These Memoranda of Law have been adapted and updated from the files FMEMOLAW and 9THAPPEA on Richard McDonald's electronic bulletin board system (BBS). See references to MEMOLAW and FMEMOLAW in Chapter 11.
Richard McDonald has given his generous permission to publish the following versions of these documents as another Appendix in the third and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone.
Editing, minor additions and grammatical clarifications were done by Mitch Modeleski, also with Richard McDonald's approval.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ______________________
) NOTICE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff )
) AND
)
vs ) DEMAND FOR HEARING
)
) TO ORDER PROOF
Defendant/Citizen )
) OF JURISDICTION
)
TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing has been requested by the
Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] to take place on the
________ day of ___________________, 1993, at _____________ hours
in Courtroom _______, of the above entitled Court located at
________________.
1. This hearing has been called to resolve certain
conclusions of law which are in controversy. The demand for this
hearing constitutes a direct challenge to the jurisdiction of
this Court in the instant matter at bar. The accused Citizen
[DEFENDANT] is aware that he has been compelled to participate in
this action under threat of arrest and incarceration, should he
fail to appear when ordered to do so.
2. The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court is not in
question here. Rather, because the matter is criminal in nature
and involves a compelled performance to what is essentially
derived from Roman Civil (Administrative) Law, the Accused
herewith challenges the In Personam jurisdiction of this Court.
The Accused does so on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed
to provide an offer of proof that the Accused is subject to the
legislative equity jurisdiction in which this Court intends to
sit to hear and determine only the facts of this matter, and not
the law, arising from a "Bill of Pains and Penalties".
3. It is well known that jurisdiction may be challenged at
any time as an issue of law because, absent jurisdiction, all
acts undertaken under the color of statute or under the color of
ordinance are null and void ab initio (from their inception).
4. Because the Accused was compelled, under threat of
further damage and injury, to enter this Court to demand relief,
this appearance is SPECIAL, and not general in nature.
5. The argument which follows sets forth the nature of the
controversy "At Law". This Court is bound by its oath of office
to sit on the Law side of its jurisdiction to hear the
controversy in a neutral capacity and to make a fair and
impartial determination.
6. This document, and the argument contained herein, is
intended to be the basis for further action on appeal, should
this Court fail to afford a complete hearing on the law of the
matter at the noticed request of the Accused. Furthermore, a
failure of this Court to seat on the Law side of its jurisdiction
to determine this timely question will give the Accused cause to
file for a Writ of Prohibition in a higher Court.
ARGUMENT
1. The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)
is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution of State of
California must be construed in harmony with the supreme law of
the land; otherwise, the State of California has violated its
solemn contract with the Union of States known as the United
States of America, and the question raised herein becomes one
which is a proper original action before the Supreme Court of the
United States, sitting in an Article 3 capacity.
2. An employee of the Internal Revenue Service has
submitted allegations in what amounts to a "Bill of Pains and
Penalties" alleging that I, [DEFENDANT], have somehow failed to
perform according to the terms of some agreement for specific
performance on my part.
3. By submitting this Bill of Pains and Penalties, the
individual in question has accused [DEFENDANT] of failing to
perform specifically to some legislative statute which is being
presented as evidence of the law. Statutes are not laws; they
are administrative regulations which are civil in nature, even
when they carry sanctions of a criminal nature, unless there is
an injured party who is brought forward as a corpus delicti.
4. Thus, because of this unsupported conclusion of law,
and because the Internal Revenue Service has administratively
decided that the Accused is subject to the statutes in question,
the Accused Citizen holds that a contrary conclusion of law
exists to challenge the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore,
this Court must now sit in a neutral position, on the Law side of
its jurisdiction, to hear and resolve the question of
controversial positions of law as they affect its jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction In Personam.
5. This argument is intended to serve as both a defense
"At Law" in this Court, and as the basis of future actions,
should it become necessary to appeal the question presented to a
higher judicial authority.
6. If the Accused Citizen is correct, and if this Court is
sitting to hear the violation of a regulatory statute, then it is
possible that the judges of this Court, in hearing this matter,
are acting in an administrative capacity rather than a judicial
capacity. This issue is discussed in detail in the argument
which follows.
7. This Court is placed on NOTICE that, if it fails to sit
and hear this issue "At Law" upon a timely request, then you may
have violated your oath of office to uphold and defend the
Constitutions of the United States of America (1787) and the
California Republic (1849). Such an act will serve to place you
and the other parties to this action outside the realm of
judicial immunity and subject to future action by this Accused
California Citizen. The Prosecutor in this action is
specifically placed on NOTICE that s/he carries no shirttail
immunity should s/he continue to prosecute, in the absence of a
determination "At Law" of the question presented herein before
trial.
JURISDICTION
8. In 1849, California became one of the several States of
the Union of States known as the United States of America.
California is a "Common Law" State, meaning that the Common Law,
as derived from the common law of England, is a recognized form
of law in the State of California.
9. Article 3 of the Constitution of the United States of
America gives "judicial" power to the various courts, among them
the District Courts. What is not generally recognized is that
the District Courts may seat in different jurisdictions. Judges
may wear different hats, so to speak, depending on the nature of
the case brought before them.
10. This Court may sit "At Law" to hear crimes and civil
complaints involving a damage or injury which is unlawful under
the Common Law of a State; or it may seat in equity to determine
specific performance to a contract in equity. Alternatively, as
a creation of the foreign Corporate State, this Court may seat
administratively in a fiction which may be termed "legislative
equity", under authority to regulate activities not of common
right, such as commerce for profit and gain, or other privileged
activities.
11. The Internal Revenue Code is essentially a "civil,
regulatory statute" which was enacted in 1939 to tax and regulate
employees of the Federal Government and "citizens of the United
States" (i.e., of the District of Columbia), and to set forth
rules and regulations for the production of revenue for the
"United States", as defined in the U.S. Constitution.
12. It is an unlawful abuse of procedure to use civil
statutes as "evidence of the law" in a criminal matter,
particularly when a United States Code has not been enacted into
positive law (see, specifically, 26 U.S.C. 7851(a)(6)(A)).
13. Both civil and criminal matters "At Law" require that
the complaining party be a victim of some recognizable damage.
The "Law" cannot recognize a "crime" unless there is a victim who
properly claims to have been damaged or injured.
14. Regulatory statutes, on the other hand, are enacted
under the police power of State and Federal Governments to
regulate activities not of common right. All statute law is
inferior to, and bound by, the restrictions of the Constitution.
These "regulatory" statutes operate as "law" on the subjects of
those statutes, and violations may carry sanctions of a criminal
nature, even in the absence of a victim or injury.
15. A self-evident truth which distinguishes "crimes" under
the Law, from "offenses of a criminal nature" under regulatory
statutes, is the difference between Rights afforded to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding, and "rights" available to a
defendant under "due process" in a statutory proceeding.
16. In the case of true crimes "At Law", the Common-Law
Citizen [DEFENDANT] enjoys all his fundamental rights as
guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, including both
"substantive" and "procedural" due process. In contrast, when
regulatory offenses "of a criminal nature" are involved, the
statutory defendant cannot demand constitutional rights, since
only certain "civil rights" have been granted in these actions,
and only "procedural due process", consisting of the right to be
heard on the facts alone, is allowed. Constitutional rights and
substantive due process are noticeably absent. Therefore, the
Court must be seated in some jurisdiction other than "At Law", in
order to hear an alleged violation of a regulatory statute.
17. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT], hereby
places all parties and the Court on NOTICE, that he is not a
"citizen of the United States" under the so-called 14th
Amendment, i.e., a juristic person or a franchised person who can
be compelled to perform under the regulatory Internal Revenue
Code, which is civil in nature. Moreover, the Accused Common-Law
Citizen [DEFENDANT] hereby challenges the In Personam
jurisdiction of the Court with this contrary conclusion of law.
This Court is now mandated to seat on the Law side of its
capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused Citizen.
18. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] contends
that the Internal Revenue Service made a false conclusion of law
in an administrative capacity when it first brought this action
before the Court, and in so doing failed to impart jurisdiction
upon this Court to seat and hear this matter in a jurisdiction of
legislative equity.
19. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] now demands
that the attorney for the Plaintiff in this matter step forward
with an offer of proof that the Accused Common-Law Citizen
[DEFENDANT], has lost his status as a Common-Law Citizen of the
California Republic, and is now a "resident" of this State who
can be compelled to perform to the letter of every civil statute
because he is either an immigrant alien, a statutory resident
(14th Amendment citizen), a juristic person (corporation), or an
enfranchised person (i.e., one who has knowingly, willingly and
voluntarily entered into an agreement for the exercise of a
privilege or the receipt of a benefit and for the attendant
considerations carried with the grant of that privilege or
benefit).
20. Once jurisdiction is challenged, this Court must sit on
the Law side of its jurisdiction as a neutral arbitrator, before
the allegations of statutory wrongdoing can proceed. Failure to
do so may subject the judge of this Court to charges of perjury
for violating the oath of office by refusing to uphold and
protect the rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitutions
of the California Republic and of the United States of America.
21. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] requests
that this Court take judicial notice that he has been compelled
to enter this Court to answer the allegation, and contends that
the allegations are founded upon false conclusions of law. The
Memorandum of Law which follows will set forth the position of
the Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT], and the record will
show that no evidence is before this Court which contradicts the
position of Citizen [DEFENDANT], except a mere fiction of law.
This fiction of law cannot stand in the face of a clear and
direct challenge.
Dated , 1993
Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
CLASSES OF CITIZENSHIP
1. The Constitution of the United States of America
recognizes several classes of people who exist in this Union of
States, as described in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 (1:2:3).
2. This Court is herewith mandated to take judicial notice
of the Constitution of the United States of America, the
Constitution of the California Republic, the Statutes at Large of
the United States of America, and all case law presented herein,
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 201, et seq.,
and Article 4, Section 1 (4:1) of the Constitution of the United
States of America (1787).
3. Excluding "Indians not taxed", since they are not under
consideration in this matter, we are left with two other classes
of individuals defined in 1:2:3 of the U.S. Constitution, to wit:
"free Persons" and "three-fifths of all other Persons".
4. The term "three fifths of all other Persons" referred
to the Black slave population and all others of races other than
"white" who could not and did not have Common-Law Citizenship of
one of the several States, at the time the Constitution was
adopted. (For an in-depth analysis of this fact, see the cases
of Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393; U.S. vs Rhodes, 1 Abbott
39; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 74; Van Valkenburg vs
Brown, 43 Cal. 43; U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649; and K.
Tashiro vs Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; et al.)
5. The Thirteenth Amendment, officially and lawfully
ratified in 1865, served only to abolish slavery within the
corporate United States. No race other than the white race could
claim Common-Law Citizenship of one of the several States, which
Citizenship was afforded the protection of the Constitutions.
(This is discussed in depth in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra).
6. Further proof that this argument applies to the State
of California is found in Article 2, Section 1 of the Original
California Constitution (1849) which states in part: "Every WHITE
male Citizen of the United States, and every WHITE male citizen
of Mexico ..." [emphasis added]. Obviously, this provision
excluded all other races from being Common-Law Citizens of
California and from having the full protection of the State and
Federal Constitutions. This was the case even before the famous
Dred Scott decision. It is most notable that the California
Constitution was altered after the so-called 14th Amendment so as
to delete all references to "white" male Citizens, and today it
refers only to "persons".
7. Following the decision in Dred Scott, supra, Congress
allegedly enacted and ratified the so-called 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States of America to afford
"statutory citizenship" status to those who were deemed excluded
from this Common-Law status under the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Constitution. This event unfolds in
detail in the case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments,
with a very significant difference which is of great importance
to the instant matter.
8. Such cases as the Slaughter House Cases, supra;
Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; K. Tashiro vs Jordan, supra;
among many others, all declared that under the Law, "there is a
clear distinction between a Citizen of a State and a citizen of
the United States".
9. A famous French statesman, Fredrick Bastiat, noted in
the early 1800's that if freedom were to be destroyed in America,
it would result from the question of slavery and from the failure
to equate all races and all humans as "equals". The Accused is
not responsible for the errors of the past and elects not to
dwell at length on this subject. However, the so-called 14th
Amendment must now be discussed and, as abhorrent as it may
sound, it is a matter of fact and law that this is the position
(intentional or unintentional) which forms the basis of the law
with which we live today.
10. In brief, as a result of the 13th Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that the Union of States known as the
United States of America was founded by "white" people and for
"white" people, and only "white" people could enjoy the Rights,
Privileges and Immunities afforded and protected by the Federal
and State Constitutions. This fact is most eloquently set forth
in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra, in stating that "... if a black
nation were to adopt our Constitution verbatim, they would have
the absolute right to restrict the right of citizenship only to
the black population if they chose to do so ...."
11. To overcome the decision in Dred Scott, supra, the
so-called 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America was allegedly ratified "at the point of a bayonet",
and was "declared" to be a part of the Constitution in the year
1868. However, an examination of the ratification by the several
States shows that various improper proceedings occurred which, in
effect, nullify the Amendment. "I cannot believe that any
court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold
that the amendment was properly approved and adopted." State vs
Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936 (1975); see also Dyett vs Turner, 439
P.2d. 266 (1968).
12. Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] will not digress
into an in-depth dissertation of the bogus ratification of the
so-called 14th Amendment, because the only necessary point to be
made is that the so-called 14th Amendment had a profound effect
upon the Union of these United States, and this effect continues
to the present time.
13. The Original Constitution of the United States of
America (1787) refers to Common-Law Citizens of the several
States in the Preamble, in Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1
(4:2:1), and in numerous other sections. Always, the word
Citizen is spelled with an upper-case "C" when referring to this
class of Common-Law Citizen as a "Citizen of the United States",
i.e., as a "Citizen of one of the United States".
14. In contrast, the so-called 14th Amendment utilizes a
lower-case "c" to distinguish this class of citizens whose status
makes them "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" as a statutory
"citizen of the United States".
15. In the law, each word and each use of the word,
including its capitalization or the lack of capitalization, has a
distinctive legal meaning. In this case, there never was the
specific status of a "citizen of the United States" until the
advent of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27) which was the
forerunner of the so-called 14th Amendment. (See Ex Parte
Knowles, 5 Cal. 300. The definition of the "United States" is
discussed in the next section of this Memorandum.)
16. Before the so-called 14th Amendment was declared to be
a part of the U.S. Constitution, there were a number of State
"residents" who could not enjoy "Common-Law Citizenship" in one
of the several States under that Constitution, because they were
not "white". The effect of the so-called 14th Amendment was to
give to all those residents a citizenship in the nation-state
that was created by Congress in the year 1801 and named the
"United States". (See 2 Stat. 103; see also U.S. vs Eliason, 41
U.S. 291, 16 Peter 291, 10 L.Ed. 968; U.S. vs Simms, 1 Cranch
255, 256 (1803).) The original Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not
encompassing enough, so it was expanded in the year 1964; but
the legal effect was the same, namely, to grant to "citizens of
the United States" the equivalent rights of the Common-Law white
Citizens of the several States. In reality, however, those
"equivalent rights" are limited by various statutes, codes and
regulations and can be changed at the whim of Congress.
17. Under the Federal and State Constitutions, "... We the
People" did not surrender our individual sovereignty to either
the State or Federal Government. Powers "delegated" do not
equate to powers surrendered. This is a Republic, not a
democracy, and the majority cannot impose its will upon the
minority simply because some "law" is already set forth. Any
individual can do anything he or she wishes to do, so long as it
does not damage, injure or impair the same Right of another
individual. The concept of a corpus delicti is relevant here, in
order to prove some "crime" or civil damage.
18. The case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments
all rings with the same message: "These amendments did not
change the status of Common-Law Citizenship of the white Citizens
of one of the several States of the Union" (now 50 in number).
19. This goes to the crux of the controversy because, under
the so-called 14th Amendment, citizenship is a privilege and not
a "Right". (See American and Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1 Pet.
511; Cook vs Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).)
20. It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment
to change the status of the Common-Law Citizens of the several
States. (See People vs Washington, 36 C. 658, 661 (1869);
French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L.Ed. 297).
21. However, over the years, the so-called 14th Amendment
has been used to create a fiction and to destroy American freedom
through administrative regulation. How is this possible? The
answer is self-evident to anyone who understands the law, namely,
a "privilege" is regulatable to any degree, including the
alteration and even the revocation of that privilege.
22. Since the statutory status of "citizen of the United
States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof" (1866 Civil Rights
Act) is one of privilege and not of Right, and since the
so-called 14th Amendment mandates that both Congress and the
several States take measures to protect these new "subjects",
then both the Federal and State governments are mandated to
protect the privileges and immunities of ONLY these "citizens of
the United States". (See Hale vs Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).
23. Of course, the amount of protection afforded has a
price to pay, but the important fact is that the "privilege" of
citizenship under the so-called 14th Amendment can be regulated
or revoked because it is a "privilege" and not a RIGHT. It is
here that the basic, fundamental concept of "self-government"
turns into a King "governing his subjects".
24. One can be called a "freeman", but that was a title of
nobility granted by the King. To be really free encompasses a
great deal more than grants of titles and privileges.
25. Over the years since 1787, because our forefathers
would have rather fought than bow to involuntary servitude, the
"powers that be" have slowly and carefully used the so-called
14th Amendment and the Social Security Act to force primary State
Citizenship into relative extinction, in the eyes of the courts.
Nevertheless, this class of Common-Law Citizens is not extinct
yet; it is simply being ignored, in order to maintain and
enlarge a revenue base for Congress.
26. Since the State of California has been mandated by the
14th Amendment to protect the statutory "citizens of the United
States", and since the People in general have been falsely led to
obtain "Social Security Numbers" as "U.S. citizens", the State of
California under prompting by the Federal Government has used the
licensing and registration of vehicles and people under the
"equal protection" clause for the "Public Welfare" to perpetuate
a scheme of revenue enhancement and regulation. This scheme has
been implemented, in part, by promoting the fiction that the
Common-Law "Citizens of a State of the Union of several States"
can be regulated to the same degree as statutory "citizens of the
United States".
27. I, [DEFENDANT], contend that both the State of
California and the Federal Government (known as the "United
States") are committing an act of GENOCIDE upon the Common-Law
State Citizens of the several States by perpetrating and
perpetuating the "fiction of law" that everyone is a statutory
"citizen of the United States".
This allegation is now discussed by proving exactly what the
"United States" means and in what capacity it now operates.
WHAT IS THE "UNITED STATES"?
28. As we begin, it must be noted that this Common-Law
Citizen alleges "fraud" by the State and Federal Governments in
their failure to inform the people that they are all included
(through the use of a fiction of law) in that statutory class of
persons called "citizens of the United States".
29. The use of this fiction of law is particularly
abhorrent in view of the fact that, when arbitrarily applied to
everyone, the States lose their sovereignty, the Common-Law
Citizens of the State lose their fundamental rights, and the
"citizens of the United States" lose the guidelines which
established their "civil rights". The net effect is that these
actions have lowered everyone's status to that of a "subject".
30. There is a clear distinction between the meanings of
"United States" and "United States of America". The people of
America have been fraudulently and purposely misled to believe
that these terms are completely synonymous in every context.
31. In fact, in Law the term "United States of America"
refers to the several States which are "united by and under the
Constitution"; the term "United States" refers to that
geographical area defined in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17
(1:8:17) and in Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2) of the
Federal Constitution.
32. In 1802, the "Congress Assembled" incorporated a
geographical area known as the "United States". The "United
States" is, therefore, a nation-state which is separate and
unique unto itself. Furthermore, even though the "United States"
is not a member of the "Union of States united by and under the
Constitution", it is bound by that Constitution to restrict its
activities in dealing with the several States and with the
Common-Law Citizens of those States. Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of
the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Congress
has exclusive power to legislate and regulate the inhabitants of
its geographical territory and its statutory "citizens" under the
so-called 14th Amendment, wherever they are "resident", even if
they do inhabit one of the 50 States of the Union.
33. The term "United States" has always referred to the
"Congress Assembled", or to those geographical areas defined in
1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. The proof of this
fact is found in the Articles of Confederation.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America in
Congress Assembled did on the fifteenth day of November in
the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy
Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America
agree to certain Articles of Confederation and perpetual
union between the States of ....
ARTICLE I. The title of this confederacy shall be "The
United States of America".
ARTICLE II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which
is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress Assembled.
NOTE: The term "UNITED STATES" as used therein refers
expressly to "Congress Assembled" on behalf of the several States
which comprise the Union of States (now 50 in number).
34. As can readily be seen from the quote below, with three
separate and distinct definitions for the term "United States",
it becomes absolutely necessary to separate and define each use
of this term in law. It is equally as necessary to separate and
define to whom the law applies when there are two classes of
citizenship existing side-by-side, with separate and distinct
rights, privileges and immunities for each. Such a separate
distinction is not made in the Internal Revenue Code. Citizens
of the California Republic are nowhere defined in this Code or in
its regulations, but are expressly omitted as such and identified
indirectly at best (see 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(B)).
The term "United States" may be used in any one of several
senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in a
family of nations. It may designate territory over which
sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the
collective name of the States which are united by and under
the Constitution.
[Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
[65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89 L.Ed. 1252]
[emphasis added]
35. The term "United States", when used in its territorial
meaning, encompasses the areas of land defined in 1:8:17 and
4:3:2, nothing more. In this respect, the "United States" is a
separate Nation which is foreign with respect to the States
united by and under the Constitution, because the "United States"
as such has never applied for admission to the Union of States
known as the "United States of America". Accordingly, statutory
"citizens of the United States", who are "subject to the
jurisdiction thereof", are defined in the wording of the
so-called 14th Amendment and of The Civil Rights Acts. At best,
this so-called Amendment is a "private Act", rather than a public
act, which designates a class of people who are unique to the
territorial jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Federal
Territories and Possessions, and the land which has been ceded by
the Legislatures of the 50 States to the foreign nation-state of
the "United States" for forts, magazines, arsenals and "other
needful buildings" (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2). Collectively, this
territorial jurisdiction is now termed "The Federal Zone" to
distinguish it uniquely from the nation as a whole and from the
50 States of the Union. The "nation" can, therefore, be defined
as the mathematical union of the federal zone and the 50 States.
36. The District of Columbia is technically a corporation
and is only defined as a "State" in its own codes and under
International Law (e.g., see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10)).
37. The several States which are united by and under the
Constitution are guaranteed a "Republican" (or "rule of law")
form of government by Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution.
However, the foreign nation-state created by Congress and called
the "United States", in its territorial sense, is a "legislative
democracy" (or "majority rule" democracy) which is governed by
International Law rather than the Common Law.
38. The U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that this foreign
nation has every right to legislate for its "citizens" and to
hold subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, both within
(inside) and without (outside) its territorial boundaries, when
legislative acts call for such effects (Cook vs Tait, supra).
39. As a foreign nation under International law, which is
derived from Roman Civil Law (see Kent's Commentaries on American
Law, Lecture 1), it is perfectly legal for this nation to
consider its people as "subjects" rather than as individual
Sovereigns. The protections of the State and the Federal
Constitutions do not apply to these "subjects" unless there is
specific statutory legislation granting specific protections
(e.g., The Civil Rights Act). The guarantees of the Constitution
extend to the "United States" (i.e., the federal zone) only as
Congress has made those guarantees applicable (Hooven, supra).
40. California is a Republic. How does this International
Law come into play in the California Republic? The answer to
this question is presented in the following section.
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
41. Because only "white" people can hold primary Common-Law
State Citizenship under the Constitution, Congress created a
different class of "citizen" and then legislated rights,
privileges and immunities which were intended to be mirror images
of the Rights, Privileges and Immunities enjoyed by the
Common-Law Citizens of the several States.
42. Unfortunately, the nation-state of the "United States"
(District of Columbia) is a democracy and not a Republic. It is
governed basically under authority of International Law, rather
than the Common Law, and its people hold citizenship by
"privilege" rather than by "Right".
43. Certain power-mad individuals, commonly known today as
the Directors of the Federal Reserve Board and the twelve (12)
major international banking families, have used the so-called
14th Amendment to commit "legal genocide" upon the class of
Common-Law Citizens known as the Citizens of the several States.
This has been accomplished by the application of Social Security
through fraud, deception and non-disclosure of material facts,
for the purpose of reducing the Union of States to a people who
are once again enslaved by puppet masters, in order to gather
revenue for the profit of international banks and their owners.
44. It is a fact so well known and understood that it is
indisputable, that "any privilege granted by government is
regulatable, taxable and subject to any restrictions imposed by
the legislative acts of its governing body", including alteration
and even revocation by that governing body.
45. If necessary to do so, the Accused [DEFENDANT] will
submit an offer of proof to show that the "Social Security Act"
is in fact a private act applying only to the territory of the
"United States", acting in its limited capacity, and to its
statutory "citizens of the United States", under the so-called
14th Amendment. Yet, this act has been advertised and promoted
throughout the several States of the Union as being "mandatory
upon the public in general", rather than a "private" act.
46. The effect in law is that, when Common-Law Citizens of
the several States apply for and receive Social Security Numbers,
they voluntarily surrender their primary Common-Law Citizenship
of a State and exchange it for that of a statutory "citizen of
the United States". It is most interesting that any State has
the power to "naturalize" a non-Citizen, but today everyone is
naturalized as "citizens of the United States" under purview of
the so-called 14th Amendment. The long-term effect of this
procedure is that the Common-Law white State Citizens are an
endangered species, on the verge of extinction, and only the
"subject class citizens" will survive to be ruled at the whim and
passion of a jurisdiction which was not intended by our Founding
Fathers or the Framers of the original U.S. Constitution.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
47. Section 1 of the so-called 14th Amendment has had a
far-reaching effect upon the several States of this Union,
because Congress mandated that it would protect its new statutory
"citizens" and that each of the States would also guarantee to
protect these special "citizens".
48. This Nation was founded upon the fundamental principles
of the Common Law and self-government, with limited actual
government. In contrast, the "subjects" of the "United States"
are considered to be incapable of self-government and in need of
protection and regulation by those in authority.
49. The majority of statute law is civil and regulatory in
nature, even when sanctions of a criminal nature are attached for
alleged violations.
50. Among the rights secured by the Common Law in the
Constitution in "criminal" cases are the right to know the
"nature and cause" of an accusation, the right to confront an
accuser, and the right to have both substantive and procedural
due process.
51. It is a fact that the District Court, in Internal
Revenue cases, DOES NOT disclose the nature and cause of the
accusation, does not afford "substantive" due process, and rarely
produces a "corpus delicti" to prove damage or an injured party.
52. The final proof is that the rights given to an accused
in an Internal Revenue case are "civil rights", rather than
Constitutional Rights. The District Court can hear a
Constitutional question, but it cannot rule upon the merits of
the question, because the Constitution does not apply to
regulatory statutes. They are set in place to regulate and
protect the statutory "citizens of the United States" who cannot
exercise, and are not given, the right of individual
self-government.
53. The Federal Constitution mandates that "counsel" be
present at all phases of the proceedings. In contrast, District
Court often conducts arraignment proceedings without either
counsel for the defense or counsel for the prosecution being
present.
CONCLUSION
54. This Court is proceeding under a jurisdiction which is
known to the Constitution, but which is foreign to the intent of
the Constitution, unless applied to those individuals who do not
have Common-Law access by "Right" to the protection of the State
and Federal Constitutions.
55. Whether this jurisdiction be named International Law,
Admiralty/Maritime Law, Legislative Equity, Statutory Law or any
other name, it is abusive and destructive of the Common-Law
Rights of the Citizens of the several States. The Constitutions
of the California Republic and the United States of America
mandate that these rights be guaranteed and protected by all
agencies of government. This is the Supreme Law of our Land.
56. The limit of police power and legislative authority is
reached when a statutory "law" derogates or destroys Rights which
are protected by the Constitution and which belong to the
Common-Law Citizens of the several States who can claim these
Rights.
57. [DEFENDANT] is a white, male Common-Law Citizen of the
Sovereign California Republic. This declaration of status is
made openly and notoriously on the record of these proceedings.
58. As an individual whose primary Common-Law Citizenship
is of the California Republic, [DEFENDANT] claims all the Rights,
Privileges and Immunities afforded and protected by the
Constitutions of the California Republic (1849) and of the United
States of America (1787), as lawfully amended.
59. [DEFENDANT] has never, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily surrendered his
original status as a Common-Law Citizen of the several States, to
become a so-called 14th Amendment Federal citizen who is subject
to the jurisdiction of the "United States".
60. This Court is proceeding in a legislative jurisdiction
which allows a "civil" statute to be used as evidence of the Law
in a "criminal proceeding", and affords only "civil rights",
"procedural due process" and the right to be heard on the facts
evidenced in the statute, rather than the Law and the facts.
61. It is now incumbent upon the Court to seat on the Law
side of its jurisdiction and to order the plaintiff to bring
forth an offer of proof that the Accused [DEFENDANT] can be
subjected to a jurisdiction which uses civil statutes as evidence
of the fundamental Law in criminal cases, which refuses to afford
all Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and available to the
Accused in criminal matters, and which practices procedural due
process to the exclusion of substantive due process, wherein only
the "facts" and not the "facts and Law" are at issue.
62. Should the prosecution fail to bring forth proof that
the Accused [DEFENDANT] has surrendered his original status as a
Common-Law "California State Citizen" for one that is essentially
in "legislative/regulatory equity", then this Court has no
alternative but to dismiss this matter of its own motion in the
interests of justice, for lack of jurisdiction.
Dated , 1993
Respectfully Submitted
Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
C E R T I F I C A T E O F S E R V I C E
I, [DEFENDANT], under penalties of perjury, declare that I
am a California Citizen, domiciled in the California Republic,
and a Citizen of the several States united by and under the
Constitution of the United States of America (see 4:2:1). I am
not a "citizen of the United States" (District of Columbia) nor a
subject of Congress under the 14th Amendment, nor a "resident" in
the State of California who seeks or who is otherwise is under
the protection of the so-called 14th Amendment.
It is hereby certified that service of this notice has been
made on the Plaintiffs and other interested parties by personal
service or by mailing one copy each thereof, on this ________ day
of __________________, 1993, in a sealed envelope, with postage
prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:
The Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, District of Columbia
Postal Zone 20530/tdc
[others as listed here]
Dated , 1993
Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
[from 9THAPPEA.DIR\APPEAL.DOC]
STATEMENT OF STATUS AND JURISDICTION
The Appellant [DEFENDANT], who enjoys the status of a
Caucasian Citizen of the California Republic with Common-Law
rights by birth as a member of the sovereign political body (see
Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404) and who enjoys these
unalienable Common-Law rights by virtue of his birth, is not a
"citizen of the United States" under the so-called 14th
Amendment. Thus, jurisdiction is invoked per the Magna Carta,
Chapters 61, 63; the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776;
the Preamble to the Constitution for the United States of
America, 1787; Article 3, Sections 1 and 2, and Article 6,
Section 2 of the Constitution for the United States of America,
(1787); the California Civil Code, Source of Law, Section 22.2;
the California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1899; and
Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. 368 (1803).
ARGUMENT
I
THE 14TH AMENDMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY APPROVED AND ADOPTED
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATES OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE MAXIMS OF LAW;
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WHITE CITIZENS OF THE SEVERAL STATES,
AND DID NOT AUTHORIZE CONGRESS TO ABOLISH
THE INTENT AND MEANING OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION (1787)
OR TO CREATE A NEW CONSTITUTION UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT [DEFENDANT],
A WHITE DE JURE STATE CITIZEN,
OF HIS UNALIENABLE RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.
POINT 1
The Appellant [DEFENDANT] was indicted and convicted under
the purview of the so-called 14th Amendment. Therefore, the
constitutionality and application of this so-called amendment is
brought squarely before this Court.
The so-called 14th Amendment is invalid, in that it was NOT
properly approved and adopted according to the provisions of
Article 5 of the Constitution (see House Congressional Record for
June 13, 1967, pages 15641-15646, incorporated fully herein by
reference and attached as exhibit "A").
The Fourteenth Amendment was forced upon the people "at the
point of a bayonet" and by the coercion that resulted from not
seating various senators who would not vote in favor of the
so-called amendment, and various other improper proceedings too
numerous to mention here (for details, see 28 Tulane Law Review
22; 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484). It is apparent that,
once a fraud is perpetrated, the fraud enlarges from the effort
to maintain illegitimate power and to conceal its legal effect
upon the invalidity of the so-called 14th Amendment.
The so-called 14th "Amendment" cannot and does not terminate
the Constitutional intent of de jure State Citizenship of the
Appellant [DEFENDANT]. There is ample evidence that no court has
ever held that this "Amendment" was properly approved and
adopted. See, in particular, State vs Phillips, 540 P.2d 936
(1975); Dyett vs Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).
POINT 2:
THE ACCUSED'S DE JURE CITIZENSHIP
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY
The presumed 14th Amendment is illegally applied to the
Appellant [DEFENDANT], a male Caucasian born in the State of
Illinois and now a Citizen of California. The Appellant was not
within the intent or meaning of the so-called 14th Amendment.
It may be stated, as a general principle of law, that it is
for the legislature to determine whether the conditions
exist which warrant the exercise of power; but the question
as to what are the subjects of its exercise, is clearly a
judicial question. One may be deprived of his liberty, and
his constitutional rights thereto may be violated, without
actual imprisonment or restraint of his person.
[In re Aubrey, 36 Wn 308, 314-314, 78 P. 900]
[emphasis added]
The most important thing to be determined is the intent of
Congress. The language of the statute may not be distorted under
the guise of construction, so as to be repugnant to the
Constitution, or to defeat the manifest intent of Congress.
United States vs Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 94 L.Ed. 457, 460; United
States vs Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 82 L.Ed. 413, 58 S.Ct. 353.
Citizenship is a status or condition, and is the result of
both act and intent. 14 C.J.S. Section 1, p. 1130, n. 62.
14th Amendment federal citizenship is a political status
which constitutes a privilege which may be defined and limited
by Congress, Ex Parte (ng) Fung Sing, D.C. Wash. 6 F.R.D. 670.
There is a clear distinction between federal and State
citizenship, K. Tashiro vs Jordan, 256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53
A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278 U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14
C.J.S. 2, p. 1131, n. 75.
The classification "citizen of the United States" is
distinguished from a Citizen of one of the several States, in
that the former is a special class of citizen created by
Congress, U.S. vs Anthony, 24 Fed 829 (1873). As such, a
"citizen of the United States" receives created rights and
privileges from Congress, and thus has a "taxable citizenship" as
a federal citizen under the protection and jurisdiction of
Congress, wherever such citizens are "resident". Cook vs Tait,
265 U.S. 47 (1924), 44 S. Ct. 447; 11 Virginia Law Review 607,
"Income Tax Based Upon Citizenship". This right to tax federal
citizenship is an inherent right under the rule of the Law of
Nations, which is part of the law of the "United States", as
described in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and Article
4, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2). The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732.
The federal government has absolutely no authority whatsoever to
tax the Citizens of the several States for their Citizenship.
The latter have natural rights and privileges which are protected
by the U.S. Constitution from federal intrusion. These rights
are inherent from birth and belong to "US the People" as Citizens
of one of the several States as described in Dred Scott vs
Sandford, 19 How. 393. Such Citizens are not under the direct
protection or jurisdiction of Congress, but they are under the
protection of the Constitutions of the States which they inhabit.
The Act of Congress called the Civil Rights Act, 14 U.S.
Statutes at Large, p. 27, which was the forerunner of the
so-called 14th Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
follows:
... [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States ... to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens ....
[emphasis added]
This was the intent of Congress, namely, not to infringe upon the
Constitution or the status of the de jure Citizens of the several
States. The term "persons" did not include the white de jure
State Citizens. It was never the intent of the 14th Amendment to
subvert the authority of the several States of the Union, or that
of the Constitution as it relates to the status of de jure State
Citizens. See People vs Washington, 36 C. 658, 661 (1869),
overruled on other grounds; also French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324;
MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L. Ed. 297.
The so-called 14th Amendment uses language very similar to
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Harlan J. explained his
interpretation of its meaning in a dissenting opinion which
quoted from the scorching veto message of President Johnson,
Lincoln's successor: It "comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific
States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies,
as well as the entire race designated as blacks, persons of
color, negroes, mulattoes and persons of African blood. Every
individual of those races born in the United States is made a
citizen thereof." Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 114, 5 S.Ct. 41,
28 L.Ed. 643; see also In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274.
In light of the statement by Chief Justice Taney in Dred
Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393, 422, in defining the term
persons, the Judge mentioned "... persons who are not recognized
as citizens ...." See also American and Ocean Ins. Co. vs
Canter, 1 Pet. 511, which also distinguishes "persons" and
"citizens". These were the persons who were the object of the
14th Amendment, to give citizenship to this class of native born
"persons" who were "resident" in the several States, and to
legislate authority to place races other than the white race
within the special category of "citizen of the United States".
It was the intent of the so-called amendment that de jure
Citizens in the several States were not included in its
terminology because they were, by birthright, Citizens as defined
in the Preamble, and could receive nothing from this so-called
amendment. See Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43.
Congress has adopted this definition of "person", as
previously described, so that the Internal Revenue Code would be
constitutional. See McBrier vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
108 F.2d 967, Fn 1 (1939). Thus, Congress has absolute authority
to regulate this de facto entity created by an Act of Congress,
this juristic person who is not given de jure State Citizenship
by birth.
Since the term "citizen of the United States" was used to
create and distinguish a different class of citizen in the 14th
Amendment, this term has been widely used in various revenue
acts, e.g., Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, Section 37, c. 6, 36
Stat. 11; Act of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act
of November 23, 1921, 40 Stat. 227; the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b). These all had a specific meaning,
which did not include a Citizen of one of the several States who
had no franchise with the federal Government (i.e., the District
of Columbia). In fact, the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,
Title I, Section 3, (3) states:
(3) Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen
of the United States.
This specifically means that the Original Social Security
Act, created in 1935, did not change one's citizenship upon
obtaining a SSN. The original Title VIII of the Social Security
Act was repealed by P.L. 76-1, Section 4, 53 Stat. 1, effective
February 11, 1939. Then the substance was added to the 1939
Income Tax Code at Sections 1400-1425. Currently, the substance
of the repealed section can be found in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code at Sections 3101-3126. This repealing, in effect, has
voided the original intent and meaning, and replaced it with a
new intent and meaning. This new intent is unconstitutionally
applied to the Appellant, a de jure State Citizen, who is a
member of the posterity as identified in the Preamble to the
Constitution for the United States of America. This new intent
has never been addressed by any court, as it relates to the
deprivation of State Citizenship.
All changes made after the fact, under the Social Security
Act as it relates to citizenship, are null and void due to fraud
(specifically, non-disclosure). Congress does not now, nor has
it ever had, the authority to take Citizenship away from the
Appellant, a Citizen of the several States, without his knowledge
and informed consent.
The error occurs when, through economic duress and the
failure to disclose to Appellant [DEFENDANT] the liabilities
associated with a Social Security Number, a de jure State Citizen
is compelled "at the point of a bayonet" to give up a Citizenship
that was derived by birth and blood. By obtaining a Social
Security Number, such a State Citizen becomes, in effect, a
second-class citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment, in order
to obtain work to purchase necessities to sustain life.
The so-called 14th Amendment was not intended to impose any
new restrictions upon Citizenship, or to prevent anyone from
becoming a Citizen by fact of birth within the United States of
America, who would thereby acquire Citizenship according to the
law existing before its adoption. "An amendatory act does not
alter the rights existing before its adoption." Billings vs Hall,
7 Cal. 1. Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of
free negroes and to put it beyond doubt that all blacks as well
as whites were citizens. U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18
S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.)
36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Strauder vs West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25
L.Ed. 664; In re Virginia, 100 U.S. 339; Neal vs Delaware, 103
U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567; Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41,
28 L.Ed. 643; Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep.
136; (numerous other cites omitted).
The First Clause of the so-called 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution made negroes "citizens of the United States"
and citizens of the State in which they reside, and thereby
created two classes of citizens: one of the United States and the
other of the State. 4 Dec. Dig. '06, page 1197; Cory vs Carter,
48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738; and it distinguishes between
federal and state citizenship, Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. App. 263,
30 Am. Rep. 131.
Nothing can be found in the so-called 14th Amendment, or in
any reference thereto, that establishes any provision that
transforms Citizens of any state into "citizens of the United
States". In the year 1868 or now (1993), the so-called amendment
created no new status for the white State Citizens. White State
Citizens are natural born Citizens, per Article 2, Section 1,
Clause 5 (2:1:5) and, as such, they are fully entitled to the
"Privileges and Immunities" mentioned in Article 4, Section 2,
Clause 1 (4:2:1), as unalienable rights. These unalienable
rights cannot be overruled or abolished by any act of congress.
The birthright of the Appellant [DEFENDANT]'s de jure State
Citizenship cannot be subordinated merely because Congress
desires more power and control over the people, in order to
create a larger revenue base for the profit of certain private
individuals. Oyama vs California, 332 U.S. 633.
State citizenship, as defined, regulated and protected by
State authority, would disappear altogether, except as
Congress might choose to withhold the exercise of powers.
The tendency of Congress, especially since the adoption of
the recent amendments, has been to overstep its own
boundaries and undertake duties not committed to it by the
Constitution.
[16 Albany Law Journal 24 (1877), (Exhibit B)]
A citizen may not have his de jure citizenship taken away,
Richards vs Secretary of State, (9th Cir) 752 F.2d 1413, (1985);
Afroyim vs Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 87 S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757
(1967); Baker vs Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244 (1969); Vance vs
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 100 S.Ct. 540, 62 L.Ed.2d 461 (1980);
U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890
(1898).
POINT 3
In the formation of the Constitution for the United States
of America, care was taken to confer no power upon the federal
government to control and regulate Citizens within the several
States, because such control would lead to tyranny.
By the Constitution, Congress was to be a representative of,
and an extension of the Several States only for external affairs.
Congress was forbidden to pass municipal laws to regulate and
control de jure Citizens of a State of the Union of the United
States of America. This is, without a doubt, the true
construction of the intent of the Constitution.
That Congress has no authority to pass laws and bind the
rights of the Citizens in the several States, beyond the powers
conferred by the Constitution, is not open to controversy. But,
it is insisted that (1) under the so-called 14th Amendment,
Congress has power to legislate for, and make a subject of, the
Appellant [DEFENDANT] through secret interpretations of the law
and (2) by force of power, laws are enacted in order to control,
by force and fraud, the Nation and the People within the several
States for the purpose of raising revenue for the profit of the
Federal Reserve banks and their private owners.
No rational man can hesitate to believe that the
deprivations of Citizenship and the abuses of the Constitution
are not derived from the Federal Reserve Act. No one can deny
that Congress has thereby attempted to abolish the classification
of de jure Citizen of a State of the Union of the United States,
so that a ever larger revenue base can be maintained.
... nor would the government suffer a loss of his
withholdings.
[[DEFENDANT]'s Pre-Sentence Report, [DATE], page 10]
This establishes, without a doubt, that the United States
government is only concerned about raising revenue under forced
extraction by the withholding system, which was prompted by the
Federal Reserve banks at the instigation of Beardsley Ruml,
former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Congress, through Social Security and the so-called 14th
Amendment, cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits
directly. If Congress, by pseudo power, can legislate away
[DEFENDANT]'s status as a de jure Citizen of the several States,
so might Congress exclude all of [DEFENDANT]'s unalienable rights
as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution.
Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks, by creating a
fictitious debt, have re-instituted an insidious form of slavery.
All slavery has its origin in power, thus usurping a jurisdiction
which does not belong to them and which is against the
unalienable rights of the appellant [DEFENDANT].
Our Constitution is a restraint upon government, purposely
provided and declared upon consideration of all the consequences
which it prohibits and permits, making restraints upon government
the rights of the governed. This careful adjustment of power and
rights makes the constitution what it was intended to be and is,
namely, a real charter of liberty which deserves the praise that
has often been given to it as "The most wonderful work ever
struck off at any given time by the brain and purpose of man."
Block vs Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135.
Thus, this court must uphold the principles upon which the
Constitution was founded; it must be held to guarantee not
particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of
individual rights to life, liberty and property. Basic "State
Citizenship" is the absolute bulwark against "National Tyranny"
as is fostered and applied through the so-called 14th Amendment.
Nowhere in the debates, papers or any court decision written by
anyone does it state that the Constitution authorizes Congress to
destroy the State Citizenship of the Appellant [DEFENDANT].
Prior to the Federal Reserve Act, no political dreamer was
ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which
separate the States, and of compounding the American People into
one common mass of slaves. Yet, this is exactly what has
happened under Social Security, by creating a revenue base for
the collection of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to
the Federal Reserve, in other words, slavery to the national debt
under the so-called 14th Amendment.
The status of "de jure State Citizen" is [DEFENDANT]'s
property. When the application of Social Security annihilates
the value of any property and strips it of its attributes, by
which alone it is distinguishable as property, the Appellant
[DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen, is deprived of it according
to the plainest interpretation of the 5th Amendment, and
certainly within the Constitutional provisions intended to shield
[DEFENDANT]'s personal rights and liberty from the exercise of
arbitrary government power.
This is a case of "suspect classification" in that the
Appellant [DEFENDANT] is "saddled with such disabilities ... as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process
...." 411 U.S. 2, 28. Thus, the devolution of [DEFENDANT]'s de
jure Citizenship into the classification of a de facto juristic
person under the so-called 14th Amendment is such a "suspect
classification" and must be reviewed in the light of the original
intent of our Founding Fathers in establishing the Union of
several States in the first place.
Citizenship under the so-called 14th Amendment is a
privilege granted by Congress, i.e., a civil status conferring
limited rights and privileges, not a birthright that is secured
by the Constitution. [DEFENDANT], a white de jure State Citizen,
by virtue of his birth in one of the several States, received
that which cannot be granted by Congress, nor can Congress make
void a Citizenship status which he derived by birth and by blood.
... [A]nd no member of the state should be disfranchised, or
deprived of any of his rights or privileges under the
constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of
his peers.
[Kent's Commentaries, Vol. II, p. 11, 1873, 12th ed.]
There can be no law, statute or treaty that can be in
conflict with the intent of the original founding constitution.
For, if this were permitted to occur, the founding Constitution
would be a nullity. The original Constitution of 1787 is
perpetual, as is the Citizenship that is recognized by it. See
Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700. If any legislation is repugnant
to the Constitution, this Court has the eminent power to declare
such enactments null and void ab initio (from their inception).
See Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-180 (1803).
The rule that should be applied is that laws, especially
foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted
and applied according to the plain import of the language used,
as it would have been the intent and understood by our Founding
Fathers. The so-called 14th Amendment has been used to distort
and nullify the purposes and intent of the foundational
Constitution, for the ulterior motive of giving pseudo power
where no such power was granted or intended, and where such
pseudo power was specifically denied in the Constitution.
This has resulted in the complete annihilation of the
balance of checks, so desired by our Founding Fathers. One of
these was the sovereignty of the people. At the present time,
the "United States", under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, has
extended its pseudo authority to abolish the status of de jure
State Citizens, and to render [DEFENDANT] a "federal" citizen
under the so-called 14th Amendment who is more apply described as
a subject of Congress and a "federal" resident within the several
States. This has had the unlawful effect of denying
[DEFENDANT]'s birthright to be a free born de jure State Citizen,
as was the intent of the original Constitution.
The so-called 14th Amendment did not authorize Congress to
change either the Citizenship or the status of Citizens of the
several States. "They are unaffected by it." U.S. vs Anthony,
24 F. 829. Yet, through deliberate misinterpretation of the Act,
Congress has by statute overruled and voided the Constitution.
This was done at the prompting of the Federal Reserve banks and
their private owners.
In application, Congress and the Federal Reserve banks have
utilized the so-called 14th Amendment as a totally new
Constitution, solely for the benefit of the Federal Reserve, and
to the detriment of Appellant [DEFENDANT], a sovereign Citizen of
the California Republic.
This Union of the United States of America was founded upon
the principles of the Christianity and the common law. Force and
fraud cannot prevail against the will of the people and the
Constitution. The legislative intent of the so-called 14th
Amendment was only to grant citizenship to a distinct class of
people, not to create a new constitution. This court must
determine whether the "act" was properly approved and adopted.
State vs Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 942 (1975). If it was properly
approved and adopted, this court must also determine if it is
also being unconstitutionally applied against the Appellant
[DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen of California.
The abuses heaped upon the Appellant, a California State
Citizen, only foretell the impending doom and downfall of a
centralized government. Our Founding Fathers understood this,
and the Constitution was written so that this would not occur.
But, to the great shame of the judicial system, they have let
the thirst for power prevail over the Constitution. (Exhibit A)
Hitler used National Social Insurance to control and enslave
the people of Germany. Likewise, the "United States" (Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 17) is doing the same thing here in America.
(Perhaps now it should be spelled "Amerika"). When is enough
enough? When will the courts quit playing "ostrich", pull their
heads out of the sand, see what is happening and correct the
situation before it is too late. The camel of tyranny now has
its nose and its two front legs under the tent.
Congress has passed the 14th Amendment under force of arms,
included the municipal code of the District of Columbia into the
United States Codes, and made various secret interpretations of
the acts, never inquiring whether they had authority to proceed.
But, can this Court also undertake for itself the same sundry
constructions? The Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches
have all repeatedly acknowledged that our particular security is
in the possession and adherence to the written Constitution.
Yet, by various and sundry constructions and the wrongful
application of the acts of Congress, the House and Senate are
attempting to turn the Constitution into a blank piece of paper,
with complete judicial approval.
[DEFENDANT], a de jure natural State Citizen, is in full
possession of personal and political rights, which the "United
States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) did not give and cannot
take away. Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393, 513; Afroyim vs
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253; U.S. vs Miller, 463 F.2d 600. Nor is the
Appellant a de jure State Citizen restrained by any enumeration
or definition of his rights or liberties. The so-called 14th
Amendment did not impair or change the status of the de jure
Citizens of the several States of the Union of the United States
of America. To imply that an act of Congress supersedes and
makes null and void the Constitution for the United States of
America, is blatantly and demonstrably absurd. This construction
cannot be enforced or adopted by any legal authority whatsoever.
The municipal jurisdiction of Congress does not extend to
the Appellant or to his property. This is the case because he is
a de jure State Citizen of the several States. The municipal
jurisdiction of Congress only extends to the limits as defined in
the Constitution itself (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).
Where rights are secured by the Constitution there can be no
legislation or rule making which would abrogate them.
[Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]
Thus, the Citizenship of the Appellant as a Citizen of California
must be upheld by the preceding positive statement and decree by
the U.S. Supreme Court. This court must uphold this principle of
law.
II
THE PREAMBLE AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.
THEREFORE, CONGRESS CANNOT DEPRIVE
A WHITE STATE CITIZEN OF HIS DE JURE STATE CITIZENSHIP
AS A MEMBER OF THE POSTERITY,
AS WAS THE INTENT DEFINED IN THE PREAMBLE.
POINT 1
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United State
declares the intent and purpose of the covenant:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
[Preamble]
Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expounded
on the importance of this Preamble:
The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of
expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt,
and universally conceded in all judicial discussions. It is
an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the
administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is
a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs,
which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be
accomplished by the provisions of the statute. We find it
laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common
law; and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression,
cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Probably it has
a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law,
from the universal principle of interpretation, that the
will and intention of the legislature is to be regarded and
followed. It is properly resorted to, where doubts or
ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part; for
if they are clear and unambiguous, there seems little room
for interpretation, except in cases leading to an obvious
absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention
expressed in the Preamble.
[Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States]
[Joseph Story, Vol. 1, De Capo Press Reprints (1970)]
[at pages 443, 444]
With the authority of Justice Story, then, we examine the
wording of the Preamble as to the term "Union". The term "Union"
as used in the Preamble is evidently the one declared in the
Declaration of Independence (1776) and organized in accordance
with "certain articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union
between the States" which declared that "the Union shall be
perpetual." See Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700.
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and
arbitrary relation. It began among Colonies, and grew out
of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles,
similar interest, and geographical relations. It was
confirmed strengthened by the necessities of war, and
received definite form, and character, and sanction from the
Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly
declared to "be perpetual." And when these Articles were
found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the
Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect union."
It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity
more clearly than these words. What can be indissoluble if
a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?
But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no
means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence,
or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the
Articles of Confederation each State retained its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the
United States. Under the Constitution, though, the powers
of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this
term, that "the people of each State compose a State, having
its own government, and endowed with all the functions
essential to separate and independent existence," and that
"without the States in union, there could be no such
political body as the United States." Not only, therefore,
can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
the States, through their union under the Constitution, but
it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the
States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as
much within the design and care of the maintenance of the
National government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.
When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she
entered into a indissoluble relation. All the obligations
of perpetual union, and all the guarantees of republican
government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The
act which consummated her admission into the Union was
something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of
a new member into the political body. And it was final.
The union between Texas and the other States was as
complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union
between the original States. There was no place for
reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution,
or through consent of the States.
[Texas vs White, 7 Wallace, at pages 723 to 726 (1886)]
Similarly, the term "establish", as used in the Preamble,
means to fix perpetually:
STAB'LISH ...
1. To set and fix firmly or unalterable; to settle
permanently.
I will establish my covenant with him for an
everlasting covenant. Gen. xvii
2. To found permanently; to erect and fix or settle;
as, to establish a colony or empire.
3. To enact or decree by authority and for permanence
4. To settle or fix; to confirm.
5. To make firm; to confirm; to ratify what has
been previously set or made.
Do we then make void the law through faith? God
forbid: yea, we establish the law. Rom. iii.
[An American Dictionary of the English Language]
[Noah Webster (1828), reprinted by]
[Foundation for American Christian Education (1967)]
ESTABLISH. This word occurs frequently in the Constitution
of the United States, and it is there used in different
meanings:
1. to settle firmly, to fix unalterable; as to
establish justice, which is the avowed object of
the Constitution ...
2. To settle or fix firmly; place on a permanent
footing; found; create; put beyond doubt or
dispute; prove; convince ...
[Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at page 642]
Thus, if the Union is perpetual, then so too is the founding
law upon which that Union was predicated in the first place, and
so too is the unalienable Citizenship recognized therein.
POINT 2
THE ORGANIC LAW
AND THE UNION FOUNDED THEREON
ARE PERPETUAL
The founding law of the nation is the perpetual authority
upon which the continued existence of the nation itself is
predicated. As such, the founding law carries universal
authority and cannot be overthrown or subverted without
repudiating the very existence of the nation established thereby.
ORGANIC LAW. The fundamental law, or constitution, of a
state or nation, written or unwritten; that law or system
of laws or principles which defines and establishes the
organization of its government. St. Louis vs Dorr, 145 Mo.
466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 LRA 686, 68 Am St Rep 575
[Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Pub. (1968), p. 1251]
The authority of the organic law is universally
acknowledged; it speaks the sovereign will of the people;
its injunction regarding the process of legislation is as
authoritative as are those touching the substance of it.
Suth. Statutory Construction, 44, note 1. "This Constitution
... shall be the supreme law of the land ...." Article 6,
Constitution of the United States (1787).
That the people have an original right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall be most conducive to their own happiness, is
the basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected. The exercise of the original right is a very
great exertion, nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed
to be permanent.
The original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns, to different departments, their respective powers.
It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to
be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter
description. The powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are
the powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if the limits may, at any time be
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction,
between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too
plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature
may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a
legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if
the latter be true, then written constitutions are absurd
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in
its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be,
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void ....
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the
constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount
law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that the
courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
[Marbury vs Madison, 1 Cranch 137, at pages 176 to 178]
III
AN INDICTMENT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION,
IF IT USES WORDS OF NUMEROUS MEANINGS,
SO AS TO BE VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS,
SO THE DEFENDANT IS UNCERTAIN OF
SECRET AND SPECIFIC MEANINGS,
THEREBY BEING DENIED A DEFENSE.
1. The indictment utilizes the term "resident" as its
jurisdictional statement, without any further clarification.
"The jurisdiction of a federal court must affirmatively and
distinctly appear and cannot be helped by presumptions or by
argumentive inferences drawn from the pleadings." Norton vs
Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 515, 45 S. Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925).
Accord, Bender vs Williamsport Area Schools District, 475 U.S.
534, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501, rehearing denied, 106
S.Ct. 2003 (1986); Nor can a contester's allegations of
jurisdiction be read in isolation from the complaint's factual
allegations, Schilling vs Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 676, 80 S.Ct.
1288, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960), nor can jurisdiction be effectively
established by omitting facts which would establish that it does
not exist. Lambert Run Coal Co. vs Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258
U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). Nor can
jurisdiction be "gleaned from the briefs and arguments" of the
Plaintiff. Bender, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1334. The burden fully
to demonstrate jurisdiction clearly falls on the Plaintiff, and a
failure fully to define the conditions creating some nexus under
the ambiguous term "resident" is an error.
The requirement to prove jurisdiction is particularly
important when the government of a foreign state (the "United
States") brings criminal charges against a Citizen of another
State.
Where jurisdiction is denied and squarely challenged,
jurisdiction cannot be assumed to exist "sub silentio" but must
be proven. Hagans vs Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533, n. 5; Monell vs
N.Y., 436 U.S. 633. Mere "good faith" assertions of power and
authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished. Owen vs Indiana,
445 U.S. 622; Butz vs Economou, 438 U.S. 478; Bivens vs 6
unknown agents, 403 U.S. 388.
An indictment is "vague" if it does not allege each of the
essential elements of the crime with sufficient clarity to enable
the defendant to prepare his defense. U.S. vs BI-CO Pavers, 741
F.2d 730 (1984). Where the defendant must guess at its meaning,
it is vague and violates the first essential element of due
process. See Connolly vs General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).
It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that
where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common
law or by statute, "includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in
the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must
state the species; it must descend to the particulars. 1
Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl. 291.
[U.S. vs Cruikshank, La. 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1872)]
[emphasis added]
IV
26 U.S.C. SECTION 7203, IN AND OF ITSELF,
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN AN INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION,
WHEN NO OTHER STATUTE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.
26 U.S.C. 7203, in and of itself, does not describe a
triable offense, nor does it state any basis for any crimes or
public offenses, so as to confer jurisdiction for any issue that
is triable as a "misdemeanor". On the contrary, as will be
shown, jurisdiction is absent.
Sec. 7203. Willful Failure to File Return, Supply
Information, or Pay Tax.
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated
tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made
under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records,
or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such
estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records,
or supply such information at the time or times required by
law and regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000
($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of the
prosecution. In the case of any person with respect to whom
there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section
shall not apply to such person with respect to such failure
if there is no addition to tax under section 6654 or 6655
with respect to such failure.
[26 U.S.C. 7203]
IRC 7203 fails to provide any definition of any offense by
failing to charge any statutory crime in any language of any
statute.
The language of 26 U.S.C. 7203, in and of itself, and any
alleged violation as propounded in Appellee's indictment, fails
to be fully descriptive of any offense or crime. It is,
therefore, fundamentally impossible to violate Section 7203 since
this Section, in and of itself, does not include or refer to any
specific statute that could provide a nexus for prosecution, as
is clearly shown in U.S. vs Menk, 260 F. Supp. 784:
But, rather, all three sections referred to in the
information, sections 4461, 4901, and 7203, must be
considered together before a complete definition of the
offense is found. Section 4461 imposes a tax on persons
engaged in a certain activity; section 4901 provides the
payment of the tax shall be a condition precedent to
engaging in the activity subject to the tax and Section 7203
makes it a misdemeanor to engage in the activity without
first having paid the tax, and provides the penalty. It is
impossible to determine the meaning or intended effect of
any one of these three sections without reference to the
others.
[U.S. vs Menk, supra, emphasis added]
Contrary to the accusatory pleadings, 26 U.S.C. 7203, in and
of itself, is not a statute subject to violation since it is
nothing more than a penalty clause for some undefined franchise
obligation. Section 7203, upon which the Appellee's indictment
is based, fails to provide a complete definition of any offense,
and therefore, in and of itself, it fails to state properly a
claim upon which probable cause could predicate. As the Court
stated in U.S. vs Menk, supra:
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
held that an indictment or information is sufficient which
defines a statutory crime substantially in the language of
the statute if such language is fully descriptive of the
offense.
[U.S. vs Menk, supra at 786]
Section 7203 contains no such descriptive language, nor does it
identify any other statutes.
It cannot be said that Section 7203 imposes a tax on persons
engaged in a certain activity, nor can it be said that 7203
provides that the payment of the tax shall be a condition
precedent to engaging in the activity subject to the tax.
However, 7203 makes it a misdemeanor to engage in the activity
without having first paid the tax, and provides the penalty. In
addition, 7203 makes it a misdemeanor not to file a return, keep
records or supply information that may be required by several
other statutes and regulations, which specifically determine that
activity and crime.
Because the activity in the Appellees' indictment is
undefined, Section 7203 is not, in and of itself, a basis for
prosecution, and there is no probable cause of action against the
Appellant. Similarly, it is impossible to determine the meaning
or intended effect of Section 7203 without having reference to
other possibly applicable and as yet undefined sections of Title
26, U.S.C.
Plainly and simply, Section 7203 is only a penalty statute,
and by itself cannot stand without reference to other statutes
and or regulations. An IRS agent stated on the record that no
other statutes were violated or identified as such before the
grand jury (CR June 28, 1988, p. 13, lines 5-12).
Thus the indictment is vague and the court is in error in
sustaining the indictment and conviction.
V
THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "PERSON" USED IN SECTION 7203,
AS DEFINED IN 7343 FOR CHAPTER 75, WHICH INCLUDES 7203,
CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SOMEONE
OTHER THAN THE INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 7343.
The words used in a statute cannot be extended beyond the
clear meaning and intent of the legislative body which created
the statute.
The courts, in construing the words of any statute, cannot
include someone other than the ones described in that statute;
to do so would be like extending the law that controls the speed
of an airplane propeller to include a pedestrian walking along a
path in a forest.
Chapter 75, which contains Section 7343, carries the heading
"Crimes, Other Offenses, and Forfeitures". Section 7343 states:
Section 7343. Definition of term "person."
The term "person" as used in this chapter includes an
officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or
employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee or
member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of
which the violation occurs.
[26 U.S.C. 7343]
This section was previously found in Section 150, which
referred only to corporation tax returns. This was the original
intent of Congress. Thus, Section 7806 is brought to bear upon
the application of this section. Section 7806 States:
Sec. 7806. Construction of title.
(b) Arrangement and Classification.
No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative
construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the
location or grouping of any particular section or provision
or portion of this title, nor shall any table of contents,
table of cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or
descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be
given any legal effect. The preceding sentence also applies
to the sidenotes and ancillary tables contained in the
various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.
[26 U.S.C. 7806(b)]
Thus, 26 U.S.C. 7203 does not apply to the Appellant, a
California State Citizen, because such individual Citizens are
not within the purview of Chapter 75. Therefore, the indictment
must fail.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Accused's conviction must be
reversed, with an affirmative declaration that the Accused is a
de jure California State Citizen, and a member of the Posterity,
as defined in the Preamble to the Constitution for the United
States of America.
Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
[DEFENDANT]
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