Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State,

Federal Witness and Victim

c/o 5150 Graves Avenue, Suite 12-C

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

In Propria Persona and

by Special Appearance Only

 

All Rights Reserved

without Prejudice

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic],) Case Number CR-00-20227-JF

                               )

          Plaintiff [sic],     ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND

                               ) MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT

     v.                        ) THREE OF INDICTMENT:

                               )

DONALD E. WISHART [sic],       ) Rule 48: Federal Rules

                               ) of Criminal Procedure (“FRCrP”).

          Defendant [sic].     )

                               ) Date: _________  Time: __________

_______________________________)

COMES NOW Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, Citizen of California State, expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic], and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter “Defendant”), to move this honorable Court for an ORDER dismissing COUNT THREE of the instant indictment [sic], with prejudice, and to provide formal NOTICE to all interested Parties of same.  See 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) [sic].

 

HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY

During a Meeting of Creditors held in Defendant’s bankruptcy proceeding, held in July 1994 A.D., Defendant specifically demanded Messrs. Colbert Tang (“Tang”) and Daniel Sutherland (“Sutherland”) to produce their lawful delegation(s) of authority, if any, to be present at said Meeting as representatives or agents of the United States.

Neither Tang nor Sutherland ever produced any delegation(s) of authority to represent, or act as agents for, the United States.  Moreover, Sutherland even refused to provide a standard business card.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that Tang and Sutherland are now, or ever were, officers or employees of the United States acting in any official capacity whatsoever.  See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), fn. 23;  Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that Tang and Sutherland are now, or ever were, “collectors, or other officers of the revenue or customs”.  See 28 U.S.C. 547(3), as discussed in Defendant’s FIRST CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, previously filed in the instant case, and now pending before this Court.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 7212, and 26 U.S.C. 7212, are one and the same.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that 26 U.S.C 7212 has ever been enacted into positive law, as such.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that any of the provisions of IRC subtitle F have ever taken effect.  See IRC § 7851(a)(6)(A).

Defendant hereby specifically denies that IRC § 7212 has ever taken effect, because it falls within subtitle F.

Defendant hereby specifically denies that IRC § 7851 has ever taken effect either, because it also falls within subtitle F!

The consistent federal legislative practice is to utilize the term “this title” [sic] to refer to a Title of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”), whether enacted into positive law, or not.  See Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, enacting Title 28, U.S.C., into positive law;  the term “this title” therein refers to Title 28, U.S.C.

Defendant specifically denies that the above stated provisions of Title 26, U.S.C., and of the IRC, are clear and unambiguous enough to survive the test for vagueness established by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):  guess at its meaning, and differ as to its application.

The income tax provisions of the IRC are void for deliberate and premeditated vagueness.  See Nature and Cause Clause, Sixth Amendment.

Defendant specifically denies that any substantive, legislative, implementing regulations have ever been promulgated for IRC § 7212.  See alleged authority to issue regulations, in general, at IRC § 7805, which falls entirely within subtitle F (roughly §§ 6000 thru 8000).

Defendant specifically denies ever having authored or issued, whether in writing or verbally, any threats of bodily harm to either Tang or Sutherland.

Defendant specifically denies ever corruptly endeavoring to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States, acting in any official capacity under “this title” [sic].

Defendant specifically denies ever by force endeavoring to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States, acting in any official capacity under “this title”.

Defendant specifically denies ever by threats of force endeavoring to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States, acting in any official capacity under “this title”.

Defendant specifically denies that Tang and Sutherland ever executed lawful Appointment Affidavits.  See Standard Form 61, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FPM Chapter 296 (61-108:  Prior Edition Usable);  5 U.S.C. 3331.

Appointment Affidavits properly executed by Tang and Sutherland do not, and cannot, exist as a matter of Law.  See related statute at 5 U.S.C. 2903, as cited on Standard Form 61 supra.

Defendant specifically denies that Tang and Sutherland, as employees of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), were ever delegated any lawful authority(s) to administer the United States internal revenue laws within the territory known as California State.

Defendant argues, on the basis of demonstrable and unrebutted evidence, which has already been admitted into evidence in numerous federal and State courts, that the terms “internal” and “Internal” mean “municipal”, i.e. limited to the territory and other property over which the United States (federal government) has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.  See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution;  and 52A C.J.S. "Law", pages 741, 742.

Pursuant to 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 supra, Defendant specifically denies that the United States (federal government) has exclusive legislative jurisdiction within the territory known as California State, with the sole exception of federal enclaves lawfully ceded to the United States (federal government) by Acts of the California Legislature and of the Congress of the United States.

Defendant specifically denies that any Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration (“ACTA”), consummated between the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the California Franchise Tax Board, is or ever was a lawful contract authorizing the IRS to administer internal revenue laws within the territory known as California State.  See Title 31, U.S.C., in toto, which has been enacted into positive law;  5 U.S.C. 556(d):  burden of proof falls upon the proponent of any rule.

Defendant specifically denies that Tang and Sutherland ever enjoyed lawful delegations of authority to administer “this title”, whether said term refers to Title 26, U.S.C., or to the IRC proper, for all of the above stated reasons.

 

INCORPORATION OF EXHIBITS

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully herein, the two (2) documents styled “State of California Uniform Commercial Code -– Form UCC-1” and “Private Security Agreement ‘True Bill’” transmitted via Certified U.S. Mail to Tang and Sutherland, respectively, on or about July 21, 1996.

See Defense Exhibits “I” and “J” filed concurrently herewith;  and Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (IV Pet.) pages 410, 433-436 (1830).  See also “indictment” at page 4, lines 12-13.

 

SPECIFIC DENIALS

Defendant specifically denies that Exhibits “I” and “J” supra are “lien documents” [sic] because Defendant never executed them, nor did Defendant ever file them in any public record before now, nor do they exhibit either the form or the substance required to perfect a lien.

Furthermore, Tang and Sutherland could have escaped any and all liability(s) simply by rebutting said documents, point-by-point;  but, they both chose instead not do so, and to fall silent, thus activating estoppel as to the contents of said Exhibits.  See U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) and Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906) (silence is fraud;  silence activates estoppel.)

Defendant also specifically denies that Exhibits “I” and “J” ever caused any real damage(s) or injury(s), monetary or otherwise, to the respective personal or property rights of Tang and Sutherland, and Defendant denies that said Exhibits ever could have done so, by law.

Defendant hereby offers to prove -- upon discovery of a certified transcript of the panel’s proceedings -- that persons alleging to be attorneys for the government did perpetrate a fraud upon this Court, and also upon a panel of federal citizens, first by stating that “these are lien documents” (or words to that effect), and then by indicting Defendant on the basis of documents which said persons knew, or should have known, were NOT “lien documents” [sic].

Lastly, Defendant specifically denies that said documents, in and of themselves, caused any damage(s) or injury(s) that obstructed or otherwise impeded -- corruptly, by force, or by threats of force [sic] -- the due administration of the IRC, or of 26 U.S.C.

 

CONCLUSIONS

COUNT THREE of the document alleged to be the “indictment” in the instant case, assumes facts not in evidence, and also facts which do not exist, and can not exist, for all of the above stated reasons.

Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.  The Law does not, and cannot, compel the doing of any impossibilities.  Confer at same in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (With Pronunciations).

Tang and Sutherland’s silence, in the face of Defendant’s lawful demands for their delegation(s) of authority, constituted fraud and activated estoppel.  U.S. v. Tweel supra.  Both Tang and Sutherland had legal and moral duties to answer, and leaving Defendant’s inquiry unanswered was intentionally misleading.

Therefore, neither Tang nor Sutherland can now submit any delegation(s) of authority as admissible evidence in this case, because they are estopped from doing so.  Carmine v. Bowen supra.

The consequence is that, since 1994, neither Tang nor Sutherland can operate as agents for the United States (federal government), notwithstanding any Law, statute or regulation to the contrary which may be, or already has been, asserted as being applicable hereto by any proponent whatsoever.  See 5 U.S.C. 556(d), in chief.

 

REMEDY REQUESTED

All premises having been duly considered, Defendant moves this honorable Court for an ORDER dismissing COUNT THREE of the instant indictment [sic], with prejudice, for failing to state any claims upon which relief can be granted.  This Court has no original jurisdiction or authority to issue any relief, when no crime has been committed, or even properly alleged.

 

VERIFICATION

I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).  See Supremacy Clause in pari materia with all provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. (Constitution, Laws and Treaties).

 

 

Dated:  September 25, 2000 A.D.

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

/s/ Donald E. Wishart

 

Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State,

Federal Witness and Victim (18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513)

(expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic])

 

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):

 

NOTICE OF MOTION AND

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT

THREE OF INDICTMENT:

Rule 48:

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:

 

Robert S. Mueller III             John S. Gordon

Office of the U.S. Attorney       Office of the U.S. Attorney

280 S. First Street, Ste. 371     312 North Spring Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        Los Angeles [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Thomas S. DiLeonardo              Ronald A. Cimino

Department of Justice, Tax Div.   Department of Justice, Tax Div.

West. Criminal Enforcement Sec.   West. Criminal Enforcement Sec.

600 “E” St., N.W., Room 5712      600 “E” St., N.W., Room 5712

Washington [ZIP code exempt]      Washington [ZIP code exempt]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA         DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

 

John Paul Reichmuth               Billy Brown

Federal Public Defender’s Office  Internal Revenue Service

160 W. Santa Clara St., Ste. 575  55 South Market Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Paul Camacho                      Don Hallenbeck

Internal Revenue Service          Internal Revenue Service

55 South Market Street            55 South Market Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Mel Steiner                       Colbert Tang

Internal Revenue Service          Internal Revenue Service

55 South Market Street            55 South Market Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Brian Watson                      Ken Whitmore

Internal Revenue Service          Internal Revenue Service

55 South Market Street            55 South Market Street

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        San Jose [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   CALIFORNIA, USA

 

Dan Sutherland                    Solicitor General

Internal Revenue Service          U.S. Dept. of Justice

55 South Market Street            10th & Constitution, N.W.

San Jose [ZIP code exempt]        Washington [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA                   DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

 

Bay View Federal Bank

Attention:  Legal Department

2121 South El Camino Real

San Mateo [ZIP code exempt]

CALIFORNIA, USA

 

 

Executed on September 25, 2000 A.D.

 

/s/ Donald E. Wishart

 

Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris

Citizen of California State,

Federal Witness and Victim (18 U.S.C. 1512, 1513)

(expressly not a “citizen of the United States” [sic])

 

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice