Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state
c/o general delivery at:
2509 North Campbell Ave., #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without prejudice
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
Swan Business Organization ) Case Number #315580
et al., )
) APPLICANT'S OPPOSITION
Plaintiffs, ) TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
) STRIKE NOTICE OF INTENT
v. ) TO APPLY FOR INTERVENTION:
)
Leon Ulan et al., ) Petition Clause,
) First Amendment
Defendants. )
________________________________)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal
citizen"), federal witness (hereinafter "Applicant"), and Vice
President for Legal Affairs of New Life Health Center Company, an
unincorporated business trust domiciled in Arizona ("New Life"),
to submit this, Applicant's formal OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR INTERVENTION, and
to provide formal Notice of same to all interested party(s).
Applicant opposes the Plaintiffs' MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICE OF
INTENT TO APPLY FOR INTERVENTION ("STRIKE MOTION"), for all of
the following reasons, to wit:
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 1 of 20
STRIKE MOTION IS OUT OF ORDER
In order to prepare Applicant's NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY
FOR INTERVENTION, Applicant visited the Clerk of the Superior
Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, and
was graciously permitted to inspect the official docket file of
the instant case #315580. On that day, Applicant witnessed, and
herein testifies to the fact that, the most recent entry was the
Court's ORDER placing the instant case on inactive status (or
language to that effect). Applicant begs the indulgence of the
Superior Court, if Applicant's memory is not entirely exact with
respect to said language. Let substance prevail over form.
Plaintiffs' STRIKE MOTION is, therefore, out of order,
because the instant case is presently inactive, and would need to
revert to active status, but only by ORDER of the Superior Court.
No such relief has been requested in the STRIKE MOTION.
STRIKE MOTION PETITIONS THE WRONG COURT
The instant case #315580 was first filed and now proceeds in
the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County
of Pima. The STRIKE MOTION, on the other hand, petitions the
Superior Court of Arizona, Pima County. These respective courts
are not one and the same. See 31 CFR 51.2 and 52.2; Form II(b),
WARRANT FOR ARREST (SUPERIOR COURT) SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA,
________ County [sic], and Form XXIII, NOTICE OF RIGHTS OF REVIEW
AFTER CONVICTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________ [sic], in Arizona Rules of Court,
State and Federal, West Publishing Company (1994).
The Superior Court of the State of Arizona is a de facto
forum convened pursuant to federal municipal law, proceeding
under the presumption that Arizona is a federal territory, not a
Union state. This presumption is enforceable upon the population
of citizens of the United States ("federal citizens") who reside
within the geographic boundaries of Arizona state, because they
are subject to federal municipal law.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 2 of 20
The Superior Court of Arizona is a de jure forum convened
pursuant to Arizona organic law, proceeding under the Tenth
Amendment and under other notable provisions of the supreme Law,
which admitted Arizona into the Union of several states which are
united by and under the Constitution for the United States of
America, as lawfully amended ("U.S. Constitution").
To the extent that the STRIKE MOTION requests relief of the
wrong forum, it is once again out of order and, moreover, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,
the STRIKE MOTION should be denied, or tabled for future
consideration and possibly also future amendment by Plaintiffs,
to correct these and other serious errors.
STRIKE MOTION EXHIBITS A FRAUD
Applicant directs the attention of this Court to the
following published legal definition of the term "fraud", as said
term applies in the instant matter, to wit:
Fraud. ... A false representation of a matter of fact ...
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury.
[emphasis added]
Applicant argues that Plaintiffs had an obligation to disclose to
this Court the related litigation which is underway in two cases:
Mitchell v. Nordbrock, Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
("Justice Court") case number #CV-97-3438, and People ex rel.
Mitchell v. Pima County Consolidated Justice Court, Superior
Court of Arizona, Pima County, case number #320831.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 3 of 20
The latter case has arisen out of the barratry and
unprofessional conduct which Applicant alleges that Plaintiffs
and Plaintiffs' "attorney" have committed in the former case.
Specifically, in Mitchell v. Nordbrock, the named defendants, who
are Plaintiffs in the instant case, filed a counterclaim which
stated a claim above the Justice Court's jurisdictional limit.
Applicant, who is the plaintiff in the latter case, followed
immediately with a DEMAND to transfer that case to the Superior
Court, pursuant to ARS 22-201(F). Contrary to the imperative
duty imposed upon the Justice of the Peace in the Justice Court,
said DEMAND was "denied" [sic] by Mr. Walter U. Weber. Applicant
now claims that said "denial" was ultra vires.
In order to prove Applicant's claim that Mr. Weber's
"denial" was done ultra vires, Applicant has sought a Peremptory
Writ of Mandamus from the Superior Court of Arizona, to compel
the Justice Court to perform its duty under ARS 22-201(F).
Applicant's PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS ("MANDAMUS
PETITION") is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by
reference, as if set forth fully herein.
Despite the filing of said MANDAMUS PETITION and service
upon them, Plaintiffs and their "attorney" countered with a
motion to amend their counterclaim, so as to reduce it to an
amount below the Justice Court's jurisdictional limit of $5,000.
Said motion to amend their counterclaim was then "granted" by Mr.
Walter U. Weber. Applicant argues that Plaintiffs' "attorney"
knew, or should have known, the upper jurisdictional limit of the
Justice Court. In point of fact, the Plaintiffs' "attorney"
attempted to bluff Applicant early on, by threatening to file a
counterclaim which would transfer that case to the Superior Court
anyway. Said bluff was left on Applicant's answering machine.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 4 of 20
Applicant now alleges that such unlawful conduct constitutes
barratry. Confer at "Barratry" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, and cases cited there. Barratry is a crime.
The STRIKE MOTION fails even to mention said MANDAMUS
PETITION. Applicant argues that the MANDAMUS PETITION should
have been mentioned by Plaintiffs, but was not. Accordingly,
their failure to disclose what should have been disclosed has
worked a fraud upon this honorable Court by Plaintiffs and their
"attorney", and has resulted in inflicting yet more fraud and
barratry upon Applicant, for all the reasons state above.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs appear to defeat their own argument
by stating, at line 7 on page 2, that "the superior court may
properly take judicial notice of its own records and records in
another action tried in the same court." Citing State v. Camino,
118 Ariz. 89, 574 P.2d 1308 (1977) and State v. Astorga, 26
Ariz.App. 252, 526 P.2d 776 (1974) [sic]. Plaintiffs then argue
that the court "may not take judicial notice of a particular
legal proceeding pending or transacted in another court." Citing
In re Henry's Estate, 6 Ariz.App. 183, 430 P.2d 937 (1967).
Applicant argues that Plaintiffs had a duty to disclose to
this Court the records of another action tried in the same court,
because Plaintiffs do believe that the Superior Court of the
State of Arizona, and the Superior Court of Arizona state, are
one and the same. Applicant argues here that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause controls in this matter. See the Supremacy Clause
for authority. Nevertheless, this relatively complex issue
should not be litigated until after Applicant formally applies
for intervention, and Applicant is under no obligation to do so.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 5 of 20
STRIKE MOTION CHILLS THE PETITION CLAUSE
To the extent that the STRIKE MOTION seeks to argue to
conclusions which are based upon Rule 24, Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure, the STRIKE MOTION is entirely moot because Applicant
has not yet formally applied for intervention, and may not ever
apply for intervention, depending on future events which have not
yet transpired, and may never happen.
Moreover, to the extent that the STRIKE MOTION seeks to
impair Applicant's fundamental Right to Petition Government for
Redress of Grievances, pursuant to the First Amendment in the
U.S. Constitution, any ORDER from this Court purporting to impair
that Right is necessarily ultra vires ab initio, for chilling and
prior restraint upon Applicant's Right to Petition the courts of
this land, for intervention and/or any other relief which
Applicant seeks to obtain from the courts. For the benefit of
this honorable Court, Applicant attaches, as Exhibit "B", a
pleading filed by Applicant in the Justice Court, detailing the
pertinent cases which have adjudicated the Petition Clause.
Applicant believes that this Court, upon reviewing the
authorities cited in Exhibit "B", will observe its duty to uphold
the Petition Clause in the First Amendment, either by denying the
STRIKE MOTION or, in the alternative, tabling the STRIKE MOTION
until such time as Applicant formally applies for Intervention in
the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, and not in the
Superior Court of Arizona.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 6 of 20
PLAINTIFFS ASSUME FUTURE KNOWLEDGE
The law does not recognize impossibilities. Lex non cogit
impossibilia. Plaintiffs have attempted to argue to a straw man
by predicting that Applicant "will engage in a calculated
campaign of pleadings harassment against the Nordbrocks."
Plaintiffs should not be permitted to persuade this Court on the
basis of any special knowledge they might claim about the future.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that none of Applicant's
pleadings filed in Mitchell v. Nordbrock "are remotely related to
the underlying issues" [in the instant case]. Plaintiffs also
allege that Applicant has made "numerous unfounded challenges to
justice court jurisdiction and to the justice of the peace
assigned to [that] case." In opposition to these false and
rebuttable claims, Plaintiff testifies as follows:
1. Plaintiffs have embezzled approximately $3,000 from
Applicant. This sum was all the money which Applicant possessed
in the world, at that point in time. They did so in retaliation
against Applicant, because Applicant had exposed Plaintiffs'
complicity in perpetrating fraud and mail fraud upon New Life --
by creating and maintaining a fictitious trustee. Applicant was,
and still is, the Vice President for Legal Affairs of New Life.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 7 of 20
2. Plaintiffs have refused to return Applicant's private,
confidential database which was stored on a one (1) gigabyte
(billion character) Iomega JAZ disk cartridge and entrusted to
Plaintiffs for safe keeping. Plaintiffs also knew well that
Applicant's life had been threatened by one of Plaintiffs'
business associates in the fall of 1996, and Applicant concluded
from that frightening experience that it was unwise to keep any
money in Applicant's dwelling unit. Plaintiffs agreed to manage
Applicant's $3,000 and to keep said disk cartridge in a safe
place -- a locked gun safe -- until receipt of further
instructions from Applicant. Although Applicant has demanded the
return of this private, confidential database, which took more
than seven (7) years of research to assemble, but Plaintiffs have
now refused to return it. Accordingly, they are in possession of
stolen property and are liable for damages to Applicant --
actual, consequential, and punitive. Therefore, Plaintiffs'
estate is now clouded, it is in real jeopardy, and it may need to
be foreclosed to discharge Plaintiffs' legal liabilities to
Applicant. Plaintiff expressly reserves these Rights.
3. Applicant has additional evidence which is essential to
prove: (1) Swan Business Organization may, in fact, be nothing
more than a nominee, or alter ego, for the private estate of
Plaintiffs, and (2) their respective tax and other liabilities,
if any, can be offset by foreclosing upon the same estate.
Applicant would, in that event, have probable cause formally to
apply for intervention in the instant case, to adjudicate the
respective priorities of all judgment creditors and claimants.
More to the point, Applicant has performed labor for
Plaintiffs, and Applicant argues that compensation for labor
takes precedence over any alleged tax liability(s).
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 8 of 20
4. Plaintiff Neil T. Nordbrock has also recently insulted
Applicant verbally in the lobby of the Coronado Station of the
U.S. Postal Service; and prior to that unfortunate incident, Mr.
Nordbrock intentionally startled Applicant by blaring Nordbrock's
truck horn as Nordbrock approached Applicant from the rear, while
Applicant was walking on a sidewalk near Applicant's dwelling.
These events are commemorated in Applicant's NOTICE AND DEMAND TO
CEASE AND DESIST, which is attached as Exhibit "C" and
incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein.
5. Finally, in the event that Plaintiffs should be
compelled to seek bankruptcy protection, the question of debt
priorities would inevitably arise in that forum as well. Debtors
cannot discharge fines and/or penalties that a federal, state, or
local government has imposed to punish debtors for violating a
law. Specifically, bankrupt debtors cannot discharge restitution
payments that might be imposed in criminal cases. Restitution is
specifically non-dischargeable because it is imposed against the
defendant(s) as rehabilitation, rather than to compensate the
victim. See Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986).
Applicant argues that Plaintiffs' retaliation against
Applicant constitutes criminal conduct, quite apart from the
question of whether, or not, Arizona state prosecutors presently
can, or ever will, prosecute them criminally. See 18 U.S.C. 1512
and 1513. Embezzlement of $3,000 is a class 3 felony in Arizona.
See ARS 13-1802(A), in chief.
Given that the plaintiff in Mitchell v. Nordbrock has also
filed a formal challenge to the juror qualification statutes in
Arizona, it may be a very long time before a competent and
qualified state grand jury can be convened to hear evidence which
Applicant has already sought to bring before such a jury.
Applicant now refuses to testify to any "grand jury" which is not
a legal body, and will oppose any subpoena(s) from state grand
juries for the same reason, pending final review of Applicant's
formal challenge to juror and voter registrant qualifications.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 9 of 20
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT CALLS FOR CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiffs have charged Applicant with filing a "frivolous,
legally unreasonable, and factually unfounded pleading" [sic].
Applicant submits that such adjectives call for findings of fact
and conclusions of law, which can only result from proper
adjudication, and declaratory relief from a competent and
qualified trial jury, after due process has run its proper
course. Applicant hereby reserves all Rights without prejudice,
including Applicant's fundamental Right to trial by jury in all
controversies exceeding twenty dollars. See the Fifth and
Seventh Amendments, in chief. Fundamental Rights are never
frivolous, unreasonable, or unfounded.
OFFER TO PROVE RACKETEERING
Applicant has also been an eyewitness, during the past 18
months, to a property conversion racket now being perpetrated by
means of bogus "commercial warrants" and "documentary drafts"
[sic] urged upon naive followers by the likes of M. Elizabeth
Broderick ("Broderick"), of Palmdale, California state, and LeRoy
Michael Schweitzer ("Schweitzer"), of Billings, Montana state.
Broderick was recently convicted in Los Angeles federal
court of twenty-six (26) counts of fraud and bank fraud;
Schweitzer is under indictment in Billings for similar charges.
Applicant was retained by both Broderick and Schweitzer to
provide services as a Counselor at Law in their respective cases
but, after Applicant submitted separate invoices to each client
in excess of $10,000, both Broderick and Schweitzer refused
payment for same (approx. $20,000 total).
Applicant can ill afford such economic retaliation.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 10 of 20
Plaintiffs have promoted the questionable legal theories of
Broderick and Schweitzer, even going so far as to tender one of
Schweitzer's commercial warrants to the Internal Revenue Service,
to discharge Plaintiffs' outstanding federal tax liability.
Evidence of this bogus warrant has been filed in Mitchell v.
Nordbrock. Said warrant by Plaintiffs is a matter of material
evidence, of which this Court should take formal judicial Notice.
Applicant is now actively pursuing more evidence which
traces these bogus commercial warrants to a property conversion
racket being orchestrated out of the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ") in downtown Los Angeles, California state. The "bounced"
warrants are delivered there by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), after electronic dossiers are assembled
which lead FBI and DOJ employees directly to large asset groups.
These asset groups are then targeted for foreclosure and/or
forfeiture, under federal banking and postal laws. Selective
prosecution is then begun against certain individuals, in part to
make examples out of them, to forfeit their real and personal
properties, and to discourage Americans from utilizing commercial
processes (e.g. true bills) to perfect claims against government
employees for systematic and premeditated violations of federal
and state law. This is entrapment, and it needs to stop.
Plaintiffs have, evidently, been actively involved in the
creation, utilization, and promotion of these bogus commercial
warrants and documentary drafts [sic]. Applicant is aware that
Mr. Neil T. Nordbrock, acting as New Life's only accountant,
urged New Life management to tender one or more of such bogus
paper instruments to discharge New Life's federal income tax
liabilities. A business associate of M. Elizabeth Broderick --
Adolf Hoch -- even confided to Applicant, in the Spring of 1996,
that New Life had used several of Broderick's documentary drafts,
"flushing New Life with much additional cash," as Mr. Hoch put it
(or words to that effect). Hoch was convicted with Broderick.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 11 of 20
Last but not least, Applicant offers to prove that M.
Elizabeth Broderick is actually a DOJ "front" woman, operating
under deep cover for the benefit of principals within the U.S.
Department of Justice in Los Angeles, and in other major cities.
Those principals are actively exploiting the capabilities of the
PROMIS software, which Applicant alleges was stolen from the
Inslaw Corporation, then significantly enhanced to operate over
the Internet, in order to assemble the electronic dossiers which
are required to target asset groups slated for forfeiture and/or
foreclosure. In summary, this appears to be a nationwide
property conversion racket, operating in violation of the
Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act at 18 U.S.C. 1961.
Compare also 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c), in pari materia.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, all premises having been duly considered by this
honorable Court, Applicant respectfully requests that all Relief
Requested in the STRIKE MOTION be denied.
In the alternative, Applicant respectfully requests that the
STRIKE MOTION be tabled, until such time as Applicant does
formally apply for intervention of Right in the instant case, at
which time the current STRIKE MOTION, or a substantially amended
version, can and should be properly considered by this honorable
Court, but only then, and not before then.
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 12 of 20
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the "United States" (federal government), that the
attached documents are true and correct copies of the originals,
with the sole exception of the original blue-ink signatures,
which signatures are hereby affixed by proxy, to the best of My
current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause.
Dated: August 27, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 13 of 20
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years of age,
a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and that I
personally served the following document(s):
APPLICANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO STRIKE NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR INTERVENTION:
Petition Clause, First Amendment
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class U.S. Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Neil and Evelyn Nordbrock
c/o 6642 E. Calle de San Alberto
Tucson, Arizona state
Lawrence E. Condit VIA FAX TRANSMISSION
c/o 376 South Stone Avenue to: (520) 624-8414
Tucson, Arizona state
Malcolm K. Ryder, Esq.
c/o 3100 N. Campbell Ave., Ste. 101
Tucson, Arizona state
Executed on August 27, 1997:
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 14 of 20
Exhibit "A":
VERIFIED PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS
People ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell
v.
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Superior Court of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona state
case number #320831
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 15 of 20
Exhibit "B":
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
(citing Petition Clause authorities)
Mitchell v. Nordbrock et al.
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Tucson, Arizona state
case number #CV-97-3438
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 16 of 20
Exhibit "C":
NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST
from
Paul Andrew Mitchell
to
Neil Thomas Nordbrock
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 17 of 20
Exhibit "D":
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Mitchell v. Nordbrock et al.
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Tucson, Arizona state
case number #CV-97-3438
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 18 of 20
Exhibit "E":
MOVANT'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
In Re New Life Health Center Company
United States Bankruptcy Court
Phoenix, Arizona state
case number #93-06051-PHX-GBN
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 19 of 20
Exhibit "F":
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE
IN RE LAWRENCE E. CONDIT
Mitchell v. Nordbrock et al.
Pima County Consolidated Justice Court
Tucson, Arizona state
case number #CV-97-3438
Applicant's Opposition to Strike Motion:
Page 20 of 20
# # #
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Swan v. Ulan