William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris c/o General Delivery Gadsden, Alabama state non-domestic zip code exempt In Propria Persona All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION STATE OF ALABAMA [sic] ) Case No. #CV-97-H-0022-M ) Plaintiff [sic] ) 16th Cir. Case #CC-95-1083-DWS ) v. ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE: ) Rules 201(d), 301, and 302, WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP [sic], ) Federal Rules of Evidence; ) Rule 9(b), Federal Rules Defendant [sic] ) of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") _____________________________) COMES NOW William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, Citizen of Alabama state, expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"), and Defendant in the above entitled action (hereinafter "Defendant"), to provide formal Notice to all interested party(s), and to demand mandatory judicial notice by this honorable Court, pursuant to Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of this, Defendant's formal Refusal, pursuant to FRCP Rule 9(b), of the alleged ORDER of the honorable James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge, issued erroneously and filed erroneously in the instant case on January 17, 1997. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 1 of 12 Defendant refuses said ORDER for fraud, as has already been amply demonstrated in Defendant's previously submitted NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ETOWAH COUNTY, for all of the same reasons as stated therein. Specifically, Defendant hereby makes a permanent, standing objection to any and all decisions, actions, orders, practices, policies, rules, statutes, regulations, procedures, and customs which are associated in any way with the United States District Court ("USDC"), as was true of the ORDER signed by Judge Hancock on January 17, 1997. The USDC has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the instant case, even though Judge Hancock may be authorized to preside over the USDC for Article IV matters. Orders issued from courts which have no jurisdiction are null and void ab initio. Defendant does wish to address an important footnote which is found in said ORDER. In said footnote, Judge Hancock wrote the following: Two of the assertions made by Kemp are of particular interest to the Court. Initially, Kemp continually refers to the undersigned as "Chief Judge." The undersigned is not happy with this promotion, and hopes he does not receive word of it through official channels. In addition, although a promotion (as viewed by some) would be largess enough, Kemp raises another point that promises possible pecuniary benefits for the undersigned. Kemp takes the position that Article III judges are exempt from the federal income tax because, as Kemp correctly points out, Art. III, Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution protects judges' salaries from being reduced during their tenure. Kemp argues that the undersigned's payment of taxes is evidence that the undersigned is not an Article III judge, and is therefore unqualified to hear this case. The undersigned is certainly an Article III judge, but would be positively thrilled to learn from some authoritative source that he is exempt from federal taxes. [ORDER dated September 17, 1997 by James H. Hancock] [Senior United States District Judge, Birmingham] Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 2 of 12 Defendant hereby wishes to apologize to Judge Hancock for the obvious clerical error in Defendant's previous pleadings, wherein Judge Hancock was incorrectly identified as the "Chief Judge," instead of Senior Judge. For the record, Defendant hereby makes a permanent correction, nunc pro tunc to the date on which the instant case was first filed in the District Court of the United States ("DCUS"). More importantly, Judge Hancock goes on to discuss Article III of the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended ("U.S. Constitution"). By way of further elaboration of the important, even crucial, matters which arise out of Article III in the instant case, Defendant respectfully requests mandatory judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of the attached letter dated January 22, 1997, from Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Defendant's Counsel of choice in the instant case, to the Disclosure Officer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, One Columbus Circle, N.E., Washington, D.C. This letter is incorporated here by reference as if set forth fully herein. Until such time as competent, certified evidence is forthcoming from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, particularly from the Chief, Judges Compensation and Benefits Branch, Article III Judges Division, which office is currently occupied by one Carol S. Sefren, that Judge Hancock is, indeed, an Article III judge, as alleged in the ORDER of January 17, 1997, Defendant expressly reserves His fundamental Right to rebut said presumption for assuming facts which are not in evidence. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 3 of 12 On the contrary, the USDC is an Article IV court, with constitutional authority originating in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. Defendant submits that federal judges who preside in the USDC are Article IV judges, not Article III judges. Furthermore, Defendant argues that Article III judges cannot preside over Article IV courts, without prior authorization; likewise, Defendant argues that Article IV judges cannot preside over Article III courts, without prior authorization. Judge Hancock belies his claim to being an Article III judge by effectively admitting that his judicial compensation is currently being diminished by federal income taxes. Judge Hancock is also keenly aware that Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution protects judges' salaries from being reduced during their tenure. It is not clear to Defendant, however, that Judge Hancock has actually reviewed and completely understood the key case of Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which is controlling in the instant case in part because it has never been overturned, and primarily because it held that the compensation of federal judges cannot be diminished by federal income taxes, notwithstanding the so-called 16th amendment. At that time, the high Court presumed that said "amendment" had been properly and lawfully ratified, because said Court had not yet been presented with evidence proving that the ratification had failed. Defendant also argues that the case of Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965), is likewise important for the admission made therein that federal judges are subject to the undue influence of the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic]. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 4 of 12 By connecting these two points in time -- 1920 and 1965 -- Defendant submits to this honorable Court the proposition that the quality of judicial decisions has deteriorated measurably in the intervening years. Moreover, between 1965 and today (1997), the quality of judicial decisions as deteriorated even further, so much so, that the reputation of the federal judiciary is now at an all-time historical low. Defendant submits that one of the major reasons for this deterioration is the fraud which Congress has perpetrated upon all federal judges by imposing federal income taxes upon their judicial compensation, in blatant violation of Article III, Section 1, and in blatant violation of the holding in Evans, and by manipulating the identities of the various federal district courts so as to extend the jurisdiction of the USDC, unlawfully, into the state zone and into the subject matters over which the USDC has no jurisdiction whatsoever. See 18 U.S.C. 3231; 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. Article III, Section 1, has never been amended or repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored. The so-called 16th amendment [sic] did not repeal Article III, Section 1, even if it had been lawfully ratified; it was not. See People v. Boxer, California Supreme Court case #S-030016, December 1992; respondent Boxer fell totally silent, activating estoppel. Defendant submits that further evidence of the Congressional fraud upon all federal judges is to be found in the common practice of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in Washington, D.C., to prepare and mail written communications on office stationery which bears the heading "Article III Judges Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 5 of 12 Division" [sic]. Defendant submits that the existence of such a Division proves that Congress is well aware of Article III, and yet all federal judges currently preside over the USDC, which is an Article IV forum, and all federal judges currently pay federal income taxes on their judicial compensation, in violation of Article III, and in violation of Evans supra. Plaintiff argues that no federal judge can be an Article III judge, if the judicial compensation of that federal judge is currently being diminished by federal income taxes. This is the case because the taxation of judicial compensation is conclusive evidence of a dependent and biased judiciary. This bias and dependence were openly and notoriously documented, for all the world to see, in the case of Lord v. Kelley supra. Defendant hereby asserts a fundamental Right to enjoy an independent and unbiased judiciary, exercising lawful authority in courts of competent jurisdiction over all matters arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The DCUS is such a court, and payment of federal income taxes upon his compensation is conclusive proof that Judge Hancock cannot preside upon this honorable DCUS. Until such time as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall certify that Judge Hancock has either voluntarily rescinded his W-4 Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate, or has been ordered to do so by one or more of his judicial superiors, if only for the duration of the instant case, Judge Hancock is deemed unqualified to preside over said case, notwithstanding his unsupported allegation that he is presently an Article III judge, primarily because Judge Hancock's judicial compensation is currently being diminished by federal income taxes, in violation of Article III, Section 1, and Evans v. Gore (never overturned). Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 6 of 12 To this end, Defendant wishes to remind this honorable Court of Defendant's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF 3 JUDGES FROM THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER THIS DCUS, which has been served on all interested party(s). Although a single Article III judge is authorized by Congress to handle case preliminaries, Defendant reserves his right to convene a 3-judge panel here, in order to adjudicate Defendant's claims: (1) that the apportionment of congressional districts is skewed, and thereby unconstitutional, for failing to count Citizens of Alabama state who are not also citizens of the United States ("federal citizens"); and, (2) that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA") is unconstitutional for exhibiting prohibited class discrimination against Citizens of Alabama state who are not also federal citizens. Defendant needs a competent and qualified Article III judge to issue a valid warrant of removal of the instant case from the Circuit Court of Etowah County into this honorable DCUS, whereupon Defendant seeks an immediate and indefinite stay of the instant proceedings, pending final review of his challenge, as previously filed in the instant case, to the constitutionality of the JSSA. See Defendant's MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 7 of 12 INCORPORATION OF MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Defendant hereby incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully herein, the attached MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROVING THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES. If his footnote is any indication, Judge Hancock will be positively thrilled to learn from these authoritative sources that he is exempt from federal taxes, as least as far as federal taxation of his judicial compensation is concerned. SUMMARY Defendant is entitled to a response to His Petition for Warrant of Removal from a competent and qualified District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), said DCUS to consider Defendant's proper petition for warrant of removal from the Circuit Court of Etowah County. James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge, is a judge of the United States District Court ("USDC"), said USDC having been demonstrated to differ from the DCUS in name, in territorial jurisdiction, and in subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Judge Hancock is not qualified to sit on a proper DCUS, because his judicial compensation is currently being diminished by federal income taxes, in violation of Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of the pivotal holding in Evans v. Gore supra, which requires competent, qualified, independent and unbiased federal judges whose compensation(s) are not currently being diminished by federal income taxes, for the DCUS. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 8 of 12 VERIFICATION I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby declare, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the "United States", and under knowledge of the law forbidding false witness before God and men, attest and affirm that I have read the foregoing and know the contents thereof, and that the same is true of My own knowledge, except those matters herein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). Executed on January 24, 1997: /s/ Mike Kemp ________________________________ William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris Citizen of Alabama state (expressly not a federal citizen) Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 9 of 12 PROOF OF SERVICE I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the "United States", that I am at least eighteen years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s): NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE: Rules 201(d), 301, and 302, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following: Solicitor General William H. Rehnquist, C.J. Department of Justice Supreme Court of U.S. 10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. James E. Hedgspeth, Jr. Clerk of Court Etowah County Offices District Court of the U.S. [sic] c/o 800 Forrest Avenue c/o 1729 Fifth Avenue North Gadsden, Alabama state Birmingham, Alabama state Clerk of Court Attorney General Circuit Court of Etowah County Department of Justice c/o 800 Forrest Avenue 10th and Constitution, N.W. Gadsden, Alabama state Washington, D.C. Clerk of Court Chief Judge Court of Criminal Appeals 11th Circuit Court of Appeals c/o P.O. Box 301555 c/o 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Montgomery, Alabama state Atlanta, Georgia state Executed on January 24, 1997: /s/ Mike Kemp _________________________________________________ William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris Citizen of Alabama state (expressly not a federal citizen) all Rights reserved without prejudice Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 10 of 12 c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 Tucson [zip code exempt] ARIZONA STATE January 22, 1997 Disclosure Officer Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building One Columbus Circle, N.E. Washington, D.C. Subject: Hon. James H. Hancock Dear Disclosure Officer: Please provide Us, as soon as possible, with a certified copy of the credentials of one James H. Hancock, employed as a federal district judge in the United States District Court ("USDC") for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division. Judge Hancock alleges that he is currently an Article III judge [sic], but he is also paying federal income taxes on his judicial compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1, in the U.S. Constitution, which has never been repealed or amended. In a recent ORDER issued from the wrong court, Judge Hancock stated that he would be positively thrilled to learn from some authoritative source that he is exempt from federal taxes. Evidently, Judge Hancock does not consider the U.S. Constitution to be an "authoritative source"; I do hope I have not drawn the wrong inference from his ORDER. We refer you (and Judge Hancock) to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which held that judicial immunity from diminution of their compensation must be sustained, notwithstanding the so-called 16th amendment [sic]. Our research informs Us that this decision has never been formally overturned, notwithstanding allegations to the contrary which have been published in the UCLA Law Review. During calendar 1996, I did witness a copy of stationery from the "Article III Judges Division" [sic] of your offices, which had been transmitted through the United States Mail to Me from Carol S. Sefren, Chief, Judges Compensation and Benefits Branch, Article III Judges Division (see attached response). Can it be that your office continues to misinform federal judges that they are authorized under Article III, even though those very same judges are paying federal income taxes on their judicial compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1, and in violation of the standing decision in Evans v. Gore, and even though all federal district judges currently preside over the USDC, and not over the District Court of the United States ("DCUS")? See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1921). Such misinformation could be construed as mail fraud. Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 11 of 12 If this is the case, permit Us respectfully to request that you cease and desist this practice at once, because it is misleading, not only for all the judges on your payroll, but also for the public at large whom those judges were appointed to serve, with integrity and without undue influence, and upon whom the public at large depend for independent and unbiased opinions. See also Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965), to appreciate how far our judiciary has deteriorated since the decision in Evans. Please respond as quickly as possible. Until We receive your certified response, important litigation must be put on hold. Thank you very much for your consideration. Sincerely yours, /s/ Paul Mitchell Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness copy: James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge William H. Rehnquist, C.J., U.S. Supreme Court parties listed in PROOF OF SERVICE, State v. Kemp litigation files Second Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 12 of 12 # # #
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Alabama v. Kemp