William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Gadsden, Alabama state
non-domestic zip code exempt

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice







               DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

              NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

                         MIDDLE DIVISION


STATE OF ALABAMA [sic]       )  Case No. #CV-97-H-0022-M
                             )
          Plaintiff [sic]    )  16th Cir. Case #CC-95-1083-DWS
                             )
     v.                      )  NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
                             )  Rules 201(d), 301, and 302,
WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP  [sic], )  Federal Rules of Evidence;
                             )  Rule 9(b), Federal Rules
          Defendant [sic]    )  of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")
_____________________________)


COMES NOW  William Michael,  Kemp, Sui  Juris, Citizen of Alabama

state, expressly  not a  citizen of  the United  States ("federal

citizen"),  and   Defendant  in   the   above   entitled   action

(hereinafter  "Defendant"),  to  provide  formal  Notice  to  all

interested party(s),  and to  demand mandatory judicial notice by

this honorable  Court, pursuant  to Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of

the Federal  Rules  of  Evidence,  of  this,  Defendant's  formal

Refusal, pursuant  to FRCP Rule 9(b), of the alleged ORDER of the

honorable James  H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge,

issued erroneously  and filed  erroneously in the instant case on

January 17, 1997.


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 1 of 12


     Defendant refuses  said ORDER for fraud, as has already been

amply demonstrated  in Defendant's previously submitted NOTICE OF

REFUSAL FOR  CAUSE OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION  TO THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF  ETOWAH COUNTY,  for all  of the  same reasons as stated

therein.   Specifically,  Defendant  hereby  makes  a  permanent,

standing objection  to any  and all  decisions, actions,  orders,

practices, policies,  rules, statutes,  regulations,  procedures,

and customs  which are  associated in  any way  with  the  United

States District  Court ("USDC"),  as was true of the ORDER signed

by  Judge  Hancock  on  January  17,  1997.    The  USDC  has  no

jurisdiction whatsoever  over the instant case, even though Judge

Hancock may be authorized to preside over the USDC for Article IV

matters.   Orders issued  from courts  which have no jurisdiction

are null and void ab initio.

     Defendant does  wish to  address an important footnote which

is found  in said  ORDER.   In said footnote, Judge Hancock wrote

the following:

     Two of  the  assertions  made  by  Kemp  are  of  particular
     interest to  the Court.   Initially, Kemp continually refers
     to the undersigned as "Chief Judge."  The undersigned is not
     happy with  this promotion,  and hopes  he does  not receive
     word of it through official channels.

     In addition,  although a promotion (as viewed by some) would
     be largess  enough, Kemp  raises another point that promises
     possible pecuniary benefits for the undersigned.  Kemp takes
     the position  that Article  III judges  are exempt  from the
     federal income  tax because,  as Kemp  correctly points out,
     Art. III,  Sec. 1  of the U.S. Constitution protects judges'
     salaries from  being reduced  during  their  tenure.    Kemp
     argues that  the undersigned's  payment of taxes is evidence
     that the  undersigned is  not an  Article III  judge, and is
     therefore unqualified to hear this case.  The undersigned is
     certainly an  Article III  judge, but  would  be  positively
     thrilled to  learn from some authoritative source that he is
     exempt from federal taxes.

             [ORDER dated September 17, 1997 by James H. Hancock]
                [Senior United States District Judge, Birmingham]


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 2 of 12


     Defendant hereby  wishes to  apologize to  Judge Hancock for

the obvious  clerical error  in Defendant's  previous  pleadings,

wherein Judge  Hancock was  incorrectly identified  as the "Chief

Judge," instead  of Senior  Judge.   For  the  record,  Defendant

hereby makes a permanent correction, nunc pro tunc to the date on

which the  instant case  was first filed in the District Court of

the United States ("DCUS").

     More importantly,  Judge Hancock  goes on to discuss Article

III of  the Constitution  for the  United States  of America,  as

lawfully amended  ("U.S.  Constitution").    By  way  of  further

elaboration of  the important,  even crucial, matters which arise

out of  Article III  in the  instant case, Defendant respectfully

requests mandatory  judicial notice,  pursuant to  Rule 201(d) of

the Federal  Rules of  Evidence, of  the  attached  letter  dated

January 22,  1997, from  Mr. Paul  Andrew Mitchell,  B.A.,  M.S.,

Defendant's Counsel  of  choice  in  the  instant  case,  to  the

Disclosure Officer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, One

Columbus  Circle,   N.E.,  Washington,   D.C.    This  letter  is

incorporated here by reference as if set forth fully herein.

     Until  such   time  as   competent,  certified  evidence  is

forthcoming from  the Administrative  Office of the United States

Courts, particularly  from the  Chief,  Judges  Compensation  and

Benefits Branch,  Article III  Judges Division,  which office  is

currently occupied by one Carol S. Sefren, that Judge Hancock is,

indeed, an  Article III judge, as alleged in the ORDER of January

17, 1997,  Defendant expressly  reserves His fundamental Right to

rebut said  presumption for  assuming  facts  which  are  not  in

evidence.


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 3 of 12


     On the  contrary, the  USDC is  an Article  IV  court,  with

constitutional authority  originating in  Article IV  of the U.S.

Constitution.   Defendant submits that federal judges who preside

in the  USDC are  Article IV  judges,  not  Article  III  judges.

Furthermore, Defendant  argues that  Article  III  judges  cannot

preside over  Article IV  courts,  without  prior  authorization;

likewise, Defendant  argues that Article IV judges cannot preside

over Article III courts, without prior authorization.

     Judge Hancock belies his claim to being an Article III judge

by  effectively  admitting  that  his  judicial  compensation  is

currently being  diminished  by  federal  income  taxes.    Judge

Hancock is  also keenly aware that Article III, Section 1, of the

U.S. Constitution  protects judges'  salaries from  being reduced

during their tenure.

     It is  not clear  to Defendant,  however, that Judge Hancock

has actually  reviewed and  completely understood the key case of

Evans v.  Gore, 253  U.S. 245 (1920), which is controlling in the

instant case  in part  because it  has never been overturned, and

primarily because it held that the compensation of federal judges

cannot be diminished by federal income taxes, notwithstanding the

so-called 16th  amendment.  At that time, the high Court presumed

that said  "amendment" had  been properly  and lawfully ratified,

because said  Court had  not yet  been  presented  with  evidence

proving that the ratification had failed.

     Defendant also  argues that  the case of Lord v. Kelley, 240

F.Supp. 167,  169 (1965), is likewise important for the admission

made therein  that  federal  judges  are  subject  to  the  undue

influence of the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic].


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 4 of 12


     By connecting  these two  points in time -- 1920 and 1965 --

Defendant submits  to this  honorable Court  the proposition that

the quality  of judicial decisions has deteriorated measurably in

the intervening  years.  Moreover, between 1965 and today (1997),

the quality  of judicial  decisions as deteriorated even further,

so much  so, that  the reputation of the federal judiciary is now

at an all-time historical low.

     Defendant submits  that one  of the  major reasons  for this

deterioration is  the fraud  which Congress  has perpetrated upon

all federal  judges by  imposing federal  income taxes upon their

judicial compensation,  in  blatant  violation  of  Article  III,

Section 1,  and in blatant violation of the holding in Evans, and

by manipulating  the identities  of the  various federal district

courts so  as to extend the jurisdiction of the USDC, unlawfully,

into the  state zone  and into the subject matters over which the

USDC has  no jurisdiction  whatsoever.   See 18  U.S.C. 3231;  28

U.S.C. 1441 et seq.

     Article III,  Section 1, has never been amended or repealed.

Repeals by  implication are  not favored.    The  so-called  16th

amendment [sic] did not repeal Article III, Section 1, even if it

had been  lawfully ratified;   it  was not.  See People v. Boxer,

California  Supreme   Court  case   #S-030016,   December   1992;

respondent Boxer fell totally silent, activating estoppel.

     Defendant submits that further evidence of the Congressional

fraud upon  all federal  judges is  to be  found  in  the  common

practice of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

in Washington,  D.C., to  prepare and mail written communications

on office  stationery which bears the heading "Article III Judges


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 5 of 12


Division" [sic].   Defendant submits that the existence of such a

Division proves  that Congress  is well aware of Article III, and

yet all  federal judges currently preside over the USDC, which is

an Article IV forum, and all federal judges currently pay federal

income taxes  on their  judicial compensation,  in  violation  of

Article III, and in violation of Evans supra.

     Plaintiff argues that no federal judge can be an Article III

judge, if  the judicial  compensation of  that federal  judge  is

currently being  diminished by federal income taxes.  This is the

case because  the taxation of judicial compensation is conclusive

evidence of  a dependent  and biased  judiciary.   This bias  and

dependence were  openly and  notoriously documented,  for all the

world to see, in the case of Lord v. Kelley supra.

     Defendant hereby  asserts a  fundamental Right  to enjoy  an

independent and  unbiased judiciary,  exercising lawful authority

in courts  of competent  jurisdiction over  all  matters  arising

under the  Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.

The DCUS  is such  a court,  and payment  of federal income taxes

upon his  compensation is  conclusive proof  that  Judge  Hancock

cannot preside upon this honorable DCUS.

     Until such time as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of

the United  States shall  certify that  Judge Hancock  has either

voluntarily rescinded  his W-4  Employee's Withholding  Allowance

Certificate, or  has been  ordered to do so by one or more of his

judicial superiors, if only for the duration of the instant case,

Judge Hancock  is deemed  unqualified to  preside over said case,

notwithstanding his  unsupported allegation  that he is presently

an Article  III judge, primarily because Judge Hancock's judicial

compensation is  currently being  diminished  by  federal  income

taxes, in  violation of Article III, Section 1, and Evans v. Gore

(never overturned).


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 6 of 12


     To this end, Defendant wishes to remind this honorable Court

of Defendant's  NOTICE AND  DEMAND FOR  TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF 3

JUDGES FROM THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER

THIS DCUS, which has been served on all interested party(s).

     Although  a  single  Article  III  judge  is  authorized  by

Congress to  handle case  preliminaries, Defendant  reserves  his

right to  convene a  3-judge panel  here, in  order to adjudicate

Defendant's claims:

     (1)  that the  apportionment of  congressional districts  is
          skewed, and  thereby unconstitutional,  for failing  to
          count Citizens  of  Alabama  state  who  are  not  also
          citizens of  the United  States  ("federal  citizens");
          and,

     (2)  that  the   federal  Jury  Selection  and  Service  Act
          ("JSSA") is  unconstitutional for exhibiting prohibited
          class discrimination  against Citizens of Alabama state
          who are not also federal citizens.

     Defendant needs  a competent and qualified Article III judge

to issue  a valid warrant of removal of the instant case from the

Circuit  Court   of  Etowah  County  into  this  honorable  DCUS,

whereupon Defendant seeks an immediate and indefinite stay of the

instant proceedings,  pending final  review of  his challenge, as

previously filed in the instant case, to the constitutionality of

the JSSA.  See Defendant's MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS.


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 7 of 12


                   INCORPORATION OF MEMORANDUM
                    OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

     Defendant hereby  incorporates by reference, as if set forth

fully herein,  the attached  MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

PROVING THE  VOLUNTARY NATURE  OF FEDERAL  INCOME TAXES.   If his

footnote is  any indication,  Judge Hancock  will  be  positively

thrilled to  learn from  these authoritative  sources that  he is

exempt from federal taxes, as least as far as federal taxation of

his judicial compensation is concerned.


                             SUMMARY

     Defendant is  entitled to  a response  to His  Petition  for

Warrant of  Removal from a competent and qualified District Court

of the  United States ("DCUS"), said DCUS to consider Defendant's

proper petition  for warrant of removal from the Circuit Court of

Etowah County.   James  H. Hancock, Senior United States District

Judge, is  a judge  of the United States District Court ("USDC"),

said USDC  having been  demonstrated to  differ from  the DCUS in

name,  in   territorial  jurisdiction,   and  in  subject  matter

jurisdiction.

     Furthermore, Judge  Hancock is  not qualified  to sit  on  a

proper DCUS, because his judicial compensation is currently being

diminished by  federal income taxes, in violation of Article III,

Section 1,  of the  U.S. Constitution,  and in  violation of  the

pivotal holding in Evans v. Gore supra, which requires competent,

qualified,  independent   and  unbiased   federal  judges   whose

compensation(s) are  not currently  being diminished  by  federal

income taxes, for the DCUS.


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 8 of 12


                          VERIFICATION

     I, William  Michael, Kemp,  Sui Juris, hereby declare, under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without  the "United States", and under knowledge of the

law forbidding  false witness  before God  and  men,  attest  and

affirm that  I have  read the  foregoing and  know  the  contents

thereof, and  that the  same is  true of My own knowledge, except

those matters herein alleged on information and belief, and as to

those matters,  I believe  them to  be  true,  so  help  Me  God,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).


Executed on January 24, 1997:

/s/ Mike Kemp
________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)


        Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 9 of 12


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, William  Michael,  Kemp,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States", that I am at least eighteen

years of  age, a  Citizen of one of the United States of America,

and that I personally served the following document(s):

                  NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
     Rules 201(d), 301, and 302, Federal Rules of Evidence,
           Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:

Solicitor General               William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice           Supreme Court of U.S.
10th and Constitution, N.W.     1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.                Washington, D.C.

James E. Hedgspeth, Jr.         Clerk of Court
Etowah County Offices           District Court of the U.S. [sic]
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue          c/o 1729 Fifth Avenue North
Gadsden, Alabama state          Birmingham, Alabama state

Clerk of Court                  Attorney General
Circuit Court of Etowah County  Department of Justice
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue          10th and Constitution, N.W.
Gadsden, Alabama state          Washington, D.C.

Clerk of Court                  Chief Judge
Court of Criminal Appeals       11th Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o P.O. Box 301555             c/o 56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Montgomery, Alabama state       Atlanta, Georgia state


Executed on January 24, 1997:

/s/ Mike Kemp
_________________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
all Rights reserved without prejudice


       Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 10 of 12


                                      c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
                                         Tucson [zip code exempt]
                                                    ARIZONA STATE

                                                 January 22, 1997

Disclosure Officer
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C.

Subject:  Hon. James H. Hancock

Dear Disclosure Officer:

Please provide  Us, as soon as possible, with a certified copy of
the credentials  of one  James H.  Hancock, employed as a federal
district judge  in the  United States District Court ("USDC") for
the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division.

Judge Hancock  alleges that  he is currently an Article III judge
[sic], but he is also paying federal income taxes on his judicial
compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1, in the U.S.
Constitution, which  has never  been repealed  or amended.   In a
recent ORDER  issued from  the wrong  court, Judge Hancock stated
that  he   would  be  positively  thrilled  to  learn  from  some
authoritative source  that  he  is  exempt  from  federal  taxes.
Evidently, Judge  Hancock does not consider the U.S. Constitution
to be  an "authoritative source";  I do hope I have not drawn the
wrong inference from his ORDER.

We refer  you (and  Judge Hancock) to the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),
which held  that  judicial  immunity  from  diminution  of  their
compensation must  be sustained,  notwithstanding  the  so-called
16th amendment [sic].  Our research informs Us that this decision
has never  been formally  overturned, notwithstanding allegations
to the contrary which have been published in the UCLA Law Review.

During calendar 1996, I did witness a copy of stationery from the
"Article III  Judges Division"  [sic] of  your offices, which had
been transmitted  through the United States Mail to Me from Carol
S.  Sefren,  Chief,  Judges  Compensation  and  Benefits  Branch,
Article III Judges Division (see attached response).

Can it  be that your office continues to misinform federal judges
that they  are authorized  under Article  III, even  though those
very same  judges  are  paying  federal  income  taxes  on  their
judicial compensation,  in violation  of Article  III, Section 1,
and in  violation of  the standing decision in Evans v. Gore, and
even though  all federal  district judges  currently preside over
the USDC,  and not  over the  District Court of the United States
("DCUS")?   See Balzac  v. Porto  Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1921).
Such misinformation could be construed as mail fraud.


       Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 11 of 12


If this  is the  case, permit Us respectfully to request that you
cease and desist this practice at once, because it is misleading,
not only  for all  the judges  on your  payroll, but also for the
public at  large whom  those judges were appointed to serve, with
integrity and  without undue  influence, and upon whom the public
at large  depend for independent and unbiased opinions.  See also
Lord v.  Kelley, 240  F.Supp. 167,  169 (1965), to appreciate how
far our judiciary has deteriorated since the decision in Evans.

Please respond  as quickly  as possible.   Until  We receive your
certified response, important litigation must be put on hold.

Thank you very much for your consideration.


Sincerely yours,

/s/ Paul Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness

copy:  James H. Hancock, Senior United States District Judge
       William H. Rehnquist, C.J., U.S. Supreme Court
       parties listed in PROOF OF SERVICE, State v. Kemp
       litigation files


       Second Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 12 of 12


                             #  #  #


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Alabama v. Kemp