Appendix Y: Memoranda of Law

Author's Note:

These Memoranda of Law have been adapted and updated from the files FMEMOLAW and 9THAPPEA on Richard McDonald's electronic bulletin board system (BBS). See references to MEMOLAW and FMEMOLAW in Chapter 11.

Richard McDonald has given his generous permission to publish the following versions of these documents as another Appendix in the third and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone.

Editing, minor additions and grammatical clarifications were done by Mitch Modeleski, also with Richard McDonald's approval.

                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF ______________________
                                 )    NOTICE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
        Plaintiff                )
                                 )                AND
        vs                       )         DEMAND FOR HEARING
                                 )           TO ORDER PROOF
        Defendant/Citizen        )
                                 )           OF JURISDICTION
             PLEASE TAKE  NOTICE that a hearing has been requested by the
        Accused Common-Law  Citizen [DEFENDANT]  to  take  place  on  the
        ________ day of ___________________, 1993, at _____________ hours
        in Courtroom  _______, of  the above  entitled Court  located  at
             1.   This  hearing   has  been  called  to  resolve  certain
        conclusions of law which are in controversy.  The demand for this
        hearing constitutes  a direct  challenge to  the jurisdiction  of
        this Court  in the  instant matter  at bar.   The accused Citizen
        [DEFENDANT] is aware that he has been compelled to participate in
        this action  under threat  of arrest and incarceration, should he
        fail to appear when ordered to do so.
             2.   The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court is not in
        question here.   Rather, because the matter is criminal in nature
        and involves  a compelled  performance  to  what  is  essentially
        derived  from  Roman  Civil  (Administrative)  Law,  the  Accused
        herewith challenges  the In  Personam jurisdiction of this Court.
        The Accused  does so  on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed
        to provide  an offer  of proof that the Accused is subject to the
        legislative equity  jurisdiction in  which this  Court intends to
        sit to  hear and determine only the facts of this matter, and not
        the law, arising from a "Bill of Pains and Penalties".
             3.   It is well known that jurisdiction may be challenged at
        any time  as an  issue of  law because,  absent jurisdiction, all
        acts undertaken  under the color of statute or under the color of
        ordinance are null and void ab initio (from their inception).
             4.   Because the  Accused was  compelled,  under  threat  of
        further damage  and injury, to enter this Court to demand relief,
        this appearance is SPECIAL, and not general in nature.
             5.   The argument which follows sets forth the nature of the
        controversy "At  Law".  This Court is bound by its oath of office
        to  sit  on  the  Law  side  of  its  jurisdiction  to  hear  the
        controversy in  a  neutral  capacity  and  to  make  a  fair  and
        impartial determination.
             6.   This document,  and the  argument contained  herein, is
        intended to  be the  basis for  further action  on appeal, should
        this Court  fail to  afford a  complete hearing on the law of the
        matter at  the noticed  request of  the Accused.   Furthermore, a
        failure of this Court to seat on the Law side of its jurisdiction
        to determine  this timely question will give the Accused cause to
        file for a Writ of Prohibition in a higher Court.
             1.   The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)
        is the  supreme law  of the  land.   The Constitution of State of
        California must  be construed  in harmony with the supreme law of
        the land;   otherwise,  the State  of California has violated its
        solemn contract  with the  Union of  States known  as the  United
        States of  America, and  the question  raised herein  becomes one
        which is a proper original action before the Supreme Court of the
        United States, sitting in an Article 3 capacity.
             2.   An  employee   of  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  has
        submitted allegations  in what  amounts to  a "Bill  of Pains and
        Penalties" alleging  that I,  [DEFENDANT], have somehow failed to
        perform according  to the  terms of  some agreement  for specific
        performance on my part.
             3.   By submitting  this Bill  of Pains  and Penalties,  the
        individual in  question   has accused  [DEFENDANT] of  failing to
        perform specifically  to some  legislative statute which is being
        presented as  evidence of  the law.  Statutes are not laws;  they
        are administrative  regulations which  are civil  in nature, even
        when they  carry sanctions  of a criminal nature, unless there is
        an injured party who is brought forward as a corpus delicti.
             4.   Thus, because  of this  unsupported conclusion  of law,
        and because  the Internal  Revenue Service  has  administratively
        decided that  the Accused is subject to the statutes in question,
        the Accused  Citizen holds  that a  contrary  conclusion  of  law
        exists to  challenge the  jurisdiction of this Court.  Therefore,
        this Court must now sit in a neutral position, on the Law side of
        its  jurisdiction,   to  hear   and  resolve   the  question   of
        controversial positions of law as they affect its jurisdiction or
        lack of jurisdiction In Personam.

             5.   This argument  is intended  to serve  as both a defense
        "At Law"  in this  Court, and  as the  basis of  future  actions,
        should it  become necessary to appeal the question presented to a
        higher judicial authority.
             6.   If the Accused Citizen is correct, and if this Court is
        sitting to hear the violation of a regulatory statute, then it is
        possible that  the judges  of this Court, in hearing this matter,
        are acting  in an  administrative capacity rather than a judicial
        capacity.   This issue  is discussed  in detail  in the  argument
        which follows.
             7.   This Court is placed on NOTICE that, if it fails to sit
        and hear  this issue "At Law" upon a timely request, then you may
        have violated  your oath  of office  to  uphold  and  defend  the
        Constitutions of  the United  States of  America (1787)  and  the
        California Republic  (1849).  Such an act will serve to place you
        and the  other parties  to  this  action  outside  the  realm  of
        judicial immunity  and subject  to future  action by this Accused
        California  Citizen.     The   Prosecutor  in   this  action   is
        specifically placed  on NOTICE  that s/he  carries  no  shirttail
        immunity should  s/he continue  to prosecute, in the absence of a
        determination "At  Law" of  the question  presented herein before
             8.   In 1849, California became one of the several States of
        the Union  of States  known as  the  United  States  of  America.
        California is  a "Common Law" State, meaning that the Common Law,
        as derived  from the  common law of England, is a recognized form
        of law in the State of California.
             9.   Article 3  of the  Constitution of the United States of
        America gives  "judicial" power to the various courts, among them
        the District  Courts.   What is  not generally recognized is that
        the District  Courts may seat in different jurisdictions.  Judges
        may wear  different hats, so to speak, depending on the nature of
        the case brought before them.
             10.  This Court  may sit  "At Law"  to hear crimes and civil
        complaints involving  a damage  or injury which is unlawful under
        the Common Law of a State;  or it may seat in equity to determine
        specific performance  to a contract in equity.  Alternatively, as
        a creation  of the  foreign Corporate  State, this Court may seat
        administratively in  a fiction  which may  be termed "legislative
        equity", under  authority to  regulate activities  not of  common
        right, such  as commerce for profit and gain, or other privileged
             11.  The Internal  Revenue Code  is  essentially  a  "civil,
        regulatory statute" which was enacted in 1939 to tax and regulate
        employees of  the Federal  Government and "citizens of the United
        States" (i.e.,  of the  District of  Columbia), and  to set forth
        rules and  regulations for  the production  of  revenue  for  the
        "United States", as defined in the U.S. Constitution.
             12.  It is  an unlawful  abuse of  procedure  to  use  civil
        statutes  as   "evidence  of  the  law"  in  a  criminal  matter,
        particularly when  a United States Code has not been enacted into
        positive law (see, specifically, 26 U.S.C. 7851(a)(6)(A)).
             13.  Both civil  and criminal  matters "At Law" require that
        the complaining  party be  a victim  of some recognizable damage.
        The "Law" cannot recognize a "crime" unless there is a victim who
        properly claims to have been damaged or injured.
             14.  Regulatory statutes,  on the  other hand,  are  enacted
        under the  police power  of  State  and  Federal  Governments  to
        regulate activities  not of  common right.   All  statute law  is
        inferior to,  and bound by, the restrictions of the Constitution.
        These "regulatory"  statutes operate  as "law" on the subjects of
        those statutes,  and violations may carry sanctions of a criminal
        nature, even in the absence of a victim or injury.
             15.  A self-evident truth which distinguishes "crimes" under
        the Law,  from "offenses  of a  criminal nature" under regulatory
        statutes,  is   the  difference  between  Rights  afforded  to  a
        defendant in  a criminal  proceeding, and "rights" available to a
        defendant under "due process" in a statutory proceeding.
             16.  In the  case of  true crimes  "At Law",  the Common-Law
        Citizen  [DEFENDANT]   enjoys  all   his  fundamental  rights  as
        guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, including both
        "substantive" and  "procedural" due  process.   In contrast, when
        regulatory offenses  "of a  criminal nature"  are  involved,  the
        statutory defendant  cannot demand  constitutional rights,  since
        only certain  "civil rights"  have been granted in these actions,
        and only  "procedural due process", consisting of the right to be
        heard on  the facts alone, is allowed.  Constitutional rights and
        substantive due  process are  noticeably absent.   Therefore, the
        Court must be seated in some jurisdiction other than "At Law", in
        order to hear an alleged violation of a regulatory statute.
             17.  The  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT],  hereby
        places all  parties and  the Court  on NOTICE,  that he  is not a
        "citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th
        Amendment, i.e., a juristic person or a franchised person who can
        be compelled  to perform  under the  regulatory Internal  Revenue
        Code, which is civil in nature.  Moreover, the Accused Common-Law
        Citizen   [DEFENDANT]   hereby   challenges   the   In   Personam
        jurisdiction of  the Court  with this contrary conclusion of law.
        This Court  is now  mandated to  seat on  the  Law  side  of  its
        capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused Citizen.

             18.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  contends
        that the  Internal Revenue Service made a false conclusion of law
        in an  administrative capacity  when it first brought this action
        before the  Court, and  in so doing failed to impart jurisdiction
        upon this Court to seat and hear this matter in a jurisdiction of
        legislative equity.
             19.  The Accused  Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] now demands
        that the  attorney for  the Plaintiff in this matter step forward
        with an  offer of  proof  that  the  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen
        [DEFENDANT], has  lost his  status as a Common-Law Citizen of the
        California Republic,  and is  now a  "resident" of this State who
        can be  compelled to perform to the letter of every civil statute
        because he  is either  an immigrant  alien, a  statutory resident
        (14th Amendment  citizen), a juristic person (corporation), or an
        enfranchised person  (i.e., one  who has knowingly, willingly and
        voluntarily entered  into an  agreement for  the  exercise  of  a
        privilege or  the receipt  of a  benefit and  for  the  attendant
        considerations carried  with  the  grant  of  that  privilege  or
             20.  Once jurisdiction is challenged, this Court must sit on
        the Law  side of its jurisdiction as a neutral arbitrator, before
        the allegations  of statutory wrongdoing can proceed.  Failure to
        do so  may subject  the judge of this Court to charges of perjury
        for violating  the oath  of office  by  refusing  to  uphold  and
        protect the  rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitutions
        of the California Republic and of the United States of America.
             21.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  requests
        that this  Court take  judicial notice that he has been compelled
        to enter  this Court  to answer the allegation, and contends that
        the allegations  are founded  upon false conclusions of law.  The
        Memorandum of  Law which  follows will  set forth the position of
        the Accused  Common-Law Citizen  [DEFENDANT], and the record will
        show that  no evidence is before this Court which contradicts the
        position of  Citizen [DEFENDANT],  except a  mere fiction of law.
        This fiction  of law  cannot stand  in the  face of  a clear  and
        direct challenge.
        Dated                , 1993
        Respectfully submitted
        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
        Citizen of the California Republic
        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris

                                MEMORANDUM OF LAW
                              CLASSES OF CITIZENSHIP
             1.   The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America
        recognizes several  classes of  people who exist in this Union of
        States, as described in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 (1:2:3).
             2.   This Court is herewith mandated to take judicial notice
        of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the
        Constitution of the California Republic, the Statutes at Large of
        the United  States of America, and all case law presented herein,
        pursuant to  the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 201, et seq.,
        and Article  4, Section 1 (4:1) of the Constitution of the United
        States of America (1787).
             3.   Excluding "Indians not taxed", since they are not under
        consideration in  this matter, we are left with two other classes
        of individuals defined in 1:2:3 of the U.S. Constitution, to wit:
        "free Persons" and "three-fifths of all other Persons".
             4.   The term  "three fifths  of all other Persons" referred
        to the  Black slave population and all others of races other than
        "white" who  could not and did not have Common-Law Citizenship of
        one of  the several  States, at  the time  the  Constitution  was
        adopted.   (For an  in-depth analysis of this fact, see the cases
        of Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393;  U.S. vs Rhodes, 1 Abbott
        39;   Slaughter House  Cases, 16  Wall. 74;   Van  Valkenburg  vs
        Brown, 43  Cal. 43;   U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649;  and K.
        Tashiro vs Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; et al.)
             5.   The  Thirteenth   Amendment,  officially  and  lawfully
        ratified in  1865, served  only to  abolish  slavery  within  the
        corporate United States.  No race other than the white race could
        claim Common-Law  Citizenship of one of the several States, which
        Citizenship was  afforded the  protection of  the  Constitutions.
        (This is discussed in depth in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra).
             6.   Further proof  that this  argument applies to the State
        of California  is found  in Article  2, Section 1 of the Original
        California Constitution (1849) which states in part: "Every WHITE
        male Citizen  of the  United States, and every WHITE male citizen
        of Mexico  ..."   [emphasis added].   Obviously,  this  provision
        excluded all  other  races  from  being  Common-Law  Citizens  of
        California and  from having  the full protection of the State and
        Federal Constitutions.   This was the case even before the famous
        Dred Scott  decision.   It is  most notable  that the  California
        Constitution was altered after the so-called 14th Amendment so as
        to delete  all references  to "white" male Citizens, and today it
        refers only to "persons".
             7.   Following the  decision in  Dred Scott, supra, Congress
        allegedly enacted  and ratified  the so-called  14th Amendment to
        the Constitution  of the  United  States  of  America  to  afford
        "statutory citizenship"  status to those who were deemed excluded
        from  this   Common-Law  status   under   the   Supreme   Court's
        interpretations of  the Constitution.    This  event  unfolds  in
        detail in  the case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments,
        with a  very significant  difference which is of great importance
        to the instant matter.
             8.   Such  cases   as  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  supra;
        Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78;  K. Tashiro vs Jordan, supra;
        among many  others, all  declared that under the Law, "there is a
        clear distinction  between a  Citizen of a State and a citizen of
        the United States".
             9.   A famous  French statesman,  Fredrick Bastiat, noted in
        the early 1800's that if freedom were to be destroyed in America,
        it would result from the question of slavery and from the failure
        to equate  all races  and all humans as "equals".  The Accused is
        not responsible  for the  errors of  the past  and elects  not to
        dwell at  length on  this subject.   However,  the so-called 14th
        Amendment must  now be  discussed and,  as abhorrent  as  it  may
        sound, it  is a  matter of fact and law that this is the position
        (intentional or  unintentional) which  forms the basis of the law
        with which we live today.
             10.  In brief,  as a  result of the 13th Amendment, the U.S.
        Supreme Court  decided that  the Union  of States  known  as  the
        United States  of America  was founded  by "white" people and for
        "white" people,  and only  "white" people could enjoy the Rights,
        Privileges and  Immunities afforded  and protected by the Federal
        and State  Constitutions.  This fact is most eloquently set forth
        in Dred Scott vs Sandford, supra, in stating that "... if a black
        nation were  to adopt  our Constitution verbatim, they would have
        the absolute  right to  restrict the right of citizenship only to
        the black population if they chose to do so ...."
             11.  To overcome  the decision  in Dred  Scott,  supra,  the
        so-called 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
        of America  was allegedly  ratified "at  the point of a bayonet",
        and was  "declared" to  be a part of the Constitution in the year
        1868.  However, an examination of the ratification by the several
        States shows that various improper proceedings occurred which, in
        effect, nullify  the Amendment.   "I  cannot believe    that  any
        court, in  full possession of its faculties, could honestly  hold
        that the  amendment was properly approved and adopted."  State vs
        Phillips, 540  P.2d. 936  (1975);   see also Dyett vs Turner, 439
        P.2d. 266 (1968).
             12.  Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] will not digress
        into an  in-depth dissertation  of the  bogus ratification of the
        so-called 14th  Amendment, because the only necessary point to be
        made is  that the  so-called 14th Amendment had a profound effect
        upon the  Union of these United States, and this effect continues
        to the present time.
             13.  The Original  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of
        America (1787)  refers to  Common-Law  Citizens  of  the  several
        States in  the Preamble,  in  Article  4,  Section  2,  Clause  1
        (4:2:1), and  in numerous  other sections.     Always,  the  word
        Citizen is  spelled with an upper-case "C" when referring to this
        class of  Common-Law Citizen as a "Citizen of the United States",
        i.e., as a "Citizen of one of the United States".
             14.  In contrast,  the so-called  14th Amendment  utilizes a
        lower-case "c" to distinguish this class of citizens whose status
        makes them  "subject to  the jurisdiction thereof" as a statutory
        "citizen of the United States".
             15.  In the  law, each  word  and  each  use  of  the  word,
        including its capitalization or the lack of capitalization, has a
        distinctive legal  meaning.   In this  case, there  never was the
        specific status  of a  "citizen of  the United  States" until the
        advent of  the 1866  Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27) which was the
        forerunner of  the so-called  14th  Amendment.    (See  Ex  Parte
        Knowles, 5  Cal. 300.   The  definition of the "United States" is
        discussed in the next section of this Memorandum.)
             16.  Before the  so-called 14th Amendment was declared to be
        a part  of the  U.S. Constitution,  there were  a number of State
        "residents" who  could not  enjoy "Common-Law Citizenship" in one
        of the  several States under that Constitution, because they were
        not "white".   The  effect of the so-called 14th Amendment was to
        give to  all those  residents a  citizenship in  the nation-state
        that was  created by  Congress in  the year  1801 and  named  the
        "United States".  (See 2 Stat. 103;  see also U.S. vs Eliason, 41
        U.S. 291,  16 Peter  291, 10  L.Ed. 968;  U.S. vs Simms, 1 Cranch
        255, 256  (1803).)  The original Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not
        encompassing enough,  so it  was expanded  in the year 1964;  but
        the legal  effect was  the same, namely, to grant to "citizens of
        the United  States" the equivalent rights of the Common-Law white
        Citizens of  the several  States.   In  reality,  however,  those
        "equivalent rights"  are limited  by various  statutes, codes and
        regulations and can be changed at the whim of Congress.
             17.  Under the  Federal and State Constitutions, "... We the
        People" did  not surrender  our individual  sovereignty to either
        the State  or Federal  Government.   Powers  "delegated"  do  not
        equate to  powers  surrendered.    This  is  a  Republic,  not  a
        democracy, and  the majority  cannot impose  its  will  upon  the
        minority simply  because some  "law" is  already set  forth.  Any
        individual can  do anything he or she wishes to do, so long as it
        does not  damage, injure  or impair  the same  Right  of  another
        individual.  The concept of a corpus delicti is relevant here, in
        order to prove some "crime" or civil damage.
             18.  The case  law surrounding  the 13th and 14th Amendments
        all rings  with the  same message:   "These  amendments  did  not
        change the status of Common-Law Citizenship of the white Citizens
        of one of the several States of the Union" (now 50 in number).
             19.  This goes to the crux of the controversy because, under
        the so-called  14th Amendment, citizenship is a privilege and not
        a "Right".   (See  American and  Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1 Pet.
        511;  Cook vs Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).)
             20.  It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment
        to change  the status  of the  Common-Law Citizens of the several
        States.   (See People  vs Washington,  36  C.  658,  661  (1869);
        French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L.Ed. 297).
             21.  However, over  the years,  the so-called 14th Amendment
        has been used to create a fiction and to destroy American freedom
        through administrative  regulation.   How is  this possible?  The
        answer is self-evident to anyone who understands the law, namely,
        a "privilege"  is   regulatable  to  any  degree,  including  the
        alteration and even the revocation of that privilege.
             22.  Since the  statutory status  of "citizen  of the United
        States, subject  to the  jurisdiction thereof" (1866 Civil Rights
        Act) is  one of  privilege  and  not  of  Right,  and  since  the
        so-called 14th  Amendment mandates  that both  Congress  and  the
        several States  take measures  to protect  these new  "subjects",
        then both  the Federal  and State  governments  are  mandated  to
        protect the  privileges and immunities of ONLY these "citizens of
        the United States".  (See Hale vs Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).
             23.  Of course,  the amount  of protection  afforded  has  a
        price to  pay, but  the important fact is that the "privilege" of
        citizenship under  the so-called  14th Amendment can be regulated
        or revoked  because it  is a  "privilege" and not a RIGHT.  It is
        here that  the basic,  fundamental concept  of  "self-government"
        turns into a King "governing his subjects".
             24.  One can  be called a "freeman", but that was a title of
        nobility granted  by the  King.   To be really free encompasses a
        great deal more than grants of titles and privileges.
             25.  Over the  years since  1787,  because  our  forefathers
        would have  rather fought  than bow to involuntary servitude, the
        "powers that  be" have  slowly and  carefully used  the so-called
        14th Amendment and the Social Security Act to force primary State
        Citizenship into  relative extinction, in the eyes of the courts.
        Nevertheless, this  class of  Common-Law Citizens  is not extinct
        yet;   it is  simply being  ignored, in  order  to  maintain  and
        enlarge a revenue base for Congress.
             26.  Since the  State of California has been mandated by the
        14th Amendment  to protect  the statutory "citizens of the United
        States", and since the People in general have been falsely led to
        obtain "Social Security Numbers" as "U.S. citizens", the State of
        California under prompting by the Federal Government has used the
        licensing and  registration of  vehicles  and  people  under  the
        "equal protection"  clause for the "Public Welfare" to perpetuate
        a scheme  of revenue enhancement and regulation.  This scheme has
        been implemented,  in part,  by promoting  the fiction  that  the
        Common-Law "Citizens  of a  State of the Union of several States"
        can be regulated to the same degree as statutory "citizens of the
        United States".
             27.  I,  [DEFENDANT],   contend  that   both  the  State  of
        California and  the Federal  Government  (known  as  the  "United
        States") are  committing an  act of  GENOCIDE upon the Common-Law
        State  Citizens   of  the  several  States  by  perpetrating  and
        perpetuating the  "fiction of  law" that  everyone is a statutory
        "citizen of the United States".
             This allegation is now discussed by proving exactly what the
        "United States" means and in what capacity it now operates.
                          WHAT IS THE "UNITED STATES"?
             28.  As we  begin, it  must be  noted that  this  Common-Law
        Citizen alleges  "fraud" by  the State and Federal Governments in
        their failure  to inform  the people  that they  are all included
        (through the  use of a fiction of law) in that statutory class of
        persons called "citizens of the United States".
             29.  The  use   of  this  fiction  of  law  is  particularly
        abhorrent in  view of  the fact that, when arbitrarily applied to
        everyone, the  States  lose  their  sovereignty,  the  Common-Law
        Citizens of  the State  lose their  fundamental rights,  and  the
        "citizens  of  the  United  States"  lose  the  guidelines  which
        established their  "civil rights".   The net effect is that these
        actions have lowered everyone's status to that of a "subject".
             30.  There is  a clear  distinction between  the meanings of
        "United States"  and "United  States of  America".  The people of
        America have  been fraudulently  and purposely  misled to believe
        that these terms are completely synonymous in every context.
             31.  In fact,  in Law  the term  "United States  of America"
        refers to  the several  States which are "united by and under the
        Constitution";     the  term   "United  States"  refers  to  that
        geographical area  defined in  Article 1,  Section 8,  Clause  17
        (1:8:17) and  in Article  4, Section  3, Clause  2 (4:3:2) of the
        Federal Constitution.
             32.  In  1802,   the  "Congress  Assembled"  incorporated  a
        geographical area  known as  the "United  States".   The  "United
        States" is,  therefore, a  nation-state  which  is  separate  and
        unique unto itself.  Furthermore, even though the "United States"
        is not  a member  of the "Union of States united by and under the
        Constitution", it  is bound  by that Constitution to restrict its
        activities in  dealing with  the  several  States  and  with  the
        Common-Law Citizens  of those  States.  Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of
        the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Congress
        has exclusive  power to legislate and regulate the inhabitants of
        its geographical territory and its statutory "citizens" under the
        so-called 14th  Amendment, wherever  they are "resident", even if
        they do inhabit one of the 50 States of the Union.
             33.  The term  "United States"  has always  referred to  the
        "Congress Assembled",  or to  those geographical areas defined in
        1:8:17 and  4:3:2 in  the U.S.  Constitution.   The proof of this
        fact is found in the Articles of Confederation.
                             ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
             Whereas the  Delegates of  the United  States of  America in
             Congress Assembled  did on  the fifteenth day of November in
             the year  of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy
             Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America
             agree to  certain Articles  of Confederation  and  perpetual
             union between the States of ....
             ARTICLE I.   The  title of  this confederacy  shall be  "The
             United States of America".
             ARTICLE II.  Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
             independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which
             is not  by this  confederation expressly  delegated  to  the
             United States, in Congress Assembled.
             NOTE:   The term  "UNITED STATES"  as  used  therein  refers
        expressly to "Congress Assembled" on behalf of the several States
        which comprise the Union of States (now 50 in number).
             34.  As can readily be seen from the quote below, with three
        separate and  distinct definitions  for the term "United States",
        it becomes  absolutely necessary  to separate and define each use
        of this  term in law.  It is equally as necessary to separate and
        define to  whom the  law applies  when there  are two  classes of
        citizenship existing  side-by-side, with  separate  and  distinct
        rights, privileges  and immunities  for each.   Such  a  separate
        distinction is  not made  in the Internal Revenue Code.  Citizens
        of the California Republic are nowhere defined in this Code or in
        its regulations, but are expressly omitted as such and identified
        indirectly at best (see 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(B)).
             The term  "United States"  may be used in any one of several
             senses.   It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
             the position  analogous to  that of  other sovereigns  in  a
             family of  nations.   It may  designate territory over which
             sovereignty of  the United  States extends, or it may be the
             collective name  of the States which are united by and under
             the Constitution.
                     [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
                                      [65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89  L.Ed. 1252]
                                                         [emphasis added]

             35.  The term  "United States", when used in its territorial
        meaning, encompasses  the areas  of land  defined in  1:8:17  and
        4:3:2, nothing  more.   In this respect, the "United States" is a
        separate Nation  which is  foreign with  respect  to  the  States
        united by and under the Constitution, because the "United States"
        as such  has never  applied for  admission to the Union of States
        known as  the "United States of America".  Accordingly, statutory
        "citizens  of  the  United  States",  who  are  "subject  to  the
        jurisdiction  thereof",   are  defined  in  the  wording  of  the
        so-called 14th  Amendment and of The Civil Rights Acts.  At best,
        this so-called Amendment is a "private Act", rather than a public
        act, which  designates a  class of  people who  are unique to the
        territorial jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Federal
        Territories and Possessions, and the land which has been ceded by
        the Legislatures  of the 50 States to the foreign nation-state of
        the "United  States" for  forts, magazines,  arsenals and  "other
        needful buildings"  (see 1:8:17  and 4:3:2).   Collectively, this
        territorial jurisdiction  is now  termed "The  Federal  Zone"  to
        distinguish it  uniquely from  the nation as a whole and from the
        50 States  of the Union.  The "nation" can, therefore, be defined
        as the mathematical union of the federal zone and the 50 States.
             36.  The District  of Columbia  is technically a corporation
        and is  only defined  as a  "State" in  its own  codes and  under
        International Law (e.g., see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10)).
             37.  The several  States which  are united  by and under the
        Constitution are  guaranteed a  "Republican" (or  "rule of  law")
        form of  government by  Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution.
        However, the  foreign nation-state created by Congress and called
        the "United  States", in its territorial sense, is a "legislative
        democracy" (or  "majority rule"  democracy) which  is governed by
        International Law rather than the Common Law.
             38.  The U.  S. Supreme  Court has  ruled that  this foreign
        nation has  every right  to legislate  for its  "citizens" and to
        hold subject  matter and  in personam  jurisdiction, both  within
        (inside) and  without (outside)  its territorial boundaries, when
        legislative acts call for such effects (Cook vs Tait, supra).
             39.  As a  foreign nation  under International law, which is
        derived from Roman Civil Law (see Kent's Commentaries on American
        Law, Lecture  1), it  is  perfectly  legal  for  this  nation  to
        consider its  people as  "subjects"  rather  than  as  individual
        Sovereigns.   The  protections  of  the  State  and  the  Federal
        Constitutions do  not apply  to these  "subjects" unless there is
        specific  statutory  legislation  granting  specific  protections
        (e.g., The Civil Rights Act).  The guarantees of the Constitution
        extend to  the "United  States" (i.e.,  the federal zone) only as
        Congress has made those guarantees applicable (Hooven, supra).
             40.  California is  a Republic.  How does this International
        Law come  into play  in the  California Republic?   The answer to
        this question is presented in the following section.
                               FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
             41.  Because only "white" people can hold primary Common-Law
        State Citizenship  under the  Constitution,  Congress  created  a
        different  class   of  "citizen"   and  then  legislated  rights,
        privileges and immunities which were intended to be mirror images
        of  the   Rights,  Privileges   and  Immunities  enjoyed  by  the
        Common-Law Citizens of the several States.
             42.  Unfortunately, the  nation-state of the "United States"
        (District of  Columbia) is a democracy and not a Republic.  It is
        governed basically  under authority  of International Law, rather
        than  the   Common  Law,  and  its  people  hold  citizenship  by
        "privilege" rather than by "Right".
             43.  Certain power-mad  individuals, commonly known today as
        the Directors  of the  Federal Reserve  Board and the twelve (12)
        major international  banking families,  have used  the  so-called
        14th Amendment  to commit  "legal genocide"  upon  the  class  of
        Common-Law Citizens  known as the Citizens of the several States.
        This has  been accomplished by the application of Social Security
        through fraud,  deception and  non-disclosure of  material facts,
        for the  purpose of  reducing the Union of States to a people who
        are once  again enslaved  by puppet  masters, in  order to gather
        revenue for the profit of international banks and their owners.
             44.  It is  a fact  so well known  and understood that it is
        indisputable,  that  "any  privilege  granted  by  government  is
        regulatable, taxable  and subject  to any restrictions imposed by
        the legislative acts of its governing body", including alteration
        and even revocation by that governing body.
             45.  If necessary  to do  so, the  Accused [DEFENDANT]  will
        submit an  offer of  proof to show that the "Social Security Act"
        is in  fact a  private act  applying only to the territory of the
        "United States",  acting in  its limited  capacity,  and  to  its
        statutory "citizens  of the  United States",  under the so-called
        14th Amendment.   Yet,  this act has been advertised and promoted
        throughout the  several States  of the  Union as being "mandatory
        upon the public in general", rather than a "private" act.
             46.  The effect  in law is that, when Common-Law Citizens of
        the several States apply for and receive Social Security Numbers,
        they voluntarily  surrender their  primary Common-Law Citizenship
        of a  State and  exchange it  for that of a statutory "citizen of
        the United  States".   It is  most interesting that any State has
        the power  to "naturalize"  a non-Citizen,  but today everyone is
        naturalized   as "citizens of the United States" under purview of
        the so-called  14th Amendment.   The  long-term  effect  of  this
        procedure is  that the  Common-Law white  State Citizens  are  an
        endangered species,  on the  verge of  extinction, and  only  the
        "subject class citizens" will survive to be ruled at the whim and
        passion of  a jurisdiction which was not intended by our Founding
        Fathers or the Framers of the original U.S. Constitution.

                             JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
             47.  Section 1  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment has  had a
        far-reaching effect  upon  the  several  States  of  this  Union,
        because Congress mandated that it would protect its new statutory
        "citizens" and  that each  of the  States would also guarantee to
        protect these special "citizens".
             48.  This Nation was founded upon the fundamental principles
        of the  Common  Law  and  self-government,  with  limited  actual
        government.   In contrast,  the "subjects" of the "United States"
        are considered  to be incapable of self-government and in need of
        protection and regulation by those in authority.
             49.  The majority  of statute law is civil and regulatory in
        nature, even when sanctions of a criminal nature are attached for
        alleged violations.
             50.  Among the  rights secured  by the  Common  Law  in  the
        Constitution in  "criminal" cases  are  the  right  to  know  the
        "nature and  cause" of  an accusation,  the right  to confront an
        accuser, and  the right  to have  both substantive and procedural
        due process.
             51.  It is  a fact  that the  District  Court,  in  Internal
        Revenue cases,  DOES NOT  disclose the  nature and  cause of  the
        accusation, does not afford "substantive" due process, and rarely
        produces a "corpus delicti" to prove damage or an injured party.
             52.  The final  proof is that the rights given to an accused
        in an  Internal Revenue  case are  "civil  rights",  rather  than
        Constitutional  Rights.     The   District  Court   can  hear   a
        Constitutional question,  but it  cannot rule  upon the merits of
        the  question,   because  the  Constitution  does  not  apply  to
        regulatory statutes.   They  are set  in place  to  regulate  and
        protect the  statutory "citizens of the United States" who cannot
        exercise,  and   are  not   given,  the   right   of   individual
             53.  The Federal  Constitution mandates  that  "counsel"  be
        present at  all phases of the proceedings.  In contrast, District
        Court  often  conducts  arraignment  proceedings  without  either
        counsel for  the defense  or counsel  for the  prosecution  being
             54.  This Court  is proceeding under a jurisdiction which is
        known to  the Constitution, but which is foreign to the intent of
        the Constitution,  unless applied to those individuals who do not
        have Common-Law  access by "Right" to the protection of the State
        and Federal Constitutions.
             55.  Whether this  jurisdiction be  named International Law,
        Admiralty/Maritime Law,  Legislative Equity, Statutory Law or any
        other name,  it is  abusive and  destructive  of  the  Common-Law
        Rights of  the Citizens  of the several States. The Constitutions
        of the  California Republic  and the  United  States  of  America
        mandate that  these rights  be guaranteed  and protected  by  all
        agencies of government.  This is the Supreme Law of our Land.
             56.  The limit  of police power and legislative authority is
        reached when a statutory "law" derogates or destroys Rights which
        are protected  by  the  Constitution  and  which  belong  to  the
        Common-Law Citizens  of the  several States  who can  claim these
             57.   [DEFENDANT] is a white, male Common-Law Citizen of the
        Sovereign California  Republic.   This declaration  of status  is
        made openly and notoriously on the record of these proceedings.
             58.  As an  individual whose  primary Common-Law Citizenship
        is of the California Republic, [DEFENDANT] claims all the Rights,
        Privileges  and   Immunities  afforded   and  protected   by  the
        Constitutions of the California Republic (1849) and of the United
        States of America (1787), as lawfully amended.
             59.  [DEFENDANT] has never, to the best of his knowledge and
        belief, knowingly,  intentionally and voluntarily surrendered his
        original status as a Common-Law Citizen of the several States, to
        become a  so-called 14th Amendment Federal citizen who is subject
        to the jurisdiction of the "United States".
             60.  This Court  is proceeding in a legislative jurisdiction
        which allows  a "civil" statute to be used as evidence of the Law
        in a  "criminal proceeding",  and affords  only  "civil  rights",
        "procedural due  process" and  the right to be heard on the facts
        evidenced in the statute, rather than the Law and the facts.
             61.  It is  now incumbent  upon the Court to seat on the Law
        side of  its jurisdiction  and to  order the  plaintiff to  bring
        forth an  offer of  proof that  the Accused  [DEFENDANT]  can  be
        subjected to a jurisdiction which uses civil statutes as evidence
        of the fundamental Law in criminal cases, which refuses to afford
        all Rights  guaranteed by  the Constitution  and available to the
        Accused in  criminal matters,  and which practices procedural due
        process to the exclusion of substantive due process, wherein only
        the "facts" and not the "facts and Law" are at issue.

             62.  Should the  prosecution fail  to bring forth proof that
        the Accused  [DEFENDANT] has surrendered his original status as a
        Common-Law "California State Citizen" for one that is essentially
        in  "legislative/regulatory  equity",  then  this  Court  has  no
        alternative but  to dismiss  this matter of its own motion in the
        interests of justice, for lack of jurisdiction.
        Dated            , 1993
        Respectfully Submitted
        Citizen of the California Republic
        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris

                   C E R T I F I C A T E   O F   S E R V I C E
             I, [DEFENDANT],  under penalties  of perjury, declare that I
        am a  California Citizen,  domiciled in  the California Republic,
        and a  Citizen of  the several  States united  by and  under  the
        Constitution of  the United  States of America (see 4:2:1).  I am
        not a "citizen of the United States" (District of Columbia) nor a
        subject of Congress under the 14th Amendment, nor a "resident" in
        the State  of California  who seeks  or who is otherwise is under
        the protection of the so-called 14th Amendment.
             It is  hereby certified that service of this notice has been
        made on  the Plaintiffs  and other interested parties by personal
        service or by mailing one copy each thereof, on this ________ day
        of __________________,  1993, in  a sealed envelope, with postage
        prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:
        The Solicitor General
        Department of Justice
        Washington, District of Columbia
        Postal Zone 20530/tdc
        [others as listed here]
        Dated                , 1993
        Respectfully submitted
        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
        Citizen of the California Republic
        In Propria Persona, Sui Juris

        [from 9THAPPEA.DIR\APPEAL.DOC]
             The Appellant  [DEFENDANT],  who  enjoys  the  status  of  a
        Caucasian Citizen  of the  California  Republic  with  Common-Law
        rights by  birth as a member of the sovereign political body (see
        Dred Scott  vs Sandford,  19 How.  393, 404) and who enjoys these
        unalienable Common-Law  rights by  virtue of  his birth, is not a
        "citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th
        Amendment.   Thus, jurisdiction  is invoked  per the Magna Carta,
        Chapters 61,  63;  the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776;
        the Preamble  to  the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of
        America, 1787;   Article  3, Sections  1 and  2, and  Article  6,
        Section 2  of the  Constitution for the United States of America,
        (1787);   the California Civil Code, Source of Law, Section 22.2;
        the California  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  Section  1899;    and
        Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. 368 (1803).
                             AND THE MAXIMS OF LAW;
                         A WHITE DE JURE STATE CITIZEN,
                                      POINT 1
             The Appellant  [DEFENDANT] was  indicted and convicted under
        the purview  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment.   Therefore,  the
        constitutionality and  application of this so-called amendment is
        brought squarely before this Court.
             The so-called  14th Amendment is invalid, in that it was NOT
        properly approved  and adopted  according to  the  provisions  of
        Article 5 of the Constitution (see House Congressional Record for
        June 13,  1967, pages  15641-15646, incorporated  fully herein by
        reference and attached as exhibit "A").
             The Fourteenth  Amendment was forced upon the people "at the
        point of  a bayonet"  and by  the coercion that resulted from not
        seating various  senators who  would not  vote in  favor  of  the
        so-called amendment,  and various  other improper proceedings too
        numerous to  mention here  (for details, see 28 Tulane Law Review
        22;  11 South Carolina Law  Quarterly 484).  It is apparent that,
        once a  fraud is  perpetrated, the fraud enlarges from the effort
        to maintain  illegitimate power  and to  conceal its legal effect
        upon the invalidity of the so-called 14th Amendment.
             The so-called 14th "Amendment" cannot and does not terminate
        the Constitutional  intent of  de jure  State Citizenship  of the
        Appellant [DEFENDANT].  There is ample evidence that no court has
        ever  held  that  this  "Amendment"  was  properly  approved  and
        adopted.   See, in  particular, State  vs Phillips,  540 P.2d 936
        (1975);  Dyett vs Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).
                                    POINT 2:
                        THE ACCUSED'S DE JURE CITIZENSHIP
                              CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY
             The presumed  14th Amendment  is illegally  applied  to  the
        Appellant [DEFENDANT],  a male  Caucasian born  in the  State  of
        Illinois and  now a Citizen of California.  The Appellant was not
        within the intent or meaning of the so-called 14th Amendment.
             It may  be stated, as a general principle of law, that it is
             for the  legislature to  determine  whether  the  conditions
             exist which warrant the exercise of power;  but the question
             as to  what are  the subjects  of its exercise, is clearly a
             judicial question.   One may be deprived of his liberty, and
             his constitutional  rights thereto  may be violated, without
             actual imprisonment or restraint of his person.
                            [In re Aubrey, 36 Wn 308, 314-314, 78 P. 900]
                                                         [emphasis added]
             The most  important thing  to be determined is the intent of
        Congress.  The language of the statute may not be distorted under
        the  guise  of  construction,  so  as  to  be  repugnant  to  the
        Constitution, or  to defeat  the  manifest  intent  of  Congress.
        United States vs Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 94 L.Ed. 457, 460;  United
        States vs Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 82 L.Ed. 413, 58 S.Ct. 353.
             Citizenship is  a status  or condition, and is the result of
        both act and intent.  14 C.J.S. Section 1, p. 1130, n. 62.
             14th Amendment  federal citizenship  is a  political  status
        which constitutes  a privilege   which may be defined and limited
        by Congress,  Ex Parte  (ng) Fung  Sing, D.C. Wash. 6 F.R.D. 670.
        There  is   a  clear   distinction  between   federal  and  State
        citizenship, K.  Tashiro vs  Jordan, 256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53
        A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278 U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14
        C.J.S. 2, p. 1131, n. 75.
             The  classification   "citizen  of  the  United  States"  is
        distinguished from  a Citizen  of one  of the  several States, in
        that the  former  is  a  special  class  of  citizen  created  by
        Congress, U.S.  vs Anthony,  24 Fed  829  (1873).    As  such,  a
        "citizen of  the  United  States"  receives  created  rights  and
        privileges from Congress, and thus has a "taxable citizenship" as
        a federal  citizen  under  the  protection  and  jurisdiction  of
        Congress, wherever  such citizens  are "resident".  Cook vs Tait,
        265 U.S.  47 (1924),  44 S. Ct. 447;  11 Virginia Law Review 607,
        "Income Tax  Based Upon  Citizenship".  This right to tax federal
        citizenship is  an inherent  right under  the rule  of the Law of
        Nations, which  is part  of the  law of  the "United  States", as
        described in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and Article
        4, Section  3, Clause 2 (4:3:2).  The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732.
        The federal  government has absolutely no authority whatsoever to
        tax the  Citizens of  the several  States for  their Citizenship.
        The latter have natural rights and privileges which are protected
        by the  U.S. Constitution  from federal  intrusion.  These rights
        are inherent from birth and belong to "US the People" as Citizens
        of one  of the  several States  as described  in  Dred  Scott  vs
        Sandford, 19  How. 393.   Such  Citizens are not under the direct
        protection or  jurisdiction of  Congress, but  they are under the
        protection of the Constitutions of the States which they inhabit.
             The Act  of Congress  called the  Civil Rights  Act, 14 U.S.
        Statutes at  Large, p.  27,  which  was  the  forerunner  of  the
        so-called 14th  Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
             ... [A]ll  persons born in the United States and not subject
             to any  foreign power,  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  are
             hereby declared  to be  citizens of  the United States;  and
             such citizens,  of every  race and  color ... shall have the
             same right,  in every  State and  Territory  in  the  United
             States ...  to full  and  equal  benefit  of  all  laws  and
             proceedings for  the security  of person and property, as is
             enjoyed by white citizens ....
                                                         [emphasis added]
        This was the intent of Congress, namely, not to infringe upon the
        Constitution or the status of the de jure Citizens of the several
        States.   The term  "persons" did  not include  the white de jure
        State Citizens.  It was never the intent of the 14th Amendment to
        subvert the authority of the several States of the Union, or that
        of the  Constitution as it relates to the status of de jure State
        Citizens.   See People  vs Washington,  36 C.  658,  661  (1869),
        overruled on other grounds;  also French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324;
        MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L. Ed. 297.
             The so-called  14th Amendment  uses language very similar to
        the  Civil   Rights  Act  of  1866.    Harlan  J.  explained  his
        interpretation of  its meaning  in  a  dissenting  opinion  which
        quoted from  the scorching  veto message  of  President  Johnson,
        Lincoln's successor:   It "comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific
        States, Indians  subject to  taxation, the people called Gypsies,
        as well  as the  entire race  designated as  blacks,  persons  of
        color, negroes,  mulattoes and  persons of  African blood.  Every
        individual of  those races  born in  the United  States is made a
        citizen thereof."   Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 114, 5 S.Ct. 41,
        28 L.Ed. 643;  see also In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274.
             In light  of the  statement by  Chief Justice  Taney in Dred
        Scott vs  Sandford, 19  How.  393,  422,  in  defining  the  term
        persons, the  Judge mentioned "... persons who are not recognized
        as citizens  ...."   See also  American and  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  vs
        Canter, 1  Pet.  511,  which  also  distinguishes  "persons"  and
        "citizens".   These were  the persons  who were the object of the
        14th Amendment,  to give citizenship to this class of native born
        "persons" who  were "resident"  in the  several  States,  and  to
        legislate authority  to place  races other  than the  white  race
        within the special category of "citizen of the United States".
             It was  the intent  of the  so-called amendment that de jure
        Citizens  in   the  several  States  were  not  included  in  its
        terminology because they were, by birthright, Citizens as defined
        in the  Preamble, and  could receive  nothing from this so-called
        amendment.  See Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43.
             Congress  has   adopted  this  definition  of  "person",  as
        previously described,  so that the Internal Revenue Code would be
        constitutional.  See McBrier vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
        108 F.2d 967, Fn 1 (1939).  Thus, Congress has absolute authority
        to regulate  this de  facto entity created by an Act of Congress,
        this juristic  person who  is not given de jure State Citizenship
        by birth.
             Since the  term "citizen  of the  United States" was used to
        create and  distinguish a  different class of citizen in the 14th
        Amendment, this  term has  been widely  used in  various  revenue
        acts, e.g.,  Tariff Act  of August  5, 1909, Section 37, c. 6, 36
        Stat. 11;   Act  of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756;  Revenue Act
        of November 23, 1921, 40 Stat. 227;  the Internal Revenue Code of
        1939 and  26 C.F.R.  1.1-1(b).  These all had a specific meaning,
        which did  not include a Citizen of one of the several States who
        had no  franchise with the federal Government (i.e., the District
        of Columbia).   In  fact, the  Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,
        Title I, Section 3, (3) states:
             (3)   Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen
             of the United States.
             This specifically  means that  the Original  Social Security
        Act, created  in 1935,  did not  change  one's  citizenship  upon
        obtaining a  SSN.  The original Title VIII of the Social Security
        Act was  repealed by  P.L. 76-1, Section 4, 53 Stat. 1, effective
        February 11,  1939.   Then the  substance was  added to  the 1939
        Income Tax  Code at Sections 1400-1425.  Currently, the substance
        of the repealed section can be found in the 1954 Internal Revenue
        Code at  Sections 3101-3126.   This  repealing,  in  effect,  has
        voided the  original intent  and meaning,  and replaced it with a
        new intent  and meaning.   This  new intent is unconstitutionally
        applied to  the Appellant,  a de  jure State  Citizen, who  is  a
        member of  the posterity  as identified  in the  Preamble to  the
        Constitution for  the United  States of America.  This new intent
        has never  been addressed  by any  court, as  it relates  to  the
        deprivation of State Citizenship.

             All changes  made after  the fact, under the Social Security
        Act as  it relates to citizenship, are null and void due to fraud
        (specifically, non-disclosure).   Congress  does not now, nor has
        it ever  had, the  authority to  take Citizenship  away from  the
        Appellant, a Citizen of the several States, without his knowledge
        and informed consent.
             The error  occurs when,  through  economic  duress  and  the
        failure to  disclose to  Appellant  [DEFENDANT]  the  liabilities
        associated with a Social Security Number, a de jure State Citizen
        is compelled "at the point of a bayonet" to give up a Citizenship
        that was  derived by  birth and  blood.   By obtaining  a  Social
        Security Number,  such a  State Citizen  becomes,  in  effect,  a
        second-class citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment, in order
        to obtain work to purchase necessities to sustain life.
             The so-called  14th Amendment was not intended to impose any
        new restrictions  upon Citizenship,  or to  prevent  anyone  from
        becoming a  Citizen by  fact of birth within the United States of
        America, who  would thereby  acquire Citizenship according to the
        law existing  before its  adoption.   "An amendatory act does not
        alter the rights existing before its adoption." Billings vs Hall,
        7 Cal.  1.   Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of
        free negroes  and to  put it beyond doubt that all blacks as well
        as whites  were citizens.  U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18
        S.Ct. 456,  42 L.Ed. 890;  Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.)
        36, 21  L.Ed. 394;   Strauder  vs West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25
        L.Ed. 664;   In re Virginia, 100 U.S. 339;  Neal vs Delaware, 103
        U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567;  Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41,
        28 L.Ed.  643;   Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep.
        136;  (numerous other cites omitted).
             The First  Clause of  the so-called  14th Amendment  of  the
        Federal Constitution made negroes "citizens of the United States"
        and citizens  of the  State in  which they  reside,  and  thereby
        created two classes of citizens: one of the United States and the
        other of the State.  4 Dec. Dig. '06, page 1197;  Cory vs Carter,
        48 Ind.  327, 17  Am. Rep.  738;   and it  distinguishes  between
        federal and state citizenship, Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. App. 263,
        30 Am. Rep. 131.
             Nothing can  be found in the so-called 14th Amendment, or in
        any  reference  thereto,  that  establishes  any  provision  that
        transforms Citizens  of any  state into  "citizens of  the United
        States".  In the year 1868 or now (1993), the so-called amendment
        created no  new status for the white State Citizens.  White State
        Citizens are  natural born  Citizens, per  Article 2,  Section 1,
        Clause 5  (2:1:5) and,  as such,  they are  fully entitled to the
        "Privileges and  Immunities" mentioned  in Article  4, Section 2,
        Clause 1  (4:2:1), as  unalienable  rights.    These  unalienable
        rights cannot be overruled or abolished by any act of congress.

             The birthright  of the Appellant [DEFENDANT]'s de jure State
        Citizenship  cannot   be  subordinated  merely  because  Congress
        desires more  power and  control over  the people,  in  order  to
        create a  larger revenue  base for  the profit of certain private
        individuals.  Oyama vs California, 332 U.S. 633.
             State citizenship,  as defined,  regulated and  protected by
             State  authority,  would  disappear  altogether,  except  as
             Congress might  choose to  withhold the  exercise of powers.
             The tendency  of Congress,  especially since the adoption of
             the  recent   amendments,  has  been  to  overstep  its  own
             boundaries and  undertake duties  not committed to it by the
                           [16 Albany Law Journal 24 (1877), (Exhibit B)]
             A citizen  may not  have his de jure citizenship taken away,
        Richards vs Secretary  of State, (9th Cir) 752 F.2d 1413, (1985);
        Afroyim vs  Rusk,   387 U.S.  253, 87  S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757
        (1967);   Baker vs  Rusk, 296  F. Supp.  1244 (1969);   Vance  vs
        Terrazas, 444  U.S. 252,  100 S.Ct.  540, 62  L.Ed.2d 461 (1980);
        U.S. vs  Wong Kim  Ark, 169  U.S. 18  S. Ct.  456, 42  L.Ed.  890

                                     POINT 3
             In the  formation of  the Constitution for the United States
        of America,  care was  taken to  confer no power upon the federal
        government to  control and  regulate Citizens  within the several
        States, because such control would lead to tyranny.
             By the Constitution, Congress was to be a representative of,
        and an extension of the Several States only for external affairs.
        Congress was  forbidden to  pass municipal  laws to  regulate and
        control de  jure Citizens  of a  State of the Union of the United
        States  of   America.    This  is,  without  a  doubt,  the  true
        construction of the intent of the Constitution.
             That Congress  has no  authority to  pass laws  and bind the
        rights of  the Citizens  in the several States, beyond the powers
        conferred by  the Constitution, is not open to controversy.  But,
        it is  insisted that  (1) under  the  so-called  14th  Amendment,
        Congress has  power to  legislate for, and make a subject of, the
        Appellant [DEFENDANT]  through secret  interpretations of the law
        and (2)  by force of power, laws are enacted in order to control,
        by force  and fraud, the Nation and the People within the several
        States for  the purpose  of raising revenue for the profit of the
        Federal Reserve banks and their private owners.
             No  rational   man  can   hesitate  to   believe  that   the
        deprivations of  Citizenship and  the abuses  of the Constitution
        are not  derived from  the Federal  Reserve Act.  No one can deny
        that Congress has thereby attempted to abolish the classification
        of de  jure Citizen of a State of the Union of the United States,
        so that a ever larger revenue base can be maintained.
             ...  nor   would  the   government  suffer  a  loss  of  his
                     [[DEFENDANT]'s Pre-Sentence Report, [DATE], page 10]
        This  establishes,  without  a  doubt,  that  the  United  States
        government is  only concerned  about raising revenue under forced
        extraction by  the withholding  system, which was prompted by the
        Federal Reserve  banks at  the  instigation  of  Beardsley  Ruml,
        former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
             Congress, through  Social Security  and the  so-called  14th
        Amendment, cannot  do indirectly  what the Constitution prohibits
        directly.   If Congress,  by pseudo  power,  can  legislate  away
        [DEFENDANT]'s status  as a de jure Citizen of the several States,
        so might Congress exclude all of [DEFENDANT]'s unalienable rights
        as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution.
             Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks, by creating a
        fictitious debt, have re-instituted an insidious form of slavery.
        All slavery has its origin in power, thus usurping a jurisdiction
        which  does   not  belong  to  them  and  which  is  against  the
        unalienable rights of the appellant [DEFENDANT].
             Our Constitution  is a  restraint upon government, purposely
        provided and  declared upon consideration of all the consequences
        which it prohibits and permits, making restraints upon government
        the rights of the governed.  This careful adjustment of power and
        rights makes  the constitution what it was intended to be and is,
        namely, a  real charter of liberty which deserves the praise that
        has often  been given  to it  as "The  most wonderful  work  ever
        struck off  at any  given time  by the brain and purpose of man."
        Block vs  Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135.
             Thus, this  court must  uphold the principles upon which the
        Constitution was  founded;   it must  be held  to  guarantee  not
        particular  forms   of  procedure,  but  the  very  substance  of
        individual rights  to life,  liberty and  property.  Basic "State
        Citizenship" is  the absolute  bulwark against "National Tyranny"
        as is  fostered and applied through the so-called 14th Amendment.
        Nowhere in  the debates,  papers or any court decision written by
        anyone does it state that the Constitution authorizes Congress to
        destroy the State Citizenship of the Appellant [DEFENDANT].
             Prior to  the Federal  Reserve Act, no political dreamer was
        ever wild  enough to  think of  breaking  down  the  lines  which
        separate the  States, and of compounding the American People into
        one common  mass of  slaves.   Yet,  this  is  exactly  what  has
        happened under  Social Security,  by creating  a revenue base for
        the collection  of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to
        the Federal Reserve, in other words, slavery to the national debt
        under the so-called 14th Amendment.
             The status  of "de  jure  State  Citizen"  is  [DEFENDANT]'s
        property.   When the  application of  Social Security annihilates
        the value  of any  property and  strips it  of its attributes, by
        which alone  it is  distinguishable as  property,  the  Appellant
        [DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen, is deprived of it according
        to  the   plainest  interpretation  of  the  5th  Amendment,  and
        certainly within the Constitutional provisions intended to shield
        [DEFENDANT]'s personal  rights and  liberty from  the exercise of
        arbitrary government power.
             This is  a case  of "suspect  classification"  in  that  the
        Appellant [DEFENDANT]  is "saddled  with such disabilities ... as
        to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process
        ...." 411  U.S. 2,  28.  Thus, the devolution of [DEFENDANT]'s de
        jure Citizenship  into the  classification of a de facto juristic
        person under  the so-called  14th Amendment  is such  a  "suspect
        classification" and must be reviewed in the light of the original
        intent of  our Founding  Fathers in  establishing  the  Union  of
        several States in the first place.
             Citizenship  under   the  so-called   14th  Amendment  is  a
        privilege granted  by Congress,  i.e., a  civil status conferring
        limited rights  and privileges,  not a birthright that is secured
        by the Constitution.  [DEFENDANT], a white de jure State Citizen,
        by virtue  of his  birth in  one of  the several States, received
        that which  cannot be  granted by Congress, nor can Congress make
        void a Citizenship status which he derived by birth and by blood.
             ... [A]nd no member of the state should be disfranchised, or
             deprived of  any of  his  rights  or  privileges  under  the
             constitution, unless  by the law of the land, or judgment of
             his peers.
                   [Kent's Commentaries, Vol.  II, p. 11, 1873, 12th ed.]
             There can  be no  law, statute  or treaty  that  can  be  in
        conflict with  the intent  of the original founding constitution.
        For, if  this were  permitted to occur, the founding Constitution
        would be  a nullity.    The  original  Constitution  of  1787  is
        perpetual, as  is the  Citizenship that is recognized by it.  See
        Texas vs  White, 7  Wallace 700.  If any legislation is repugnant
        to the  Constitution, this Court has the eminent power to declare
        such enactments  null and  void ab initio (from their inception).
        See Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-180 (1803).
             The rule  that should  be applied  is that  laws, especially
        foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted
        and applied  according to  the plain import of the language used,
        as it  would have  been the intent and understood by our Founding
        Fathers.   The so-called  14th Amendment has been used to distort
        and  nullify   the  purposes   and  intent  of  the  foundational
        Constitution, for  the ulterior  motive of  giving  pseudo  power
        where no  such power  was granted  or intended,  and  where  such
        pseudo power was specifically denied in the Constitution.
             This has  resulted  in  the  complete  annihilation  of  the
        balance of  checks, so  desired by  our Founding Fathers.  One of
        these was  the sovereignty  of the  people.  At the present time,
        the "United  States", under  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, has
        extended its  pseudo authority  to abolish  the status of de jure
        State Citizens,  and to  render [DEFENDANT]  a "federal"  citizen
        under the so-called 14th Amendment who is more apply described as
        a subject of Congress and a "federal" resident within the several
        States.     This  has   had  the   unlawful  effect   of  denying
        [DEFENDANT]'s birthright to be a free born de jure State Citizen,
        as was the intent of the original Constitution.
             The so-called  14th Amendment  did not authorize Congress to
        change either  the Citizenship  or the  status of Citizens of the
        several States.   "They  are unaffected by it."  U.S. vs Anthony,
        24 F. 829.  Yet, through deliberate misinterpretation of the Act,
        Congress has  by statute  overruled and  voided the Constitution.
        This was  done at  the prompting of the Federal Reserve banks and
        their private owners.
             In application,  Congress and the Federal Reserve banks have
        utilized  the   so-called  14th   Amendment  as   a  totally  new
        Constitution, solely  for the benefit of the Federal Reserve, and
        to the detriment of Appellant [DEFENDANT], a sovereign Citizen of
        the California Republic.
             This Union  of the United States of America was founded upon
        the principles of the Christianity and the common law.  Force and
        fraud cannot  prevail against  the will  of the  people  and  the
        Constitution.   The legislative  intent  of  the  so-called  14th
        Amendment was  only to  grant citizenship  to a distinct class of
        people, not  to create  a new  constitution.    This  court  must
        determine whether  the "act"  was properly  approved and adopted.
        State vs  Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 942 (1975).  If it was properly
        approved and  adopted, this  court must  also determine  if it is
        also  being  unconstitutionally  applied  against  the  Appellant
        [DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen of California.
             The abuses  heaped upon  the Appellant,  a California  State
        Citizen, only  foretell the  impending doom  and  downfall  of  a
        centralized government.   Our  Founding Fathers  understood this,
        and the  Constitution was  written so  that this would not occur.
        But, to  the great  shame of  the judicial system,  they have let
        the thirst for power prevail over the Constitution.  (Exhibit A)
             Hitler used National Social Insurance to control and enslave
        the people of Germany.  Likewise, the "United States" (Article 1,
        Section 8,  Clause 17)  is doing  the same thing here in America.
        (Perhaps now  it should  be spelled  "Amerika").   When is enough
        enough?   When will the courts quit playing "ostrich", pull their
        heads out  of the  sand, see  what is  happening and  correct the
        situation before  it is  too late.   The camel of tyranny now has
        its nose and its two front legs under the tent.
             Congress has  passed the 14th Amendment under force of arms,
        included the  municipal code of the District of Columbia into the
        United States  Codes, and  made various secret interpretations of
        the acts,  never inquiring whether they had authority to proceed.
        But, can  this Court  also undertake  for itself  the same sundry
        constructions?   The Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches
        have all  repeatedly acknowledged that our particular security is
        in the  possession and  adherence to  the  written  Constitution.
        Yet,  by  various  and  sundry  constructions  and  the  wrongful
        application of  the acts  of Congress,  the House  and Senate are
        attempting to  turn the Constitution into a blank piece of paper,
        with complete judicial approval.
             [DEFENDANT], a  de jure  natural State  Citizen, is  in full
        possession of  personal and  political rights,  which the "United
        States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) did not give and cannot
        take away.  Dred Scott vs Sandford, 19 How. 393, 513;  Afroyim vs
        Rusk, 387  U.S. 253;   U.S.  vs Miller, 463 F.2d 600.  Nor is the
        Appellant a  de jure  State Citizen restrained by any enumeration
        or definition  of his  rights or  liberties.   The so-called 14th
        Amendment did  not impair  or change  the status  of the  de jure
        Citizens of  the several States of the Union of the United States
        of America.   To  imply that  an act  of Congress  supersedes and
        makes null  and void  the Constitution  for the  United States of
        America, is blatantly and demonstrably absurd.  This construction
        cannot be enforced or adopted by any legal authority whatsoever.
             The municipal  jurisdiction of  Congress does  not extend to
        the Appellant or to his property.  This is the case because he is
        a de  jure State  Citizen of  the several  States.  The municipal
        jurisdiction of Congress only extends to the limits as defined in
        the Constitution itself (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).
             Where rights are secured by the Constitution there can be no
             legislation or rule making which would abrogate them.
                                       [Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]
        Thus, the Citizenship of the Appellant as a Citizen of California
        must be  upheld by the preceding positive statement and decree by
        the U.S. Supreme Court.  This court must uphold this principle of
                          ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.
                          AS A MEMBER OF THE POSTERITY,
                                     POINT 1
             The  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  State
        declares the intent and purpose of the covenant:
             We the  People of the United States, in Order to form a more
             perfect   Union,    establish   justice,   insure   domestic
             Tranquility, provide  for the  common defence,  promote  the
             general Welfare,  and secure  the Blessings  of  Liberty  to
             ourselves and  our Posterity,  do ordain  and establish this
             Constitution for the United States of America.
        Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expounded
        on the importance of this Preamble:
             The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of
             expounding the  language of  a statute,  has been long felt,
             and universally conceded in all judicial discussions.  It is
             an  admitted   maxim  in   the  ordinary   course   of   the
             administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is
             a key  to open  the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs,
             which are  to be  remedied, and the objects, which are to be
             accomplished by  the provisions  of the statute.  We find it
             laid down  in some of our earliest authorities in the common
             law;   and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression,
             cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.  Probably it has
             a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law,
             from the  universal principle  of interpretation,  that  the
             will and  intention of the legislature is to be regarded and
             followed.   It is  properly resorted  to,  where  doubts  or
             ambiguities arise  upon the  words of the enacting part; for
             if they  are clear  and unambiguous, there seems little room
             for interpretation,  except in   cases leading to an obvious
             absurdity,  or  to  a  direct  overthrow  of  the  intention
             expressed in the Preamble.
                  [Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States]
                    [Joseph Story, Vol. 1, De Capo Press Reprints (1970)]
                                                      [at pages 443, 444]
             With the  authority of  Justice Story,  then, we examine the
        wording of the Preamble as to the term "Union".  The term "Union"
        as used  in the  Preamble is  evidently the  one declared  in the
        Declaration of  Independence (1776)  and organized  in accordance
        with "certain  articles  of  Confederation  and  Perpetual  Union
        between the  States" which  declared that  "the  Union  shall  be
        perpetual."  See Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700.
             The Union  of the  States never  was a purely artificial and
             arbitrary relation.   It  began among Colonies, and grew out
             of common  origin, mutual  sympathies,  kindred  principles,
             similar  interest,  and  geographical  relations.    It  was
             confirmed  strengthened  by  the  necessities  of  war,  and
             received definite form, and character, and sanction from the
             Articles of  Confederation.  By these the Union was solemnly
             declared to  "be perpetual."   And  when these Articles were
             found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the
             Constitution was  ordained "to  form a  more perfect union."
             It is  difficult to  convey the  idea of  indissoluble unity
             more clearly  than these words.  What can be indissoluble if
             a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?
             But the  perpetuity and  indissolubility of the Union, by no
             means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence,
             or of the right of self-government by the States.  Under the
             Articles  of   Confederation   each   State   retained   its
             sovereignty, freedom,  and independence,  and  every  power,
             jurisdiction, and  right  not  expressly  delegated  to  the
             United States.   Under  the Constitution, though, the powers
             of the  States were  much restricted,  still, all powers not
             delegated to  the  United  States,  nor  prohibited  to  the
             States, are  reserved to  the States  respectively or to the
             people.   And we have already had occasion to remark at this
             term, that "the people of each State compose a State, having
             its own  government, and  endowed  with  all  the  functions
             essential to  separate and  independent existence," and that
             "without the  States  in  union,  there  could  be  no  such
             political body  as the United States."  Not only, therefore,
             can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
             the States,  through their union under the Constitution, but
             it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the
             States, and  the maintenance  of their  governments, are  as
             much within  the design  and care  of the maintenance of the
             National  government.     The   Constitution,  in   all  its
             provisions, looks  to an  indestructible Union,  composed of
             indestructible States.
             When, therefore,  Texas became one of the United States, she
             entered into  a indissoluble  relation.  All the obligations
             of perpetual  union, and  all the  guarantees of  republican
             government in the Union, attached at once to the State.  The
             act which  consummated her  admission  into  the  Union  was
             something more  than a compact;  it was the incorporation of
             a new  member into  the political  body.   And it was final.
             The  union  between  Texas  and  the  other  States  was  as
             complete, as  perpetual, and  as indissoluble  as the  union
             between the  original  States.    There  was  no  place  for
             reconsideration, or  revocation, except  through revolution,
             or through consent of the States.
                  [Texas vs White, 7 Wallace, at pages 723 to 726 (1886)]
             Similarly, the  term "establish",  as used  in the Preamble,
        means to fix perpetually:
               STAB'LISH ...
               1.      To set and fix firmly or unalterable;  to settle
                       I will establish my covenant with him for an
                       everlasting covenant.  Gen. xvii
               2.      To found permanently;  to erect and fix or settle;
                       as, to establish a colony or empire.
               3.      To enact or decree by authority and for permanence
               4.      To settle or fix;  to confirm.
               5.      To make firm;  to confirm;  to ratify what has
                       been previously set or made.
                       Do we then make void the law through faith?  God
                       forbid: yea, we establish the law.  Rom. iii.
                         [An American Dictionary of the English Language]
                                      [Noah Webster (1828), reprinted by]
                     [Foundation for American Christian Education (1967)]
             ESTABLISH.   This word occurs frequently in the Constitution
             of the  United States,  and it  is there  used in  different
               1.      to settle firmly, to fix unalterable;  as to
                       establish justice, which is the avowed object of
                       the Constitution ...
               2.      To settle or fix firmly;  place on a permanent
                       footing;  found;  create;  put beyond doubt or
                       dispute;  prove;  convince ...
                             [Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at page 642]
             Thus, if the Union is perpetual, then so too is the founding
        law upon  which that Union was predicated in the first place, and
        so too is the unalienable Citizenship recognized therein.
                                      POINT 2
                                 THE ORGANIC LAW
                          AND THE UNION FOUNDED THEREON
                                  ARE PERPETUAL
             The founding  law of  the nation  is the perpetual authority
        upon which  the continued  existence  of  the  nation  itself  is
        predicated.     As  such,  the  founding  law  carries  universal
        authority  and   cannot  be   overthrown  or   subverted  without
        repudiating the very existence of the nation established thereby.
             ORGANIC LAW.   The  fundamental law,  or constitution,  of a
             state or  nation, written  or unwritten;  that law or system
             of laws  or principles  which defines  and  establishes  the
             organization of  its government.  St. Louis vs Dorr, 145 Mo.
             466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 LRA 686, 68 Am St Rep 575
             [Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Pub. (1968), p. 1251]
             The  authority   of   the   organic   law   is   universally
             acknowledged;   it speaks  the sovereign will of the people;
             its injunction  regarding the  process of  legislation is as
             authoritative as  are those  touching the  substance of  it.
             Suth. Statutory Construction, 44, note 1. "This Constitution
             ... shall  be the supreme law of  the land ...."  Article 6,
             Constitution of the United States (1787).
             That the  people have  an original  right to  establish, for
             their  future  government,  such  principles  as,  in  their
             opinion, shall  be most conducive to their own happiness, is
             the basis  on which  the  whole  American  fabric  has  been
             erected.   The exercise  of the  original right   is  a very
             great exertion,  nor can  it, nor  ought it to be frequently
             repeated.   The principles,  therefore, so  established, are
             deemed fundamental.   And  as the authority, from which they
             proceed, is  supreme, and  can seldom act, they are designed
             to be permanent.
             The original  and supreme will organizes the government, and
             assigns, to  different departments, their respective powers.
             It may either stop here;  or establish certain limits not to
             be transcended by those departments.
             The government  of  the  United  States  is  of  the  latter
             description.  The powers of the legislature are defined, and
             limited;     and  those  limits  may  not  be  mistaken,  or
             forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose are
             the powers  limited, and  to what purpose is that limitation
             committed to  writing, if  the limits  may, at  any time  be
             passed by those intended to be restrained?  The distinction,
             between a  government with  limited and unlimited powers, is
             abolished, if  those limits  do not  confine the  persons on
             whom they  are imposed,  and if  acts  prohibited  and  acts
             allowed, are  of equal  obligation.  It is a proposition too
             plain to  be contested,  that the  constitution controls any
             legislative act  repugnant to  it;  or, that the legislature
             may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
             Between these  alternatives there  is no middle ground.  The
             constitution  is   either   a   superior,   paramount   law,
             unchangeable by  ordinary means,  or it  is on  a level with
             ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
             when the legislature shall please to alter it.
             If the  former part  of the  alternative  be  true,  then  a
             legislative act  contrary to the constitution is not law: if
             the latter  be true,  then written  constitutions are absurd
             attempts, on  the part  of the  people, to limit a power, in
             its own  nature illimitable.   Certainly  all those who have
             framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
             fundamental  and   paramount  law   of   the   nation,   and
             consequently the  theory of  every such  government must be,
             that  an   act  of   the  legislature,   repugnant  to   the
             constitution, is void ....
             If then  the courts are to regard the constitution;  and the
             constitution  is   superior  to  any  ordinary  act  of  the
             legislature;   the constitution,  and not such ordinary act,
             must govern the case to which they both apply.
             Those  then   who  controvert   the   principle   that   the
             constitution is  to be  considered, in court, as a paramount
             law, are  reduced   to the necessity of maintaining that the
             courts must  close their  eyes on  the constitution, and see
             only the law.
                  [Marbury vs Madison, 1 Cranch 137, at pages 176 to 178]

                        SO AS TO BE VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS,
                        SO THE DEFENDANT IS UNCERTAIN OF
                          SECRET AND SPECIFIC MEANINGS,
                         THEREBY BEING DENIED A DEFENSE.
             1.   The indictment  utilizes the  term  "resident"  as  its
        jurisdictional statement, without any further clarification.
              "The jurisdiction of a federal court must affirmatively and
        distinctly appear  and cannot  be helped  by presumptions  or  by
        argumentive inferences  drawn  from  the  pleadings."  Norton  vs
        Larney, 266  U.S. 511,  515, 45  S. Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925).
        Accord, Bender  vs Williamsport  Area Schools  District, 475 U.S.
        534, 106  S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501, rehearing denied, 106
        S.Ct.  2003  (1986);    Nor  can  a  contester's  allegations  of
        jurisdiction be  read in  isolation from  the complaint's factual
        allegations, Schilling  vs Rogers,  363 U.S.  666, 676,  80 S.Ct.
        1288, 4  L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960), nor can jurisdiction be effectively
        established by  omitting facts which would establish that it does
        not exist.   Lambert Run Coal Co. vs Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258
        U.S. 377,  382, 42  S.Ct. 349,  66 L.Ed.  671 (1922).    Nor  can
        jurisdiction be  "gleaned from  the briefs  and arguments" of the
        Plaintiff.   Bender, supra,  106 S.Ct. at 1334.  The burden fully
        to demonstrate jurisdiction clearly falls on the Plaintiff, and a
        failure fully  to define the conditions creating some nexus under
        the ambiguous term "resident" is an error.
             The  requirement   to  prove  jurisdiction  is  particularly
        important when  the government  of a  foreign state  (the "United
        States") brings  criminal charges  against a  Citizen of  another
             Where  jurisdiction   is  denied  and  squarely  challenged,
        jurisdiction cannot  be assumed to exist "sub silentio" but  must
        be proven.  Hagans vs Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533, n. 5;  Monell vs
        N.Y., 436  U.S. 633.   Mere  "good faith" assertions of power and
        authority (jurisdiction)  have been  abolished.  Owen vs Indiana,
        445 U.S.  622;   Butz vs  Economou, 438  U.S. 478;   Bivens  vs 6
        unknown agents, 403 U.S. 388.
             An indictment  is "vague"  if it does not allege each of the
        essential elements of the crime with sufficient clarity to enable
        the defendant  to prepare his defense.  U.S. vs BI-CO Pavers, 741
        F.2d 730  (1984).  Where the defendant must guess at its meaning,
        it is  vague and  violates the  first essential  element  of  due
        process.  See Connolly vs General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
        391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).
             It is  an elementary  principle of  criminal pleading,  that
             where the  definition of an offense, whether it be at common
             law or  by statute,  "includes  generic  terms,  it  is  not
             sufficient that  the indictment  shall charge the offense in
             the same  generic terms  as in  the definition;  but it must
             state the  species;   it must  descend to the particulars. 1
             Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl. 291.
                        [U.S. vs Cruikshank, La. 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1872)]
                                                         [emphasis added]
                    26 U.S.C. SECTION 7203, IN AND OF ITSELF,
             26 U.S.C.  7203, in  and of  itself,  does  not  describe  a
        triable offense,  nor does  it state  any basis for any crimes or
        public offenses,  so as to confer jurisdiction for any issue that
        is triable  as a  "misdemeanor".   On the  contrary, as  will  be
        shown, jurisdiction is absent.
             Sec.  7203.    Willful  Failure  to  File  Return,    Supply
             Information, or Pay Tax.
             Any person  required under  this title  to pay any estimated
             tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made
             under authority  thereof to make a return, keep any records,
             or supply  any information,  who willfully fails to pay such
             estimated tax  or tax,  make such return, keep such records,
             or supply  such information at the time or times required by
             law and  regulations, shall,  in addition to other penalties
             provided by  law, be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and,  upon
             conviction thereof,  shall be  fined not  more than  $25,000
             ($100,000 in  the case  of a corporation), or imprisoned not
             more than  1 year,  or both,  together with the costs of the
             prosecution.  In the case of any person with respect to whom
             there is  a failure  to pay  any estimated tax, this section
             shall not  apply to such person with respect to such failure
             if there  is no  addition to  tax under section 6654 or 6655
             with respect to such failure.
                                                         [26 U.S.C. 7203]
             IRC 7203  fails to  provide any definition of any offense by
        failing to  charge any  statutory crime  in any  language of  any
             The language  of 26  U.S.C. 7203,  in and of itself, and any
        alleged violation  as propounded  in Appellee's indictment, fails
        to be  fully descriptive  of  any  offense  or  crime.    It  is,
        therefore, fundamentally impossible to violate Section 7203 since
        this Section,  in and of itself, does not include or refer to any
        specific statute  that could  provide a nexus for prosecution, as
        is clearly shown in U.S. vs Menk, 260 F. Supp. 784:
             But,  rather,   all  three   sections  referred  to  in  the
             information,  sections   4461,  4901,   and  7203,  must  be
             considered together  before a  complete  definition  of  the
             offense is  found.   Section 4461  imposes a  tax on persons
             engaged in  a certain  activity;   section 4901 provides the
             payment of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition  precedent  to
             engaging in the activity subject to the tax and Section 7203
             makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage  in the  activity without
             first having  paid the  tax, and provides the penalty. It is
             impossible to  determine the  meaning or  intended effect of
             any one  of these  three sections  without reference  to the
                                    [U.S. vs Menk, supra, emphasis added]
             Contrary to the accusatory pleadings, 26 U.S.C. 7203, in and
        of itself,  is not  a statute  subject to  violation since  it is
        nothing more  than a  penalty clause for some undefined franchise
        obligation.   Section 7203,  upon which the Appellee's indictment
        is based,  fails to provide a complete definition of any offense,
        and therefore,  in and  of itself,  it fails  to state properly a
        claim upon  which probable  cause could  predicate.  As the Court
        stated in U.S. vs Menk, supra:
             The Court  of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
             held that  an indictment  or information is sufficient which
             defines a  statutory crime  substantially in the language of
             the statute  if such  language is  fully descriptive  of the
                                             [U.S. vs Menk, supra at 786]
        Section 7203  contains no  such descriptive language, nor does it
        identify any other statutes.
             It cannot be said that Section 7203 imposes a tax on persons
        engaged in  a certain  activity, nor  can it  be said  that  7203
        provides that  the payment  of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition
        precedent to  engaging  in  the  activity  subject  to  the  tax.
        However, 7203  makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage in the activity
        without having  first paid  the tax, and provides the penalty. In
        addition, 7203  makes it a misdemeanor not to file a return, keep
        records or  supply information  that may  be required  by several
        other statutes and regulations, which specifically determine that
        activity and crime.
             Because  the   activity  in  the  Appellees'  indictment  is
        undefined, Section  7203 is  not, in  and of  itself, a basis for
        prosecution, and there is no probable cause of action against the
        Appellant.   Similarly, it is impossible to determine the meaning
        or intended  effect of  Section 7203  without having reference to
        other possibly  applicable and as yet undefined sections of Title
        26, U.S.C.
             Plainly and  simply, Section 7203 is only a penalty statute,
        and by  itself cannot  stand without  reference to other statutes
        and or  regulations.   An IRS  agent stated on the record that no
        other statutes  were violated  or identified  as such  before the
        grand jury (CR June 28, 1988, p. 13, lines 5-12).
             Thus the  indictment is  vague and  the court is in error in
        sustaining the indictment and conviction.
             AS DEFINED IN 7343 FOR CHAPTER 75, WHICH INCLUDES 7203,
             The words  used in  a statute  cannot be extended beyond the
        clear meaning  and intent  of the  legislative body which created
        the statute.
             The courts,  in construing  the words of any statute, cannot
        include someone  other than  the ones  described in that statute;
        to do  so would be like extending the law that controls the speed
        of an  airplane propeller to include a pedestrian walking along a
        path in a forest.
             Chapter 75, which contains Section 7343, carries the heading
        "Crimes, Other Offenses, and Forfeitures".  Section 7343 states:
             Section 7343.  Definition of term "person."
             The term  "person" as  used  in  this  chapter  includes  an
             officer or  employee  of  a  corporation,  or  a  member  or
             employee of  a partnership, who as such officer, employee or
             member is  under a  duty to  perform the  act in  respect of
             which the violation occurs.
                                                         [26 U.S.C. 7343]
             This section  was previously  found in  Section  150,  which
        referred only  to corporation tax returns.  This was the original
        intent of  Congress.   Thus, Section 7806 is brought to bear upon
        the application of this section.  Section 7806 States:
             Sec. 7806.  Construction of title.
             (b)  Arrangement and Classification.
             No inference,  implication, or  presumption  of  legislative
             construction shall  be  drawn  or  made  by  reason  of  the
             location or  grouping of any particular section or provision
             or portion  of this  title, nor shall any table of contents,
             table of  cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or
             descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be
             given any legal effect.  The preceding sentence also applies
             to the  sidenotes and  ancillary  tables  contained  in  the
             various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.
                                                      [26 U.S.C. 7806(b)]
        Thus,  26  U.S.C.  7203  does  not  apply  to  the  Appellant,  a
        California State  Citizen, because  such individual  Citizens are
        not within  the purview of Chapter 75.  Therefore, the indictment
        must fail.
             For the  forgoing reasons,  the Accused's conviction must be
        reversed, with  an affirmative  declaration that the Accused is a
        de jure  California State Citizen, and a member of the Posterity,
        as defined  in the  Preamble to  the Constitution  for the United
        States of America.
        Respectfully submitted
        with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
        and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,
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