U.S. Supreme
Court
AGENCY
HOLDING CORP. v. MALLEY-DUFF & ASSOCS., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)
483 U.S. 143
AGENCY HOLDING CORP. ET
AL. v. MALLEY-DUFF & ASSOCIATES, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 86-497.
Argued April 21, 1987
Decided June 22, 1987 *
[ Footnote
* ]
Together with No. 86-531, Crown Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Malley-Duff &
Associates, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court.
In
February 1978, petitioner Crown Life Insurance Co. terminated its relationship
with its agent, respondent Malley-Duff & Associates (Malley-Duff), for
failure to satisfy a production quota. Alleging, inter alia, that the real
reason for the termination was petitioners' desire to acquire its lucrative
territory, Malley-Duff brought suit in March 1981 under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Federal District Court
granted petitioners' summary judgment motion, dismissing the RICO claims on the
ground that they were barred by Pennsylvania's 2-year fraud statute of
limitations. In the absence of a RICO statute of limitations, the court concluded
that the 2-year statute was the best state law analogy. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the State's "catchall" 6-year residual
statute of limitations contained the appropriate limitations period for all
RICO claims arising in the State.
Held:
1.
The 4-year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement
actions, 15 U.S.C. 15b, applies in RICO civil enforcement actions. Because the
predicate acts that may establish a civil RICO violation are far ranging and
cannot be reduced to a single generic classification, and because important
RICO concepts were unknown to common law, there is a need for a uniform
limitations period for civil RICO in order to avoid intolerable uncertainty for
parties and time-consuming litigation. The Clayton Act offers the closest
analogy to civil RICO, in light of similarities in purpose and structure
between the statutes, and the clear legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil
enforcement provision on the Clayton Act's. Moreover, the Clayton Act provides
a far closer analogy to RICO than any state statute. It is unlikely that
Congress intended state "catchall" statutes of limitations to apply
or that such statutes would fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by RICO, and, in those States that do not have catchalls, any
selection of a state statute would be at odds with RICO's sui generis nature.
RICO cases [483 U.S. 143, 144] commonly
involve interstate transactions, and the possibility of a multiplicity of
applicable state limitations periods presents the dangers of forum shopping and
of complex, expensive, and unnecessary litigation. Application of a uniform
federal period also avoids the possibility that application of unduly short
state periods would thwart the legislative purpose of providing an effective
remedy. Section 15b is preferable to the "catchall" federal 5-year
statute of limitations that applies in RICO criminal prosecutions, since that
statute does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities
unique to RICO civil enforcement actions. Pp. 146-156.
2. Because this litigation was filed less than
four years after Malley-Duff's termination as Crown Life's agent, which is the
earliest time Malley-Duff's RICO action could have accrued, the litigation is
timely. Pp. 156-157.
792 F.2d 341, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 157.
Robert L. Frantz argued the cause for
petitioners in No. 86-531. With him on the briefs were Alexander Black and
Daniel E. Wille. John H. Bingler, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No.
86-497. With him on the briefs was Michael R. Bucci, Jr.
Harry Woodruff Turner argued the cause for
respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were David A. Borkovic and
Stephen H. Kaufman.Fn
Fn
[483 U.S. 143, 144] David P. Bruton and Eric
A. Schaffer filed a brief for Congress Financial Corporation et al. as amici
curiae urging reversal.
Briefs
of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp.
et al. by Michael D. Fishbein and Michael P. Malakoff; and for HMK Corporation
by James G. Harrison, Lawrence D. Diehl, Robert A. Blackwood, and G. Robert
Blakey.
JUSTICE
O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
At
issue in these consolidated cases is the appropriate statute of limitations for
civil enforcement actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964 (1982 ed. and Supp. III). [483 U.S. 143, 145]
I
Petitioner
Crown Life Insurance Company (Crown Life) is a Canadian corporation engaged in
the business of selling life, health, and casualty insurance policies.
Respondent Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. (Malley-Duff),
was an agent of Crown Life for a territory in the Pittsburgh area. Crown Life
terminated Malley-Duff's agency on February 13, 1978, after Malley-Duff failed
to satisfy a production quota. This case is the second of two actions brought
by Malley-Duff following that termination.
In
April 1978, Malley-Duff filed its first suit (Malley-Duff I) against the
petitioners in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and a state law
claim for tortious interference with contract. See 734 F.2d 133 (CA3 1984).
Before the antitrust action was brought to trial, however, on March 20, 1981,
Malley-Duff brought this action (Malley-Duff II) in the same court, alleging
causes of action under RICO, 42 U.S.C. 1985, and state civil conspiracy law.
Initially, Malley-Duff II was consolidated with Malley-Duff I, but the two
cases were severed before trial. Only the RICO claim of Malley-Duff II is at
issue before this Court.
The
RICO claim arose out of two alleged incidents. First, Malley-Duff alleges that
Crown Life, together with several Crown Life employees and petitioner Agency
Holding Corporation formed an enterprise whose purpose was to acquire by false
and fraudulent means and pretenses various Crown Life agencies that had
lucrative territories. This enterprise allegedly acquired Malley-Duff's agency
by imposing an impossibly high annual production quota on Malley-Duff nine
months into fiscal year 1977 and then terminating the agency when Malley-Duff
failed to meet this quota. Malley-Duff further alleges that the petitioners
used a similar scheme to acquire Crown Life agencies in other cities. Second,
Malley-Duff alleges that the petitioners obstructed justice during the course
of discovery in Malley-Duff I. [483
U.S. 143, 146]
On
July 29, 1982, the petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The
District Court granted this motion and entered judgment for the petitioners on
all counts. The District Court dismissed Malley-Duff's RICO claims on the
ground that they were barred by Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of limitations
period for fraud, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5524(7) (1982), concluding that this was
the best state law analogy for Malley-Duff's claims. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed. In its view, under Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261 (1985), Pennsylvania's "catchall" 6-year residual
statute of limitations, 5527, was the appropriate statute of limitations for
all RICO claims arising in Pennsylvania. 792 F.2d 341 (1986).
We granted certiorari, 479
U.S. 983 (1986), to resolve the important question of the appropriate
statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions brought under RICO.
II
As
is sometimes the case with federal statutes, RICO does not provide an express
statute of limitations for actions brought under its civil enforcement
provision. Although it has been suggested that federal courts always should
apply the state statute of limitations most analogous to each individual case
whenever a federal statute is silent on the proper limitations period, see
Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 280 (dissent); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 174 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), a clear majority of the
Court rejected such a single path. Instead, the Court has stated:
"In
such situations we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there
be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to `borrow' the most
suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We have
generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most
closely analogous statute of limitations under state law. `The implied
absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the
federal enactments is a phase of fashioning [483 U.S. 143, 147] remedial
details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial
determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles.'"
DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 158-159, quoting Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
The
characterization of a federal claim for purposes of selecting the appropriate
statute of limitations is generally a question of federal law, Wilson v.
Garcia, supra, at 269-270, and in determining the appropriate statute of
limitations, the initial inquiry is whether all claims arising out of the
federal statute "should be characterized in the same way, or whether they
should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual
circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case." 471
U.S., at 268 . Once this characterization is made, the next inquiry is
whether a federal or state statute of limitations should be used. We have held
that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652, requires application of state
statutes of limitations unless "a timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in
federal law should be applied." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S., at 159 , n. 13; see also id., at 174, n. 1
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Given our longstanding practice of borrowing state
law, and the congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume
that Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law. In some limited
circumstances, however, our characterization of a federal claim has led the
Court to conclude that "state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory
vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In those instances, it may be
inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at
odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law." DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 161. While the mere fact
that state law fails to provide a perfect analogy to the federal cause of
action is never itself sufficient to justify the use of a federal statute of
limitations, in some circumstances the Court has found it [483 U.S. 143, 148]
more appropriate to borrow limitation periods found in other federal,
rather than state, statutes:
"[A]s
the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state-law
choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state
law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a
rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than
available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from
state law." DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 171-172.
See
also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355 (1977) (adopting federal statute of limitations for Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission enforcement actions); McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357
U.S. 221 (1958) (federal limitations period applied to unseaworthiness
action under general admiralty law); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra (refusing to apply
state limitations period to action to enforce federally created equitable
right).
Federal
courts have not adopted a consistent approach to the problem of selecting the
most appropriate statute of limitations for civil RICO claims. Indeed, an
American Bar Association task force described the current state of the law
regarding the applicable statute of limitations for civil RICO claims as
"confused, inconsistent, and unpredictable." Report of the Ad Hoc
Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law 391 (1985) (hereinafter ABA Report). Some courts have simply used the state
limitations period most similar to the predicate offenses alleged in the
particular RICO claim. See, e. g., Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Securities,
Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (CA6 1986); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837 (Minn. 1984).
Others, such as the Court of Appeals in this case, have chosen a uniform
statute of limitations applicable to all [483
U.S. 143, 149] civil RICO
actions brought within a given State. See, e. g., Tellis v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741 (CA7 1986); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d
1429 (CA9 1984); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F.
Supp. 724 (EDNY 1984). The courts, however, have uniformly looked to state
statutes of limitations rather than a federal uniform statute of limitations.
See ABA Report 387.
We
agree with the Court of Appeals that, for reasons similar to those expressed in
Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S., at 272 -275, a uniform statute of limitations should be selected in
RICO cases. As Judge Sloviter aptly observed:
"RICO
is similar to [42 U.S.C.] 1983 in that both `encompass numerous and diverse
topics and subtopics.' [Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 273.]
Many civil RICO actions have alleged wire and mail fraud as predicate acts, but
18 U.S.C. 1961 defines `racketeering activity' to include nine state law
felonies and violations of over 25 federal statutes, including those
prohibiting bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement of pension funds, gambling
offenses, obstruction of justice, interstate transportation of stolen property,
and labor crimes." A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Congress Financial
Corp., 792 F.2d 330, 337 (CA3 1986) (concurring in judgment).
Although
the large majority of civil RICO complaints use mail fraud, wire fraud or
securities fraud as the required predicate offenses, a not insignificant number
of complaints allege criminal activity of a type generally associated with
professional criminals such as arson, bribery, theft and political corruption.
ABA Report 56-57. As the Court of Appeals noted, "[e]ven RICO claims based
on `garden variety' business disputes might be analogized to breach of
contract, fraud, conversion, tortious interference with business relations,
misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, usury, disparagement,
etc., with a multiplicity of applicable limitations periods." 792 F.2d, at 348. Moreover, RICO is designed to remedy
injury caused by a pattern of racketeering, [483 U.S. 143, 150] and
"[c]oncepts such as RICO `enterprise' and `pattern of racketeering
activity' were simply unknown to common law." Ibid.
Under
these circumstances, therefore, as with 1983, a uniform statute of limitations
is required to avoid intolerable "uncertainty and time-consuming
litigation." Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S., at 272 . This uncertainty has real-world
consequences to both plaintiffs and defendants in RICO actions.
"Plaintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their
claims, having wrongly postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute.
Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with
confidence when their delicts lie in repose." Id., at
275, n. 34. It is not surprising, therefore, that the petitioners no
less than the respondent support the adoption of a uniform statute of
limitations. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 86-497, p. 17; Brief for
Petitioners in No. 86-531, p. 12.
Unlike
1983, however, we believe that it is a federal statute that offers the closest
analogy to civil RICO. The Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 15,
offers a far closer analogy to RICO than any state law alternative. Even a
cursory comparison of the two statutes reveals that the civil action provision
of RICO was patterned after the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act provides:
"Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 15 U.S.C. 15(a).
RICO's
civil enforcement provision provides:
"Any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and [483 U.S. 143, 151]
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. 1964(c).
Both
RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing
for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes
bring to bear the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a
serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed
inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act
and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both statutes aim to
compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury
"in his business or property by reason of" a violation.
The
close similarity of the two provisions is no accident. The "clearest
current" in the legislative history of RICO "is the reliance on the
Clayton Act model." Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 489 (1985). As early as 1967, Senator Hruska had proposed
bills that would use "the novel approach of adapting antitrust concepts to
thwart organized crime." ABA Report 78. As Senator Hruska explained:
"The
antitrust laws now provide a well established vehicle for attacking
anticompetitive activity of all kinds. They contain broad discovery provisions
as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinarily broad and
flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against the `legitimate'
business activities of organized crime." 113 Cong. Rec.
17999 (1967).
The
American Bar Association's Antitrust Section agreed that "[t]he time
tested machinery of the antitrust laws contains several useful and workable
features which are appropriate for use against organized crime," including
the use of treble-damages remedies. 115 Cong. Rec. 6995
(1969).
The
use of an antitrust model for the development of remedies against organized
crime was unquestionably at work when Congress later considered the bill that
eventually became [483 U.S. 143, 152] RICO. That bill, introduced by Senators
McClellan and Hruska in 1969, did not, in its initial form, include a private
civil enforcement provision. Representative Steiger, however, proposed the
addition of a private treble-damages action "similar to the private damage
remedy found in the anti-trust laws." Hearings on S. 30,
and Related Proposals, before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 520 (1970). During these same hearings,
the American Bar Association proposed an amendment "to include the
additional civil remedy of authorizing private damage suits based upon the concept
of Section 4 of the Clayton Act" that would adopt a treble-damages civil
remedy. Id., at 543-544. The Committee approved the amendment, and the full
House approved a bill that included the civil enforcement remedy. During the
House debates, the bill's sponsor described the civil enforcement remedy as
"another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against
organized criminality," 116 Cong. Rec. 35295 (1970), and Representative
Steiger stated that he viewed the RICO civil enforcement remedy as a
"parallel private . . . remed[y]" to the Clayton Act. Id., at 27739 (letter to House Judiciary Committee).
Together
with the similarities in purpose and structure between RICO and the Clayton
Act, the clear legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil enforcement provision
on the Clayton Act strongly counsels in favor of application of the 4-year
statute of limitations used for Clayton Act claims. 15 U.S.C.
15b. This is especially true given the lack of any satisfactory state
law analogue to RICO. While "[t]he atrocities" that led Congress to
enact 42 U.S.C. 1983 "plainly sounded in tort," Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S., at 277 , there is no comparable single state
law analogue to RICO. As noted above, the predicate acts that may establish
racketeering activity under RICO are far ranging, and unlike 1983, cannot be
reduced to a single generic characterization. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
selected Pennsylvania's "catchall" [483 U.S. 143, 153]
statute of limitations. In Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 278, we rejected
the use of a "catchall" statute of limitations because we concluded
that it was unlikely that Congress would have intended such a statute of
limitations to apply. Furthermore, not all States have a "catchall"
statute of limitations, see ABA Report 391, and the absence of such a statute
in some States "distinguishes the RICO choice from the 1983 choice made in
Wilson v. Garcia." A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v.
Congress Financial Corp., 792 F.2d, at 339 (Sloviter, J., concurring in
judgment). While we concluded in Wilson v. Garcia that characterization
of all 1983 actions as personal injury claims minimized the risk that the
choice of a state limitations period "would not fairly serve the federal
interests vindicated by 1983," 471
U.S., at 279 , "a similar statement could not be made with confidence
about RICO and state statutory `catch alls.'" A. J. Cunningham Packing
Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp., 792 F.2d, at 339.
Any selection of a state statute of limitations in those States without a
catchall statute would be wholly at odds with the Court of Appeals' recognition
of the sui generis nature of RICO. Ibid.
The
federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation strongly suggest
that the limitations period of the Clayton Act is a significantly more
appropriate statute of limitations than any state limitations period. JUSTICE
SCALIA recognizes that under his preferred approach to the question before us a
federal statute "may be sufficient to pre-empt a state statute that
discriminates against federal rights or is too short to permit the federal
right to be vindicated." Post, at 162. In our
view the practicalities of RICO litigation present equally compelling reasons
for federal pre-emption of otherwise available state statutes of limitations
even under JUSTICE SCALIA'S approach. As this case itself illustrates, RICO
cases commonly involve interstate transactions, and conceivably the statute of
limitations of several States could govern any given RICO claim. Indeed, some
nexus to interstate [483 U.S. 143, 154]
or foreign commerce is
required as a jurisdictional element of a civil RICO claim, 18 U.S.C. 1962(b)
and (c), and the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of
racketeering. Thus, predicate acts will often occur in several States. This is
in marked contrast to the typical 1983 suit, in which there need not be any
nexus to interstate commerce, and which most commonly involves a dispute wholly
within one State. The multistate nature of RICO indicates the desirability of a
uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of multiple state
limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum
shopping and, at the very least, would "virtually guarante[e] . . .
complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward
matter." ABA Report 392. Moreover, application of a uniform federal
limitations period avoids the possibility of the application of unduly short
state statutes of limitations that would thwart the legislative purpose of
creating an effective remedy. Ibid.; see also
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S., at 166 , 167-168 (concluding that the federal statute of limitations
was appropriate because state limitation periods were too short).
The
petitioners, however, suggest that the legislative history reveals that
Congress specifically considered and rejected a uniform federal limitations
period. The petitioners note that Representative Steiger offered a
comprehensive amendment that, together with six other provisions, included a
proposed 5-year statute of limitations. 116 Cong. Rec. 35346
(1970). Congress did not "reject" this proposal, however.
Instead, Representative Steiger voluntarily withdrew the proposed amendment
immediately after it was introduced so that it could be referred to the House
Judiciary Committee for study. Id., at 35346-35347. The reason for the reference
to the House Judiciary Committee had absolutely nothing to do with the proposed
statute of limitations. Instead, the amendment had included yet another civil
remedy, and Representative Poff observed that "prudence would dictate [483 U.S. 143, 155] that the Judiciary Committee very carefully
explore the potential consequences that this new remedy might have." Id., at 35346. Under these circumstances, we are unable to
find any congressional intent opposing a uniform federal statute of
limitations. The petitioners also point to the fact that a predecessor bill to
RICO introduced by Senator Hruska, S. 1623, included a 4-year statute of
limitations. 115 Cong. Rec. 6996 (1969). Senator
Hruska, however, dropped his support for this bill in order to introduce with
Senator McClellan the bill that eventually became RICO. See ABA Report 87. The
reason that this new bill did not include a statute of limitations is simple,
and in no way even remotely suggests the rejection of a uniform federal statute
of limitations: the new bill included no private treble-damages remedy, and
thus obviously had no need for a limitations period. Id., at
88. Finally, the petitioners cite the inclusion of a statute of
limitations provision in S. 16, the Civil Remedies for Victims of Racketeering
Activity and Theft Act of 1972, which would have amended 1964 of RICO but was
not enacted. 118 Cong. Rec. 29368 (1972). This
proposed bill, however, was not focused on the addition of a statute of
limitations. Instead, the purpose of the bill was to broaden even further the
remedies available under RICO. In particular, it would have authorized the
United States itself to sue for damages and to intervene in private damages actions, and it would have further permitted private actions
for injunctive relief. Congress' failure to enact this proposal, therefore,
cannot be read as a rejection of a uniform federal statute of limitations.
We
recognize that there is also available the 5-year statute of limitations for
criminal prosecutions under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. 3282. This statute of
limitations, however, is the general "catchall" federal criminal
statute of limitations. RICO itself includes no express statute of limitations
for either civil or criminal remedies, and the 5-year statute of limitations
applies to criminal RICO prosecutions only because [483 U.S. 143, 156]
Congress has provided such a criminal limitations period when no other
period is specified. Thus, the 5-year statute of limitations for criminal RICO
actions does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities
unique to civil RICO actions or, indeed, any other federal civil remedy. In our
view, therefore, the Clayton Act offers the better federal law analogy.
JUSTICE
SCALIA accepts our conclusion that state statutes of limitations are
inappropriate for civil RICO claims, but concludes that if state codes fail to
furnish an appropriate limitations period, there is none to apply. Post, at 170. As this Court observed in Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S., at 271 , however:
"A
federal cause of action `brought at any distance of time' would be `utterly
repugnant to the genius of our laws.' Adams v. Woods, 2
Cranch 336, 342 (1805). Just determinations of fact cannot be made when,
because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or
evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to
assume that their sins may be forgotten."
In
sum, we conclude that there is a need for a uniform statute of limitations for
civil RICO, that the Clayton Act clearly provides a far closer analogy than any
available state statute, and that the federal policies that lie behind RICO and
the practicalities of RICO litigation make the selection of the 4-year statute
of limitations for Clayton Act actions, 15 U.S.C. 15b, the most appropriate
limitations period for RICO actions.
This
litigation was filed on March 20, 1981, less than four years after the earliest
time Malley-Duff's RICO action could have accrued - i. e., the date of
Malley-Duff's termination on February 13, 1978. Accordingly the litigation was
timely brought. Because it is clear that Malley-Duff's RICO claims accrued
within four years of the time the complaint was filed, [483 U.S. 143, 157]
we have no occasion to decide the appropriate time of accrual for a RICO
claim.
The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
The
Court today continues on the course adopted in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151 (1983), and concludes that although Congress has enacted no
federal limitations period for civil actions for damages brought under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964 (1982
ed. and Supp. III), it will supply one by "borrowing" the 4-year
statute of limitations applicable to suits under the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. 15b. While at first glance it may seem a small
step from the familiar practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations to
today's decision to borrow a federal one, in my view it turns out to be a giant
leap into the realm of legislative judgments. I therefore cannot join the
Court's opinion.
I
The
issue presented by this case cannot arise with respect to federal criminal
statutes, as every federal offense is governed by an express limitations
period. If no statute specifically defines a limitations period (or prescribes
the absence of a limitations period, see 18 U.S.C. 3281) for a particular
offense, a "catchall" statute operates to forbid prosecution, trial,
or punishment "unless the indictment is found or the information is
instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed." 3282. Congress has not provided that kind of a default
limitations period, however, for federal civil suits; and since it has long
been enacting civil statutes without express limitations periods, courts have
long been wrestling with the problem of determining what, if any, limitations
periods to apply. Prior to DelCostello, the virtually uniform practice was to
look to applicable state statutes of limitations. Indeed, we departed [483 U.S. 143, 158] from that practice only when the applicable
state limitations period would have frustrated the policy of the federal
statute, concluding that in such a case no limitations period governs the suit.
See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355, 361 , 366-372 (1977). Until DelCostello,
we never responded to legislative silence by applying a limitations period
drawn from a different federal statute.
To
understand why this new practice differs from - and is less legitimate than -
the practice of borrowing state statutes, it is necessary to understand the
two-phase history through which the earlier practice developed. It is in turn
essential to that understanding to recognize that certain common conceptions
about the borrowing of state limitations statutes are mistaken. As Part I-A
explains in more detail, the very label used to describe that practice -
"borrowing" - is misleading. In its original form, during what I term
the "first phase" of the borrowing doctrine, our practice of applying
state law in reality involved no borrowing at all; rather, we applied state
limitations periods to federal causes of action because we believed that those
state statutes applied of their own force, unless pre-empted by federal law. In
the "second phase" of our development of the borrowing doctrine, we
approached the issue rather differently. Whereas we had originally focused on
the federal statute creating the cause of action only for purposes of our
pre-emption inquiry - i. e., in order to ascertain whether the otherwise
applicable state statute of limitations conflicted with the federal statute's
terms or purposes - we later came to believe that the federal statute itself
was the source of our obligation to apply state law. That is, instead of
treating Congress' silence on the limitations question as a failure to pre-empt
state law, we came to treat it as an affirmative directive to borrow state law.
In my view, that deviation from the "first phase" approach was an
analytical error. It has led in turn to the further error the Court commits (or
compounds) today in deciding to treat congressional silence as a directive to
borrow a [483 U.S. 143, 159] limitations period from a different federal
statute. Today's error is by far the more serious of the two. As the history
outlined above (and discussed in detail below) suggests, the borrowing of state
statutes on the erroneous ground of congressional intent has a basis in, and to
a reasonable degree approximates the results of, the approach that I think is
correct as an original matter. The same cannot be said for the borrowing of
federal statutes.
A
The
analysis representing the "first phase" of the borrowing doctrine is
exemplified by McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830), the first case
presenting the question of what limitations period, if any, applies to a claim
having its source in federal law when federal law does not specify the
applicable time limit. Plaintiff-in-error McCluny had sought to purchase land
under a federal statute providing for the sale of lands owned by the United
States, but the register, a federal officer, had refused his tendered payment.
McCluny then brought an action for trespass on the case in the Circuit Court
for the District of Ohio, arguing that the register had wrongfully withheld the
land, causing him $50,000 in damages. The register prevailed below on the
ground that the Ohio statute of limitations governing actions for trespass on
the case barred plaintiff's suit. McCluny argued that the Circuit Court had
erred. The Ohio limitations statute, he contended, had no application in a suit
brought in federal court against a federal officer for violation of a right
conferred by an Act of Congress, not because Congress did not intend so (an
issue raised by neither party to the dispute) but because the Ohio Legislature
did not intend so. Id., at 270-274. We agreed with McCluny that the issue was
whether the statute applied as a matter of Ohio law, see id., at 276 ("The
decision in this cause depends upon the construction of the statute of
Ohio"), but agreed with the register that under Ohio law, the statute
applied. We reasoned that while it [483
U.S. 143, 160] was
doubtless true that Ohio had not contemplated that its statute would govern
such actions, by framing it to apply to all actions for trespass on the case
the legislature had designed the statute to cover numerous torts not
specifically within its contemplation. Id., at 277-278. At no point did we even
question Ohio's power to enact statutes of limitations applicable to federal
rights, so long as Congress had not provided otherwise. Rather, we simply noted
that it was "well settled" that such statutes are "the law of the
forum, and operat[e] upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction."
Id., at 276-277. In the course of our opinion, we also mentioned the Rules of
Decision Act, which provides:
"[T]he
laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply." 34, Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. 1652.
But
we discussed that statute not as the source of Ohio's power, but as
confirmation of it where "no special provision had been made by
congress," 3 Pet., at 277.
McCluny
is an odd case to modern ears, because although a federal statute was clearly
the source of McCluny's claim of right, it did not expressly create his cause
of action. Yet neither the parties nor the Court raised the question we would
certainly ask today: whether the federal statute gave him an "implied right"
to sue. Instead McCluny simply brought an action seeking a common-law writ of
trespass on the case. That feature of the case leaves open the argument that
our acceptance of Ohio's power to pass limitations periods applicable to
federal rights was based on the fact that the cause of action itself came from
the common law rather than a federal statute.
That
argument, however, was rejected in Campbell v. Haverhill, 155
U.S. 610 (1895), where we were faced with the [483 U.S. 143, 161]
question whether to apply to a suit for patent infringement a
Massachusetts statute of limitations requiring actions for tort to be brought
within six years. In patent infringement suits, both the right and the cause of
action were created by congressional legislation, and the federal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, it was argued that "the States,
having no power to create the right or enforce the remedy, have no power to
limit such remedy or to legislate in any manner with respect to the subject
matter." Id., at 615. We replied that "this
is rather to assert a distinction than to point out a difference," ibid.,
and that in the absence of congressional provision to the contrary, the States
had the power to pass statutes of limitations that apply neutrally to federal
rights, id., at 614-615, 618-620 (although they might not have the power to
enact statutes that discriminated against federal rights or provided
excessively short time periods for bringing suit, id., at 614-615). 1
B
These
early cases provide the foundation for a reasonably coherent theory about the
application of state statutes of limitations to federal statutory causes of
action. First, state statutes of limitations whose terms appear to cover
federal statutory causes of action apply as a matter of state law to such
claims, even though the state legislature that enacted the statutes did not
have those claims in mind. McCluny, supra, at 277-278.
Second, imposition of limitations periods on federal causes of action is within
the States' powers, if not pre-empted by Congress. Campbell
v. Haverhill, supra, at [483 U.S. 143,
162] 614-615, 618-620;
McCluny, 3 Pet., at 276-277. Third, the obligation to apply state
statutes of limitations does not spring from Congress' intent in enacting the
federal statute; rather, that intent is relevant only to the question whether
the state limitations period had been pre-empted by Congress' failure to
provide one. Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at 616.
Fourth, congressional silence on the limitations issue is ordinarily
insufficient to pre-empt state statutes; "special provision" by
Congress is required to do that. Ibid.; McCluny,
supra, at 277. Fifth, the federal statute - its substantive provisions rather
than its mere silence - may be sufficient to pre-empt a state statute that
discriminates against federal rights or is too short to permit the federal
right to be vindicated. Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at
614-615.
As
to the role of the Rules of Decision Act: Although Campbell v. Haverhill in
particular is not clear on the question, the Rules of Decision Act plays no
role in deriving the first two principles stated above. It directs federal
courts to follow state laws only "in cases where they apply," which
federal courts would be required to do even in the absence of the Act. That is
clear not only from the borrowing cases, but also from other early opinions of
this Court displaying the clear understanding that the Act did not make state
laws applicable to any new classes of cases. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5
Pet. 457, 464 (1831) (the Rules of Decision Act "has been uniformly held
to be no more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it: to
wit, that the lex loci must be the governing rule of private right, under
whatever jurisdiction private right comes to be examined"); Bank of
Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492, 525-526 (1829) ("The laws of the
states . . . would be . . . regarded [as rules of decision in the courts of the
United States] independent of that special enactment"); Hill, The Erie
Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1026, 1035 (1953); see also
Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 162 (1827) (holding that the Supreme Court
would follow rules of property law settled [483
U.S. 143, 163] by
state-court decisions without mentioning the Rules of Decision Act); Shelby v.
Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 367 (1826) (holding that the Court was required to follow
state statutes and their construction by state courts because of its duty to
administer the laws of the respective States, without mentioning the Rules of
Decision Act). In fact, because the Act required application of future state
laws as well as those in effect at the time of its passage, it would have been
considered open to serious constitutional challenge as an improper delegation
of congressional legislative power to the States had it been anything other
than declaratory on that point. See Wayman v. Southard, 10
Wheat. 1, 47-48 (1825).
Thus,
the Act changes the analysis of the question whether a federal court should
look to state law only insofar as it provides the basis for the fourth principle.
Its directive to federal courts to apply state law unless federal law otherwise
"requires or provides" creates a presumption against implicit
pre-emption which must be rebutted by affirmative congressional action, except
for the implicit preclusion of state statutes that discriminate against federal
claims or provide too short a limitations period to permit vindication of the
federal right.
II
So
understood, the borrowing doctrine involves no borrowing at all. Instead, it
only requires us to engage in two everyday interpretive exercises: the
determination of which state statute of limitations applies to a federal claim
as a matter of state law, and the determination of whether the federal statute
creating the cause of action pre-empts that state limitations period. We need
not embark on a quest for an "appropriate" statute of limitations
except to the limited extent that making those determinations may entail
judgments as to which statute the State would believe "appropriate"
and as to whether federal policy nevertheless makes that statute
"inappropriate." Finally, if we determine that the state limitations
period that would apply under state law is pre-empted [483 U.S. 143, 164]
because it is inconsistent with the federal statute, that is the end of
the matter, and there is no limitation on the federal cause of action.
In
my view, that is the best approach to the question before us, and if a
different historical practice had not intervened I would adhere to it. See also
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S., at 172 -174 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For many years, however, we
have used a different analysis. In the second phase of development of the
borrowing doctrine, perhaps forgetting its origins, the Court adopted the view
that we borrow the "appropriate" state statute of limitations when
Congress fails to provide one because that is Congress' directive, implied by
its silence on the subject. See Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 706 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 2 As an original matter, that is not a very
plausible interpretation of congressional silence. If one did not believe that
state limitations periods applied of their own force, the most natural
intention to impute to a Congress that enacted no limitations period would be
that it wished none. However, after a century and a half of the Court's
reacting to congressional silence by applying state statutes - first for the
right [483 U.S. 143, 165] reason, then for the wrong one - by now at
least it is reasonable to say that such a result is what Congress must expect,
and hence intend, by its silence. The approach therefore has some legitimacy,
and in any event generally produces the same results as the one I believe to be
correct. 3
III
As
JUSTICE O'CONNOR pointed out in her dissent in DelCostello, however, if we are
serious about this "congressional intent" justification for the
borrowing doctrine, we should at least require some evidence of actual
alternation of that intent before departing from it. See 462
U.S., at 174 -175 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). For if the basis of the rule
is, in some form, that Congress knows that we will borrow state statutes of
limitations unless it directs otherwise, it also knows that it [483 U.S. 143, 166]
has to direct otherwise if it wants us to do something else. In
addition, as under our former approach, should we discover that there is no
appropriate state statute to borrow, because all the available ones run afoul
of federal policy, we ought to conclude that there is no limitations period.
In
the case before us, however, the Court does not require any showing of actual
congressional intent at all before departing from our practice of borrowing
state statutes, prowling hungrily through the Statutes at Large for an
appetizing federal limitations period, and pouncing on the Clayton Act. Of
course, a showing of actual congressional intent that we depart from tradition
and borrow a federal statute is quite impossible. Under ordinary principles of
construction, the very identity between the language and structure of the
Clayton Act's and RICO's private civil-remedy provisions relied on by the Court
as arguments for borrowing 15 U.S.C. 15b, would, when coupled with Congress'
enactment of a limitations period for the former and failure to enact one for
the latter, demonstrate - if any intent to depart from the state borrowing rule
- a desire for no limitations period at all. The same is suggested by the
legislative history discussed by the Court, showing that Congress has passed up
several opportunities to impose a federal limitations period on civil RICO
claims, ante, at 154-155. The Court avoids the troublesome requirement of
finding a congressional intent to depart from state borrowing by the simple
expedient of reformulating the rule, transforming it from a presumption that
congressional silence means that we should apply the appropriate state
limitations period into a presumption that congressional silence means we
should apply the appropriate limitations period, state or federal. I cannot go
along with this, for two reasons.
First,
I can find no legitimate source for the new rule. Whereas our prior practice
provides some basis for arguing that when Congress creates a civil cause of
action without a limitations period, it expects and intends application of an [483 U.S. 143, 167] appropriate state statute, there is no
basis whatsoever for arguing that its silence signifies that the most
appropriate statute, state or federal, should be borrowed. To the contrary, all
available evidence indicates that when Congress intends a federal limitations period
for a civil cause of action, it enacts one - for example, 15 U.S.C. 15b itself.
The possibility of borrowing a federal statute of limitations did not occur to
any of the parties in this litigation until it was suggested by a concurring
judge in the Court of Appeals, see 792 F.2d 341, 356 (CA3 1986), and all of the
Federal Courts of Appeals that have passed on the issue of the appropriate RICO
limitations period have applied state statutes. See 792 F.2d 341 (1986) (case
below); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (CA2 1987); La Porte Construction Co.
v. Bayshore National Bank, 805 F.2d 1254 (CA5 1986); Silverberg v. Thomson
McKinnon Securities, Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (CA6 1986); Tellis v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741 (CA7 1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer
Corp., 729 F.2d 576 (CA8 1984); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (CA9 1984); Hunt
v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011 (CA11 1986). It is extremely
unlikely that Congress expected anything different. Moreover, had our prior rule
been that a federal statute should be borrowed if appropriate, the
considerations the Court advances as to why that is the right course here -
that it will promote uniformity and avoid litigation, and that there are
differences between the federal action and the actions covered by state
statutes - would have been sufficient to warrant selection of a federal
limitations period for almost any federal statute, a conclusion plainly
inconsistent with the results of our cases. 4 [483
U.S. 143, 168]
Second, as the case before us demonstrates, the
new rule involves us in a very different kind of enterprise from that required
when we borrow state law. In general, the type of decision we face in the
latter context is how to choose among various statutes of limitations, each of
which was intended by the state legislature to apply to a whole category of
causes of action. Federal statutes of limitations, on the other hand, are
almost invariably tied to specific causes of action. The first consequence of
this distinction is that in practice the inquiry as to which state statute to
select will be very close to the traditional kind of classification question
courts deal with all the time. Thus, for example, if a federal statute creates
a cause of action that has elements of tort and contract, we may frame the
question of which statute to apply as whether it is more
"appropriate" to apply the State's tort or contract limitations
period. In reality, however, rather than examine whether the policies of the
federal statute are better served by one limitations period than the other, we
will generally answer [483 U.S. 143,
169] that question by
determining whether the federal cause of action should be classified as
sounding in tort or contract. See, e. g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482
U.S. 656, 662 (1987)
(42 U.S.C. 1981 actions sound in tort); id., at 670 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ( 1981 actions sound in contract). In deciding whether to
borrow a federal statute that clearly does not apply by its terms, however, we
genuinely will have to determine whether, for example, the Clayton Act's
limitations period will better serve the policies underlying civil actions
under RICO than the limitations period covering criminal actions under RICO, or
whether either will do the job better than state limitations upon actions for economic
injury. That seems to me to be quintessentially the kind of judgment to be made
by a legislature. See generally Wilcox v. Fitch, 20 Johns. *472, *475 (N. Y.
1823) (limitations are creatures of statute, and did not exist at common law);
Wall v. Robson, 2 Nott & McCord 498, 499 (S. C. 1820) (same); 2 E. Coke,
Institutes 95 (6th ed. 1680).
The second consequence of the generality of
state statutes of limitations versus the particularity of federal ones is that
in applying a state statute, we do not really have to make a new legislative
judgment. The state legislature will already have made the judgment that, for
example, in contract actions, a certain balance should be struck between
"protecting valid claims . . . [and] prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975).
That judgment will have been made in the knowledge that it will apply to a
broad range of contractual matters, some of which the legislature has not
specifically contemplated. That is not true of a federal statute enacted with
reference to a particular cause of action, such as the one for the Clayton Act.
The Court is clearly aware of this difficulty. It declines to apply 18 U.S.C.
3282, the general 5-year criminal statute of limitations, on the ground that it
"does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities
unique to civil RICO actions." Ante, at 156. [483 U.S. 143, 170]
That objection should also, however, lead it to reject a 4-year
limitations period, which clearly reflects only the balance of equities
Congress deemed appropriate to the Clayton Act.
* * *
Thus, while I can accept the reasons the Court
gives for refusing to apply state statutes of limitations to the civil RICO
claim at issue here, ante, at 152-154, they lead me to a very different
conclusion from that reached by the Court. I would hold that if state codes do
not furnish an "appropriate" limitations period, there is none to
apply. Such an approach would promote uniformity as effectively as the
borrowing of a federal statute, and would do a better job of avoiding
litigation over limitations issues than the Court's approach. That was the view
we took in Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355 (1977),
as to Title VII civil enforcement actions, unmoved by the fear that that conclusion
might prove "`"repugnant to the genius of our laws."'"
Ante, at 156, quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 271 (1985),
in turn quoting Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). 5 See also 18 U.S.C. 3281
(no limitations period for federal capital offenses). Indeed, it might even
prompt Congress to enact a limitations period that it believes
"appropriate," a judgment far more within its competence than ours.
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Although the opinion
states that the Rules of Decision Act requires us to apply state statutes, 155
U.S., at 614 , and therefore appears to suggest that the Act
rather than the state laws themselves was the source of our obligation to do
so, a careful reading of the opinion belies that interpretation. Because the
Act directs the federal courts to regard state laws as rules of decision only "in
cases where they apply," the parties and the Court treated the questions
of the applicability of the Act and the applicability of state law of its own
force as interchangeable.
[ Footnote 2 ] Thus, although we did
not squarely reject our earlier approach until DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151 (1983),
the Court correctly argued in that case that our way of analyzing the issue had
changed before then. Id., at 159-160, n. 13. Contrary
to the DelCostello Court's claim, however, neither our decision in Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938),
nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship underlying it in any way required
that change. Neither remotely established that that statute applies only in
diversity cases. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1033-1034 (1953); see also DelCostello v.
Teamsters, supra, at 173, n. 1 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that
"`the [Act] itself neither contains nor suggests . . . a distinction'"
between diversity and federal-question cases, quoting Campbell v. Haverhill, 155
U.S. 610, 616 (1895));
Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 383, 408, n. 122 (1964) (characterizing the view that Erie requires
application of state law only in diversity cases as an "oftencountered
heresy").
[ Footnote 3 ] It need not always
produce the same results, because the implicit directive attributed to Congress
is not (as the old approach provided) that the courts apply the statute of
limitations that the State deemed appropriate, but rather that the courts
instead determine which state limitations period will best serve the policies
of the federal statute. See, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 706 (1966);
cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 268 -269
(1985). Imagine, for example, a federal statute with no limitations period
creating a cause of action in favor of handicapped persons discriminated
against in the making of contracts. If a State had two statutes of limitations,
one covering tortious personal injury, and one covering tortious economic
injury, under the old approach the question would have been whether the federal
statutory cause of action was an action for personal or economic injury. Under
the new approach the question, at least in theory, is whether application of
the personal injury or economic injury statute best serves the policies of the
federal Act.
Second, even before conducting pre-emption
analysis, the old approach can lead to the conclusion that state law supplies
no statute of limitations. For example, that would be true in the case of our
hypothetical federal statute if a State had limitations periods only for
assault and battery. The new approach, however, should never lead to that
conclusion, because we have already made the determination that federal law
directs us to borrow some limitations period, and the only question is which
one.
In fact, however, our analysis under the new
approach has not been ruthlessly faithful to its logic, so that it has turned
out in practice to be almost indistinguishable from the old approach. See
infra, at 168-169.
[ Footnote 4 ] Even DelCostello does
not fully support the Court's reformulation in the present opinion. It
specifically noted that "our holding today should not be taken as a
departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal
causes of action" and that it did "not mean to suggest that federal
courts should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails
to provide a perfect analogy." 462
U.S., at 171 .
It also [483 U.S. 143, 168] involved borrowing a
federal statute that was arguably applicable by its own terms. Id., at 170. In any event, to the extent our decision here
rests on our interpretation of congressional intent, the Court's conclusion in
that case that Congress intended 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. 160(b), to be borrowed for suits claiming breach of the duty of fair
representation tells us nothing as to what Congress intended in enacting RICO.
Because
we claimed in DelCostello not to have abandoned our prior practice, that
decision did not place Congress on notice that henceforth we would interpret
its silence as a directive to borrow federal statutes of limitations. Any
decision that the lower federal courts, whose regular task involves
interpreting our opinions, did not understand to have worked a change in the
law, see supra, at 167, is certainly not clear enough to form the basis for a
presumption that Congress' expectations were transformed. In any event, even if
that decision had announced a general change of approach, to which it could be
expected that Congress would adapt, it would only be appropriate to make the
assumption that it had done so with respect to statutes passed after the
decision came down. RICO was passed in 1970, well before our opinion in DelCostello.
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 943, 18 U.S.C. 1963.
[ Footnote
5 ]
In Adams v. Woods, that argument was advanced not as a reason why the Court
should apply a clearly inapplicable statute of limitations, but as a reason why
it should interpret an arguably ambiguous one to apply to the claim at issue. 2
Cranch, at 341-342. [483 U.S. 143, 171]