April 23, 2001 A.D.
Harold J. Evans, Designated Agent and
Associate Vice President for Legal Affairs,
Research and Technology
University of Arkansas
2404 North University Avenue
Little Rock 72207
Subject: discovering identity(s) of suspected subscriber(s),
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. (pending)
Dear Designated Agent:
Certified evidence now in our custody implicates one or more subscribers or customers of your Internet service with criminal copyright infringement, false designation of origin, retaliation against a federal witness, deprivation of fundamental Rights, and conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity (citations infra).
A private criminal investigation has been underway since December 1995 A.D. As the Author, damaged Party and Private Attorney General on this case, I have been required by 18 U.S.C. § 4 to report these felony federal offenses to the FBI in various American cities, and to a supervisory judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pasadena, California. See Internet URL:
For your information, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was signed into U.S. law on October 28, 1998 A.D. On page 9 in the “U.S. Copyright Office Summary,” dated December 1998 and available at their Internet website, you will find the following statement:
... Title II establishes a procedure by which a copyright owner can obtain a subpoena from a federal court ordering a service provider to disclose the identity of a subscriber who is allegedly engaging in infringing activities. (Section 512(h)).
[bold emphasis added]
We believe we are correct to infer from this subpoena authority that, as the Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff, I do have a fundamental Right to compel disclosure of the identity of any subscriber (or customer) who is engaging in activities that infringe My exclusive copyrights. Also, in the interests of justice, investigative efficiency, economy, and to prevent the hindering of apprehension and prosecution, that Right can be asserted prior to the filing of an application for subpoena.
Moreover, please be advised that I do have certain fiduciary responsibilities to other Persons who have now been designated as beneficiaries of settlements, jury awards and any other benefits that may accrue. For example, I have recently re-confirmed My verbal commitment to assist in establishing an Indigent Eye Care Fund (“EyeCare”), to be managed under the good auspices of Dr. John C. Alden, M.D., noted eye surgeon practicing in Oakland, California. Any failure on My part to exercise due diligence in this investigation could constitute a serious breach of those fiduciary responsibilities. This demand letter is such an act of due diligence on My part.
For all the reasons stated herein, we conclude that Internet Service Providers should be held liable for any acts which conceal the identities, or hinder the apprehension and prosecution, of subscribers (or customers) engaged in any copyright infringements, Lanham Act violations, or patterns of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B) and 2319. The pertinent federal law at § 1961(5) states:
“pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. [bold emphasis added]
On July 2, 1996, criminal infringement of a copyright was added to the predicate acts listed at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), i.e. any act which is indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 2319. See also 17 U.S.C. § 506 (criminal copyright infringement), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 (obstruction of justice), 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations), 1512 (tampering with a witness or victim), 1513 (retaliating against a witness or victim), 1952 (racketeering), 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property). All are predicate acts leading to treble damages for direct and vicarious RICO liability. § 1964(c).
Our investigation of the pertinent court cases found that the 4‑year statute of limitations for civil RICO claims can be tolled [i.e. extended] until the Plaintiff has enough information to sue. Fujisawa v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332 (1997, CA7 Ill.) If there is further injury to the Plaintiff, or further predicate acts that are part of the same pattern of racketeering activity, the 4‑year period runs from the time the Plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the last injury or the last predicate act. Arab African Int’l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168 (1993, CA3 N.J.) A RICO action’s timeliness depends only on the 4‑year statute of limitations. Where it is timely, predicate acts may be alleged and proved even if a suit alleging those acts would be time-barred in the absence of a RICO claim. Hoxworth v. Blinder, 980 F.2d 912 (1992, CA3 Pa.)
We therefore demand hereby that you disclose the correct identity and the current mailing address (or the last known mailing address) for service of legal process upon the principal(s) responsible for:
by delivering same to the following physical location, within fourteen (14) calendar days of your receipt of this DEMAND:
c/o Forwarding Agent
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Thank you very much for your timely cooperation in this matter.
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Author, Damaged Party, and Plaintiff,
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. (pending)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Attachments: none with email