pleadings.   These documentary exhibits include, for example, the
Postmaster's response to our FOIA request for a certified copy of
the Standing  Delivery Order  (USPS  Form  3801)  signed  by  the
federal grand  jury Foreperson  in  the  New  Life  case.    This
response stated  that there  was no  such document  in existence,
proving that  the Foreperson  had never authorized anyone else to
accept or sign for U.S. Mail addressed to him/her.
 
     Thank you very much for your consideration.

                          VERIFICATION
 
     I, Paul  Andrew, Mitchell,  B.A., M.S.,  Citizen of  Arizona
state and  federal  witness,  hereby  verify,  under  penalty  of
perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without
the "United  States," that the above statements of fact are true,
correct, complete,  and not misleading, to the best of My current
information, knowledge,  and belief,  so help Me God, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
 
Further Affiant sayeth naught.
 
 
Respectfully submitted,
 
/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
 
Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness
 
 
attachments:  to FBI, Tucson
 
email:    supremelawfirm@altavista.net
 
website:  http://supremelaw.com
 
copy:     Bruce J. Gebhardt
          Special Agent in Charge
 
copy:     Thomas H. Basham
          Supervisory Senior Resident Agent
          c/o Federal Bureau of Investigation
          1 South Church Avenue, Suite 600
          Tucson, Arizona state 85701/tdc
 
copy:     Postmaster
          U.S. Post Office
          Downtown Station
          Tucson, Arizona

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Attachment "D":
 
                   MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
     FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
                   AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
           CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE:
         28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518, 1861, 1865 and 1867(d)
 
               In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on
                 New Life Health Center Company
 
                  United States District Court
                      Tucson, Arizona state
                     Case Number #GJ-95-1-6

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
zip code exempt
 
Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 
                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
 
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA      )       Case No. GJ-95-1-6
SERVED ON                      )      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY )   MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
                               )   FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
                               )  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
                               )  AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
                               )         CHALLENGE TO
                               )  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
                               )    28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518,
_______________________________)    1861, 1865, and 1867(d)
 
COMES NOW  Paul  Andrew,  Mitchell, Sui Juris, Sovereign Arizona
 
Citizen (hereinafter  "Counsel") and  Vice President  for  Legal
 
Affairs of  New Life  Health Center  Company, an  Unincorporated
 
Business Trust  domiciled in  the Arizona  Republic (hereinafter
 
the "Company"),  to Petition  this honorable Court for a stay of
 
the instant proceedings, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
 
1867(d), pending proper review of the Company's challenge to the
 
constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit:
 
     1865.  Qualifications for jury service
 
     (a)  The chief  judge of  the district court, or such other
          district court judge as the plan may provide ... shall
          determine solely  on the basis of information provided
          on the  juror qualification  form and  other competent
          evidence whether  a  person  is  unqualified  for,  or
          exempt, or to be excused from jury service. ...
 
     (b)  In making  such determination  the chief  judge of the
          district court,  or such other district court judge as
          the plan  may provide, shall deem any person qualified
          to serve  on grand  and petit  juries in  the district
          court unless he --
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 1 of 9

          (1)  is  not  a  citizen of the United States eighteen
               years old  who has  resided for  a period  of one
               year within the judicial district; ....
 
                                [28 U.S.C. 1865, emphasis added]
 
     In stark  contrast, it  is the  policy of the United States
 
that all  citizens shall  have the  opportunity to be considered
 
for service on grand juries in the district courts of the United
 
States.   To be  constitutional, and  to be  consistent with its
 
legislative intent,  the term  "all citizens",  as that  term is
 
used in  28 U.S.C.  1861, must  be  construed  to  include  also
 
Citizens of  the freely  associated compact  states who  are not
 
also citizens of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizens"):
 
     1861.     Declaration of policy
 
     It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
     Federal courts  entitled to  trial by  jury shall  have the
     right to  grand and  petit juries selected at random from a
     fair cross  section of  the community  in the  district  or
     division wherein  the court  convenes.   It is  further the
     policy of  the United  States that  all citizens shall have
     the opportunity  to be  considered for service on grand and
     petit juries  in the  district courts of the United States,
     and shall  have an  obligation  to  serve  as  jurors  when
     summoned for that purpose.
 
                                [28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]
 
     Counsel hereby provides notice to all interested parties of
 
His sworn (verified) statement of law and facts which constitute
 
a substantial  failure to  comply with  the Constitution for the
 
United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S.
 
Constitution"), and  with the  provisions of  Title  28,  United
 
States Code,  Section 1861:   Declaration  of Policy.    See  28
 
U.S.C. 1867(d).   The  presently convened Grand Jury consists of
 
members all  of whom  are citizens  of the  United  States,  not
 
necessarily Citizens  of Arizona state.  See Dyett v. Turner and
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 2 of 9

State v.  Phillips infra;   52 Stat. 1034, Chapter 644, June 24,
 
1938, in pari materia  with  the  Tenth  Amendment;    Right  of
 
Election;  voter registration affidavits.
 
     By way  of introduction  to the crucial matters of fact and
 
law which  are discussed at length in Counsel's sworn (verified)
 
statement, which  is hereby  incorporated by reference as if set
 
forth fully  herein, this honorable Court is hereby respectfully
 
requested to  take formal  judicial  notice  of  the  additional
 
standing authorities on this question:
 
     We have  in our political system a Government of the United
     States and  a government  of each  of the  several  States.
     Each one  of these governments is distinct from the others,
     and each  has citizens  of its  own ....    Slaughter-House
     Cases
               [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
     A person  who is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States**  is
     necessarily a  citizen of  the particular state in which he
     resides.   But a  person may  be a  citizen of a particular
     state and  not a  citizen of  the United  States.   To hold
     otherwise would  be  to  deny  to  the  state  the  highest
     exercise of  its sovereignty,  -- the  right to declare who
     are its citizens.
                              [State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
                               [6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
 
     There are,  then, under  our republican form of government,
     two classes  of citizens,  one of the United States and one
     of the  state. One  class of  citizenship may  exist  in  a
     person, without  the other, as in the case of a resident of
     the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in
     the same person.
 
                  [Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
                         [48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]
 
     There are  over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in
     the United  States. ...  Each of these now has an invisible
     federal  zone   extending  1,000  feet  beyond  the  (often
     irregular) boundaries of the school property.
 
                          [U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)]
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 3 of 9

     As a  Party to the instant case, which is presently a civil
 
action proceeding  under the  Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure,
 
with the  possibility of  a criminal indictment issuing from it,
 
the Company  hereby challenges the presently convened Grand Jury
 
on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with
 
section 1861  of Title 28, because Citizens of Arizona state who
 
are not  also citizens  of  the  United  States  (a/k/a  federal
 
citizens) are  disqualified from  serving  by  virtue  of  their
 
chosen Citizenship  status.   See 28  U.S.C. 1867(e);   Right of
 
Election;   15 Statutes  at  Large,  Chapter  249  (Section  1),
 
enacted July 27, 1868;  jus soli;  jus sanguinis.  Specifically,
 
the offensive  statute  forces  the  following  unconstitutional
 
result upon  Citizens of Arizona state who choose not also to be
 
citizens of the United States (a/k/a federal citizens):
 
            citizen of         Citizen of         Qualified
          United States       Arizona state       to serve
 
               Yes                Yes                Yes
               Yes                No                 Yes
               No                 No                 No
               No                 Yes                No     **
 
This result ("**") violates the Tenth Amendment by disqualifying
 
Citizens of  Arizona state  from serving on federal grand juries
 
when they are not also federal citizens, thus denying to accused
 
Citizens of  Arizona state  a grand  jury of  Their Peers when a
 
grand jury consists only of federal citizens.
 
     An intentional  discrimination against  a class of persons,
 
solely because  of their  class, by  officers in  charge of  the
 
selection and summoning of grand jurors in a criminal case, is a
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 4 of 9

violation of  the fundamental Rights of an accused.  See Cassell
 
v. Texas,  339 U.S. 282;  Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398;  Pierre
 
v. Louisiana,  306 U.S. 354.  Such a violation is not excused by
 
the fact  that the  persons actually  selected for  jury service
 
otherwise possess  the necessary  qualifications for  jurors  as
 
prescribed by statute.  See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460.
 
     Discrimination  in  the  selection  of  a  grand  jury,  as
 
prohibited by  the  U.S.  Constitution,  means  an  intentional,
 
systematic noninclusion  because of  class.   There are  two (2)
 
classes of citizenship in America.  E.g. Gardina supra.
 
     28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically excludes those classes of
 
Citizens who  are not  mentioned.   Expressio unius est exclusio
 
alterius.   The following statute dramatically demonstrates that
 
Congress appreciates the difference between the two classes, and
 
knows how  to discriminate  against "citizens  of  the  American
 
republics" (a/k/a  State Citizens)  in favor of "citizens of the
 
United States" (a/k/a federal citizens):
 
                             AN ACT
 
     To authorize  the  President  to  permit  citizens  of  the
     American republics  to receive  instruction at professional
     educational  institutions   and  schools   maintained   and
     administered by  the Government  of the United States or by
     departments or agencies thereof.
 
     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
     the United  States of  America in  Congress assembled, That
     the President  be, and  he hereby  is, authorized,  in  his
     discretion and  under such  regulations as he may prescribe
     by Executive  order, to  permit citizens  of  the  American
     republics to  receive instruction,  with or  without charge
     therefor,  at  professional  educational  institutions  and
     schools maintained  and administered  by the  Government of
     the United States or by departments or agencies thereof:
 
     Provided, That such citizens shall agree to comply with all
     regulations for  the government  of  the  institutions  and
     schools at which they may be under instruction and to exert
     every effort  to accomplish  successfully  the  courses  of
     instruction prescribed:
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 5 of 9

     And provided  further, That  the regulations  prescribed by
     the President under the authority of this Act shall contain
     provisions  limiting  the  admission  of  citizens  of  the
     American  republics   to  primary  schools  maintained  and
     administered by the Government of the United States so that
     there will under no circumstances be any curtailment of the
     admission of  citizens of  the United  States  eligible  to
     receive instruction  therein and  not more than one citizen
     of any  American republic  shall receive instruction at the
     same time  in the  United States  Military Academy  and not
     more  than   one  in   the  United  States  Naval  Academy.
     Approved, June 24, 1938.
 
                     [52 Stat. 1034, Chapter 644, June 24, 1938]
                         [Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session]
                                           [bold emphasis added]
 
     Once a  prima facie  case for  the existence  of purposeful
 
discrimination is made out, the burden shifts to the prosecution
 
to prove  otherwise.   See Whitus  v.  Georgia,  385  U.S.  545.
 
Reliance on  the so-called  Fourteenth Amendment to resolve this
 
matter is  out of the question, because the Fourteenth Amendment
 
was never  lawfully ratified.   See  State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d
 
936, 941 (1975);  Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266,
 
270 (1968);  Full Faith and Credit Clause;  28 Tulane Law Review
 
22;   11 South  Carolina Law Quarterly 484;  House Congressional
 
Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.
 
     As such, there is no constitutional provision which makes a
 
federal citizen  also a citizen of the Union state in which s/he
 
resides, nor  is there any constitutional provision which states
 
that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned.
 
     The judicial  history of  American citizenship is a subject
 
which is rich in nuance and detail, as demonstrated in Counsel's
 
sworn (verified)  statement.   For example, at a time when those
 
Islands were  in the  federal zone,  the Supreme  Court  of  the
 
Philippine Islands  found that "citizenship," strictly speaking,
 
is a  term of  municipal law and, according to that Court, it is
 
municipal  law   which  regulates   the  conditions   on   which
 
citizenship is acquired:
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 6 of 9

     Citizenship, says  Moore  on  International  Law,  strictly
     speaking, is  a term  of  municipal  law  and  denotes  the
     possession within  the particular  state of  full civil and
     political rights subject to special disqualifications, such
     as minority, sex, etc.  The conditions on which citizenship
     are [sic]  acquired are  regulated by municipal law.  There
     is  no   such  thing   as  international   citizenship  nor
     international law (aside from that which might be contained
     in treaties) by which citizenship is acquired.
 
                                   [Roa v. Collector of Customs]
                                 [23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912)]
 
Indeed, international  law is  divided roughly  into two groups:
 
(1) public  international law and (2) private international law.
 
Citizenship is  a term  of private international law (also known
 
as municipal  law) in  which the  terms  "state",  "nation"  and
 
"country" are all synonymous:
 
     Private international  law assumes  a more important aspect
     in the  United States  than elsewhere,  for the reason that
     the  several   states,  although   united  under  the  same
     sovereign authority  and governed  by the same laws for all
     national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, are
     otherwise, at  least so far as private international law is
     concerned, in  the same  relation as foreign countries. The
     great majority  of questions  of private  international law
     are therefore  subject to  the same  rules when  they arise
     between two  states of the Union as when they arise between
     two foreign  countries, and  in the ensuing pages the words
     "state," "nation,"  and "country" are used synonymously and
     interchangeably, there  being no  intention to  distinguish
     between  the  several  states  of  the  Union  and  foreign
     countries by the use of varying terminology.
 
                        [16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 2]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
Congress does  refer to the Union states as "countries."  See 28
 
U.S.C. 297.  The reference to "citizens of the United States" at
 
26 C.F.R.  1.1-1(b)  and  (c)  is  material  evidence  that  the
 
Internal Revenue  Code ("IRC") is a municipal law.  See also IRC
 
3121(e).   Furthermore, a  leading legal  encyclopedia leaves no
 
doubt that  the terms  "municipal law"  and "internal  law"  are
 
equivalent:
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 7 of 9

     International law and Municipal or internal law.
 
     ... [P]ositive  law is classified as international law, the
     law which  governs the  interrelations of  soverign states,
     and municipal law, which is, when used in contradistinction
     to international  law, the  branch of the law which governs
     the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
 
          However,  the   term  "municipal   law"  has   several
     meanings, and  in order  to avoid  confusing these meanings
     authorities have  found more  satisfactory Bentham's phrase
     "internal law,"  this being  the equivalent  of the  French
     term "droit  interne," to  express the  concept of internal
     law of a sovereign state.
 
          The phrase  "municipal law"  is derived from the Roman
     law, and  when employed as indicating the internal law of a
     sovereign  state  the  word  "municipal"  has  no  specific
     reference  to  modern  municipalities,  but  rather  has  a
     broader, more extensive meaning, as discussed in the C.J.S.
     definition Municipal.
                                   [52A C.J.S. 741, 742 ("Law")]
                                                [emphasis added]
 
 
                         RELIEF SOUGHT
 
     Wherefore,  Counsel  petitions  this  honorable  Court,  on
 
behalf of the Company, for an indefinite stay of the proceedings
 
in the  instant case,  pending proper  review of the substantial
 
issues of  law and  fact which  are alleged  in this  Motion and
 
which are  contained in  Counsel's  sworn  (verified)  statement
 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herewith.
 
 
Respectfully submitted on May 24, 1996.
 
 
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
 
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state
 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 8 of 9

                        PROOF OF SERVICE
 
I, Linda  H. Burns,  hereby certify,  under penalty  of perjury,
 
under the  laws of  the United  States of  America, without  the
 
United States,  that I am at least 18 years of age and a Citizen
 
of one  of the United States of America, that I am not currently
 
a Party  to this  action,  and  that  I  personally  served  the
 
following document:
 
                      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
     MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
                  GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
            AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO
                  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
 
by placing  said document in first class U.S. Mail, with postage
 
prepaid and properly addressed to the following individuals:
 
 
ROBERT L. MISKELL                  John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona
 
JANET NAPOLITANO                   Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona
 
Grand Jury Foreperson              Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co.  U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway                     Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona
 
Judge Alex Kozinski                Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200     300 West Congress
Pasadena, California               Tucson, Arizona
 
Attorney General                   Solicitor General
Department of Justice              Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. !      10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.
 
 
Dated:  May 24, 1996
 
 
/s/ Linda Burns
________________________________________
Linda H. Burns, Citizen of Arizona state
 
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
 
 
                   Motion to Stay Proceedings:
                          Page 9 of 9

 

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U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, 8th Circuit