Mr. Justice NELSON.
 
 I shall proceed to state the grounds upon which I have
arrived at the conclusion, that the judgment of the court below
should be affirmed. The suit was brought in the court below by
the plaintiff, for the purpose of asserting his freedom, and that
of Harriet, his wife, and two children.
 
 The defendant plead, in abatement to the suit, that the
cause of action, if any, accrued to the plaintiff out of the
jurisdiction of the court, and exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri; for, that
the said plaintiff is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as
alleged in the declaration, because he is a negro of African
descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were
brought into this country and sold as negro slaves.
 
 To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant
joined in demurrer. The court below sustained the demurrer,
holding that the plea was insufficient in law to abate the suit.
 
 The defendant then plead over in bar of the action:
 
 1. The general issue. 2. That the plaintiff was a negro
slave, the lawful property of the defendant. And 3. That Harriet,
the wife of said plaintiff, and the two children, were the lawful
slaves of the said defendant. Issue was taken upon these pleas,
and the cause went down to trial before the court and jury, and
an agreed state of facts was presented, upon which the trial
proceeded, and resulted in a verdict for the defendant, under the
instructions of the court.
 
 The facts agreed upon were substantially as follows:
 
 That in the year 1834, the plaintiff, Scott, was a negro
slave of Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United
States; and in that year he took the plaintiff from the State of
Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of
Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April
or May, 1836. At this date, Dr. Emerson removed, with the
plaintiff, from the Rock Island post to the military post at Fort
Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in
the Territory of Upper Louisiana, and north of the latitude
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, and north of the State of
Missouri. That he held the plaintiff in slavery, at Fort
Snelling, from the last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
 
 That in the year 1835, Harriet, mentioned in the
declaration, was a negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged
to the army of the United States; and in that year he took her to
Fort Snelling, already mentioned, and kept her there as a slave
until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her to Dr.
Emerson, who held her in slavery, at Fort Snelling, until the
year 1838. That in the year 1836, the plaintiff and Harriet were
married, at Fort Snelling, with the consent of their master. The
two children, Eliza and Lizzie, are the fruit of this marriage.
The first is about fourteen years of age, and was born on board
the steamboat Gipsey, north of the State of Missouri, and upon
the Mississippi river; the other, about seven years of age, was
born in the State of Missouri, at the military post called
Jefferson Barracks.
 
 In 1838, Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff, Harriet, and
their daughter Eliza, from Fort Snelling to the State of
Missouri, where they have ever since resided. And that, before
the commencement of this suit, they were sold by the Doctor to
Sandford, the defendant, who has claimed and held them as slaves
ever since.
 
 The agreed case also states that the plaintiff brought a
suit for his freedom, in the Circuit Court of the State of
Missouri, on which a judgment was rendered in his favor; but
that, on a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State, the
judgment of the court below was reversed, and the cause remanded
to the circuit for a new trial.
 
 On closing the testimony in the court below, the counsel for
the plaintiff prayed the court to instruct the jury, upon the
agreed state of facts, that they ought to find for the plaintiff;
when the court refused, and instructed them that, upon the facts,
the law was with the defendant.
 
 With respect to the plea in abatement, which went to the
citizenship of the plaintiff, and his competency to bring a suit
in the Federal courts, the common-law rule of pleading is, that
upon a judgment against the plea on demurrer, and that the
defendant answer over, and the defendant submits to the judgment,
and pleads over to the merits, the plea in abatement is deemed to
be waived, and is not afterwards to be regarded as a part of the
record in deciding upon the rights of the parties. There is some
question, however, whether this rule of pleading applies to the
peculiar system and jurisdiction of the Federal courts. As, in
these courts, if the facts appearing on the record show that the
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, its judgment will be reversed
in the appellate court for that cause, and the case remanded with
directions to be dismissed.
 
 In the view we have taken of the case, it will not be
necessary to pass upon this question, and we shall therefore
proceed at once to an examination of the case upon its merits.
The question upon the merits, in general terms, is, whether or
not the removal of the plaintiff, who was a slave, with his
master, from the State of Missouri to the State of Illinois, with
a view to a temporary residence, and after such residence and
return to the slave State, such residence in the free State works
an emancipation.
 
 As appears from an agreed statement of facts, this question
has been before the highest court of the State of Missouri, and a
judgment rendered that this residence in the free State has no
such effect; but, on the contrary, that his original condition
continued unchanged.
 
 The court below, the Circuit Court of the United States for
Missouri, in which this suit was afterwards brought, followed the
decision of the State court, and rendered a like judgment against
the plaintiff.
 
 The argument against these decisions is, that the laws of
Illinois, forbidding slavery within her territory, had the effect
to set the slave free while residing in that State, and to
impress upon him the condition and status of a freeman; and that,
by force of these laws, this status and condition accompanied him
on his return to the slave State, and of consequence he could not
be there held as a slave.
 
 This question has been examined in the courts of several of
the slaveholding States, and different opinions expressed and
conclusions arrived at. We shall hereafter refer to some of them,
and to the principles upon which they are founded. Our opinion
is, that the question is one which belongs to each State to
decide for itself, either by its Legislature or courts of
justice; and hence, in respect to the case before us, to the
State of Missouri -- a question exclusively of Missouri law, and
which, when determined by that State, it is the duty of the
Federal courts to follow it. In other words, except in cases
where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United
States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of
slavery within its jurisdiction.
 
 As a practical illustration of the principle, we may refer
to the legislation of the free States in abolishing slavery, and
prohibiting its introduction into their territories. Confessedly,
except as restrained by the Federal Constitution, they exercised,
and rightfully, complete and absolute power over the subject.
Upon what principle, then, can it be denied to the State of
Missouri? The power flows from the sovereign character of the
States of this Union; sovereign, not merely as respects the
Federal Government -- except as they have consented to its
limitation -- but sovereign as respects each other. Whether,
therefore, the State of Missouri will recognize or give effect to
the laws of Illinois within her territories on the subject of
slavery, is a question for her to determine. Nor is there any
constitutional power in this Government that can rightfully
control her.
 
 Every State or nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within her own territory; and, her laws affect and
bind all property and persons residing within it. It may regulate
the manner and circumstances under which property is held, and
the condition, capacity, and state, of all persons therein; and,
also, the remedy and modes of administering justice. And it is
equally true, that no State or nation can affect or bind property
out of its territory, or persons not residing within it. No
State, therefore, can enact laws to operate beyond its own
dominions, and, if it attempts to do so, it may be lawfully
refused obedience. Such laws can have no inherent authority
extra-territorially. This is the necessary result of the
independence of distinct and separate sovereignties.
 
 Now, it follows from these principles, that whatever force
or effect the laws of one State or nation may have in the
territories of another, must depend solely upon the laws and
municipal regulations of the latter, upon its own jurisprudence
and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent.
 
 Judge Story observes, in his Conflict of Laws, (p. 24,)
"that a State may prohibit the operation of all foreign laws, and
the rights growing out of them, within its territories." "And
that when its code speaks positively on the subject, it must be
obeyed by all persons who are within reach of its sovereignty;
when its customary unwritten or common law speaks directly on the
subject, it is equally to be obeyed."
 
 Nations, from convenience and comity, and from mutual
interest, and a sort of moral necessity to do justice, recognize
and administer the laws of other countries. But, of the nature,
extent, and utility, of them, respecting property, or the state
and condition of persons within her territories, each nation
judges for itself; and is never bound, even upon the ground of
comity, to recognize them, if prejudicial to her own interests.
The recognition is purely from comity, and not from any absolute
or paramount obligation.
 
 Judge Story again observes, (398,) "that the true foundation
and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within
another is the voluntary consent of the latter, and is
inadmissible when they are contrary to its known interests." And
he adds, "in the silence of any positive rule affirming or
denying or restraining the operation of the foreign laws, courts
of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own
Government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or
prejudicial to its interests." (See also 2 Kent Com., p. 457; 13
Peters, 519, 589.)
 
 These principles fully establish, that it belongs to the
sovereign State of Missouri to determine by her laws the question
of slavery within her jurisdiction, subject only to such
limitations as may be found in the Federal Constitution; and,
further, that the laws of other States of the Confederacy,
whether enacted by their Legislatures or expounded by their
courts, can have no operation within her territory, or affect
rights growing out of her own laws on the subject. This is the
necessary result of the independent and sovereign character of
the State. The principle is not peculiar to the State of
Missouri, but is equally applicable to each State belonging to
the Confederacy. The laws of each have no extra-territorial
operation within the jurisdiction of another, except such as may
be voluntarily conceded by her laws or courts of justice. To the
extent of such concession upon the rule of comity of nations, the
foreign law may operate, as it then becomes a part of the
municipal law of the State. When determined that the foreign law
shall have effect, the municipal law of the State retires, and
gives place to the foreign law.
 
 In view of these principles, let us examine a little more
closely the doctrine of those who maintain that the law of
Missouri is not to govern the status and condition of the
plaintiff. They insist that the removal and temporary residence
with his master in Illinois, where slavery is inhibited, had the
effect to set him free, and that the same effect is to be given
to the law of Illinois, within the State of Missouri, after his
return. Why was he set free in Illinois? Because the law of
Missouri, under which he was held as a slave, had no operation by
its own force extra-territorially; and the State of Illinois
refused to recognize its effect within her limits, upon
principles of comity, as a state of slavery was inconsistent with
her laws, and contrary to her policy. But, how is the case
different on the return of the plaintiff to the State of
Missouri? Is she bound to recognize and enforce the law of
Illinois? For, unless she is, the status and condition of the
slave upon his return remains the same as originally existed. Has
the law of Illinois any greater force within the jurisdiction of
Missouri, than the laws of the latter within that of the former?
Certainly not. They stand upon an equal footing. Neither has any
force extra-territorially, except what may be voluntarily
conceded to them.
 
 It has been supposed, by the counsel for the plaintiff, that
a rule laid down by Huberus had some bearing upon this question.
Huberus observes that "personal qualities, impressed by the laws
of any place, surround and accompany the person wherever he goes,
with this effect: that in every place he enjoys and is subject to
the same law which other persons of his class elsewhere enjoy or
are subject to." (De Confl. Leg., lib. 1, tit. 3, sec. 12; 4
Dallas, 375 n.; 1 Story Con. Laws, pp. 59, 60.)
 
 The application sought to be given to the rule was this:
that as Dred Scott was free while residing in the State of
Illinois, by the laws of that State, on his return to the State
to Missouri he carried with him the personal qualities of
freedom, and that the same effect must be given to his status
there as in the former State. But the difficulty in the case is
in the total misapplication of the rule.
 
 These personal qualities, to which Huberus refers, are those
impressed upon the individual by the law of the domicil; it is
this that the author claims should be permitted to accompany the
person into whatever country he might go, and should supersede
the law of the place where he had taken up a temporary residence.
 
 Now, as the domicil of Scott was in the State of Missouri,
where he was a slave, and from whence he was taken by his master
into Illinois for a temporary residence, according to the
doctrine of Huberus, the law of his domicil would have
accompanied him, and during his residence there he would remain
in the same condition as in the State of Missouri. In order to
have given effect to the rule, as claimed in the argument, it
should have been first shown that a domicil had been acquired in
the free State, which cannot be pretended upon the agreed facts
in the case. But the true answer to the doctrine of Huberus is,
that the rule, in any aspect in which it may be viewed, has no
bearing upon either side of the question before us, even if
conceded to the extent laid down by the author; for he admits
that foreign Governments give effect to these laws of the domicil
no further than they are consistent with their own laws, and not
prejudicial to their own subjects; in other words, their force
and effect depend upon the law of comity of the foreign
Government. We should add, also, that this general rule of
Huberus, referred to, has not been admitted in the practice of
nations, nor is it sanctioned by the most approved jurists of
international law. (Story Con., sec. 91, 96, 103, 104; 2 Kent.
Com., p. 457, 458; 1 Burge Con. Laws, pp. 12, 127.)
 
 We come now to the decision of this court in the case of
Strader et al. v. Graham, (10 How., p. 2.) The case came up from
the Court of Appeals, in the State of Kentucky. The question in
the case was, whether certain slaves of Graham, a resident of
Kentucky, who had been employed temporarily at several places in
the State of Ohio, with their master's consent, and had returned
to Kentucky into his service, had thereby become entitled to
their freedom. The Court of Appeals held that they had not. The
case was brought to this court under the twenty-fifth section of
the judiciary act. This court held that it had no jurisdiction,
for the reason, the question was one that belonged exclusively to
the State of Kentucky. The Chief Justice, in delivering the
opinion of the court, observed that "every State has an undoubted
right to determine the status or domestic and social condition of
the persons domiciled within its territory, except in so far as
the powers of the States in this respect are restrained, or
duties and obligations imposed upon them, by the Constitution of
the United States. There is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States, he observes, that can in any degree control the
law of Kentucky upon this subject. And the condition of the
negroes, therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return,
depended altogether upon the laws of that State, and could not be
influenced by the laws of Ohio. It was exclusively in the power
of Kentucky to determine, for herself, whether their employment
in another State should or should not make them free on their
return."
 
 It has been supposed, in the argument on the part of the
plaintiff, that the eighth section of the act of Congress passed
March 6, 1820, (3 St. at Large, p. 544,) which prohibited slavery
north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, within which the
plaintiff and his wife temporarily resided at Fort Snelling,
possessed some superior virtue and effect, extra-territorially,
and within the State of Missouri, beyond that of the laws of
Illinois, or those of Ohio in the case of Strader et al. v.
Graham. A similar ground was taken and urged upon the court in
the case just mentioned, under the ordinance of 1787, which was
enacted during the time of the Confederation, and reenacted by
Congress after the adoption of the Constitution, with some
amendments adapting it to the new Government. (1 St. at Large, p.
50.)
 
 In answer to this ground, the Chief Justice, in delivering
the opinion of the court, observed: "The argument assumes that
the six articles which that ordinance declares to be perpetual,
are still in force in the States since formed within the
territory, and admitted into the Union. If this proposition could
be maintained, it would not alter the question; for the
regulations of Congress, under the old Confederation or the
present Constitution, for the government of a particular
Territory, could have no force beyond its limits. It certainly
could not restrict the power of the States, within their
respective territories, nor in any manner interfere with their
laws and institutions, nor give this court control over them.
 
 "The ordinance in question, he observes, if still in
 force, could have no more operation than the laws of
 Ohio in the State of Kentucky, and could not influence
 the decision upon the rights of the master or the
 slaves in that State."
 
 
 This view, thus authoritatively declared, furnishes a
conclusive answer to the distinction attempted to be set up
between the extra-territorial effect of a State law and the act
of Congress in question.
 
 It must be admitted that Congress possesses no power to
regulate or abolish slavery within the States; and that, if this
act had attempted any such legislation, it would have been a
nullity. And yet the argument here, if there be any force in it,
leads to the result, that effect may be given to such
legislation; for it is only by giving the act of Congress
operation within the State of Missouri, that it can have any
effect upon the question between the parties. Having no such
effect directly, it will be difficult to maintain, upon any
consistent reasoning, that it can be made to operate indirectly
upon the subject.
 
 The argument, we think, in any aspect in which it may be
viewed, is utterly destitute of support upon any principles of
constitutional law, as, according to that, Congress has no power
whatever over the subject of slavery within the State; and is
also subversive of the established doctrine of international
jurisprudence, as, according to that, it is an axiom that the
laws of one Government have no force within the limits of
another, or extra-territorially, except from the consent of the
latter.
 
 It is perhaps not unfit to notice, in this connection, that
many of the most eminent statesmen and jurists of the country
entertain the opinion that this provision of the act of Congress,
even within the territory to which it relates, was not authorized
by any power under the Constitution. The doctrine here contended
for, not only upholds its validity in the territory, but claims
for it effect beyond and within the limits of a sovereign State
-- an effect, as insisted, that displaces the laws of the State,
and substitutes its own provisions in their place.
 
 The consequences of any such construction are apparent. If
Congress possesses the power, under the Constitution, to abolish
slavery in a Territory, it must necessarily possess the like
power to establish it. It cannot be a one-sided power, as may
suit the convenience or particular views of the advocates. It is
a power, if it exists at all, over the whole subject; and then,
upon the process of reasoning which seeks to extend its influence
beyond the Territory, and within the limits of a State, if
Congress should establish, instead of abolish, slavery, we do not
see but that, if a slave should be removed from the Territory
into a free State, his status would accompany him, and continue,
notwithstanding its laws against slavery. The laws of the free
State, according to the argument, would be displaced, and the act
of Congress, in its effect, be substituted in their place. We do
not see how this conclusion could be avoided, if the construction
against which we are contending should prevail. We are satisfied,
however, it is unsound, and that the true answer to it is, that
even conceding, for the purposes of the argument, that this
provision of the act of Congress is valid within the Territory
for which it was enacted, it can have no operation or effect
beyond its limits, or within the jurisdiction of a State. It can
neither displace its laws, nor change the status or condition of
its inhabitants.
 
 Our conclusion, therefore, is, upon this branch of the case,
that the question involved is one depending solely upon the law
of Missouri, and that the Federal court sitting in the State, and
trying the case before us, was bound to follow it.
 
 The remaining question for consideration is, What is the law
of the State of Missouri on this subject? And it would be a
sufficient answer to refer to the judgment of the highest court
of the State in the very case, were it not due to that tribunal
to state somewhat at large the course of decision and the
principles involved, on account of some diversity of opinion in
the cases. As we have already stated, this case was originally
brought in the Circuit Court of the State, which resulted in a
judgment for the plaintiff. The case was carried up to the
Supreme Court for revision. That court reversed the judgment
below, and remanded the cause to the circuit, for a new trial. In
that state of the proceeding, a new suit was brought by the
plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States, and tried
upon the issues and agreed case before us, and a verdict and
judgment for the defendant, that court following the decision of
the Supreme Court of the State. The judgment of the Supreme Court
is reported in the 15 Misso. R., p. 576. The court placed the
decision upon the temporary residence of the master with the
slaves in the State and Territory to which they removed, and
their return to the slave State; and upon the principles of
international law, that foreign laws have no extra-territorial
force, except such as the State within which they are sought to
be enforced may see fit to extend to them, upon the doctrine of
comity of nations.
 
 This is the substance of the grounds of the decision.
 
 The same question has been twice before that court since,
and the same judgment given, (15 Misso. R., 595; 17 Ib., 434.) It
must be admitted, therefore, as the settled law of the State,
and, according to the decision in the case of Strader et al. v.
Graham, is conclusive of the case in this court.
 
 It is said, however, that the previous cases and course of
decision in the State of Missouri on this subject were different,
and that the courts had held the slave to be free on his return
from a temporary residence in the free State. We do not see, were
this to be admitted, that the circumstance would show that the
settled course of decision, at the time this case was tried in
the court below, was not to be considered the law of the State.
Certainly, it must be, unless the first decision of a principle
of law by a State court is to be permanent and irrevocable. The
idea seems to be, that the courts of a State are not to change
their opinions, or, if they do, the first decision is to be
regarded by this court as the law of the State.It is certain, if
this be so, in the case before us, it is an exception to the rule
governing this court in all other cases. But what court has not
changed its opinions? What judge has not changed his?
 
 Waiving, however, this view, and turning to the decisions of
the courts of Missouri, it will be found that there is no
discrepancy between the earlier and the present cases upon this
subject. There are some eight of them reported previous to the
decision in the case before us, which was decided in 1852. The
last of the earlier cases was decided in 1836. In each one of
these, with two exceptions, the master or mistress removed into
the free State with the slave, with a view to a permanent
residence -- in other words, to make that his or her domicil. And
in several of the cases, this removal and permanent residence
were relied on, as the ground of the decision in favor of the
plaintiff. All these cases, therefore, are not necessarily in
conflict with the decision in the case before us, but consistent
with it. In one of the two excepted cases, the master had hired
the slave in the State of Illinois from 1817 to 1825. In the
other, the master was an officer in the army, and removed with
his slave to the military post of Fort Snelling, and at Prairie
du Chien, in Michigan, temporarily, while acting under the orders
of his Government. It is conceded the decision in this case was
departed from in the case before us, and in those that have
followed it. But it is to be observed that these subsequent cases
are in conformity with those in all the slave States bordering on
the free -- in Kentucky, (2 Marsh., 476; 5 B. Munroe, 176; 9 Ib.,
565) -- in Virginia, (1 Rand., 15; 1 Leigh, 172; 10 Grattan, 495)
-- in Maryland, (4 Harris and McHenry, 295, 322, 325.) In
conformity, also, with the law of England on this subject, Ex
parte Grace, (2 Hagg. Adm., R., 94,) and with the opinions of the
best eminent jurists of the country. (Story's Confl., 396 a; 2
Kent Com., 258 n.; 18 Pick., 193, Chief Justice Shaw. See
Corresp. between Lord Stowell and Judge Story, 1 vol. Life of
Story, p. 552, 558.)
 
 Lord Stowell, in communicating his opinion in the case of
the slave Grace to Judge Story, states, in his letter, what the
question was before him, namely: "Whether the emancipation of a
slave brought to England insured a complete emancipation to him
on his return to his own country, or whether it only operated as
a suspension of slavery in England, and his original character
devolved on him again upon his return." He observed, "the
question had never been examined since an end was put to slavery
fifty years ago," having reference to the decision of Lord
Mansfield in the case of Somersett; but the practice, he
observed, "has regularly been, that on his return to his own
country, the slave resumed his original character of slave." And
so Lord Stowell held in the case.
 
 Judge Story, in his letter in reply, observes: "I have read
with great attention your judgment in the slave case, &c. Upon
the fullest consideration which I have been able to give the
subject, I entirely concur in your views. If I had been called
upon to pronounce a judgment in a like case, I should have
certainly arrived at the same result." Again he observes: "In my
native State, (Massachusetts,) the state of slavery is not
recognized as legal; and yet, if a slave should come hither, and
afterwards return to his own home, we should certainly think that
the local law attached upon him, and that his servile character
would be reintegrated."
 
 We may remark, in this connection, that the case before the
Maryland court, already referred to, and which was decided in
1799, presented the same question as that before Lord Stowell,
and received a similar decision. This was nearly thirty years
before the decision in that case, which was in 1828. The Court of
Appeals observed, in deciding the Maryland case, that "however
the laws of Great Britain in such instances, operating upon such
persons there, might interfere so as to prevent the exercise of
certain acts by the masters, not permitted, as in the case of
Somersett, yet, upon the bringing Ann Joice into this State,
(then the province of Maryland,) the relation of master and slave
continued in its extent, as authorized by the laws of this
State." And Luther Martin, one of the counsel in that case,
stated, on the argument, that the question had been previously
decided the same way in the case of slaves returning from a
residence in Pennsylvania, where they had become free under her
laws.
 
 The State of Louisiana, whose courts had gone further in
holding the slave free on his return from a residence in a free
State than the courts of her sister States, has settled the law,
by an act of her Legislature, in conformity with the law of the
court of Missouri in the case before us. (Sess. Law, 1846.)
 
 The case before Lord Stowell presented much stronger
features for giving effect to the law of England in the case of
the slave Grace then exists in the cases that have arisen in this
country, for in that case the slave returned to a colony of
England over which the Imperial Government exercised supreme
authority. Yet, on the return of the slave to the colony, from a
temporary residence in England, he held that the original
condition of the slave attached. The question presented in cases
arising here is as to the effect and operation to be given to the
laws of a foreign State, on the return of the slave within an
independent sovereignty.
 
 Upon the whole, it must be admitted that the current of
authority, both in England and in this country, is in accordance
with the law as declared by the courts of Missouri in the case
before us, and we think the court below was not only right, but
bound to follow it.
 
 Some question has been made as to the character of the
residence in this case in the free State. But we regard the facts
as set forth in the agreed case as decisive. The removal of Dr.
Emerson from Missouri to the military posts was in the discharge
of his duties as surgeon in the army, and under the orders of his
Government. He was liable at any moment to be recalled, as he was
in 1838, and ordered to another post. The same is also true as it
respects Major Taliaferro. In such a case, the officer goes to
his post for a temporary purpose, to remain there for an
uncertain time, and not for the purpose of fixing his permanent
abode. The question we think too plain to require argument. The
case of the Attorney General v. Napier, (6 Welsh, Hurtst. and
Gordon Exch. Rep., 217,) illustrates and applies the principle in
the case of an officer of the English army.
 
 A question has been alluded to, on the argument, namely: the
right of the master with his slave of transit into or through a
free State, on Business or commercial pursuits, or in the
exercise of a Federal right, or the discharge of a Federal duty,
being a citizen of the United States, which is not before us.
This question depends upon different considerations and
principles from the one in hand, and turns upon the rights and
privileges secured to a common citizen of the republic under the
Constitution of the United States. When that question arises, we
shall be prepared to decide it.
 
 Our conclusion is, that the judgment of the court below
should be affirmed.
 
 
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