Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State

and Federal Witness [sic]

c/o 5150 Graves Avenue, Suite 12-C

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

In Propria Persona and

by Special Appearance Only

 

All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )   Case Number CR-00-20227-JF

                                )

          Plaintiff [sic],      )   NOTICE OF MOTION AND

                                )   MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS

     v.                         )   ON COUNTS THREE THRU SEVEN:

                                )

DONALD E. WISHART [sic],        )

                                )   Rule 7(f): Federal Rules of

          Defendant [sic]       )   Criminal Procedure (“FRCrP”);

                                )

________________________________)

COMES NOW Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, Citizen of California State, expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic], and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter “Defendant”), to move this honorable Court for an ORDER directing the prosecution to file and serve upon Defendant a written Bill of Particulars, setting out in sufficient detail information which is absolutely required for Defendant adequately to prepare His defense.

Counts Four thru Seven all state that Defendant “was required by law … to file an income tax return”, but that “law” is never cited.  Defendant specifically denies that any such “law” required Him to file an income tax return for any of the calendar years in question.

Accordingly, the Bill of Particulars must set forth, in sufficient detail, all of the following information, which is absolutely required for Defendant adequately to prepare His defense against Counts Three thru Seven:

 

1.   the statute(s), if any, which created a specific liability in Defendant for taxes imposed by Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code for each calendar year in question;

2.   all published regulation(s) which implemented the statute(s) identified in point 1 above;

3.   the statute(s), if any, which created a specific legal duty for Defendant to file an income tax return for each calendar year in question;

4.   all published regulation(s) which implemented the statute(s) identified in point 3 above;

5.   the specific form(s) which Defendant is alleged to have failed to make;

6.   the specific and relevant authority(s) that would authorize the Director, or District Director, of the IRS to require Defendant to make a return;  see 26 CFR 1.6001-1(d) [conditions precedent:] “… by notice served upon him, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such specific records as will enable the district director to determine whether or not such person is liable for tax under subtitle A of the Code, including qualified State individual income taxes …” [bold emphasis added], so as to determine if Defendant had ANY Subtitle A personal income tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code;

7.   the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) control number(s) assigned to the regulation(s), form(s), e.g. 1040, 720, 2555, etc., and instruction(s) for completing said returns, as required by 44 U.S.C. 3501 thru 3520, inclusive;

8.   with respect to the allegations that Defendant received “gross income”, state in concise and particular detail the exact source(s) of same, and indicate whether or not those sources were inside the “United States” or outside the “United States”, as required by IRC 861 and 862, as implemented by substantive, legislative regulations found at 26 CFR 1.861-1, to wit: “Income from sources within the United States [sic] – (a) Categories of income.  Part 1 (section 861 and following), subchapter N, chapter 1 of the Code, and the regulations thereunder determine the sources of income for purposes of the income tax”;  see also 26 CFR 1.861-8(a):  “The rules contained in this section apply in determining taxable income of the taxpayer from specific sources and activities under other sections of the Code, referred to in this section as operative sections [sic]”;  and 26 CFR 1.861-8(e)(11)(f): “Miscellaneous matters -– (1) Operative sections.  The operative sections of the Code which require the determination of taxable income of the taxpayer from specific sources or activities and which give rise to statutory groupings to which this section is applicable include the sections described below” (i.e. subsections (i) thru (vi)(M))  [bold emphasis added];

9.   state, in concise and particular detail, the taxable activity(s) from item 8 supra, and from (i) and (vi)(M) supra, in which it is alleged that Defendant was engaged;

10.  state, in concise and particular detail, the statute(s) and corresponding published regulation(s) that levy a tax upon the taxable activity(s) in which it is alleged that Defendant was engaged (see points 8 and 9 supra);

11.  state in concise and particular detail the statute(s) and corresponding regulations which create a specific liability for taxes levied upon said activity(s).

 

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
 
I.
 
DEFENDANT WILL BE UNABLE
ADEQUATELY TO DEFEND AGAINST
THE INSTANT CHARGES WITHOUT
FURTHER PARTICULARIZING OF ALLEGATIONS
 

Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court may direct the filing of a Bill of Particulars upon a Motion by the Defendant.

The functions of such a Motion are to provide a defendant with information about the details of the charges necessary to the preparation of the defense, avoid prejudicial surprise at trial, and protect against a second prosecution based upon the same set of facts.  See Yeargain v. United States, 314 F.2d 881, 882 (9th Cir.1963);  United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 8098 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836.

As originally promulgated, Rule 7(f) required a showing of cause before a Bill would lie.  That requirement was stricken by the amendment of 1966, which was expressly designed "to encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts towards bills of particulars."  See Rule 7(f), Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendment.

The granting, or refusal to grant, a Bill of Particulars is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.  See United States v. Dreitzler, 572 F.2d 539, 553 (9th Cir. 1978).

The test in ruling on such a Motion as this, is whether deprivation of the information sought will render the Defendant unable to prepare a defense, avoid surprise, or avoid later risking double jeopardy.  See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 63-64 (3d Cir.1971), cert. den. 405 U.S. 936.

A defendant should not be deprived of information needed to prepare a defense, simply because the information might be used by the government as evidence.  See United States v. Crisona, 271 F.2d 156 (S.D.N.Y.1967).

The simple fact that an indictment may be sufficient is not an argument against granting a Bill of Particulars.  See Gisport v. United States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).

Moreover, a Motion for Bill of Particulars cannot be denied on the theory a defendant "knows" what he or she "did."  Such a ruling effectively stands the presumption of innocence on its head, in assuming a defendant has knowledge of his or her own acts, which were in fact "guilty."  See United States v. Tanner, 279 F.Supp. 683, 695-696 (D.Del.1971).

Although a defendant may not use a Bill of Particulars to ascertain all of the evidence which the government intends to produce, a defendant is entitled to know the theory of the government's case as to each count.  See Yeargain v. United States, supra, 314 F.2d at 882.

As noted in the Opinion of Judge Whittaker, cited with approval in the advisory committee note to the 1966 amendment to Rule 7(f):

 

It seems quite clear that where charges in an indictment are so general that they do not sufficiently advise the defendant of the specific acts with which he is charged, a bill of particulars should be ordered.

 

United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 375

(W.D.Mo.1954)

 

Moreover, because a Bill of Particulars has a fundamental connection to the Sixth Amendment Right to defend, doubt must be resolved in favor of disclosure and the public interest, in giving the accused the Right to mount a defense.  See United States v. Tanner, supra, 279 F.Supp. at 474;  United States v. Manetti, supra, 323 F.Supp. at 696.

Notably, prejudice to a defendant has been defined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to be the "impairment of the ability to mount a defense."  See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 869 (1982)  [bold emphasis added].

The instant indictment contains the very form of generalized charges against which a Bill of Particulars is designed to protect.  Without further particularization, Defendant will not be able fully to exercise His fundamental Right to a fair trial, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Defendant’s ability to mount a defense will be irreparably impaired.

 

II.

 

THE INDICTMENT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY APPRISE

THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE

OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.

 

The charges in the indictment herein are glaringly void of requisite information concerning the specific acts involved.

The charges in no way enable the preparation of a defense.

All information requested herein is essential to remedy the indictment's deficiencies, by allowing Defendant to prepare a defense.

In evaluating any motion for a Bill of Particulars, the Court is called upon to make a "particularized decision" which takes into account the amount of facts stated in the indictment.  See United States v. Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 117, 123 (N.D.Ga. 1979);  United States v. Barket, 380 F.Supp. 1018, 1021 (W.D.Mo. 1974).

It is well established that a defendant should not be deprived of a Bill of Particulars simply because he requests information which might be used by the government as evidence.  See United States v. Crisona, supra, 271 F.Supp. at 156.

 

III.

 

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT MANDATES DISCLOSURE

OF THE FACTUAL INFORMATION SOUGHT HEREIN.

 

A Bill of Particulars, unlike most criminal discovery devices, directly implicates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the Right to make a vigorous and prepared defense in a criminal case.  See United States v. Tanner, supra, 279 F.Supp. at 473-74.

When the charging document lacks sufficient particularity to allow a defendant to prepare a defense, as here, the Defendant's ability to confront adverse witnesses and to use compulsory process is seriously inhibited, if not irreparably obstructed.

Obviously, due process requires that an accused enjoy the opportunity to defend, including being able to examine witnesses, offer evidence in defense, and be represented or assisted by a fully prepared trial counsel.  See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).

Denial of the Right to defend is an error of constitutional magnitude, requiring proof that the error involved was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).

Therefore, any judicial doubt concerning Defendant's Motion herein must be resolved in favor of disclosure, due to the fundamental public interest in giving the accused a right to mount a defense.  See United States v. Manetti, supra, 323 F.Supp. at 696.  Any impairment of the ability to mount a defense constitutes prejudice.  United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 U.S. at 869.

CONCLUSION

Any attempt to defend against the charges in the instant indictment, without further particularization, will result in manifest prejudice to Defendant.  For all the reasons stated above, this Court is respectfully requested to grant this Motion for a complete Bill of Particulars, to avoid all prejudice and a violation of Defendant's fundamental Right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Defendant also asserts a right to a complete Bill of Particulars under the principle of reciprocal discovery.  (See: Rule 16(b)(1);  Defendant’s FIRST CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, filed in part formally to discover the law(s), if any, which require IRS employees to execute and file a valid Oath of Office.)

 

VERIFICATION

I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause in pari materia with all provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. (Constitution, Laws and Treaties).

 

Dated:  September 17, 2000 A.D.

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

/s/ Donald E. Wishart

 

Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State and

Federal Witness (18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513)

(expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic])

 

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):

 

NOTICE OF MOTION AND

MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS

ON COUNTS THREE THRU SEVEN:

Rule 7:

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;

 

 

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:

 

Robert S. Mueller III             John S. Gordon

Office of the U.S. Attorney       Office of the U.S. Attorney

280 South First St., Ste. 371     312 North Spring Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        Los Angeles [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Thomas S. DiLeonardo              Ronald A. Cimino

U.S. Department of Justice        U.S. Department of Justice

West. Criminal Enforcement Sec.   West. Criminal Enforcement Sec.

P.O. Box 972, Ben Franklin Stn.   P.O Box 972, Ben Franklin Stn.

Washington [ZIP code exempt]      Washington [ZIP code exempt]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA         DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

 

John Paul Reichmuth

Federal Public Defender’s Office

160 West Santa Clara Street, Suite 575

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

 

Executed on September 17, 2000 A.D.

 

/s/ Donald E. Wishart

 

Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State and

Federal Witness (18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513)

(expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic])

 

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice