Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE

In Propria Persona

Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only






                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,       )    Case No. 95-484-WDB
                                )
     Plaintiff,                 )  MEMORANDUM OF LAW
                                )  IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
     v.                         )  TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
                                )  OF THIS COURT
Sheila Terese, Wallen,          )  [i.e. There is none.]
                                )
     Defendant.                 )  Rules 301, 302:
                                )  Federal Rules of Evidence
                                )  Rule 54:  Federal Rules
                                )  of Criminal Procedure
________________________________)


COMES NOW  Sheila Terese,  Wallen, Sui  Juris, Citizen of Arizona

state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to present this Her Memorandum of Law in Support of

Her Challenge to the Jurisdiction of this Court, i.e. there is no

jurisdiction in a United States District Court [sic], as distinct

from a  District Court  of the  United States  [sic], to  bring a

criminal prosecution  for alleged  violations of Title 21, United

States  Code,  Section  841(a)(1).    Defendant  now  presents  a

detailed Memorandum  of Law  on the  subject of  Federal Judicial

Authority within  the several  States of  the Union  (hereinafter

"the several States"), to wit:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 1 of 40


      Federal Judicial Authority within the Several States

   This memorandum  will be  construed to  comply with provisions
necessary to  establish presumed fact (Rules 301 and 302, Federal
Rules of  Evidence, and attending State rules), should interested
parties fail  to rebut any given allegation of fact, or matter of
law, addressed  herein.   This  position  will  be  construed  as
adequate to  meet  all  requirements  of  judicial  notice,  thus
preserving fundamental  Law.   Matters addressed  herein, if  not
rebutted, will  be construed  to have  general application.  This
memorandum  addresses  jurisdiction  of  United  States  District
Courts  and  related  agencies  of  the  United  States  (federal
government).


 Part I:  Foundation of Law, Jurisdiction, Principles & History

   In the American system of Government, the Separation of Powers
Doctrine works in two ways:  First, it assures separation between
the three branches of government, the branches being legislative,
executive, and  judicial.   Second, the Doctrine effects vertical
separation between  the  operations  of  the  state  and  federal
governments, or  put another way, operations of the government of
the United States and the governments of the several States which
are parties to the Constitution for the United States of America,
as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution").

   In this  system, as  asserted  by  American  Founders  in  the
Declaration of  Independence, all  Men (and  Women)  are  created
equal, and  are equally  endowed by  their Creator  with  certain
unalienable or  inherent Rights,  those listed in the Declaration
of Independence  being the  Rights  to  life,  liberty,  and  the
pursuit of happiness, or in the less poetic phrasing of the Fifth
Amendment to  the U.S. Constitution:  life, liberty and property.
This list,  of course,  is not  exhaustive, as articulated in the
Ninth and  Tenth Amendments  to the  U.S. Constitution,  and all,
individually and  collectively, are  accountable in the framework
of "the  laws of Nature and Nature's God."  The phrase, in modern
terms, is  better understood  as physical  and moral  law.    Man
cannot author  or amend  the laws of Nature and Nature's God, but
is directly  accountable in the framework of cause and effect, or
where moral law is concerned, cause and consequence.

  By  establishing  these  principles  prior  to  addressing  the
reasons for, and the power and operation of, government, American
Founders preserved  the essence  of English  and American-lineage
Common Law  which evolved  and was  proven by cultural experience
over many  hundreds of  years.   The Magna  Charta,  drafted  and
signed by  King John in 1215, is commonly recognized as the point
of demarcation  so far  as a formal proclamation of common rights
is concerned.   The  foundation was  basically biblical, with the
understanding that  People  are  individually  created  and  are,
therefore,  individually   accountable  to   God.     Even   when
governments encroache on the special relationship between Man and
God, Man is still accountable, individually and collectively, and
s/he invariably suffers the consequences of tyranny.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 2 of 40


   The Founders  went on  to say that governments are established
among Men  for the  sole purpose of securing inherent Rights, and
governments so  established may  rule only  by the consent of the
Governed.

   In July  1776, the  notion of specifically delegated authority
conveyed  by  constitutions  was  well  understood,  because  the
English  considered  the  Magna  Charta  and  subsequent  similar
documents to be elements of their unwritten constitution.  On the
other hand,  American colonies  had  continuing  experience  with
written constitutions  for civil  government which  began in 1636
(Massachusetts).

   Lowell H.  Becraft, Jr., an attorney from Huntsville, Alabama,
addresses historical  events leading  to the American Revolution,
in his  privately distributed memorandum on federal jurisdiction,
as follows:

      The original  thirteen colonies  of America  were  each
    separately  established  by  charters  from  the  English
    Crown.   Outside of  the common  bond  of  each  being  a
    dependency and colony of the mother country, England, the
    colonies were  not otherwise  united.   Each had  its own
    governor, legislative  assembly and  courts, and each was
    governed separately  and  independently  by  the  English
    Parliament.

      The political  connections of  the separate colonies to
    the English  Crown and Parliament descended to an unhappy
    state of  affairs as  the direct  result of Parliamentary
    acts adopted in the late 1760's and early 1770's.  Due to
    the real  and perceived  dangers caused  by these various
    acts, the  First Continental  Congress  was  convened  by
    representatives of the several colonies in October, 1774,
    the  purpose  of  which  was  to  submit  a  petition  of
    grievances to  the British  Parliament and Crown.  By the
    Declaration  and   Resolves  of   the  First  Continental
    Congress,  dated   October   14,   1774,   the   colonial
    representatives labeled these Parliamentary acts of which
    they complained as "impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well
    as unconstitutional,  and most  dangerous and destructive
    of American  rights,"  and  the  purpose  of  which  were
    designs, schemes  and plans  "which demonstrate  a system
    formed to  enslave America."  Revolution was assuredly in
    the formative  stages  absent  conciliation  between  the
    mother country and colonies.

      Between October,  1775, and the middle of 1776, each of
    the colonies  separately severed their ties and relations
    with England,  and several  adopted constitutions for the
    newly formed  States.   By July,  1776, the  exercise  of
    British  authority  in  any  and  all  colonies  was  not
    recognized in  any degree.   The  capstone of this actual
    separation of  the colonies  from England  was  the  more
    formal Declaration of Independence.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 3 of 40


      The legal effect of the Declaration of Independence was
    to  make  each  new  State  a  separate  and  independent
    sovereign over  which there  was no  other government  of
    superior power  or jurisdiction.   This was clearly shown
    in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212
    (1808), where it was held:

          This opinion  is predicated  upon  a  principle
        which is  believed to  be  undeniable,  that  the
        several states  which composed this Union, so far
        at least as regarded their municipal regulations,
        became entitled, from the time when they declared
        themselves independent,  to all  the  rights  and
        powers of sovereign states, and that they did not
        derive them  from concessions made by the British
        king.  The treaty of peace contains a recognition
        of their  independence, not  a grant of it.  From
        hence it  results, that  the laws  of the several
        state governments  were  the  laws  of  sovereign
        states, and  as such  were  obligatory  upon  the
        people of  such state,  from the  time they  were
        enacted.


      And a  further expression of similar import is found in
    Harcourt v.  Gaillard, 25  U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527
    (1827), where the Court stated:

          There was no territory within the United States
        that was  claimed in any other right than that of
        some one  of the confederated states;  therefore,
        there could  be no  acquisition of territory made
        by  the   United   States   distinct   from,   or
        independent of some one of the states.

          Each declared itself sovereign and independent,
        according to the limits of its territory.

          [T]he  soil   and  sovereignty   within   their
        acknowledged limits  were as  much theirs  at the
        declaration of independence as at this hour.


      Thus, unequivocally,  in July,  1776,  the  new  States
    possessed all  sovereignty, power,  and jurisdiction over
    all the  soil and persons in their respective territorial
    limits.

      This condition  of supreme  sovereignty of  each  State
    over all  property and persons within the borders thereof
    continued notwithstanding the adoption of the Articles of
    Confederation.   In Article  II of  that document, it was
    expressly stated:

          Article   II.      Each   state   retains   its
        sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
        Power, Jurisdiction  and right,  which is  not by
        this confederation  expressly  delegated  to  the
        United States, in Congress assembled.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 4 of 40


      As  the   history  of   the  confederation   government
    demonstrated,  each   State  was   indeed  sovereign  and
    independent to  the  degree  that  it  made  the  central
    government   created    by   the   confederation   fairly
    ineffectual.     These  defects   of  the   confederation
    government strained  the relations  between and among the
    States  and   the  remedy   became  the   calling  of   a
    constitutional convention.

      The representatives  which assembled in Philadelphia in
    May, 1787,  to attend  the Constitutional  Convention met
    for the  primary  purpose  of  improving  the  commercial
    relations among  the States,  although the product of the
    Convention produced  more than  this.   But, no intention
    was demonstrated  for the  States  to  surrender  in  any
    degree the  jurisdiction so  possessed by  the States  at
    that time, and indeed the Constitution as finally drafted
    continued the same territorial jurisdiction of the States
    as existed  under the  Articles of  Confederation.    The
    essence of  this  retention  of  state  jurisdiction  was
    embodied in  Art. I,  8, Cl. 17 of the U.S. Constitution,
    which reads as follows:

          To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases
        whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
        Miles square)  as may,  by Cession  of particular
        States, and  the Acceptance  of Congress,  become
        the Seat  of the Government of the United States,
        and to  exercise like  Authority over  all Places
        purchased by  the Consent  of the  Legislature of
        the State  in which  the Same  shall be,  for the
        Erection of  Forts,  Magazines,  Arsenals,  dock-
        Yards, and other needful Buildings;  ....


   The necessity for granting federal government sovereignty over
land which  would serve  as the  seat of  that government  became
conspicuous during  the Revolution,  when a  contingent of  irate
folks from the Continental Army beleaguered Congress while it was
in  session   in  Philadelphia.     Members   of  Congress   fled
Philadelphia  to   Princeton,  New  Jersey,  and  from  there  to
Annapolis, Maryland.   Philadelphia  and Pennsylvania governments
were unable, or unwilling, to disperse the rebels who taunted and
insulted Members  of Congress.   Problems  persisted for the weak
government under  the Articles  of  Confederation  following  the
Revolution, and  it was in this framework that the Constitutional
Convention was  called in  1787.   The purpose for establishing a
seat  of   government  under   Congress'  exclusive   legislative
jurisdiction was addressed in Essay No. 43 of The Federalist:

      The indispensable  necessity of  complete authority  at
    the seat  of government carries its own evidence with it.
    It is  a power  exercised by  every  legislature  of  the
    Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general
    supremacy.   Without it  not only  the  public  authority
    might be  insulted and  its proceedings  interrupted with
    impunity, but  a dependence of the members of the general
    government on  the State  comprehending the  seat of  the
    government for  protection in  the exercise of their duty
    might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe
    or influence  equally dishonorable  to the government and
    dissatisfactory to  the other members of the Confederacy.
    This consideration  has the  more weight  as the  gradual
    accumulation of  public improvements  at  the  stationary
    residence of  the government  would be  both too  great a
    public pledge  to be left in the hands of a single State,
    and would  create so  many obstacles  to a removal of the
    government, as  still further  to abridge  its  necessary
    independence.   The extent  of this  federal district  is
    sufficiently circumscribed  to satisfy  every jealousy of
    an opposite  nature.   And as it is to be appropriated to
    this use with the consent of the State ceding it;  as the
    State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights
    and the  consent of  the citizens  inhabiting it;  as the
    inhabitants will  find sufficient inducements of interest
    to become  willing parties  to the cession;  as they will
    have had  their voice  in the  election of the government
    which is to exercise authority over them;  as a municipal
    legislature for  local purposes,  derived from  their own
    suffrages, will  of course  be allowed  them;  and as the
    authority of  the legislature  of the  State, and  of the
    inhabitants of  the ceded  part of  it, to  concur in the
    cession will  be derived  from the  whole people  of  the
    State  in  their  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  every
    imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

      The  necessity   of  a   like  authority   over  forts,
    magazines, etc.,  established by  the general government,
    is not  less evident.   The public money expended on such
    places,  and  the  public  property  deposited  in  them,
    require that  they should be exempt from the authority of
    the particular  State.   Nor would  it be  proper for the
    places on  which the  security of  the entire  Union  may
    depend to  be in  any degree  dependent on  a  particular
    member of  it.  All objections and scruples are here also
    obviated by  requiring  the  concurrence  of  the  States
    concerned in every such establishment.


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 5 of 40


   Becraft cites  several early  court cases  which addressed the
matter of  State  versus  "United  States"  (federal  government)
jurisdiction,  with   each  of   the  decisions  reinforcing  the
principle of  State sovereignty, unless or until land is ceded by
a State legislature to the United States:

      Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was
    United States  v. Bevans,  16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818),
    which  involved   a  federal  prosecution  for  a  murder
    committed on board the Warship, Independence, anchored in
    the  harbor   of  Boston,  Massachusetts.    The  defense
    complained  that  only  the  state  had  jurisdiction  to
    prosecute and  argued that the federal Circuit Courts had
    no jurisdiction of this crime supposedly committed within
    the federal  government's  admiralty  jurisdiction.    In
    argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the United
    States admitted as follows:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 6 of 40


          The exclusive  jurisdiction  which  the  United
        States have  in forts  and  dock-yards  ceded  to
        them, is  derived from  the express assent of the
        states by  whom the  cessions are made.  It could
        be derived  in no  other manner;  because without
        it, the  authority of  the state would be supreme
        and exclusive therein, 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.


      In  holding   that  the   State  of  Massachusetts  had
    jurisdiction over the crime, the Court held:

          What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which
        a state possesses?

          We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction
        of a  state is  co-extensive with  its territory;
        co-extensive  with   its  legislative   power,  3
        Wheat., at 386, 387.

          The article  which describes the judicial power
        of the  United States  is not  intended  for  the
        cession of  territory or of general jurisdiction.
        ... Congress  has  power  to  exercise  exclusive
        jurisdiction over  this district,  and  over  all
        places  purchased   by   the   consent   of   the
        legislature of  the state in which the same shall
        be,  for   the  erection   of  forts,  magazines,
        arsenals,   dock-yards,    and   other    needful
        buildings.

          It is  observable that  the power  of exclusive
        legislation (which  is  jurisdiction)  is  united
        with cession  of territory,  which is  to be  the
        free act  of the  states.   It  is  difficult  to
        compare  the   two  sections   together,  without
        feeling a  conviction, not  to be strengthened by
        any commentary  on them,  that, in describing the
        judicial power,  the framers  of our constitution
        had not  in view  any cession  of territory;  or,
        which  is   essentially  the   same,  of  general
        jurisdiction, 3 Wheat., at 388.


      Thus in  Bevans, the Court established a principle that
    federal jurisdiction  extends only over the areas wherein
    it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this
    is a principle incorporated into all subsequent decisions
    regarding the  extent of  federal jurisdiction.   To hold
    otherwise would  destroy the  purpose, intent and meaning
    of the entire U.S. Constitution.

      The  decision   in  Bevans   was  closely  followed  by
    decisions made  in two state courts and one federal court
    within the  next two  years.   In Commonwealth  v. Young,
    Brightly, N.P.  302, 309 (Pa. 1818), the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania was  presented with  the  issue  of  whether
    lands owned  by the  United States for which Pennsylvania
    had never  ceded jurisdiction  had to be sold pursuant to
    state  law.     In   deciding  that   the  state  law  of
    Pennsylvania exclusively  controlled this sale of federal
    land, the Court held:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 7 of 40


          The legislation  and authority  of congress  is
        confined to cessions by particular states for the
        seat of government, and purchases made by consent
        of the  legislature of the state, for the purpose
        of erecting  forts.   The legislative  power  and
        exclusive jurisdiction  remained in  the  several
        states, of all territory within their limits, not
        ceded to,  or purchased  by, congress,  with  the
        assent of  the state  legislature, to prevent the
        collision of  legislation and  authority  between
        the United States and the several states.


      A year  later,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  was
    presented with the issue of whether the State of New York
    had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort Niagara,
    a federal fort.  In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233
    (N.Y. 1819), that court held that the fort was subject to
    the jurisdiction  of the  State since  the lands therefor
    had not  been ceded  to the United States.  The rationale
    of its opinion stated:

          To oust  this  state  of  its  jurisdiction  to
        support and  maintain its  laws,  and  to  punish
        crimes,  it   must  be   shown  that  an  offense
        committed within  the acknowledged  limits of the
        state, is  clearly and  exclusively cognizable by
        the laws and courts of the United States.  In the
        case  already   cited,  Chief   Justice  Marshall
        observed, that  to bring  the offense  within the
        jurisdiction of  the courts of the union, it must
        have been  committed out  of the  jurisdiction of
        any state;   it  is not  (he says,)  the  offense
        committed,  but   the  place   in  which   it  is
        committed, which  must be out of the jurisdiction
        of the state.


      The case  relied upon  by this court was U.S. v. Bevans
    supra.

      At about  the same time that the New York Supreme Court
    rendered its opinion in Godfrey, a similar fact situation
    was before  a federal  court, the  only difference  being
    that the  murder committed  in the  case occurred on land
    which had  been ceded  to the  United States.   In United
    States v.  Cornell,  25  Fed.Cas.  646,  648  No.  14,867
    (C.C.D.R.I., 1819),  the court  held that  the case  fell
    within federal jurisdiction, describing such jurisdiction
    as follows:


    Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 8 of 40


          But  although   the  United   States  may  well
        purchase and  hold  lands  for  public  purposes,
        within the  territorial limits  of a  state, this
        does not  of  itself  oust  the  jurisdiction  or