Appendix Y: Memoranda of Law

Author's Note:

These Memoranda of Law have been adapted and updated from the files FMEMOLAW and 9THAPPEA on Richard McDonald's electronic bulletin board system (BBS). See references to MEMOLAW and FMEMOLAW in Chapter 11.

Richard McDonald has given his generous permission to publish the following versions of these documents as another Appendix in the third and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone.

Editing, minor additions and grammatical clarifications were done by Mitch Modeleski, also with Richard McDonald's approval.




                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF ______________________



                                 )    NOTICE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION

        Plaintiff                )

                                 )                AND


        vs                       )         DEMAND FOR HEARING


                                 )           TO ORDER PROOF

        Defendant/Citizen        )

                                 )           OF JURISDICTION







             PLEASE TAKE  NOTICE that a hearing has been requested by the

        Accused Common-Law  Citizen [DEFENDANT]  to  take  place  on  the

        ________ day of ___________________, 1993, at _____________ hours

        in Courtroom  _______, of  the above  entitled Court  located  at




             1.   This  hearing   has  been  called  to  resolve  certain

        conclusions of law which are in controversy.  The demand for this

        hearing constitutes  a direct  challenge to  the jurisdiction  of

        this Court  in the  instant matter  at bar.   The accused Citizen

        [DEFENDANT] is aware that he has been compelled to participate in

        this action  under threat  of arrest and incarceration, should he

        fail to appear when ordered to do so.


             2.   The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court is not in

        question here.   Rather, because the matter is criminal in nature

        and involves  a compelled  performance  to  what  is  essentially

        derived  from  Roman  Civil  (Administrative)  Law,  the  Accused

        herewith challenges  the In  Personam jurisdiction of this Court.

        The Accused  does so  on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed

        to provide  an offer  of proof that the Accused is subject to the

        legislative equity  jurisdiction in  which this  Court intends to

        sit to  hear and determine only the facts of this matter, and not

        the law, arising from a "Bill of Pains and Penalties".


             3.   It is well known that jurisdiction may be challenged at

        any time  as an  issue of  law because,  absent jurisdiction, all

        acts undertaken  under the color of statute or under the color of

        ordinance are null and void ab initio (from their inception).


             4.   Because the  Accused was  compelled,  under  threat  of

        further damage  and injury, to enter this Court to demand relief,

        this appearance is SPECIAL, and not general in nature.


             5.   The argument which follows sets forth the nature of the

        controversy "At  Law".  This Court is bound by its oath of office

        to  sit  on  the  Law  side  of  its  jurisdiction  to  hear  the

        controversy in  a  neutral  capacity  and  to  make  a  fair  and

        impartial determination.


             6.   This document,  and the  argument contained  herein, is

        intended to  be the  basis for  further action  on appeal, should

        this Court  fail to  afford a  complete hearing on the law of the

        matter at  the noticed  request of  the Accused.   Furthermore, a

        failure of this Court to seat on the Law side of its jurisdiction

        to determine  this timely question will give the Accused cause to

        file for a Writ of Prohibition in a higher Court.






             1.   The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)

        is the  supreme law  of the  land.   The Constitution of State of

        California must  be construed  in harmony with the supreme law of

        the land;   otherwise,  the State  of California has violated its

        solemn contract  with the  Union of  States known  as the  United

        States of  America, and  the question  raised herein  becomes one

        which is a proper original action before the Supreme Court of the

        United States, sitting in an Article 3 capacity.


             2.   An  employee   of  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  has

        submitted allegations  in what  amounts to  a "Bill  of Pains and

        Penalties" alleging  that I,  [DEFENDANT], have somehow failed to

        perform according  to the  terms of  some agreement  for specific

        performance on my part.


             3.   By submitting  this Bill  of Pains  and Penalties,  the

        individual in  question   has accused  [DEFENDANT] of  failing to

        perform specifically  to some  legislative statute which is being

        presented as  evidence of  the law.  Statutes are not laws;  they

        are administrative  regulations which  are civil  in nature, even

        when they  carry sanctions  of a criminal nature, unless there is

        an injured party who is brought forward as a corpus delicti.


             4.   Thus, because  of this  unsupported conclusion  of law,

        and because  the Internal  Revenue Service  has  administratively

        decided that  the Accused is subject to the statutes in question,

        the Accused  Citizen holds  that a  contrary  conclusion  of  law

        exists to  challenge the  jurisdiction of this Court.  Therefore,

        this Court must now sit in a neutral position, on the Law side of

        its  jurisdiction,   to  hear   and  resolve   the  question   of

        controversial positions of law as they affect its jurisdiction or

        lack of jurisdiction In Personam.

             5.   This argument  is intended  to serve  as both a defense

        "At Law"  in this  Court, and  as the  basis of  future  actions,

        should it  become necessary to appeal the question presented to a

        higher judicial authority.



             6.   If the Accused Citizen is correct, and if this Court is

        sitting to hear the violation of a regulatory statute, then it is

        possible that  the judges  of this Court, in hearing this matter,

        are acting  in an  administrative capacity rather than a judicial

        capacity.   This issue  is discussed  in detail  in the  argument

        which follows.



             7.   This Court is placed on NOTICE that, if it fails to sit

        and hear  this issue "At Law" upon a timely request, then you may

        have violated  your oath  of office  to  uphold  and  defend  the

        Constitutions of  the United  States of  America (1787)  and  the

        California Republic  (1849).  Such an act will serve to place you

        and the  other parties  to  this  action  outside  the  realm  of

        judicial immunity  and subject  to future  action by this Accused

        California  Citizen.     The   Prosecutor  in   this  action   is

        specifically placed  on NOTICE  that s/he  carries  no  shirttail

        immunity should  s/he continue  to prosecute, in the absence of a

        determination "At  Law" of  the question  presented herein before






             8.   In 1849, California became one of the several States of

        the Union  of States  known as  the  United  States  of  America.

        California is  a "Common Law" State, meaning that the Common Law,

        as derived  from the  common law of England, is a recognized form

        of law in the State of California.



             9.   Article 3  of the  Constitution of the United States of

        America gives  "judicial" power to the various courts, among them

        the District  Courts.   What is  not generally recognized is that

        the District  Courts may seat in different jurisdictions.  Judges

        may wear  different hats, so to speak, depending on the nature of

        the case brought before them.



             10.  This Court  may sit  "At Law"  to hear crimes and civil

        complaints involving  a damage  or injury which is unlawful under

        the Common Law of a State;  or it may seat in equity to determine

        specific performance  to a contract in equity.  Alternatively, as

        a creation  of the  foreign Corporate  State, this Court may seat

        administratively in  a fiction  which may  be termed "legislative

        equity", under  authority to  regulate activities  not of  common

        right, such  as commerce for profit and gain, or other privileged



             11.  The Internal  Revenue Code  is  essentially  a  "civil,

        regulatory statute" which was enacted in 1939 to tax and regulate

        employees of  the Federal  Government and "citizens of the United

        States" (i.e.,  of the  District of  Columbia), and  to set forth

        rules and  regulations for  the production  of  revenue  for  the

        "United States", as defined in the U.S. Constitution.


             12.  It is  an unlawful  abuse of  procedure  to  use  civil

        statutes  as   "evidence  of  the  law"  in  a  criminal  matter,

        particularly when  a United States Code has not been enacted into

        positive law (see, specifically, 26 U.S.C. 7851(a)(6)(A)).


             13.  Both civil  and criminal  matters "At Law" require that

        the complaining  party be  a victim  of some recognizable damage.

        The "Law" cannot recognize a "crime" unless there is a victim who

        properly claims to have been damaged or injured.


             14.  Regulatory statutes,  on the  other hand,  are  enacted

        under the  police power  of  State  and  Federal  Governments  to

        regulate activities  not of  common right.   All  statute law  is

        inferior to,  and bound by, the restrictions of the Constitution.

        These "regulatory"  statutes operate  as "law" on the subjects of

        those statutes,  and violations may carry sanctions of a criminal

        nature, even in the absence of a victim or injury.


             15.  A self-evident truth which distinguishes "crimes" under

        the Law,  from "offenses  of a  criminal nature" under regulatory

        statutes,  is   the  difference  between  Rights  afforded  to  a

        defendant in  a criminal  proceeding, and "rights" available to a

        defendant under "due process" in a statutory proceeding.


             16.  In the  case of  true crimes  "At Law",  the Common-Law

        Citizen  [DEFENDANT]   enjoys  all   his  fundamental  rights  as

        guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, including both

        "substantive" and  "procedural" due  process.   In contrast, when

        regulatory offenses  "of a  criminal nature"  are  involved,  the

        statutory defendant  cannot demand  constitutional rights,  since

        only certain  "civil rights"  have been granted in these actions,

        and only  "procedural due process", consisting of the right to be

        heard on  the facts alone, is allowed.  Constitutional rights and

        substantive due  process are  noticeably absent.   Therefore, the

        Court must be seated in some jurisdiction other than "At Law", in

        order to hear an alleged violation of a regulatory statute.


             17.  The  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT],  hereby

        places all  parties and  the Court  on NOTICE,  that he  is not a

        "citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th

        Amendment, i.e., a juristic person or a franchised person who can

        be compelled  to perform  under the  regulatory Internal  Revenue

        Code, which is civil in nature.  Moreover, the Accused Common-Law

        Citizen   [DEFENDANT]   hereby   challenges   the   In   Personam

        jurisdiction of  the Court  with this contrary conclusion of law.

        This Court  is now  mandated to  seat on  the  Law  side  of  its

        capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused Citizen.

             18.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  contends

        that the  Internal Revenue Service made a false conclusion of law

        in an  administrative capacity  when it first brought this action

        before the  Court, and  in so doing failed to impart jurisdiction

        upon this Court to seat and hear this matter in a jurisdiction of

        legislative equity.


             19.  The Accused  Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] now demands

        that the  attorney for  the Plaintiff in this matter step forward

        with an  offer of  proof  that  the  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen

        [DEFENDANT], has  lost his  status as a Common-Law Citizen of the

        California Republic,  and is  now a  "resident" of this State who

        can be  compelled to perform to the letter of every civil statute

        because he  is either  an immigrant  alien, a  statutory resident

        (14th Amendment  citizen), a juristic person (corporation), or an

        enfranchised person  (i.e., one  who has knowingly, willingly and

        voluntarily entered  into an  agreement for  the  exercise  of  a

        privilege or  the receipt  of a  benefit and  for  the  attendant

        considerations carried  with  the  grant  of  that  privilege  or



             20.  Once jurisdiction is challenged, this Court must sit on

        the Law  side of its jurisdiction as a neutral arbitrator, before

        the allegations  of statutory wrongdoing can proceed.  Failure to

        do so  may subject  the judge of this Court to charges of perjury

        for violating  the oath  of office  by  refusing  to  uphold  and

        protect the  rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitutions

        of the California Republic and of the United States of America.


             21.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  requests

        that this  Court take  judicial notice that he has been compelled

        to enter  this Court  to answer the allegation, and contends that

        the allegations  are founded  upon false conclusions of law.  The

        Memorandum of  Law which  follows will  set forth the position of

        the Accused  Common-Law Citizen  [DEFENDANT], and the record will

        show that  no evidence is before this Court which contradicts the

        position of  Citizen [DEFENDANT],  except a  mere fiction of law.

        This fiction  of law  cannot stand  in the  face of  a clear  and

        direct challenge.



        Dated                , 1993



        Respectfully submitted

        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights

        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,





        Citizen of the California Republic

        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris


                                MEMORANDUM OF LAW


                              CLASSES OF CITIZENSHIP


             1.   The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America

        recognizes several  classes of  people who exist in this Union of

        States, as described in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 (1:2:3).


             2.   This Court is herewith mandated to take judicial notice

        of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the

        Constitution of the California Republic, the Statutes at Large of

        the United  States of America, and all case law presented herein,

        pursuant to  the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 201, et seq.,

        and Article  4, Section 1 (4:1) of the Constitution of the United

        States of America (1787).


             3.   Excluding "Indians not taxed", since they are not under

        consideration in  this matter, we are left with two other classes

        of individuals defined in 1:2:3 of the U.S. Constitution, to wit:

        "free Persons" and "three-fifths of all other Persons".


             4.   The term  "three fifths  of all other Persons" referred

        to the  Black slave population and all others of races other than

        "white" who  could not and did not have Common-Law Citizenship of

        one of  the several  States, at  the time  the  Constitution  was

        adopted.   (For an  in-depth analysis of this fact, see the cases

        of Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393;  U.S. vs Rhodes, 1 Abbott

        39;   Slaughter House  Cases, 16  Wall. 74;   Van  Valkenburg  vs

        Brown, 43  Cal. 43;   U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649;  and K.

        Tashiro vs Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; et al.)


             5.   The  Thirteenth   Amendment,  officially  and  lawfully

        ratified in  1865, served  only to  abolish  slavery  within  the

        corporate United States.  No race other than the white race could

        claim Common-Law  Citizenship of one of the several States, which

        Citizenship was  afforded the  protection of  the  Constitutions.

        (This is discussed in depth in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra).


             6.   Further proof  that this  argument applies to the State

        of California  is found  in Article  2, Section 1 of the Original

        California Constitution (1849) which states in part: "Every WHITE

        male Citizen  of the  United States, and every WHITE male citizen

        of Mexico  ..."   [emphasis added].   Obviously,  this  provision

        excluded all  other  races  from  being  Common-Law  Citizens  of

        California and  from having  the full protection of the State and

        Federal Constitutions.   This was the case even before the famous

        Dred Scott  decision.   It is  most notable  that the  California

        Constitution was altered after the so-called 14th Amendment so as

        to delete  all references  to "white" male Citizens, and today it

        refers only to "persons".


             7.   Following the  decision in  Dred Scott, supra, Congress

        allegedly enacted  and ratified  the so-called  14th Amendment to

        the Constitution  of the  United  States  of  America  to  afford

        "statutory citizenship"  status to those who were deemed excluded

        from  this   Common-Law  status   under   the   Supreme   Court's

        interpretations of  the Constitution.    This  event  unfolds  in

        detail in  the case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments,

        with a  very significant  difference which is of great importance

        to the instant matter.


             8.   Such  cases   as  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  supra;

        Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78;  K. Tashiro vs Jordan, supra;

        among many  others, all  declared that under the Law, "there is a

        clear distinction  between a  Citizen of a State and a citizen of

        the United States".


             9.   A famous  French statesman,  Fredrick Bastiat, noted in

        the early 1800's that if freedom were to be destroyed in America,

        it would result from the question of slavery and from the failure

        to equate  all races  and all humans as "equals".  The Accused is

        not responsible  for the  errors of  the past  and elects  not to

        dwell at  length on  this subject.   However,  the so-called 14th

        Amendment must  now be  discussed and,  as abhorrent  as  it  may

        sound, it  is a  matter of fact and law that this is the position

        (intentional or  unintentional) which  forms the basis of the law

        with which we live today.


             10.  In brief,  as a  result of the 13th Amendment, the U.S.

        Supreme Court  decided that  the Union  of States  known  as  the

        United States  of America  was founded  by "white" people and for

        "white" people,  and only  "white" people could enjoy the Rights,

        Privileges and  Immunities afforded  and protected by the Federal

        and State  Constitutions.  This fact is most eloquently set forth

        in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra, in stating that "... if a black

        nation were  to adopt  our Constitution verbatim, they would have

        the absolute  right to  restrict the right of citizenship only to

        the black population if they chose to do so ...."


             11.  To overcome  the decision  in Dred  Scott,  supra,  the

        so-called 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

        of America  was allegedly  ratified "at  the point of a bayonet",

        and was  "declared" to  be a part of the Constitution in the year

        1868.  However, an examination of the ratification by the several

        States shows that various improper proceedings occurred which, in

        effect, nullify  the Amendment.   "I  cannot believe    that  any

        court, in  full possession of its faculties, could honestly  hold

        that the  amendment was properly approved and adopted."  State vs

        Phillips, 540  P.2d. 936  (1975);   see also Dyett vs Turner, 439

        P.2d. 266 (1968).


             12.  Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] will not digress

        into an  in-depth dissertation  of the  bogus ratification of the

        so-called 14th  Amendment, because the only necessary point to be

        made is  that the  so-called 14th Amendment had a profound effect

        upon the  Union of these United States, and this effect continues

        to the present time.


             13.  The Original  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of

        America (1787)  refers to  Common-Law  Citizens  of  the  several

        States in  the Preamble,  in  Article  4,  Section  2,  Clause  1

        (4:2:1), and  in numerous  other sections.     Always,  the  word

        Citizen is  spelled with an upper-case "C" when referring to this

        class of  Common-Law Citizen as a "Citizen of the United States",

        i.e., as a "Citizen of one of the United States".


             14.  In contrast,  the so-called  14th Amendment  utilizes a

        lower-case "c" to distinguish this class of citizens whose status

        makes them  "subject to  the jurisdiction thereof" as a statutory

        "citizen of the United States".


             15.  In the  law, each  word  and  each  use  of  the  word,

        including its capitalization or the lack of capitalization, has a

        distinctive legal  meaning.   In this  case, there  never was the

        specific status  of a  "citizen of  the United  States" until the

        advent of  the 1866  Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27) which was the

        forerunner of  the so-called  14th  Amendment.    (See  Ex  Parte

        Knowles, 5  Cal. 300.   The  definition of the "United States" is

        discussed in the next section of this Memorandum.)


             16.  Before the  so-called 14th Amendment was declared to be

        a part  of the  U.S. Constitution,  there were  a number of State

        "residents" who  could not  enjoy "Common-Law Citizenship" in one

        of the  several States under that Constitution, because they were

        not "white".   The  effect of the so-called 14th Amendment was to

        give to  all those  residents a  citizenship in  the nation-state

        that was  created by  Congress in  the year  1801 and  named  the

        "United States".  (See 2 Stat. 103;  see also U.S. vs Eliason, 41

        U.S. 291,  16 Peter  291, 10  L.Ed. 968;  U.S. vs Simms, 1 Cranch

        255, 256  (1803).)  The original Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not

        encompassing enough,  so it  was expanded  in the year 1964;  but

        the legal  effect was  the same, namely, to grant to "citizens of

        the United  States" the equivalent rights of the Common-Law white

        Citizens of  the several  States.   In  reality,  however,  those

        "equivalent rights"  are limited  by various  statutes, codes and

        regulations and can be changed at the whim of Congress.


             17.  Under the  Federal and State Constitutions, "... We the

        People" did  not surrender  our individual  sovereignty to either

        the State  or Federal  Government.   Powers  "delegated"  do  not

        equate to  powers  surrendered.    This  is  a  Republic,  not  a

        democracy, and  the majority  cannot impose  its  will  upon  the

        minority simply  because some  "law" is  already set  forth.  Any

        individual can  do anything he or she wishes to do, so long as it

        does not  damage, injure  or impair  the same  Right  of  another

        individual.  The concept of a corpus delicti is relevant here, in

        order to prove some "crime" or civil damage.


             18.  The case  law surrounding  the 13th and 14th Amendments

        all rings  with the  same message:   "These  amendments  did  not

        change the status of Common-Law Citizenship of the white Citizens

        of one of the several States of the Union" (now 50 in number).


             19.  This goes to the crux of the controversy because, under

        the so-called  14th Amendment, citizenship is a privilege and not

        a "Right".   (See  American and  Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1 Pet.

        511;  Cook vs Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).)


             20.  It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment

        to change  the status  of the  Common-Law Citizens of the several

        States.   (See People  vs Washington,  36  C.  658,  661  (1869);

        French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L.Ed. 297).


             21.  However, over  the years,  the so-called 14th Amendment

        has been used to create a fiction and to destroy American freedom

        through administrative  regulation.   How is  this possible?  The

        answer is self-evident to anyone who understands the law, namely,

        a "privilege"  is   regulatable  to  any  degree,  including  the

        alteration and even the revocation of that privilege.


             22.  Since the  statutory status  of "citizen  of the United

        States, subject  to the  jurisdiction thereof" (1866 Civil Rights

        Act) is  one of  privilege  and  not  of  Right,  and  since  the

        so-called 14th  Amendment mandates  that both  Congress  and  the

        several States  take measures  to protect  these new  "subjects",

        then both  the Federal  and State  governments  are  mandated  to

        protect the  privileges and immunities of ONLY these "citizens of

        the United States".  (See Hale vs Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).


             23.  Of course,  the amount  of protection  afforded  has  a

        price to  pay, but  the important fact is that the "privilege" of

        citizenship under  the so-called  14th Amendment can be regulated

        or revoked  because it  is a  "privilege" and not a RIGHT.  It is

        here that  the basic,  fundamental concept  of  "self-government"

        turns into a King "governing his subjects".


             24.  One can  be called a "freeman", but that was a title of

        nobility granted  by the  King.   To be really free encompasses a

        great deal more than grants of titles and privileges.


             25.  Over the  years since  1787,  because  our  forefathers

        would have  rather fought  than bow to involuntary servitude, the

        "powers that  be" have  slowly and  carefully used  the so-called

        14th Amendment and the Social Security Act to force primary State

        Citizenship into  relative extinction, in the eyes of the courts.

        Nevertheless, this  class of  Common-Law Citizens  is not extinct

        yet;   it is  simply being  ignored, in  order  to  maintain  and

        enlarge a revenue base for Congress.


             26.  Since the  State of California has been mandated by the

        14th Amendment  to protect  the statutory "citizens of the United

        States", and since the People in general have been falsely led to

        obtain "Social Security Numbers" as "U.S. citizens", the State of

        California under prompting by the Federal Government has used the

        licensing and  registration of  vehicles  and  people  under  the

        "equal protection"  clause for the "Public Welfare" to perpetuate

        a scheme  of revenue enhancement and regulation.  This scheme has

        been implemented,  in part,  by promoting  the fiction  that  the

        Common-Law "Citizens  of a  State of the Union of several States"

        can be regulated to the same degree as statutory "citizens of the

        United States".


             27.  I,  [DEFENDANT],   contend  that   both  the  State  of

        California and  the Federal  Government  (known  as  the  "United

        States") are  committing an  act of  GENOCIDE upon the Common-Law

        State  Citizens   of  the  several  States  by  perpetrating  and

        perpetuating the  "fiction of  law" that  everyone is a statutory

        "citizen of the United States".


             This allegation is now discussed by proving exactly what the

        "United States" means and in what capacity it now operates.



                          WHAT IS THE "UNITED STATES"?


             28.  As we  begin, it  must be  noted that  this  Common-Law

        Citizen alleges  "fraud" by  the State and Federal Governments in

        their failure  to inform  the people  that they  are all included

        (through the  use of a fiction of law) in that statutory class of

        persons called "citizens of the United States".


             29.  The  use   of  this  fiction  of  law  is  particularly

        abhorrent in  view of  the fact that, when arbitrarily applied to

        everyone, the  States  lose  their  sovereignty,  the  Common-Law

        Citizens of  the State  lose their  fundamental rights,  and  the

        "citizens  of  the  United  States"  lose  the  guidelines  which

        established their  "civil rights".   The net effect is that these

        actions have lowered everyone's status to that of a "subject".


             30.  There is  a clear  distinction between  the meanings of

        "United States"  and "United  States of  America".  The people of

        America have  been fraudulently  and purposely  misled to believe

        that these terms are completely synonymous in every context.


             31.  In fact,  in Law  the term  "United States  of America"

        refers to  the several  States which are "united by and under the

        Constitution";     the  term   "United  States"  refers  to  that

        geographical area  defined in  Article 1,  Section 8,  Clause  17

        (1:8:17) and  in Article  4, Section  3, Clause  2 (4:3:2) of the

        Federal Constitution.


             32.  In  1802,   the  "Congress  Assembled"  incorporated  a

        geographical area  known as  the "United  States".   The  "United

        States" is,  therefore, a  nation-state  which  is  separate  and

        unique unto itself.  Furthermore, even though the "United States"

        is not  a member  of the "Union of States united by and under the

        Constitution", it  is bound  by that Constitution to restrict its

        activities in  dealing with  the  several  States  and  with  the

        Common-Law Citizens  of those  States.  Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of

        the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Congress

        has exclusive  power to legislate and regulate the inhabitants of

        its geographical territory and its statutory "citizens" under the

        so-called 14th  Amendment, wherever  they are "resident", even if

        they do inhabit one of the 50 States of the Union.


             33.  The term  "United States"  has always  referred to  the

        "Congress Assembled",  or to  those geographical areas defined in

        1:8:17 and  4:3:2 in  the U.S.  Constitution.   The proof of this

        fact is found in the Articles of Confederation.


                             ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION


             Whereas the  Delegates of  the United  States of  America in

             Congress Assembled  did on  the fifteenth day of November in

             the year  of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy

             Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America

             agree to  certain Articles  of Confederation  and  perpetual

             union between the States of ....


             ARTICLE I.   The  title of  this confederacy  shall be  "The

             United States of America".


             ARTICLE II.  Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and

             independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which

             is not  by this  confederation expressly  delegated  to  the

             United States, in Congress Assembled.



             NOTE:   The term  "UNITED STATES"  as  used  therein  refers

        expressly to "Congress Assembled" on behalf of the several States

        which comprise the Union of States (now 50 in number).


             34.  As can readily be seen from the quote below, with three

        separate and  distinct definitions  for the term "United States",

        it becomes  absolutely necessary  to separate and define each use

        of this  term in law.  It is equally as necessary to separate and

        define to  whom the  law applies  when there  are two  classes of

        citizenship existing  side-by-side, with  separate  and  distinct

        rights, privileges  and immunities  for each.   Such  a  separate

        distinction is  not made  in the Internal Revenue Code.  Citizens

        of the California Republic are nowhere defined in this Code or in

        its regulations, but are expressly omitted as such and identified

        indirectly at best (see 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(B)).


             The term  "United States"  may be used in any one of several

             senses.   It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying

             the position  analogous to  that of  other sovereigns  in  a

             family of  nations.   It may  designate territory over which

             sovereignty of  the United  States extends, or it may be the

             collective name  of the States which are united by and under

             the Constitution.


                     [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]

                                      [65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89  L.Ed. 1252]

                                                         [emphasis added]


             35.  The term  "United States", when used in its territorial

        meaning, encompasses  the areas  of land  defined in  1:8:17  and

        4:3:2, nothing  more.   In this respect, the "United States" is a

        separate Nation  which is  foreign with  respect  to  the  States

        united by and under the Constitution, because the "United States"

        as such  has never  applied for  admission to the Union of States

        known as  the "United States of America".  Accordingly, statutory

        "citizens  of  the  United  States",  who  are  "subject  to  the

        jurisdiction  thereof",   are  defined  in  the  wording  of  the

        so-called 14th  Amendment and of The Civil Rights Acts.  At best,

        this so-called Amendment is a "private Act", rather than a public

        act, which  designates a  class of  people who  are unique to the

        territorial jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Federal

        Territories and Possessions, and the land which has been ceded by

        the Legislatures  of the 50 States to the foreign nation-state of

        the "United  States" for  forts, magazines,  arsenals and  "other

        needful buildings"  (see 1:8:17  and 4:3:2).   Collectively, this

        territorial jurisdiction  is now  termed "The  Federal  Zone"  to

        distinguish it  uniquely from  the nation as a whole and from the

        50 States  of the Union.  The "nation" can, therefore, be defined

        as the mathematical union of the federal zone and the 50 States.


             36.  The District  of Columbia  is technically a corporation

        and is  only defined  as a  "State" in  its own  codes and  under

        International Law (e.g., see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10)).


             37.  The several  States which  are united  by and under the

        Constitution are  guaranteed a  "Republican" (or  "rule of  law")

        form of  government by  Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution.

        However, the  foreign nation-state created by Congress and called

        the "United  States", in its territorial sense, is a "legislative

        democracy" (or  "majority rule"  democracy) which  is governed by

        International Law rather than the Common Law.


             38.  The U.  S. Supreme  Court has  ruled that  this foreign

        nation has  every right  to legislate  for its  "citizens" and to

        hold subject  matter and  in personam  jurisdiction, both  within

        (inside) and  without (outside)  its territorial boundaries, when

        legislative acts call for such effects (Cook vs Tait, supra).


             39.  As a  foreign nation  under International law, which is

        derived from Roman Civil Law (see Kent's Commentaries on American

        Law, Lecture  1), it  is  perfectly  legal  for  this  nation  to

        consider its  people as  "subjects"  rather  than  as  individual

        Sovereigns.   The  protections  of  the  State  and  the  Federal

        Constitutions do  not apply  to these  "subjects" unless there is

        specific  statutory  legislation  granting  specific  protections

        (e.g., The Civil Rights Act).  The guarantees of the Constitution

        extend to  the "United  States" (i.e.,  the federal zone) only as

        Congress has made those guarantees applicable (Hooven, supra).


             40.  California is  a Republic.  How does this International

        Law come  into play  in the  California Republic?   The answer to

        this question is presented in the following section.



                               FAILURE TO DISCLOSE


             41.  Because only "white" people can hold primary Common-Law

        State Citizenship  under the  Constitution,  Congress  created  a

        different  class   of  "citizen"   and  then  legislated  rights,

        privileges and immunities which were intended to be mirror images

        of  the   Rights,  Privileges   and  Immunities  enjoyed  by  the

        Common-Law Citizens of the several States.


             42.  Unfortunately, the  nation-state of the "United States"

        (District of  Columbia) is a democracy and not a Republic.  It is

        governed basically  under authority  of International Law, rather

        than  the   Common  Law,  and  its  people  hold  citizenship  by

        "privilege" rather than by "Right".


             43.  Certain power-mad  individuals, commonly known today as

        the Directors  of the  Federal Reserve  Board and the twelve (12)

        major international  banking families,  have used  the  so-called

        14th Amendment  to commit  "legal genocide"  upon  the  class  of

        Common-Law Citizens  known as the Citizens of the several States.

        This has  been accomplished by the application of Social Security

        through fraud,  deception and  non-disclosure of  material facts,

        for the  purpose of  reducing the Union of States to a people who

        are once  again enslaved  by puppet  masters, in  order to gather

        revenue for the profit of international banks and their owners.


             44.  It is  a fact  so well known  and understood that it is

        indisputable,  that  "any  privilege  granted  by  government  is

        regulatable, taxable  and subject  to any restrictions imposed by

        the legislative acts of its governing body", including alteration

        and even revocation by that governing body.


             45.  If necessary  to do  so, the  Accused [DEFENDANT]  will

        submit an  offer of  proof to show that the "Social Security Act"

        is in  fact a  private act  applying only to the territory of the

        "United States",  acting in  its limited  capacity,  and  to  its

        statutory "citizens  of the  United States",  under the so-called

        14th Amendment.   Yet,  this act has been advertised and promoted

        throughout the  several States  of the  Union as being "mandatory

        upon the public in general", rather than a "private" act.


             46.  The effect  in law is that, when Common-Law Citizens of

        the several States apply for and receive Social Security Numbers,

        they voluntarily  surrender their  primary Common-Law Citizenship

        of a  State and  exchange it  for that of a statutory "citizen of

        the United  States".   It is  most interesting that any State has

        the power  to "naturalize"  a non-Citizen,  but today everyone is

        naturalized   as "citizens of the United States" under purview of

        the so-called  14th Amendment.   The  long-term  effect  of  this

        procedure is  that the  Common-Law white  State Citizens  are  an

        endangered species,  on the  verge of  extinction, and  only  the

        "subject class citizens" will survive to be ruled at the whim and

        passion of  a jurisdiction which was not intended by our Founding

        Fathers or the Framers of the original U.S. Constitution.


                             JURISDICTION OF THE COURT



             47.  Section 1  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment has  had a

        far-reaching effect  upon  the  several  States  of  this  Union,

        because Congress mandated that it would protect its new statutory

        "citizens" and  that each  of the  States would also guarantee to

        protect these special "citizens".



             48.  This Nation was founded upon the fundamental principles

        of the  Common  Law  and  self-government,  with  limited  actual

        government.   In contrast,  the "subjects" of the "United States"

        are considered  to be incapable of self-government and in need of

        protection and regulation by those in authority.



             49.  The majority  of statute law is civil and regulatory in

        nature, even when sanctions of a criminal nature are attached for

        alleged violations.



             50.  Among the  rights secured  by the  Common  Law  in  the

        Constitution in  "criminal" cases  are  the  right  to  know  the

        "nature and  cause" of  an accusation,  the right  to confront an

        accuser, and  the right  to have  both substantive and procedural

        due process.



             51.  It is  a fact  that the  District  Court,  in  Internal

        Revenue cases,  DOES NOT  disclose the  nature and  cause of  the

        accusation, does not afford "substantive" due process, and rarely

        produces a "corpus delicti" to prove damage or an injured party.



             52.  The final  proof is that the rights given to an accused

        in an  Internal Revenue  case are  "civil  rights",  rather  than

        Constitutional  Rights.     The   District  Court   can  hear   a

        Constitutional question,  but it  cannot rule  upon the merits of

        the  question,   because  the  Constitution  does  not  apply  to

        regulatory statutes.   They  are set  in place  to  regulate  and

        protect the  statutory "citizens of the United States" who cannot

        exercise,  and   are  not   given,  the   right   of   individual




             53.  The Federal  Constitution mandates  that  "counsel"  be

        present at  all phases of the proceedings.  In contrast, District

        Court  often  conducts  arraignment  proceedings  without  either

        counsel for  the defense  or counsel  for the  prosecution  being






             54.  This Court  is proceeding under a jurisdiction which is

        known to  the Constitution, but which is foreign to the intent of

        the Constitution,  unless applied to those individuals who do not

        have Common-Law  access by "Right" to the protection of the State

        and Federal Constitutions.


             55.  Whether this  jurisdiction be  named International Law,

        Admiralty/Maritime Law,  Legislative Equity, Statutory Law or any

        other name,  it is  abusive and  destructive  of  the  Common-Law

        Rights of  the Citizens  of the several States. The Constitutions

        of the  California Republic  and the  United  States  of  America

        mandate that  these rights  be guaranteed  and protected  by  all

        agencies of government.  This is the Supreme Law of our Land.


             56.  The limit  of police power and legislative authority is

        reached when a statutory "law" derogates or destroys Rights which

        are protected  by  the  Constitution  and  which  belong  to  the

        Common-Law Citizens  of the  several States  who can  claim these



             57.   [DEFENDANT] is a white, male Common-Law Citizen of the

        Sovereign California  Republic.   This declaration  of status  is

        made openly and notoriously on the record of these proceedings.


             58.  As an  individual whose  primary Common-Law Citizenship

        is of the California Republic, [DEFENDANT] claims all the Rights,

        Privileges  and   Immunities  afforded   and  protected   by  the

        Constitutions of the California Republic (1849) and of the United

        States of America (1787), as lawfully amended.


             59.  [DEFENDANT] has never, to the best of his knowledge and

        belief, knowingly,  intentionally and voluntarily surrendered his

        original status as a Common-Law Citizen of the several States, to

        become a  so-called 14th Amendment Federal citizen who is subject

        to the jurisdiction of the "United States".


             60.  This Court  is proceeding in a legislative jurisdiction

        which allows  a "civil" statute to be used as evidence of the Law

        in a  "criminal proceeding",  and affords  only  "civil  rights",

        "procedural due  process" and  the right to be heard on the facts

        evidenced in the statute, rather than the Law and the facts.


             61.  It is  now incumbent  upon the Court to seat on the Law

        side of  its jurisdiction  and to  order the  plaintiff to  bring

        forth an  offer of  proof that  the Accused  [DEFENDANT]  can  be

        subjected to a jurisdiction which uses civil statutes as evidence

        of the fundamental Law in criminal cases, which refuses to afford

        all Rights  guaranteed by  the Constitution  and available to the

        Accused in  criminal matters,  and which practices procedural due

        process to the exclusion of substantive due process, wherein only

        the "facts" and not the "facts and Law" are at issue.

             62.  Should the  prosecution fail  to bring forth proof that

        the Accused  [DEFENDANT] has surrendered his original status as a

        Common-Law "California State Citizen" for one that is essentially

        in  "legislative/regulatory  equity",  then  this  Court  has  no

        alternative but  to dismiss  this matter of its own motion in the

        interests of justice, for lack of jurisdiction.




        Dated            , 1993



        Respectfully Submitted





        Citizen of the California Republic

        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris


                   C E R T I F I C A T E   O F   S E R V I C E



             I, [DEFENDANT],  under penalties  of perjury, declare that I

        am a  California Citizen,  domiciled in  the California Republic,

        and a  Citizen of  the several  States united  by and  under  the

        Constitution of  the United  States of America (see 4:2:1).  I am

        not a "citizen of the United States" (District of Columbia) nor a

        subject of Congress under the 14th Amendment, nor a "resident" in

        the State  of California  who seeks  or who is otherwise is under

        the protection of the so-called 14th Amendment.



             It is  hereby certified that service of this notice has been

        made on  the Plaintiffs  and other interested parties by personal

        service or by mailing one copy each thereof, on this ________ day

        of __________________,  1993, in  a sealed envelope, with postage

        prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:




        The Solicitor General

        Department of Justice

        Washington, District of Columbia

        Postal Zone 20530/tdc


        [others as listed here]



        Dated                , 1993



        Respectfully submitted

        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights

        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,





        Citizen of the California Republic

        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris



        [from 9THAPPEA.DIR\APPEAL.DOC]







             The Appellant  [DEFENDANT],  who  enjoys  the  status  of  a

        Caucasian Citizen  of the  California  Republic  with  Common-Law

        rights by  birth as a member of the sovereign political body (see

        Dred Scott  vs Sandford,  19 How.  393, 404) and who enjoys these

        unalienable Common-Law  rights by  virtue of  his birth, is not a

        "citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th

        Amendment.   Thus, jurisdiction  is invoked  per the Magna Carta,

        Chapters 61,  63;  the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776;

        the Preamble  to  the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of

        America, 1787;   Article  3, Sections  1 and  2, and  Article  6,

        Section 2  of the  Constitution for the United States of America,

        (1787);   the California Civil Code, Source of Law, Section 22.2;

        the California  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  Section  1899;    and

        Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. 368 (1803).









                             AND THE MAXIMS OF LAW;






                         A WHITE DE JURE STATE CITIZEN,




                                      POINT 1


             The Appellant  [DEFENDANT] was  indicted and convicted under

        the purview  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment.   Therefore,  the

        constitutionality and  application of this so-called amendment is

        brought squarely before this Court.



             The so-called  14th Amendment is invalid, in that it was NOT

        properly approved  and adopted  according to  the  provisions  of

        Article 5 of the Constitution (see House Congressional Record for

        June 13,  1967, pages  15641-15646, incorporated  fully herein by

        reference and attached as exhibit "A").



             The Fourteenth  Amendment was forced upon the people "at the

        point of  a bayonet"  and by  the coercion that resulted from not

        seating various  senators who  would not  vote in  favor  of  the

        so-called amendment,  and various  other improper proceedings too

        numerous to  mention here  (for details, see 28 Tulane Law Review

        22;  11 South Carolina Law  Quarterly 484).  It is apparent that,

        once a  fraud is  perpetrated, the fraud enlarges from the effort

        to maintain  illegitimate power  and to  conceal its legal effect

        upon the invalidity of the so-called 14th Amendment.



             The so-called 14th "Amendment" cannot and does not terminate

        the Constitutional  intent of  de jure  State Citizenship  of the

        Appellant [DEFENDANT].  There is ample evidence that no court has

        ever  held  that  this  "Amendment"  was  properly  approved  and

        adopted.   See, in  particular, State  vs Phillips,  540 P.2d 936

        (1975);  Dyett vs Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).



                                    POINT 2:


                        THE ACCUSED'S DE JURE CITIZENSHIP

                              CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY



             The presumed  14th Amendment  is illegally  applied  to  the

        Appellant [DEFENDANT],  a male  Caucasian born  in the  State  of

        Illinois and  now a Citizen of California.  The Appellant was not

        within the intent or meaning of the so-called 14th Amendment.



             It may  be stated, as a general principle of law, that it is

             for the  legislature to  determine  whether  the  conditions

             exist which warrant the exercise of power;  but the question

             as to  what are  the subjects  of its exercise, is clearly a

             judicial question.   One may be deprived of his liberty, and

             his constitutional  rights thereto  may be violated, without

             actual imprisonment or restraint of his person.


                            [In re Aubrey, 36 Wn 308, 314-314, 78 P. 900]

                                                         [emphasis added]


             The most  important thing  to be determined is the intent of

        Congress.  The language of the statute may not be distorted under

        the  guise  of  construction,  so  as  to  be  repugnant  to  the

        Constitution, or  to defeat  the  manifest  intent  of  Congress.

        United States vs Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 94 L.Ed. 457, 460;  United

        States vs Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 82 L.Ed. 413, 58 S.Ct. 353.


             Citizenship is  a status  or condition, and is the result of

        both act and intent.  14 C.J.S. Section 1, p. 1130, n. 62.


             14th Amendment  federal citizenship  is a  political  status

        which constitutes  a privilege   which may be defined and limited

        by Congress,  Ex Parte  (ng) Fung  Sing, D.C. Wash. 6 F.R.D. 670.

        There  is   a  clear   distinction  between   federal  and  State

        citizenship, K.  Tashiro vs  Jordan, 256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53

        A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278 U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14

        C.J.S. 2, p. 1131, n. 75.


             The  classification   "citizen  of  the  United  States"  is

        distinguished from  a Citizen  of one  of the  several States, in

        that the  former  is  a  special  class  of  citizen  created  by

        Congress, U.S.  vs Anthony,  24 Fed  829  (1873).    As  such,  a

        "citizen of  the  United  States"  receives  created  rights  and

        privileges from Congress, and thus has a "taxable citizenship" as

        a federal  citizen  under  the  protection  and  jurisdiction  of

        Congress, wherever  such citizens  are "resident".  Cook vs Tait,

        265 U.S.  47 (1924),  44 S. Ct. 447;  11 Virginia Law Review 607,

        "Income Tax  Based Upon  Citizenship".  This right to tax federal

        citizenship is  an inherent  right under  the rule  of the Law of

        Nations, which  is part  of the  law of  the "United  States", as

        described in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and Article

        4, Section  3, Clause 2 (4:3:2).  The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732.

        The federal  government has absolutely no authority whatsoever to

        tax the  Citizens of  the several  States for  their Citizenship.

        The latter have natural rights and privileges which are protected

        by the  U.S. Constitution  from federal  intrusion.  These rights

        are inherent from birth and belong to "US the People" as Citizens

        of one  of the  several States  as described  in  Dred  Scott  vs

        Sandford, 19  How. 393.   Such  Citizens are not under the direct

        protection or  jurisdiction of  Congress, but  they are under the

        protection of the Constitutions of the States which they inhabit.


             The Act  of Congress  called the  Civil Rights  Act, 14 U.S.

        Statutes at  Large, p.  27,  which  was  the  forerunner  of  the

        so-called 14th  Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as




             ... [A]ll  persons born in the United States and not subject

             to any  foreign power,  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  are

             hereby declared  to be  citizens of  the United States;  and

             such citizens,  of every  race and  color ... shall have the

             same right,  in every  State and  Territory  in  the  United

             States ...  to full  and  equal  benefit  of  all  laws  and

             proceedings for  the security  of person and property, as is

             enjoyed by white citizens ....

                                                         [emphasis added]


        This was the intent of Congress, namely, not to infringe upon the

        Constitution or the status of the de jure Citizens of the several

        States.   The term  "persons" did  not include  the white de jure

        State Citizens.  It was never the intent of the 14th Amendment to

        subvert the authority of the several States of the Union, or that

        of the  Constitution as it relates to the status of de jure State

        Citizens.   See People  vs Washington,  36 C.  658,  661  (1869),

        overruled on other grounds;  also French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324;

        MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L. Ed. 297.


             The so-called  14th Amendment  uses language very similar to

        the  Civil   Rights  Act  of  1866.    Harlan  J.  explained  his

        interpretation of  its meaning  in  a  dissenting  opinion  which

        quoted from  the scorching  veto message  of  President  Johnson,

        Lincoln's successor:   It "comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific

        States, Indians  subject to  taxation, the people called Gypsies,

        as well  as the  entire race  designated as  blacks,  persons  of

        color, negroes,  mulattoes and  persons of  African blood.  Every

        individual of  those races  born in  the United  States is made a

        citizen thereof."   Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 114, 5 S.Ct. 41,

        28 L.Ed. 643;  see also In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274.


             In light  of the  statement by  Chief Justice  Taney in Dred

        Scott vs  Sandford, 19  How.  393,  422,  in  defining  the  term

        persons, the  Judge mentioned "... persons who are not recognized

        as citizens  ...."   See also  American and  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  vs

        Canter, 1  Pet.  511,  which  also  distinguishes  "persons"  and

        "citizens".   These were  the persons  who were the object of the

        14th Amendment,  to give citizenship to this class of native born

        "persons" who  were "resident"  in the  several  States,  and  to

        legislate authority  to place  races other  than the  white  race

        within the special category of "citizen of the United States".


             It was  the intent  of the  so-called amendment that de jure

        Citizens  in   the  several  States  were  not  included  in  its

        terminology because they were, by birthright, Citizens as defined

        in the  Preamble, and  could receive  nothing from this so-called

        amendment.  See Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43.


             Congress  has   adopted  this  definition  of  "person",  as

        previously described,  so that the Internal Revenue Code would be

        constitutional.  See McBrier vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

        108 F.2d 967, Fn 1 (1939).  Thus, Congress has absolute authority

        to regulate  this de  facto entity created by an Act of Congress,

        this juristic  person who  is not given de jure State Citizenship

        by birth.


             Since the  term "citizen  of the  United States" was used to

        create and  distinguish a  different class of citizen in the 14th

        Amendment, this  term has  been widely  used in  various  revenue

        acts, e.g.,  Tariff Act  of August  5, 1909, Section 37, c. 6, 36

        Stat. 11;   Act  of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756;  Revenue Act

        of November 23, 1921, 40 Stat. 227;  the Internal Revenue Code of

        1939 and  26 C.F.R.  1.1-1(b).  These all had a specific meaning,

        which did  not include a Citizen of one of the several States who

        had no  franchise with the federal Government (i.e., the District

        of Columbia).   In  fact, the  Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,

        Title I, Section 3, (3) states:



             (3)   Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen

             of the United States.



             This specifically  means that  the Original  Social Security

        Act, created  in 1935,  did not  change  one's  citizenship  upon

        obtaining a  SSN.  The original Title VIII of the Social Security

        Act was  repealed by  P.L. 76-1, Section 4, 53 Stat. 1, effective

        February 11,  1939.   Then the  substance was  added to  the 1939

        Income Tax  Code at Sections 1400-1425.  Currently, the substance

        of the repealed section can be found in the 1954 Internal Revenue

        Code at  Sections 3101-3126.   This  repealing,  in  effect,  has

        voided the  original intent  and meaning,  and replaced it with a

        new intent  and meaning.   This  new intent is unconstitutionally

        applied to  the Appellant,  a de  jure State  Citizen, who  is  a

        member of  the posterity  as identified  in the  Preamble to  the

        Constitution for  the United  States of America.  This new intent

        has never  been addressed  by any  court, as  it relates  to  the

        deprivation of State Citizenship.

             All changes  made after  the fact, under the Social Security

        Act as  it relates to citizenship, are null and void due to fraud

        (specifically, non-disclosure).   Congress  does not now, nor has

        it ever  had, the  authority to  take Citizenship  away from  the

        Appellant, a Citizen of the several States, without his knowledge

        and informed consent.


             The error  occurs when,  through  economic  duress  and  the

        failure to  disclose to  Appellant  [DEFENDANT]  the  liabilities

        associated with a Social Security Number, a de jure State Citizen

        is compelled "at the point of a bayonet" to give up a Citizenship

        that was  derived by  birth and  blood.   By obtaining  a  Social

        Security Number,  such a  State Citizen  becomes,  in  effect,  a

        second-class citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment, in order

        to obtain work to purchase necessities to sustain life.


             The so-called  14th Amendment was not intended to impose any

        new restrictions  upon Citizenship,  or to  prevent  anyone  from

        becoming a  Citizen by  fact of birth within the United States of

        America, who  would thereby  acquire Citizenship according to the

        law existing  before its  adoption.   "An amendatory act does not

        alter the rights existing before its adoption." Billings vs Hall,

        7 Cal.  1.   Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of

        free negroes  and to  put it beyond doubt that all blacks as well

        as whites  were citizens.  U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18

        S.Ct. 456,  42 L.Ed. 890;  Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.)

        36, 21  L.Ed. 394;   Strauder  vs West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25

        L.Ed. 664;   In re Virginia, 100 U.S. 339;  Neal vs Delaware, 103

        U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567;  Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41,

        28 L.Ed.  643;   Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep.

        136;  (numerous other cites omitted).


             The First  Clause of  the so-called  14th Amendment  of  the

        Federal Constitution made negroes "citizens of the United States"

        and citizens  of the  State in  which they  reside,  and  thereby

        created two classes of citizens: one of the United States and the

        other of the State.  4 Dec. Dig. '06, page 1197;  Cory vs Carter,

        48 Ind.  327, 17  Am. Rep.  738;   and it  distinguishes  between

        federal and state citizenship, Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. App. 263,

        30 Am. Rep. 131.


             Nothing can  be found in the so-called 14th Amendment, or in

        any  reference  thereto,  that  establishes  any  provision  that

        transforms Citizens  of any  state into  "citizens of  the United

        States".  In the year 1868 or now (1993), the so-called amendment

        created no  new status for the white State Citizens.  White State

        Citizens are  natural born  Citizens, per  Article 2,  Section 1,

        Clause 5  (2:1:5) and,  as such,  they are  fully entitled to the

        "Privileges and  Immunities" mentioned  in Article  4, Section 2,

        Clause 1  (4:2:1), as  unalienable  rights.    These  unalienable

        rights cannot be overruled or abolished by any act of congress.

             The birthright  of the Appellant [DEFENDANT]'s de jure State

        Citizenship  cannot   be  subordinated  merely  because  Congress

        desires more  power and  control over  the people,  in  order  to

        create a  larger revenue  base for  the profit of certain private

        individuals.  Oyama vs California, 332 U.S. 633.



             State citizenship,  as defined,  regulated and  protected by

             State  authority,  would  disappear  altogether,  except  as

             Congress might  choose to  withhold the  exercise of powers.

             The tendency  of Congress,  especially since the adoption of

             the  recent   amendments,  has  been  to  overstep  its  own

             boundaries and  undertake duties  not committed to it by the



                           [16 Albany Law Journal 24 (1877), (Exhibit B)]



             A citizen  may not  have his de jure citizenship taken away,

        Richards vs Secretary  of State, (9th Cir) 752 F.2d 1413, (1985);

        Afroyim vs  Rusk,   387 U.S.  253, 87  S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757

        (1967);   Baker vs  Rusk, 296  F. Supp.  1244 (1969);   Vance  vs

        Terrazas, 444  U.S. 252,  100 S.Ct.  540, 62  L.Ed.2d 461 (1980);

        U.S. vs  Wong Kim  Ark, 169  U.S. 18  S. Ct.  456, 42  L.Ed.  890


                                     POINT 3


             In the  formation of  the Constitution for the United States

        of America,  care was  taken to  confer no power upon the federal

        government to  control and  regulate Citizens  within the several

        States, because such control would lead to tyranny.


             By the Constitution, Congress was to be a representative of,

        and an extension of the Several States only for external affairs.

        Congress was  forbidden to  pass municipal  laws to  regulate and

        control de  jure Citizens  of a  State of the Union of the United

        States  of   America.    This  is,  without  a  doubt,  the  true

        construction of the intent of the Constitution.


             That Congress  has no  authority to  pass laws  and bind the

        rights of  the Citizens  in the several States, beyond the powers

        conferred by  the Constitution, is not open to controversy.  But,

        it is  insisted that  (1) under  the  so-called  14th  Amendment,

        Congress has  power to  legislate for, and make a subject of, the

        Appellant [DEFENDANT]  through secret  interpretations of the law

        and (2)  by force of power, laws are enacted in order to control,

        by force  and fraud, the Nation and the People within the several

        States for  the purpose  of raising revenue for the profit of the

        Federal Reserve banks and their private owners.


             No  rational   man  can   hesitate  to   believe  that   the

        deprivations of  Citizenship and  the abuses  of the Constitution

        are not  derived from  the Federal  Reserve Act.  No one can deny

        that Congress has thereby attempted to abolish the classification

        of de  jure Citizen of a State of the Union of the United States,

        so that a ever larger revenue base can be maintained.



             ...  nor   would  the   government  suffer  a  loss  of  his



                     [[DEFENDANT]'s Pre-Sentence Report, [DATE], page 10]



        This  establishes,  without  a  doubt,  that  the  United  States

        government is  only concerned  about raising revenue under forced

        extraction by  the withholding  system, which was prompted by the

        Federal Reserve  banks at  the  instigation  of  Beardsley  Ruml,

        former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


             Congress, through  Social Security  and the  so-called  14th

        Amendment, cannot  do indirectly  what the Constitution prohibits

        directly.   If Congress,  by pseudo  power,  can  legislate  away

        [DEFENDANT]'s status  as a de jure Citizen of the several States,

        so might Congress exclude all of [DEFENDANT]'s unalienable rights

        as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution.


             Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks, by creating a

        fictitious debt, have re-instituted an insidious form of slavery.

        All slavery has its origin in power, thus usurping a jurisdiction

        which  does   not  belong  to  them  and  which  is  against  the

        unalienable rights of the appellant [DEFENDANT].


             Our Constitution  is a  restraint upon government, purposely

        provided and  declared upon consideration of all the consequences

        which it prohibits and permits, making restraints upon government

        the rights of the governed.  This careful adjustment of power and

        rights makes  the constitution what it was intended to be and is,

        namely, a  real charter of liberty which deserves the praise that

        has often  been given  to it  as "The  most wonderful  work  ever

        struck off  at any  given time  by the brain and purpose of man."

        Block vs  Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135.


             Thus, this  court must  uphold the principles upon which the

        Constitution was  founded;   it must  be held  to  guarantee  not

        particular  forms   of  procedure,  but  the  very  substance  of

        individual rights  to life,  liberty and  property.  Basic "State

        Citizenship" is  the absolute  bulwark against "National Tyranny"

        as is  fostered and applied through the so-called 14th Amendment.

        Nowhere in  the debates,  papers or any court decision written by

        anyone does it state that the Constitution authorizes Congress to

        destroy the State Citizenship of the Appellant [DEFENDANT].


             Prior to  the Federal  Reserve Act, no political dreamer was

        ever wild  enough to  think of  breaking  down  the  lines  which

        separate the  States, and of compounding the American People into

        one common  mass of  slaves.   Yet,  this  is  exactly  what  has

        happened under  Social Security,  by creating  a revenue base for

        the collection  of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to

        the Federal Reserve, in other words, slavery to the national debt

        under the so-called 14th Amendment.


             The status  of "de  jure  State  Citizen"  is  [DEFENDANT]'s

        property.   When the  application of  Social Security annihilates

        the value  of any  property and  strips it  of its attributes, by

        which alone  it is  distinguishable as  property,  the  Appellant

        [DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen, is deprived of it according

        to  the   plainest  interpretation  of  the  5th  Amendment,  and

        certainly within the Constitutional provisions intended to shield

        [DEFENDANT]'s personal  rights and  liberty from  the exercise of

        arbitrary government power.


             This is  a case  of "suspect  classification"  in  that  the

        Appellant [DEFENDANT]  is "saddled  with such disabilities ... as

        to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process

        ...." 411  U.S. 2,  28.  Thus, the devolution of [DEFENDANT]'s de

        jure Citizenship  into the  classification of a de facto juristic

        person under  the so-called  14th Amendment  is such  a  "suspect

        classification" and must be reviewed in the light of the original

        intent of  our Founding  Fathers in  establishing  the  Union  of

        several States in the first place.


             Citizenship  under   the  so-called   14th  Amendment  is  a

        privilege granted  by Congress,  i.e., a  civil status conferring

        limited rights  and privileges,  not a birthright that is secured

        by the Constitution.  [DEFENDANT], a white de jure State Citizen,

        by virtue  of his  birth in  one of  the several States, received

        that which  cannot be  granted by Congress, nor can Congress make

        void a Citizenship status which he derived by birth and by blood.


             ... [A]nd no member of the state should be disfranchised, or

             deprived of  any of  his  rights  or  privileges  under  the

             constitution, unless  by the law of the land, or judgment of

             his peers.


                   [Kent's Commentaries, Vol.  II, p. 11, 1873, 12th ed.]


             There can  be no  law, statute  or treaty  that  can  be  in

        conflict with  the intent  of the original founding constitution.

        For, if  this were  permitted to occur, the founding Constitution

        would be  a nullity.    The  original  Constitution  of  1787  is

        perpetual, as  is the  Citizenship that is recognized by it.  See

        Texas vs  White, 7  Wallace 700.  If any legislation is repugnant

        to the  Constitution, this Court has the eminent power to declare

        such enactments  null and  void ab initio (from their inception).

        See Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-180 (1803).


             The rule  that should  be applied  is that  laws, especially

        foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted

        and applied  according to  the plain import of the language used,

        as it  would have  been the intent and understood by our Founding

        Fathers.   The so-called  14th Amendment has been used to distort

        and  nullify   the  purposes   and  intent  of  the  foundational

        Constitution, for  the ulterior  motive of  giving  pseudo  power

        where no  such power  was granted  or intended,  and  where  such

        pseudo power was specifically denied in the Constitution.


             This has  resulted  in  the  complete  annihilation  of  the

        balance of  checks, so  desired by  our Founding Fathers.  One of

        these was  the sovereignty  of the  people.  At the present time,

        the "United  States", under  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, has

        extended its  pseudo authority  to abolish  the status of de jure

        State Citizens,  and to  render [DEFENDANT]  a "federal"  citizen

        under the so-called 14th Amendment who is more apply described as

        a subject of Congress and a "federal" resident within the several

        States.     This  has   had  the   unlawful  effect   of  denying

        [DEFENDANT]'s birthright to be a free born de jure State Citizen,

        as was the intent of the original Constitution.


             The so-called  14th Amendment  did not authorize Congress to

        change either  the Citizenship  or the  status of Citizens of the

        several States.   "They  are unaffected by it."  U.S. vs Anthony,

        24 F. 829.  Yet, through deliberate misinterpretation of the Act,

        Congress has  by statute  overruled and  voided the Constitution.

        This was  done at  the prompting of the Federal Reserve banks and

        their private owners.


             In application,  Congress and the Federal Reserve banks have

        utilized  the   so-called  14th   Amendment  as   a  totally  new

        Constitution, solely  for the benefit of the Federal Reserve, and

        to the detriment of Appellant [DEFENDANT], a sovereign Citizen of

        the California Republic.


             This Union  of the United States of America was founded upon

        the principles of the Christianity and the common law.  Force and

        fraud cannot  prevail against  the will  of the  people  and  the

        Constitution.   The legislative  intent  of  the  so-called  14th

        Amendment was  only to  grant citizenship  to a distinct class of

        people, not  to create  a new  constitution.    This  court  must

        determine whether  the "act"  was properly  approved and adopted.

        State vs  Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 942 (1975).  If it was properly

        approved and  adopted, this  court must  also determine  if it is

        also  being  unconstitutionally  applied  against  the  Appellant

        [DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen of California.


             The abuses  heaped upon  the Appellant,  a California  State

        Citizen, only  foretell the  impending doom  and  downfall  of  a

        centralized government.   Our  Founding Fathers  understood this,

        and the  Constitution was  written so  that this would not occur.

        But, to  the great  shame of  the judicial system,  they have let

        the thirst for power prevail over the Constitution.  (Exhibit A)


             Hitler used National Social Insurance to control and enslave

        the people of Germany.  Likewise, the "United States" (Article 1,

        Section 8,  Clause 17)  is doing  the same thing here in America.

        (Perhaps now  it should  be spelled  "Amerika").   When is enough

        enough?   When will the courts quit playing "ostrich", pull their

        heads out  of the  sand, see  what is  happening and  correct the

        situation before  it is  too late.   The camel of tyranny now has

        its nose and its two front legs under the tent.


             Congress has  passed the 14th Amendment under force of arms,

        included the  municipal code of the District of Columbia into the

        United States  Codes, and  made various secret interpretations of

        the acts,  never inquiring whether they had authority to proceed.

        But, can  this Court  also undertake  for itself  the same sundry

        constructions?   The Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches

        have all  repeatedly acknowledged that our particular security is

        in the  possession and  adherence to  the  written  Constitution.

        Yet,  by  various  and  sundry  constructions  and  the  wrongful

        application of  the acts  of Congress,  the House  and Senate are

        attempting to  turn the Constitution into a blank piece of paper,

        with complete judicial approval.


             [DEFENDANT], a  de jure  natural State  Citizen, is  in full

        possession of  personal and  political rights,  which the "United

        States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) did not give and cannot

        take away.  Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393, 513;  Afroyim vs

        Rusk, 387  U.S. 253;   U.S.  vs Miller, 463 F.2d 600.  Nor is the

        Appellant a  de jure  State Citizen restrained by any enumeration

        or definition  of his  rights or  liberties.   The so-called 14th

        Amendment did  not impair  or change  the status  of the  de jure

        Citizens of  the several States of the Union of the United States

        of America.   To  imply that  an act  of Congress  supersedes and

        makes null  and void  the Constitution  for the  United States of

        America, is blatantly and demonstrably absurd.  This construction

        cannot be enforced or adopted by any legal authority whatsoever.


             The municipal  jurisdiction of  Congress does  not extend to

        the Appellant or to his property.  This is the case because he is

        a de  jure State  Citizen of  the several  States.  The municipal

        jurisdiction of Congress only extends to the limits as defined in

        the Constitution itself (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).



             Where rights are secured by the Constitution there can be no

             legislation or rule making which would abrogate them.


                                       [Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]



        Thus, the Citizenship of the Appellant as a Citizen of California

        must be  upheld by the preceding positive statement and decree by

        the U.S. Supreme Court.  This court must uphold this principle of







                          ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.



                          AS A MEMBER OF THE POSTERITY,




                                     POINT 1


             The  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  State

        declares the intent and purpose of the covenant:



             We the  People of the United States, in Order to form a more

             perfect   Union,    establish   justice,   insure   domestic

             Tranquility, provide  for the  common defence,  promote  the

             general Welfare,  and secure  the Blessings  of  Liberty  to

             ourselves and  our Posterity,  do ordain  and establish this

             Constitution for the United States of America.




        Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expounded

        on the importance of this Preamble:



             The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of

             expounding the  language of  a statute,  has been long felt,

             and universally conceded in all judicial discussions.  It is

             an  admitted   maxim  in   the  ordinary   course   of   the

             administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is

             a key  to open  the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs,

             which are  to be  remedied, and the objects, which are to be

             accomplished by  the provisions  of the statute.  We find it

             laid down  in some of our earliest authorities in the common

             law;   and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression,

             cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.  Probably it has

             a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law,

             from the  universal principle  of interpretation,  that  the

             will and  intention of the legislature is to be regarded and

             followed.   It is  properly resorted  to,  where  doubts  or

             ambiguities arise  upon the  words of the enacting part; for

             if they  are clear  and unambiguous, there seems little room

             for interpretation,  except in   cases leading to an obvious

             absurdity,  or  to  a  direct  overthrow  of  the  intention

             expressed in the Preamble.


                  [Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States]

                    [Joseph Story, Vol. 1, De Capo Press Reprints (1970)]

                                                      [at pages 443, 444]



             With the  authority of  Justice Story,  then, we examine the

        wording of the Preamble as to the term "Union".  The term "Union"

        as used  in the  Preamble is  evidently the  one declared  in the

        Declaration of  Independence (1776)  and organized  in accordance

        with "certain  articles  of  Confederation  and  Perpetual  Union

        between the  States" which  declared that  "the  Union  shall  be

        perpetual."  See Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700.


             The Union  of the  States never  was a purely artificial and

             arbitrary relation.   It  began among Colonies, and grew out

             of common  origin, mutual  sympathies,  kindred  principles,

             similar  interest,  and  geographical  relations.    It  was

             confirmed  strengthened  by  the  necessities  of  war,  and

             received definite form, and character, and sanction from the

             Articles of  Confederation.  By these the Union was solemnly

             declared to  "be perpetual."   And  when these Articles were

             found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the

             Constitution was  ordained "to  form a  more perfect union."

             It is  difficult to  convey the  idea of  indissoluble unity

             more clearly  than these words.  What can be indissoluble if

             a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?


             But the  perpetuity and  indissolubility of the Union, by no

             means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence,

             or of the right of self-government by the States.  Under the

             Articles  of   Confederation   each   State   retained   its

             sovereignty, freedom,  and independence,  and  every  power,

             jurisdiction, and  right  not  expressly  delegated  to  the

             United States.   Under  the Constitution, though, the powers

             of the  States were  much restricted,  still, all powers not

             delegated to  the  United  States,  nor  prohibited  to  the

             States, are  reserved to  the States  respectively or to the

             people.   And we have already had occasion to remark at this

             term, that "the people of each State compose a State, having

             its own  government, and  endowed  with  all  the  functions

             essential to  separate and  independent existence," and that

             "without the  States  in  union,  there  could  be  no  such

             political body  as the United States."  Not only, therefore,

             can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to

             the States,  through their union under the Constitution, but

             it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the

             States, and  the maintenance  of their  governments, are  as

             much within  the design  and care  of the maintenance of the

             National  government.     The   Constitution,  in   all  its

             provisions, looks  to an  indestructible Union,  composed of

             indestructible States.


             When, therefore,  Texas became one of the United States, she

             entered into  a indissoluble  relation.  All the obligations

             of perpetual  union, and  all the  guarantees of  republican

             government in the Union, attached at once to the State.  The

             act which  consummated her  admission  into  the  Union  was

             something more  than a compact;  it was the incorporation of

             a new  member into  the political  body.   And it was final.

             The  union  between  Texas  and  the  other  States  was  as

             complete, as  perpetual, and  as indissoluble  as the  union

             between the  original  States.    There  was  no  place  for

             reconsideration, or  revocation, except  through revolution,

             or through consent of the States.


                  [Texas vs White, 7 Wallace, at pages 723 to 726 (1886)]


             Similarly, the  term "establish",  as used  in the Preamble,

        means to fix perpetually:


               STAB'LISH ...


               1.      To set and fix firmly or unalterable;  to settle



                       I will establish my covenant with him for an

                       everlasting covenant.  Gen. xvii


               2.      To found permanently;  to erect and fix or settle;

                       as, to establish a colony or empire.


               3.      To enact or decree by authority and for permanence


               4.      To settle or fix;  to confirm.


               5.      To make firm;  to confirm;  to ratify what has

                       been previously set or made.


                       Do we then make void the law through faith?  God

                       forbid: yea, we establish the law.  Rom. iii.


                         [An American Dictionary of the English Language]

                                      [Noah Webster (1828), reprinted by]

                     [Foundation for American Christian Education (1967)]


             ESTABLISH.   This word occurs frequently in the Constitution

             of the  United States,  and it  is there  used in  different



               1.      to settle firmly, to fix unalterable;  as to

                       establish justice, which is the avowed object of

                       the Constitution ...


               2.      To settle or fix firmly;  place on a permanent

                       footing;  found;  create;  put beyond doubt or

                       dispute;  prove;  convince ...


                             [Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at page 642]


             Thus, if the Union is perpetual, then so too is the founding

        law upon  which that Union was predicated in the first place, and

        so too is the unalienable Citizenship recognized therein.



                                      POINT 2


                                 THE ORGANIC LAW

                          AND THE UNION FOUNDED THEREON

                                  ARE PERPETUAL



             The founding  law of  the nation  is the perpetual authority

        upon which  the continued  existence  of  the  nation  itself  is

        predicated.     As  such,  the  founding  law  carries  universal

        authority  and   cannot  be   overthrown  or   subverted  without

        repudiating the very existence of the nation established thereby.



             ORGANIC LAW.   The  fundamental law,  or constitution,  of a

             state or  nation, written  or unwritten;  that law or system

             of laws  or principles  which defines  and  establishes  the

             organization of  its government.  St. Louis vs Dorr, 145 Mo.

             466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 LRA 686, 68 Am St Rep 575


             [Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Pub. (1968), p. 1251]



             The  authority   of   the   organic   law   is   universally

             acknowledged;   it speaks  the sovereign will of the people;

             its injunction  regarding the  process of  legislation is as

             authoritative as  are those  touching the  substance of  it.

             Suth. Statutory Construction, 44, note 1. "This Constitution

             ... shall  be the supreme law of  the land ...."  Article 6,

             Constitution of the United States (1787).



             That the  people have  an original  right to  establish, for

             their  future  government,  such  principles  as,  in  their

             opinion, shall  be most conducive to their own happiness, is

             the basis  on which  the  whole  American  fabric  has  been

             erected.   The exercise  of the  original right   is  a very

             great exertion,  nor can  it, nor  ought it to be frequently

             repeated.   The principles,  therefore, so  established, are

             deemed fundamental.   And  as the authority, from which they

             proceed, is  supreme, and  can seldom act, they are designed

             to be permanent.



             The original  and supreme will organizes the government, and

             assigns, to  different departments, their respective powers.

             It may either stop here;  or establish certain limits not to

             be transcended by those departments.



             The government  of  the  United  States  is  of  the  latter

             description.  The powers of the legislature are defined, and

             limited;     and  those  limits  may  not  be  mistaken,  or

             forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose are

             the powers  limited, and  to what purpose is that limitation

             committed to  writing, if  the limits  may, at  any time  be

             passed by those intended to be restrained?  The distinction,

             between a  government with  limited and unlimited powers, is

             abolished, if  those limits  do not  confine the  persons on

             whom they  are imposed,  and if  acts  prohibited  and  acts

             allowed, are  of equal  obligation.  It is a proposition too

             plain to  be contested,  that the  constitution controls any

             legislative act  repugnant to  it;  or, that the legislature

             may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.



             Between these  alternatives there  is no middle ground.  The

             constitution  is   either   a   superior,   paramount   law,

             unchangeable by  ordinary means,  or it  is on  a level with

             ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable

             when the legislature shall please to alter it.



             If the  former part  of the  alternative  be  true,  then  a

             legislative act  contrary to the constitution is not law: if

             the latter  be true,  then written  constitutions are absurd

             attempts, on  the part  of the  people, to limit a power, in

             its own  nature illimitable.   Certainly  all those who have

             framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the

             fundamental  and   paramount  law   of   the   nation,   and

             consequently the  theory of  every such  government must be,

             that  an   act  of   the  legislature,   repugnant  to   the

             constitution, is void ....



             If then  the courts are to regard the constitution;  and the

             constitution  is   superior  to  any  ordinary  act  of  the

             legislature;   the constitution,  and not such ordinary act,

             must govern the case to which they both apply.



             Those  then   who  controvert   the   principle   that   the

             constitution is  to be  considered, in court, as a paramount

             law, are  reduced   to the necessity of maintaining that the

             courts must  close their  eyes on  the constitution, and see

             only the law.


                  [Marbury vs Madison, 1 Cranch 137, at pages 176 to 178]







                        SO AS TO BE VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS,

                        SO THE DEFENDANT IS UNCERTAIN OF

                          SECRET AND SPECIFIC MEANINGS,

                         THEREBY BEING DENIED A DEFENSE.



             1.   The indictment  utilizes the  term  "resident"  as  its

        jurisdictional statement, without any further clarification.


              "The jurisdiction of a federal court must affirmatively and

        distinctly appear  and cannot  be helped  by presumptions  or  by

        argumentive inferences  drawn  from  the  pleadings."  Norton  vs

        Larney, 266  U.S. 511,  515, 45  S. Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925).

        Accord, Bender  vs Williamsport  Area Schools  District, 475 U.S.

        534, 106  S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501, rehearing denied, 106

        S.Ct.  2003  (1986);    Nor  can  a  contester's  allegations  of

        jurisdiction be  read in  isolation from  the complaint's factual

        allegations, Schilling  vs Rogers,  363 U.S.  666, 676,  80 S.Ct.

        1288, 4  L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960), nor can jurisdiction be effectively

        established by  omitting facts which would establish that it does

        not exist.   Lambert Run Coal Co. vs Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258

        U.S. 377,  382, 42  S.Ct. 349,  66 L.Ed.  671 (1922).    Nor  can

        jurisdiction be  "gleaned from  the briefs  and arguments" of the

        Plaintiff.   Bender, supra,  106 S.Ct. at 1334.  The burden fully

        to demonstrate jurisdiction clearly falls on the Plaintiff, and a

        failure fully  to define the conditions creating some nexus under

        the ambiguous term "resident" is an error.


             The  requirement   to  prove  jurisdiction  is  particularly

        important when  the government  of a  foreign state  (the "United

        States") brings  criminal charges  against a  Citizen of  another



             Where  jurisdiction   is  denied  and  squarely  challenged,

        jurisdiction cannot  be assumed to exist "sub silentio" but  must

        be proven.  Hagans vs Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533, n. 5;  Monell vs

        N.Y., 436  U.S. 633.   Mere  "good faith" assertions of power and

        authority (jurisdiction)  have been  abolished.  Owen vs Indiana,

        445 U.S.  622;   Butz vs  Economou, 438  U.S. 478;   Bivens  vs 6

        unknown agents, 403 U.S. 388.


             An indictment  is "vague"  if it does not allege each of the

        essential elements of the crime with sufficient clarity to enable

        the defendant  to prepare his defense.  U.S. vs BI-CO Pavers, 741

        F.2d 730  (1984).  Where the defendant must guess at its meaning,

        it is  vague and  violates the  first essential  element  of  due

        process.  See Connolly vs General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,

        391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).


             It is  an elementary  principle of  criminal pleading,  that

             where the  definition of an offense, whether it be at common

             law or  by statute,  "includes  generic  terms,  it  is  not

             sufficient that  the indictment  shall charge the offense in

             the same  generic terms  as in  the definition;  but it must

             state the  species;   it must  descend to the particulars. 1

             Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl. 291.


                        [U.S. vs Cruikshank, La. 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1872)]

                                                         [emphasis added]





                    26 U.S.C. SECTION 7203, IN AND OF ITSELF,





             26 U.S.C.  7203, in  and of  itself,  does  not  describe  a

        triable offense,  nor does  it state  any basis for any crimes or

        public offenses,  so as to confer jurisdiction for any issue that

        is triable  as a  "misdemeanor".   On the  contrary, as  will  be

        shown, jurisdiction is absent.



             Sec.  7203.    Willful  Failure  to  File  Return,    Supply

             Information, or Pay Tax.


             Any person  required under  this title  to pay any estimated

             tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made

             under authority  thereof to make a return, keep any records,

             or supply  any information,  who willfully fails to pay such

             estimated tax  or tax,  make such return, keep such records,

             or supply  such information at the time or times required by

             law and  regulations, shall,  in addition to other penalties

             provided by  law, be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and,  upon

             conviction thereof,  shall be  fined not  more than  $25,000

             ($100,000 in  the case  of a corporation), or imprisoned not

             more than  1 year,  or both,  together with the costs of the

             prosecution.  In the case of any person with respect to whom

             there is  a failure  to pay  any estimated tax, this section

             shall not  apply to such person with respect to such failure

             if there  is no  addition to  tax under section 6654 or 6655

             with respect to such failure.


                                                         [26 U.S.C. 7203]



             IRC 7203  fails to  provide any definition of any offense by

        failing to  charge any  statutory crime  in any  language of  any



             The language  of 26  U.S.C. 7203,  in and of itself, and any

        alleged violation  as propounded  in Appellee's indictment, fails

        to be  fully descriptive  of  any  offense  or  crime.    It  is,

        therefore, fundamentally impossible to violate Section 7203 since

        this Section,  in and of itself, does not include or refer to any

        specific statute  that could  provide a nexus for prosecution, as

        is clearly shown in U.S. vs Menk, 260 F. Supp. 784:



             But,  rather,   all  three   sections  referred  to  in  the

             information,  sections   4461,  4901,   and  7203,  must  be

             considered together  before a  complete  definition  of  the

             offense is  found.   Section 4461  imposes a  tax on persons

             engaged in  a certain  activity;   section 4901 provides the

             payment of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition  precedent  to

             engaging in the activity subject to the tax and Section 7203

             makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage  in the  activity without

             first having  paid the  tax, and provides the penalty. It is

             impossible to  determine the  meaning or  intended effect of

             any one  of these  three sections  without reference  to the


                                    [U.S. vs Menk, supra, emphasis added]


             Contrary to the accusatory pleadings, 26 U.S.C. 7203, in and

        of itself,  is not  a statute  subject to  violation since  it is

        nothing more  than a  penalty clause for some undefined franchise

        obligation.   Section 7203,  upon which the Appellee's indictment

        is based,  fails to provide a complete definition of any offense,

        and therefore,  in and  of itself,  it fails  to state properly a

        claim upon  which probable  cause could  predicate.  As the Court

        stated in U.S. vs Menk, supra:



             The Court  of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly

             held that  an indictment  or information is sufficient which

             defines a  statutory crime  substantially in the language of

             the statute  if such  language is  fully descriptive  of the



                                             [U.S. vs Menk, supra at 786]


        Section 7203  contains no  such descriptive language, nor does it

        identify any other statutes.


             It cannot be said that Section 7203 imposes a tax on persons

        engaged in  a certain  activity, nor  can it  be said  that  7203

        provides that  the payment  of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition

        precedent to  engaging  in  the  activity  subject  to  the  tax.

        However, 7203  makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage in the activity

        without having  first paid  the tax, and provides the penalty. In

        addition, 7203  makes it a misdemeanor not to file a return, keep

        records or  supply information  that may  be required  by several

        other statutes and regulations, which specifically determine that

        activity and crime.


             Because  the   activity  in  the  Appellees'  indictment  is

        undefined, Section  7203 is  not, in  and of  itself, a basis for

        prosecution, and there is no probable cause of action against the

        Appellant.   Similarly, it is impossible to determine the meaning

        or intended  effect of  Section 7203  without having reference to

        other possibly  applicable and as yet undefined sections of Title

        26, U.S.C.


             Plainly and  simply, Section 7203 is only a penalty statute,

        and by  itself cannot  stand without  reference to other statutes

        and or  regulations.   An IRS  agent stated on the record that no

        other statutes  were violated  or identified  as such  before the

        grand jury (CR June 28, 1988, p. 13, lines 5-12).


             Thus the  indictment is  vague and  the court is in error in

        sustaining the indictment and conviction.








             AS DEFINED IN 7343 FOR CHAPTER 75, WHICH INCLUDES 7203,





             The words  used in  a statute  cannot be extended beyond the

        clear meaning  and intent  of the  legislative body which created

        the statute.


             The courts,  in construing  the words of any statute, cannot

        include someone  other than  the ones  described in that statute;

        to do  so would be like extending the law that controls the speed

        of an  airplane propeller to include a pedestrian walking along a

        path in a forest.


             Chapter 75, which contains Section 7343, carries the heading

        "Crimes, Other Offenses, and Forfeitures".  Section 7343 states:



             Section 7343.  Definition of term "person."


             The term  "person" as  used  in  this  chapter  includes  an

             officer or  employee  of  a  corporation,  or  a  member  or

             employee of  a partnership, who as such officer, employee or

             member is  under a  duty to  perform the  act in  respect of

             which the violation occurs.

                                                         [26 U.S.C. 7343]



             This section  was previously  found in  Section  150,  which

        referred only  to corporation tax returns.  This was the original

        intent of  Congress.   Thus, Section 7806 is brought to bear upon

        the application of this section.  Section 7806 States:



             Sec. 7806.  Construction of title.


             (b)  Arrangement and Classification.


             No inference,  implication, or  presumption  of  legislative

             construction shall  be  drawn  or  made  by  reason  of  the

             location or  grouping of any particular section or provision

             or portion  of this  title, nor shall any table of contents,

             table of  cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or

             descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be

             given any legal effect.  The preceding sentence also applies

             to the  sidenotes and  ancillary  tables  contained  in  the

             various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.


                                                      [26 U.S.C. 7806(b)]


        Thus,  26  U.S.C.  7203  does  not  apply  to  the  Appellant,  a

        California State  Citizen, because  such individual  Citizens are

        not within  the purview of Chapter 75.  Therefore, the indictment

        must fail.







             For the  forgoing reasons,  the Accused's conviction must be

        reversed, with  an affirmative  declaration that the Accused is a

        de jure  California State Citizen, and a member of the Posterity,

        as defined  in the  Preamble to  the Constitution  for the United

        States of America.




        Respectfully submitted

        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights

        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,







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