Chapter 12: Includes What?

Now, we juxtapose the sublime next to the ridiculous. In a previous chapter, the issues of statutory construction that arose from the terms "includes" and "including" were so complex, another chapter is required to revisit these terms in greater detail. Much of the debate revolves around an apparent need to adopt either an expansive or a restrictive meaning for these terms, and to stay with this choice. The restrictive meaning settles a host of problems. It confines the meaning of all defined terms to the list of items which follow the words "include", "includes" and "including". An official Treasury Decision, T.D. 3980, and numerous court decisions have reportedly sided with this restrictive school of ambiguous terminology. The Informer provides a good illustration of this school of thought by defining "includes" and "include" very simply as follows:
     ... [T]o use "includes" as defined in IRC is restrictive. 
                                    [Which One Are You?, page 20] 
     ... [I]n tax law it is defined as a word of restriction .... 
                                   [Which One Are You?, page 131] 
     In every  definition that  uses the word "include", only the 
     words that follow are defining the Term. 
                                    [Which One Are You?, page 13] 
Author Ralph Whittington cites Treasury Decision (T.D.) 3980 as his justification for joining the restrictive school. According to his reading of this T.D., the Secretary of the Treasury has adopted a restrictive meaning by stating that "includes" means to "comprise as a member", to "confine", to "comprise as the whole a part". This was the definition as found in the New Standard Dictionary at the time this T.D. was published:
     "(1) To comprise,  comprehend, or  embrace  as  a  component 
     part, item,  or member;   as,  this volume  includes all his 
     works, the bill includes his last purchase." 
     "(2) To enclose  within;   contain;  confine;  as, an oyster 
     shell sometimes includes a pearl." 
     It is defined by Webster as follows: 
     "To comprehend  or comprise,  as a genus of the species, the 
     whole a  part, an argument or reason the inference;  to take 
     or reckon  in;   to contain;    embrace;    as  this  volume 
     includes the essays to and including the tenth." 
     The Century  Dictionary  defines  "including,"  thus:    "to 
     comprise as a part." 
                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927] 
                               [Vol. 29, page 64, emphasis added] 
Authors like Whittington may have seized upon a partial reading of this T.D., in order to solve what we now know to be a source of great ambiguity in the IRC and in other United States Codes. For example, contrary to the dictionary definitions cited above, page 65 of T.D. 3980 goes on to say the following:
     Perhaps the  most lucid  statement the  books afford  on the 
     subject is  in Blanck  et al.  vs Pioneer  Mining Co. et al. 
     (Wash.;  159 Pac. 1077, 1079), namely, "the word 'including' 
     is a  term of  enlargement and not a term of limitation, and 
     necessarily  implies   that  something  is  intended  to  be 
     embraced in  the permitted  deductions  beyond  the  general 
     language  which  precedes.    But  granting  that  the  word 
     'including' is  a term  of enlargement,  it is clear that it 
     only  performs  that  office  by  introducing  the  specific 
     elements constituting  the enlargement.   It  thus, and thus 
     only, enlarges the otherwise more limited, preceding general 
     language.   *   *   *   The word  'including' introduces  an 
     enlarging definition of the preceding general words, 'actual 
     cost of  the labor,' thus of necessity excluding the idea of 
     a further  enlargement than  that furnished by the enlarging 
     clause to  introduced.   When read in its immediate context, 
     as on all authority it must be read, the word 'including' is 
     obviously used  in the  sense of its synonymous 'comprising; 
     comprehending; embracing.'" 
                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927] 
                               [Vol. 29, page 65, emphasis added] 
Now, didn't that settle the matter once and for all? Yes? No? Treasury Decision 3980 is really not all that decisive, since it obviously joins the restrictive school on one page, and then jumps ship to the expansive school on the very next page. If you are getting confused already, that's good. At least when it comes to "including", be proud of the fact you are not alone:
     This word  has received  considerable discussion in opinions 
     of the courts.  It has been productive of much controversy. 
                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927] 
                  [Vol. 29, page 64, paragraph 3, emphasis added] 
Amen to that!

One of my goals in this chapter is to demonstrate how the continuing controversy is proof that terms with a long history of semantic confusion should never be used in a Congressional statute. Such terms are proof that the statute is null and void for vagueness. The confusion we experience is inherent in the language, and no doubt deliberate, because the controversy has not exactly been a well kept national security secret.

Let us see if the Restrictive School leads to any absurd results. Reductio ad absurdum to the rescue again! Notice what results obtain for the definition of "State" as found in the 7701, the "Definitions" section of the Internal Revenue Code:

     Step 1:  Define "State" as follows: 
     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District 
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry 
     out provisions of this title. 
                                                [IRC 7701(a)(10)] 
     Step 2:  Define "United States" as follows: 
     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense 
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia. 
                                                 [IRC 7701(a)(9)] 
     Step 3:  Substitute text from one into the other: 
     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense 
     includes only  the Districts of Columbia and the District of 
     Columbia.  (Or is it the District of Columbias?) 
This is an absurd result, no? yes? none of the above? Is the definition of "United States" clarified by qualifying it with the phrase "when used in a geographical sense"? yes or no? This qualifier only makes our situation worse, because the IRC rarely if ever distinguishes Code sections which do use "United States" in a geographical sense, from Code sections which do not use it in a geographical sense. Nor does the Code tell us which sense to use as the default, that is, the intended meaning we should use when the Code does not say "in a geographical sense". Identical problems arise if we must be specific as to "where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title", as stated in 7701(a)(10). Where is it not so necessary?

The Informer's work is a good example of the confusion that reigns in this empire of verbiage. Having emphatically sided with the Restrictive School, he then goes on to define the term "States" to mean Guam, Virgin Islands and "Etc.", as follows:

     The term  "States" in  26 USC 7701(a)(9) is referring to the 
     federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, Etc., and NOT the 50 
     States of the Union. 
                                    [Which One Are You?, page 98] 
You can't have it both ways, can you? no? yes? maybe? Let us marshall some help directly from the IRC itself. Against the fierce winds of hot air emanating from the Restrictive School of Language Arts, there is a section of the IRC which does appear to evidence a contrary intent to utilize the expansive sense:
     Includes  and   Including.     The  terms   "includes"   and 
     "including" when  used in  a definition  contained  in  this 
     title shall  not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise 
     within the meaning of the term defined. 
                                    [IRC 7701(c), emphasis added] 
Perhaps we should give this school a completely different name. How about the Federal Area of Restrictive Terminology (F-A-R-T)? All in favor, say AYE! (Confusion is a gaseous state.)

Section 7701(c) utilizes the key phrase "other things", which now requires us to examine the legal meaning of things. (So, what else is new?) Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines "things" as follows:

     Things.   The objects  of dominion  or property  as  contra- 
     distinguished from "persons." Gayer v. Whelan, 138 P.2d 763, 
     768.   ... Such permanent objects, not being persons, as are 
     sensible, or perceptible through the senses. 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
This definition, in turn, requires us to examine the legal meaning of "persons" in Black's, as follows:
     Person.   In general  usage, a  human  being  (i.e.  natural 
     person),  though   by  statute   term  may   include   labor 
     organizations,  partnerships,   associations,  corporations, 
     legal representatives,  trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or 
Here, Black's Law Dictionary states that "person" by statute may include artificial persons, in addition to natural persons. How, then, does the IRC define "person"?
     Person. --  The term "person" shall be construed to mean and 
     include  an   individual,  a   trust,  estate,  partnership, 
     association, company or corporation. 
                                                 [IRC 7701(a)(1)] 
Unfortunately, the IRC does not define the term "individual", so, without resorting to the regulations in the CFR, we must again utilize a law dictionary like Black's Sixth Edition:
     Individual.  As a noun, this term denotes a single person as 
     distinguished  from   a  group  or  class,  and  also,  very 
     commonly, a  private or natural person as distinguished from 
     a partnership, corporation, or association .... 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
Therefore, "things" and "persons" must be distinguished from each other, but the term "person" is not limited to human beings because it shall be construed to mean and include an individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation. So, are we justified in making the inference that individuals, trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies and corporations are excluded from "things" as that term is used in Section 7701(c)? This author says YES. Notice also the strained grammar that is found in the phrase "shall be construed to mean and include". Why not use the simpler grammar found in the phrase "means and includes"? The answer: because the term "includes" is defined by IRC 7701(c) to be expansive, that's why! But the term "include" is not mentioned in 7701(c); therefore, it must be restrictive and is actually used as such in the IRC. Accordingly, no individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation could otherwise fall within the statutory meaning of a term explicitly defined by the IRC because, being "persons", none of these is a "thing"! Logically, then, "includes" and "including" are also restrictive when they are used in IRC definitions of "persons". Utterly amazing, yes?

Author Otto Skinner, as we already know from a previous chapter, cites Section 7701(c) of the IRC as proof that we all belong in the Expansive School of Language Science. Followers of this school argue that "includes only" should be used, and is actually used in the IRC, when a restrictive meaning is intended. In other words, "includes" and "including" are always expansive. An intent contrary to the expansive sense is evidenced by using "includes only" whenever necessary. Fine. All in favor say AYE. All opposed, jump ship. The debate is finished yes? Not so fast. Cheerleaders, put down your pom-poms. The operative concepts introduced by 7701(c) are those "things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined". Now, the 64 million dollar question is this:

     How does something join the class of things that are "within 
     the meaning  of the  term defined", if that something is not 
     enumerated in the definition? 
We can obtain some help in answering this question by referring to an older clarification of "includes" and "including" that was published in the Code of Federal Regulations in the year 1961. This clarification introduces the notion of "same general class". (So, you might be in the right school, but you may be in the wrong class. Detention after school!) This clarification reads:
     170.59    Includes and including. 
     "Includes" and  "including" shall  not be  deemed to exclude 
     things other  than those  enumerated which  are in  the same 
     general class. 
                   [26 CFR 170.59, revised as of January 1, 1961] 
In an earlier chapter, a double negative was detected in the "clarification" found at IRC 7701(c), namely, the terms "not ... exclude" are equivalent to saying "include" ("not-ex" = "in"). Two negatives make a positive. Apply this same finding to regulation 170.59 above, and you get the following:
     "Includes" and "including" shall be deemed to include things 
     other than  those enumerated  which are  in the same general 
What are those things which are "in the same general class", if they have not been enumerated in the definition? This is one of the many possible variations of the 64 million dollar question asked above. Are we any closer to an answer? yes? no? maybe? (Is this astronomy class, or basket weaving?) If a person, place or thing is not enumerated in the statutory definition of a term, is it not a violation of the rules of statutory construction to join such a person, place or thing to that definition? One of these rules is a canon called the "ejusdem generis" rule, defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, as follows:
     Under "ejusdem  generis" canon  of  statutory  construction, 
     where general  words follow  the enumeration  of  particular 
     classes of  things, the  general words  will be construed as 
     applying only  to things  of the same general class as those 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
Here the term "same general class" is used once again. One of the major points of this book is to distinguish the 50 States from the federal zone, by using the principle of territorial heterogeneity. The 50 States are in one class, because of the constitutional restraints under which Congress must operate inside those 50 States. The areas within the federal zone are in a different class, because these same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone. This may sound totally correct, in theory, but the IRC is totally mum on this issue of "general class" (because it has none). Yes, this is all the more reason why the IRC is null and void for vagueness.

This conclusion is supported by two other rules of statutory construction. The first of these is noscitur a sociis, in Latin. Black's defines this rule as follows:

     Noscitur a  sociis.   It is  known from its associates.  The 
     meaning of  a word  is or may be known from the accompanying 
     words.   Under the  doctrine of  "noscitur  a  sociis",  the 
     meaning of  questionable or  doubtful words  or phrases in a 
     statute may  be ascertained  by reference  to the meaning of 
     other words or phrases associated with it. 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
In this context, the 50 States are associated with each other by sharing their membership in the Union under the Constitution. The land areas within the federal zone are associated with each other by sharing their inclusion within the zone over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The areas inside and outside the zone are therefore dissociated from each other because of this key difference, i.e., the Union, in or out.

The second rule is inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, in Latin. Black's defines this rule as follows:

     Inclusio unius  est exclusio alterius.  The inclusion of one 
     is the exclusion of another.  The certain designation of one 
     person is  an absolute  exclusion of  all others.  ...  This 
     doctrine decrees  that where  law  expressly  describes  [a] 
     particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable 
     inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was 
     intended to be omitted or excluded. 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
Are we, or are we not, therefore, justified in drawing the following irrefutable inferences?
     Places omitted  from the  statutory definitions  of "State", 
     "States" and  "United States"  were intended  to be  omitted 
     (like California, Maine, Florida and Oregon). 
     "Include" is  omitted from  the definition of "includes" and 
     "including" because  the latter  terms were  intended to  be 
     expansive, while the former was intended to be restrictive. 
Let's dive back into the Code in order to find any help we can get on this issue. In Subtitle F, the Code contains a formal definition of "other terms" as follows:
     Other terms.  -- Any term used in this subtitle with respect 
     to the application of, or in connection with, the provisions 
     of any  other subtitle  of this  title shall  have the  same 
     meaning as in such provisions. 
                                                [IRC 7701(a)(28)] 
Let's use the rules of grammar to decompose this definition of "other terms" into two separate definitions, as follows:
     Any term  used in Subtitle F with respect to the application 
     of the  provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same 
     meaning as in such provisions. 
     Any  term   used  in  Subtitle  F  in  connection  with  the 
     provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same meaning 
     as in such provisions. 
Now, therefore, does IRC 7701(a)(28) clarify anything? For example, if there is a different definition of "State" in the provisions of some other subtitle, do we now know enough to decide whether or not:
     (1)  that  different  definition  should  be  expanded  with 
          things that  are  within  the  meaning  as  defined  at 
          7701(a)(10)?  Yes or No? 
     (2)  the definition  at 7701(a)(10)  should be expanded with 
          things that  are within  the meaning  of that different 
          definition?  Yes or No? 
     (3)  all of the above are correct? 
     (4)  none of the above is correct? 
If you are having difficulty answering these questions, don't blame yourself. With all this evidence staring you in the face, it is not difficult to argue that the confusion which you are experiencing is inherent in the statute and therefore deliberate.

To confuse our separate cheering squads even more, the word "shall" means "may". Squad leaders, let's see those pom-poms. Since this may be most difficult for many of you to swallow without convincing proof, the following court decisions leave no doubt about the legal meaning of "shall". In the decision of Cairo & Fulton R.R. Co. vs Hecht, 95 U.S. 170, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

     As against  the government  the word  "shall" when  used  in 
     statutes, is  to be  construed as  "may," unless  a contrary 
     intention is manifest. 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
Does the IRC manifest a contrary intent? In the decision of George Williams College vs Village of Williams Bay, 7 N.W.2d 891, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
     "Shall" in a statute may be construed to mean "may" in order 
     to avoid constitutional doubt. 
In the decision of Gow vs Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 Atlantic 136, that court stated:
     If necessary  to avoid  unconstitutionality  of  a  statute, 
     "shall" will be deemed equivalent to "may" .... 
Maybe we can shed some light on the overall situation by treating the terms "State" and "States" as completely different words. After all, the definition of "United States" uses the plural form twice, and there is no definition of "States" as such. Note carefully the following:
     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District 
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry 
     out provisions of this title. 
                                                [IRC 7701(a)(10)] 
     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense 
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia. 
                                                 [IRC 7701(a)(9)] 
So, can we assume that the singular form of words necessarily has a meaning that is different from the plural form of words? This might help us to distinguish the two terms "include" and "includes", since one is the singular form of the verb, while the other can be the plural form of the verb. For example, the sentence "It includes ..." has a singular subject and a singular predicate. The sentence "They include ..." has a plural subject and a plural predicate, but the sentence "I include ..." has a singular subject and predicate. What if "include" is used as an infinitive, rather than a predicate? Recall that the "clarification" at IRC 7701(c) contains explicit references to "includes" and "including", but not to the word "include". Does this therefore provide us with a definitive reason for deciding that the term "include" is restrictive, while the terms "includes" and "including" are expansive? Some people, including this author, are completely satisfied that it does (but not all people are so satisfied). What if these latter terms are used in the restrictive sense of "includes only" or "including only"? Are you getting even more confused now? Welcome to the state of confusion (surely a gaseous state). Recall once again the definition of "State" at 7701(a)(10):
     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District 
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry 
     out provisions of this title. 
Now recall the definition of "United States" at 7701(a)(9): 
     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense 
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia. 
                                                 [IRC 7701(a)(9)] 
Title 1  and the  Code of Federal Regulations come to the rescue. 
Plural forms and singular forms are interchangeable: 
     170.60    Inclusive language. 
     Words in the plural form shall include the singular and vice 
     versa, and  words in  the masculine gender shall include the 
     feminine  as   well  as   trusts,   estates,   partnerships, 
     associations, companies, and corporations. 
                   [26 CFR 170.60, revised as of January 1, 1961] 
Now, doesn't that really clarify everything? If "includes" is singular and "include" is plural, using the above rule for "inclusive language", the term "include" includes "includes". Wait, didn't we already make this remarkable discovery in a previous chapter? Answer: No, in that chapter, we discovered that "includes" includes "include". But, now we have conflicting results. Didn't we just prove that one is restrictive and the other is expansive? What gives? Remember, also, that "shall" means "may". Therefore, our rule for "inclusive language" from the CFR can now be rewritten to say that "words in the plural form MAY include the singular" (and may NOT, depending on whether it is a week from Tuesday). If this is Tuesday, then we must be in Belgium. At least one major mystery is now solved.

Does the Code of Federal Regulations clarify any of the definitions found in section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code? The following table lists the headings of corresponding sections from the CFR, beginning at 26 CFR 301.7701-1:

     301.7701-1     Classification of organizations for tax 
     301.7701-2     Associations 
     301.7701-3     Partnerships 
     301.7701-4     Trusts 
     301.7701-5     Domestic, foreign, resident, and nonresident 
     301.7701-6     Fiduciary 
     301.7701-7     Fiduciary distinguished from agent 
     301.7701-8     Military or naval forces and Armed Forces of 
                    the United States 
     301.7701-9     Secretary or his delegate 
     301.7701-10    District director 
     301.7701-11    Social security number 
     301.7701-12    Employer identification number 
     301.7701-13    Pre-1970 domestic building and loan 
     301.7701-13A   Post-1970 domestic building and loan 
     301.7701-14    Cooperative bank 
     301.7701-15    Income tax return preparer 
     301.7701-16    Other terms 
     301.7701-17T   Collective-bargaining plans and agreements 
                                [26 CFR 301.7701-1 thru 7701-17T] 
This list contains such essential topics as trusts, associations, cooperative banks, and pre- and post-1970 domestic building and loan associations. In fact, there are numerous pages dedicated to these building and loan associations. However, the reader reaches the end of the list without finding any reference to "State" or "United States". Instead, the following regulation is found near the end of the list:
     301.7701-16  Other terms. 
     For a definition of the term "withholding agent" see section 
     1.1441-7(a).   Any other  terms that  are defined in section 
     7701 and  that are  not defined  in sections  301.7701-1  to 
     301.7701-15, inclusive,  shall, when  used in  this chapter, 
     have the meanings assigned to them in section 7701. 
                                             [26 CFR 301.7701-16] 
Like it or not, we are right back where we started, in IRC Section 7701, the "definitions" section of that Code, where "other terms" are defined differently. You may pass "GO" again, but do not collect 200 dollars. You must pay the bank instead! (Try changing that rule the next time you play Monopoly. The Monopoly bank will, of course, end up owning everything in sight.) You are also free to search some 6,000 pages of additional regulations to determine if the fluctuating definitions of the terms "State" and "United States" are clarified anywhere else in the Code of Federal Regulations. Happy hunting!

The only way out of this swamp is to rely on something other than the murky gyrations of conflicting, mutually destructive semantic mishmash. That something is The Fundamental Law: Congress can only tax the Citizens of foreign States under special and limited circumstances. Congress can only levy a direct tax on Citizens of the 50 States if that tax is duly apportioned. Congress can only levy an indirect tax on Citizens of the 50 States if that tax is uniform. These are the chains of the Constitution. Read Thomas Jefferson.

The historical record documents undeniable proof that the confusion, ambiguity and jurisdictional deceptions now built into the IRC were deliberate. This historical record provides the "smoking gun" that proves the real intent was deception. The first Internal Revenue Code was Title 35 of the Revised Statutes of June 22, 1874. On December 5, 1898, Mr. Justice Cox of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia delivered an address before the Columbia Historical Society. In this address, he discussed the history of the District of Columbia as follows:

          In  June  1866,  an  act  was  passed  authorizing  the 
     President to appoint three commissioners to revise and bring 
     together all  the statutes ....  [T]he act does not seem, in 
     terms, to  allude to  the District  of Columbia,  or even to 
     embrace it  ....  Without having any express authority to do 
     so, they made a separate revision and collection of the acts 
     of Congress relating to the District, besides the collection 
     of general  statutes relating  to the  whole United  States. 
     Each collection was reported to Congress, to be approved and 
     enacted into  law ....   [T]he  whole is enacted into law as 
     the body  of the statute law of the United States, under the 
     title of Revised Statutes as of 22 June 1874. ... 
          [T]he general  collection might  perhaps be considered, 
     in a  limited sense  as a  code for the United States, as it 
     embraced all  the laws  affecting the  whole  United  States 
     within  the   constitutional  legislative   jurisdiction  of 
     Congress, but there could be no complete code for the entire 
     United States, because the subjects which would be proper to 
     be regulated  by a  code in  the States are entirely outside 
     the legislative authority of Congress. 
                  [District of Columbia Code, Historical Section] 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
More than half a century later, the deliberate confusion and ambiguity were problems that not only persisted; they were getting worse by the minute. In the year 1944, during Roosevelt's administration, Senator Barkley made a speech from the floor of the House of Representatives in which he complained:
     Congress is  to blame  for these complexities to the extent, 
     and only to the extent, to which it has accepted the advice, 
     the  recommendations,  and  the  language  of  the  Treasury 
     Department, through its so-called experts who have sat in on 
     the passage  of every  tax measure  since  I  can  remember. 
     Every member  of the  House Ways  and  Means  Committee  and 
     member of the Senate Finance Committee knows that every time 
     we have  undertaken to  write a  new tax bill in the last 10 
     years we  have started  out with  the  universal  desire  to 
     simplify the  tax laws and the forms through which taxes are 
     collected.   We have attempted to adopt policies which would 
     simplify them.   When we have agreed upon a policy,  we have 
     submitted that  policy to  the Treasury  Department to write 
     the appropriate  language to  carry out  that policy;    and 
     frequently the Treasury Department, through its experts, has 
     brought back  language so complicated and circumambient that 
     neither Solomon  nor all  the wise  men of  the  East  could 
     understand it or interpret it. 
               [Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session] 
               [Vol. 90, Part 2, February 23, 1944, pages 1964-5] 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
You have, no doubt, heard that ignorance of the law is no excuse for violating the law. This principle is explicitly stated in the case law which defines the legal force and effect of administrative regulations. But, ambiguity and deception in the law are an excuse, and the ambiguity in the IRC is a major cause of our ignorance. Moreover, this principle applies as well to ambiguity and deception in the case law. Lack of specificity leads to uncertainty, which leads in turn to court decisions which are also void for vagueness. The 6th Amendment guarantees our right to ignore vague and ambiguous laws, and this must be extended to vague and ambiguous case law. In light of their enormous influence in laying the foundations for territorial heterogeneity and a legislative democracy for the federal zone, The Insular Cases have been justly criticized, by peers, for lacking the minimum judicial precision required in such cases:
          The Absence  of  Judicial  Precision.  --  Whether  the 
     decisions in  the Insular  Cases are  considered correct  or 
     incorrect, it  seems generally  admitted that  the  opinions 
     rendered  are  deficient  in  clearness  and  in  precision, 
     elements  most   essential  in  cases  of  such  importance. 
     Elaborate discussions  and irreconcilable  differences  upon 
     general principles,  and upon  fascinating  and  fundamental 
     problems suggested  by  equally  indiscriminating  dicta  in 
     other cases,  complicate, where they do not hide, the points 
     at issue.   It  is extremely  difficult to determine exactly 
     what has been decided;  the position of the court in similar 
     cases arising in the future, or still pending, is entirely a 
     matter of conjecture.  ... 
          It is  still more  to be  regretted that the defects in 
     the decision  under discussion  are by no means exceptional. 
     From our  system of  allowing judges to express opinion upon 
     general principles  and of following judicial precedent, two 
     evils almost  inevitably result:   our books are overcrowded 
     with dicta,  while dictum  is frequently taken for decision. 
     Since  the  questions  involved  are  both  fundamental  and 
     political, in  constitutional cases  more than in any others 
     the  temptation  to digress,  necessarily strong,  is seldom 
     resisted;   at the  same time it is strikingly difficult, in 
     these  cases,   to  distinguish   between  decision,   ratio 
     decidendi, and  dictum.   Yet because the questions involved 
     are both extensive and political, and because the evils of a 
     dictum or of an ill-considered decision are of corresponding 
     importance,   a    precise   analysis,   with   a   thorough 
     consideration  of   the  questions   raised,  and  of  those 
     questions only,  is imperative.   The  continued absence  of 
     judicial precision may possibly become a matter of political 
     importance;   for opinions  such as those rendered cannot be 
     allowed a permanent place in our system of government. 
                                      [15 Harvard Law Review 220] 
The average American cannot be expected to have the skill required to navigate the journey we just took through the verbal swamp that is the Internal Revenue Code, nor does the average American have the time required to make such a journey. Chicanery does not make good law. The rules of statutory construction fully support this unavoidable conclusion:
     ... [I]f  it is  intended that  regulations  will  be  of  a 
     specific and  definitive nature  then it  will be clear that 
     the only  safe method  of interpretation  will be  one  that 
     "shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to 
     suppress subtle  inventions and evasions for the continuance 
     of the mischief ...." 
       [Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G. Sutherland] 
           [3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)] 
The Supreme Court has also agreed, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
     ... [K]eeping in mind the well settled rule that the citizen 
     is exempt  from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear 
     and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of 
     a tax  law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor 
     of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid. 
                         [Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. vs McLain] 
                            [192 U.S. 397 (1903), emphasis added] 
     In the  interpretation of  statutes levying  taxes it is the 
     established  rule   not  to   extend  their  provisions,  by 
     implication, beyond  the clear  import of the language used, 
     or to  enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not 
     specifically pointed  out.    In  case  of  doubt  they  are 
     construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor 
     of the citizen. 
                     [United States vs Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369] 
                                                 [emphasis added] 
On what basis, then, should the Internal Revenue Service be allowed to extend the provisions of the IRC beyond the clear import of the language used? On what basis can the IRS act when that language has no clear import? On what basis is the IRS justified in enlarging their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out? The answer is tyranny. The "golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing up the neighborhood to fetch the gold. What a service!

Consider for a moment the sheer size of the class of people now affected by the fraudulent 16th Amendment. First of all, take into account all those Americans who have passed away, but who paid taxes into the Treasury after the year 1913. How many of those correctly understood all the rules, when people like Frank R. Brushaber were confused as early as 1914? Add to that number all those Americans who are still alive today and who have paid taxes to the IRS because they thought there was a law, and they thought that law was the 16th Amendment. After all, they were told as much by numerous federal officials and possibly also their parents, friends, relatives, school teachers, scout masters and colleagues. Don't high school civics classes now spend a lot of time teaching students how to complete IRS 1040 forms and schedules, instead of teaching the Constitution?

Donald C. Alexander, when he was Commissioner of Internal Revenue, published an official statement in the Federal Register that the 16th Amendment was the federal government's general authority to tax the incomes of individuals and corporations (see Chapter 1 and Appendix J). Sorry, Donald, you were wrong. At this point in time, it is impossible for us to determine whether you were lying, or whether you too were a victim of the fraud. Just how many people are in the same general class of those affected by the fraudulent 16th Amendment? Is it 200 million? Is it 300 million? Whatever it is, it just boggles the imagination. It certainly does involve a very large number of federal employees who went to work for Uncle Sam in good faith.

It is clear, there is a huge difference between the area covered by the federal zone, and the area covered by the 50 States. Money is a powerful motivation for all of us. Congress had literally trillions of dollars to gain by convincing most Americans they were inside its revenue base when, in fact, most Americans were outside its revenue base, and remain outside even today. This is deception on a grand scale, and the proof of this deception is found in the statute itself. It is no wonder why public relations "officials" of the IRS cringe in fear when dedicated Patriots like Godfrey Lehman admit, out loud and in person, that he has read the law. It is quite stunning how the carefully crafted definitions of "United States" do appear to unlock a statute that is horribly complex and deliberately so. As fate would have it, these carefully crafted definitions also expose perhaps the greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any people at any time in the history of the world. It is now time for a shift in the wind.

[ Next | Prev |Contents ]