Winterrowd v.
Winterrowd v.
NOTICE
The text
of this opinion can be corrected before
the
opinion is published in the Pacific
Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or
other formal
errors to
the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail:
corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
OF
|
RALPH KERMIT WINTERROWD 2ND, |
) |
|
|
) Court of Appeals Nos. A-9233 & A-9234 |
|
Appellant, |
) Trial Court Nos. 3AN-04-4649, |
|
|
) 3AN-05-3893, & 3AN-05-3894 MO |
|
v. |
) |
|
|
) |
|
|
) O P I N I O N |
|
|
) |
|
Appellee. |
) No. 2050 |
|
|
) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Appeal from the District Court, Third
Judi
cial District,
Magistrate.
Appearances: Ralph Kermit Winterrowd
2nd, in
propria persona, Knik, for the
Appellant.
Rachel Plumlee, Assistant
Municipal
Prosecutor, and
Frederick H. Boness,
Municipal Attorney,
lee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart,
Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
On
Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd was stopped for speeding. On both
occasions, the
police asked Winterrowd to produce his
drivers
license, his
vehicle registration, and proof of
motor vehicle
insurance.
During the January 3rd traffic
stop, Winterrowd
produced his
drivers license and registration, but
he did not
produce proof of
insurance. Instead, Winterrowd invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to
the
assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment to the
United
States Constitution. Because Winterrowd
did not produce proof of
motor vehicle insurance,
he was cited for violating
Section
09.28.030(B)(1) of the Anchorage Municipal Code (failure to carry
proof of motor vehicle insurance).
During the October 11th
traffic stop, Winterrowd
produced his drivers license, but
he did not produce his vehicle
registration or proof of insurance. Again, Winterrowd invoked
his Fifth Amendment
privilege against
self-incrimination and
right to counsel.
This time, Winterrowd was cited for failing to
produce proof
of motor vehicle insurance upon the
demand of a
police officer, AMC 09.28.030(B)(2), and for failing to
carry
motor vehicle registration, AMC 09.52.020.
These three
charges were jointly adjudicated
in a
single bench trial
in the district
court. At his
trial,
Winterrowd argued that, because he
was subjected to a seizure
of
his person within
the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and
because he thereafter
invoked his privilege
against self-
incrimination and his rights to silence
and to the assistance of
counsel under the Fifth
Amendment, he could not be penalized for
failing to produce the
documentation that the officers asked
him
for. The district court
rejected this argument
and found
Winterrowd guilty of all three offenses.
Winterrowd now appeals his
convictions, renewing the
constitutional argument that he
presented to the district court.
Winterrowd
is correct that a motorist who is subjected
to a traffic
stop is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
However,
not all Fourth Amendment seizures amount to custody for
purposes of Miranda
v. Arizona.1 That
is, not all
Fourth
Amendment
seizures trigger the Fifth Amendment rights to silence
and to the assistance of counsel recognized in
Miranda.
We addressed this point of law in
McNeill v. State, 984
P.2d
5 (
Generally, in
determining whether a
person is in
custody for Miranda purposes, a
court must
ask whether, under
the
circumstances
of the police interaction with
the suspect, ... a reasonable person
[would]
have felt
free to break off the interrogation
and, depending on the location, either leave
or ask the
police to leave. [quoting
Long v.
State, 837 P.2d 737, 740 (
...
This wording suggests
that Miranda
warnings will be required whenever a person
is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes,
but
that is
not the law. The cases
applying
Miranda recognize that there are some Fourth
Amendment seizures of
temporary duration
most
notably, routine traffic stops and other
investigative stops
in which Miranda
warnings are not required, even though
the
person
is temporarily in custody and the
police can
properly ignore a request that the
officers
depart and leave the person alone.
McNeill, 984 P.2d at 6-7
(emphasis omitted), citing Berkemer v.
McCarty,
468
317 (1984)
(holding that Miranda does not apply when a
motorist
is subjected to
roadside questioning during a routine
traffic
stop); Blake
v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska
App. 1988)
(holding that police
officers are not required to give Miranda
warnings during an
investigative stop unless and
until the
initial stop ripens into custody as that term
is defined in
Miranda jurisprudence). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4th
ed. 2004),
9.3(b), Vol. 4, pp. 367-377.
In his reply briefs, Winterrowd
asserts that he is not
attempting to
raise a Miranda
issue. Instead, Winterrowd
asserts, he is relying on the Fifth Amendment rights
to silence
and to the assistance of counsel that the law
gives him apart
from Miranda. But in roadside encounters like the ones in
these
cases, there is no Fifth Amendment right to silence
or to counsel
apart from situations of custodial interrogation as
defined in
Miranda jurisprudence.
(
in custody for Miranda purposes, the police could continue
to
question him despite his arguable
request for an attorney).
Because Winterrowds
traffic stops did not constitute
custody for
Miranda purposes, the police could continue
to ask
Winterrowd to produce
his vehicle registration and proof
of
insurance even after Winterrowd invoked
his Fifth Amendment
rights to silence and to the assistance of
counsel because those
rights did not apply in Winterrowds
situation.
The remaining issue is whether Winterrowd, by invoking
his privilege
against self-incrimination, could lawfully
refuse
the
police officers demands
that he produce
his vehicle
registration and proof
of insurance. The answer is
no:
motorists have no
Fifth Amendment right to
refuse authorized
police requests for production of their vehicle
registration and
proof of insurance.
See Larkin v. Hartigan,
620 N.E.2d 598, 602 (
1993) (There is
nothing unconstitutional about
requiring a
vehicle owner
to verify [that] his insurance sufficiently
meets
all legal
requirements.); People v. Goodin, 668 N.W.2d 392,
395-
96
(Mich. App. 2003) (motorists have no Fifth Amendment privilege
to refuse to
produce their drivers license, registration, and
name and address).
Accord: State v.
App. 1995); State v. Melemai, 643 P.2d 541,
545-46 (Haw. 1982);
People v. Lucus, 243 N.E.2d
228, 230-31 (
Samuel, 277 N.E.2d
381, 386; 327 N.Y.S.2d 321,
329-330 (N.Y.
1971); Lamb v. State, 488
P.2d 1295, 1296-97 (
1971); Commonwealth v.
Long, 831 A.2d 737, 747-750 (
2003); State v. Smyth, 397
A.2d 497, 499-500 (R.I. 1979); Banks
v.
Commonwealth, 230 S.E.2d 256, 257-59 (
See also Byers v.
S.Ct. 1535, 1537-1540; 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971) (holding
that hit-and-
run statutes that require motorists to produce
identification do
not violate the Fifth Amendment).
For these reasons, the district courts judgements are
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 384