William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Gadsden, Alabama state
(non-domestic zip code exempt)

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice







               DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

              NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

                         MIDDLE DIVISION


STATE OF ALABAMA [sic]        )  Case No. CV97-H-22-M
                              )
          Plaintiff [sic]     )  16th Cir. Case #CC-95-1083-DWS
                              )
     v                        )  NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE
                              )  OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION
WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP  [sic],  )  TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
                              )  FOR ETOWAH COUNTY
          Defendant [sic]     )  Rule 201(d), 301, and 302,
                              )  Federal Rules of Evidence
                              )  Rule 9(b) FRCP
                              )
                              )
                              )
                              )
______________________________)


COMES  NOW   William  Michael   Kemp,  Sui   Juris   (hereinafter
"Petitioner"),  to   provide  formal  Notice  to  all  interested
party(s),  and  to  demand  mandatory  judicial  notice  by  this
honorable Court,  pursuant to  Rules 201(d),  301, and 302 of the
Federal Rules  of Evidence, of this, Petitioner's formal Refusal,
pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of
the alleged ORDER of the honorable James H. Hancock, Chief Judge,
United States  District Court (hereinafter "Chief Judge"), issued
and filed  erroneously in  the instant  case on  January 8, 1997.
Petitioner refuses  said ORDER for fraud, as is demonstrated with
particularity in the following, to wit:


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 1 of 10


     1.   Because Petitioner  seeks, as  is His  Right, to invoke
Constitutional (Article  III) judicial authority in protection of
His Rights  guaranteed under  the  Constitution  for  the  United
States of America, as lawfully amended ("U.S. Constitution"), and
declares that  these Rights  have been  violated by  a "Drug Task
Force" of  Etowah County  Alabama, which  operates with  a  large
proportion of  federal funding;

     Petitioner declares  that not only have His essential Rights
been  violated,   but  also  federal  funds  have  been  used  to
accomplish the  violation;  further,  these  violations  are  the
standard practice of said "Drug Task Force."

     Petitioner filed  His PETITION FOR WARRANT OF REMOVAL in the
District Court  of the  United States ("DCUS"), Northern Judicial
District of  Alabama, Middle  Division, as is evident on the face
of the  document. Petitioner  has a  receipt from  a Postal Money
Order, serial  number 64697148821,  issued on  January 6, 1997 at
United States  Post Office  "359530." This  shows receipt  by the
Clerk, District  Court of  the United States [sic], of the sum of
one hundred  fifty dollars  and no  cents  ($$150.00)  in  lawful
money, from Petitioner, whose ship-to location is in care of 2108
Lookout Street located in Gadsden, Alabama state.

     2.   The Chief  Judge's ORDER  is plainly  issued  from  the
United  States  District  Court  for  the  Northern  District  of
Alabama, Middle  Division.    As  mentioned  supra,  Petitioner's
VERIFIED PETITION  was presented  to the  District Court  of  the
United States.  The former is an Article IV territorial tribunal,
with  territorial   and  subject   matter  jurisdiction   tightly
constrained by  Acts of  Congress;   the latter is an Article III
judicial power  Court, with  general  jurisdiction  to  hear  all
matters arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States. Petitioner finds the Chief Judge's ORDER of Remand
to be ultra vires (without effect) on the instant case.

        Jurisdiction of  court may be challenged at any stage
    of the  proceeding, and  also  may  be  challenged  after
    conviction and  execution of  judgment by  way of writ of
    habeas corpus.

        [U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 2 of 10


     3.   NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOIA REQUEST

     Petitioner hereby  places all  interested party(s) on formal
Notice of  Petitioner's intent  to submit  a proper request under
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") for all financial records
of the federally funded Drug Task Force of Etowah county, Alabama
state.  The DCUS is the federal court of original jurisdiction to
compel production  of documents requested under the  FOIA, and to
enjoin  the   improper  withholding   of  said   documents,  upon
exhaustion of  requester's administrative remedies.  See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B).

     4.   Petitioner argues that the only competent and qualified
candidates for  temporary assignment  to preside on a three-judge
panel in  this honorable  District Court  of  the  United  States
("DCUS") are  those who  now preside upon the United States Court
of International  Trade, which is expressly an Article III forum,
by Act of Congress.  See 28 U.S.C. 251(a), to wit:

          The court is a court established under article III
    of the Constitution of the United States.

     5.   Petitioner requires  a competent and qualified panel of
three federal judges to preside on this DCUS, because Citizens of
Alabama state  are not  presently being  counted in  decisions to
apportion congressional districts:  they cannot register to vote;
and they  also cannot  serve on  federal grand  or petit  juries,
unless they  are willing  to sign  fraudulent voter  registration
affidavits and  thereby create  the presumption  that  they  have
opted into  Federal citizenship.  Confer at "Federal citizenship"
in Black's  Law Dictionary,  Sixth Edition.    Petitioner  hereby
explicitly exercises  His fundamental Right of Election to refuse
Federal citizenship, because the "United States" [sic] has become
a criminal enterprise, as evidenced by the War on Drugs [sic] and
its municipal  instrumentality, the  "Drug Task  Force" [sic]  of
Etowah county,  Alabama state.   See  Alabama voter  registration
forms;  Right of Election;  jus soli;  jus sanguinis.

     6.   The authority in Evans [See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245
(1920), never  overturned]  is  particularly  poignant.    It  is
apparent  to   Petitioner,  because   of  irrefutable  historical
research, that  all sitting  Judges of the United States District
Court in America are appointed to serve in either an Article I or
in an Article IV capacity at the present time.  In this capacity,
said Judges  do not enjoy the explicit immunity which is found in
Article III, Section 1 ("3:1") of the Constitution for the United
States of America, as lawfully amended, to wit:

        The Judges,  both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
    shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [sic], and
    shall, at  stated Times,  receive for  their Services,  a
    Compensation, which  shall not be diminished during their
    Continuance in Office.

        [U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 3 of 10


     7.   Petitioner submits  that one  of the  major reasons why
said Judges  do not  enjoy the  explicit immunity  at 3:1  is the
doctrine of  territorial heterogeneity.   Confer  in The  Federal
Zone:   Cracking the  Code of  Internal Revenue,  Fourth Edition,
previously available  on the  Internet via  the Alta Vista search
engine;  see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):

          Each  of  these  [schools]  now  has  an  invisible
    federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
    irregular) boundaries of the school property.

        [Kennedy concurring]

Here, the  U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as
a common  noun, without any citations or footnotes.  The doctrine
of territorial  heterogeneity, as  such, is summarized as follows
in the  "Conclusions" of  The Federal  Zone: Cracking the Code of
Internal Revenue, to wit:

        In  exercising   its  exclusive  authority  over  the
    federal  zone,  Congress  is  not  subject  to  the  same
    constitutional  limitations  that  exist  inside  the  50
    States.   For this  reason, the areas that are inside and
    outside the  federal zone  are heterogeneous with respect
    to each other.  This difference results in a principle of
    territorial heterogeneity:   the areas within the federal
    zone are  subject to one set of rules;  the areas without
    (or outside)  the federal zone are subject to a different
    set of  rules.   The Constitution  rules outside the zone
    and inside  the 50 States.  The Congress rules inside the
    zone and  outside the  50 States.   The  50  States  are,
    therefore,   in    one   general   class,   because   all
    constitutional restraints  upon  Congress  are  in  force
    throughout the  50 States,  without prejudice  to any one
    State.   The areas  within the  federal  zone  are  in  a
    different   general    class,    because    these    same
    constitutional restraints  simply do  not limit  Congress
    inside that zone.

        [The  Federal   Zone,   electronic   Fifth   Edition,
         Conclusions]

     8.   In the  pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), which  is discussed  at several  places in  the book  The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine
whereby the  Constitution of  the "United  States", as such, does
not extend  beyond the  limits of  the states which are united by
and under  it.  This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."

     9.   This  doctrine   has  been   reinforced  by  subsequent
decisions of  the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven
& Allison  v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court
ruled that  the guarantees  of the  Constitution  extend  to  the
federal  zone   only  as   Congress  has  made  those  guarantees
applicable.   The United  States  District  Courts  ("USDC")  are
currently established  by Congress  as territorial (federal zone)
courts, with  constitutional authority emanating from Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2, to wit:


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 4 of 10


          The Congress  shall have  Power to  dispose of  and
    make all  needed Rules  and  Regulations  respecting  the
    Territory or  other  Property  belonging  to  the  United
    States;  ....[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]

     10.  There is  a distinct  and definite difference between a
"United States  District Court"  and a  "District  Court  of  the
United States".   The words "District Court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III
of the  Constitution, not  the legislative courts which have long
been  the   courts  of   the  Territories.     See  International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237  at 241  (1952), 72  S.Ct. 235,  96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska
536.

     11.  The term "District Court of the United States" commonly
describes Article  III courts  or "courts  of the United States",
and not  legislative courts  of the  territories.   See  American
Insurance Co.  v. 356  Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed
242;   International Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union v.
Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
L.Ed. 1082,  69 S.Ct.  641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,
69 S.Ct. 936.

     12.  Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the
United States  is a  part of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  phrase
"court of  the United  States" when  used in a federal statute is
generally construed  as not  referring to  "territorial  courts."
See Balzac  v. Porto  Rico, 258  U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.
343, 66 L.Ed. 627.  In Balzac, the High Court stated:

        The United States District Court is not a true United
    States  court   established  under  Article  III  of  the
    Constitution to  administer the  judicial  power  of  the
    United States  therein conveyed.  It is created by virtue
    of the  sovereign congressional  faculty,  granted  under
    Article IV,  Section 3, of that instrument, of making all
    needful rules  and regulations  respecting the  territory
    belonging to  the United  States.  The resemblance of its
    jurisdiction to  that of  true United  States  courts  in
    offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a
    tribunal not  subject to local influence, does not change
    its character as a mere territorial court.

     13.  The distinction  within the  dual nature of the federal
court system  is also noted in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states
that the  United States  District Court  for the Canal Zone shall
have jurisdiction  "concurrently with  the district courts of the
United States,  of offenses against the laws of the United States
committed upon the high seas."


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 5 of 10


     14.  This honorable  Court is  directed to  one of the great
masters  of  U.S.  Constitution,  Chief  Justice  John  Marshall,
writing in  the year  1828.   Here, Justice Marshall makes a very
clear distinction  between judicial courts, authorized by Article
III, and  legislative (territorial) courts, authorized by Article
IV.   Marshall even utilizes some of the exact wording of Article
IV to  differentiate those  courts  from  Article  III  "judicial
power" courts, as follows:

        These   [territorial]    courts   then,    are    not
    Constitutional  courts,   in  which  the  judicial  power
    conferred by  the Constitution  on the general government
    can be  deposited.   They are  incapable of receiving it.
    They are  legislative courts,  created in  virtue of  the
    general  rights   of  sovereignty  which  exists  in  the
    government, or  in virtue  of that  clause which  enables
    Congress to  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations,
    respecting the  territory belonging to the United States.
    The jurisdiction  with which  they are invested, is not a
    part of  that judicial  power which  is defined in the 3d
    article  of   the  Constitution,   but  is  conferred  by
    Congress, in  the execution of those general powers which
    that body  possesses over  the territories  of the United
    States.  Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised
    in the  States in those courts only which are established
    in pursuance  of the  3d article of the Constitution, the
    same limitation  does not  extend to the territories.  In
    legislating for  them, Congress  exercises  the  combined
    powers of the general and of the State government.

        [American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton], [1
         Pet. 511 (1828)]

        Other supporting authorities now follow, to wit:

        Constitutional  provision   against   diminution   of
    compensation of  federal judges  was designed  to  secure
    independence of judiciary.

        [O'Donoghue v. U.S., 289 U.S. 516 (1933)], [headnote
         2. Judges]

        The term  "District Courts  of the United States," as
    used in  Criminal  Appeals  Rules,  without  an  addition
    expressing  a   wider  connotation,   had  its   historic
    significance and described courts created under article 3
    of Constitution, and did not include territorial courts.

        [Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201], [headnote 2.
         Courts]

        Where statute  authorized Supreme  Court to prescribe
    Criminal Appeals  Rules in  District Courts of the United
    States including  named territorial  courts, omission  in
    rules when  drafted of  reference to  District  Court  of
    Hawaii, and  certain other of the named courts, indicated
    that Criminal  Appeals Rules  were not  to apply to those
    [latter] courts.

        [Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201], [headnote 4.
         Courts]


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 6 of 10


     15.  The following  paragraph from  Mookini is extraordinary
for several  reasons:   (1) it refers to the "historic and proper
sense" of  the term  "District Courts of the United States",  (2)
it makes a key distinction between such courts and application of
their rules  to territorial  courts;   (3) the application of the
maxim inclusio  unius est  exclusio  alterius  is  obvious  here,
namely, the  omission of  territorial courts  clearly shows  that
they were intended to be omitted:

        Not only  did the  promulgating order  use  the  term
    District Courts  of the United States in its historic and
    proper sense,  but the  omission of  provisions  for  the
    application of  the rules  to the  territorial courts and
    other courts  mentioned in  the authorizing  act  clearly
    shows the limitation that was intended.

        [Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]

        The words  "district  court  of  the  United  States"
    commonly describe  constitutional  courts  created  under
    Article III  of the  Constitution,  not  the  legislative
    courts  which   have  long   been  the   courts  of   the
    Territories.

        [Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.
         v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952)]

        The phrase  "court of  the  United  States",  without
    more, means  solely  courts  created  by  Congress  under
    Article III  of  the  Constitution  and  not  territorial
    courts.

        [Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.
         v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), headnote 1]

        United  States   District  Courts   have  only   such
    jurisdiction as  is conferred by an Act of Congress under
    the Constitution.   U.S.C.A.  Const. art.  3, sec. 2;  28
    U.S.C.A. 1344]

        [Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972),
         headnote 2. Courts]

        The United States district courts are not courts of
    general jurisdiction.  They have no jurisdiction except
    as prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article III of the
    Constitution. [many cites omitted]

        [Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976)]


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 7 of 10


        Jurisdiction of  court may be challenged at any stage
    of the  proceeding, and  also  may  be  challenged  after
    conviction and  execution of  judgment by  way of writ of
    habeas corpus.

        [U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]

        The  United  States  District  Court  has  only  such
    jurisdiction as Congress confers.

        [Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin], [191 F.Supp 245
         (D.C.N.Y. 1960)]

     16.  Lastly,     Petitioner  hereby   notoriously   objects,
permanently for  the record, to the evident practice of the Clerk
of Court  of using  a rubber  stamp with  the nomenclature  "U.S.
District Court,"  when this honorable Court is the District Court
of the United States [sic] as a matter of law.


     17.  RELATED CASES AND INCORPORATION OF RELATED PLEADINGS

     Pursuant to  the Full  Faith and  Credit Clause,  Petitioner
hereby provides  formal Notice  to all  interested party(s),  and
demands mandatory  judicial notice, pursuant to Rules 201(d), 301
and 302  of the  Federal Rules  of  Evidence,  of  the  following
related cases,  in  which  the  below  mentioned  pleadings  have
already been  served on  all party(s)  to those  cases (if    not
actually filed, or lodged, in said cases) respectively:

     (1)   Looker v.  United States  et al,  DCUS West  Virginia,
Northern Judicial  District, Case  Numbers #5:96-CR-40, #1:96-CR-
41, #1:96-CR-42,  and #1:96-CR-43, REBUTTAL TO RESPONSE OF UNITED
STATES TO  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION  TO STAY  PROCEEDINGS  UNTIL  FINAL
REVIEW OF  CHALLENGE TO  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF JURY SELECTION
AND SERVICE  ACT:   28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., which is incorporated
by reference as if set forth fully herein;

     (2)   People of  the United  States of  America ex relatione
Paul Andrew  Mitchell v.  United States   et  al., DCUS  Montana,
Billings Division, Case Number #CV-96-163-BLG;  see attached copy
of  NOTICE   OF  REFUSAL  FOR  CAUSE  [cites  omitted]  which  is
incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein;

     (3)   In re: Paul Andrew Mitchell Freedom of Information Act
Request, USDC Montana, Helena Division, Case Number #MCV-96-50-H-
CCL;   see attached  copy of  NOTICE OF  REFUSAL FOR CAUSE [cites
omitted] which  is also incorporated by reference as if set forth
fully herein.

     For the  convenience of  this  honorable  Court,  Petitioner
attaches said  pleadings hereto  as Exhibits.   Due to logistical
problems, Petitioner  hereby informs  this honorable  Court  that
said Exhibits  are  expected  to  arrive  under  separate  cover,
transmitted to  the Clerk  of Court  via Priority  U.S.  Mail  by
Petitioner's Counsel of choice, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 8 of 10


                             SUMMARY

     Petitioner is  entitled to a response to His Petition from a
competent and  qualified District  Court  of  the  United  States
[sic], said  Court to  consider Petitioner's  proper petition for
warrant of removal.  Chief Judge Hancock is a judge of the United
States District  Court, said  Court having  been demonstrated  to
differ from the District Court of the United States.  Further, he
is not  qualified to sit on a proper District Court of the United
States, because  his judicial  compensation  is  currently  being
diminished by  federal income taxes, in violation of Article III,
Section 1,  of the  U.S. Constitution,  and in  violation of  the
pivotal holding  in Evans  v. Gore,  which requires competent and
qualified federal judges, whose compensation(s) are not currently
being diminished  by federal income taxes, for the District Court
of the  United States.   See  Evans v.  Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)
(never overturned).

                          VERIFICATION

     I, William  Michael, Kemp,  Sui Juris, hereby declare, under
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of
America, without  the "United States", and under knowledge of the
law forbidding  false witness  before God  and  men,  attest  and
affirm that  I have  read the  foregoing and  know  the  contents
thereof, and  that the  same is  true of My own knowledge, except
those matters herein alleged on information and belief, and as to
those matters,  I believe  them to  be  true,  so  help  Me  God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).


Dated:  January 14, 1997

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mike Kemp
______________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 9 of 10


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, William  Michael,  Kemp,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under
penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least eighteen
years of  age, a  Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):

                   NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE
                 OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION
                      TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
                        FOR ETOWAH COUNTY
  Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
        Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United  States mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly
addressed to the following:

Clerk of Court                     Solicitor General
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals  Department of Justice
c/o P.O. Box 301555                10th and Constitution, N.W.
Montgomery, Alabama state          Washington, D.C.

James E. Hedgspeth, Jr.         Clerk of Court
Etowah County Offices           District Court of the U.S. [sic]
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue          c/o 1729 Fifth Avenue North
Gadsden, Alabama state          Birmingham, Alabama state

Clerk of Court                  Attorney General
Circuit Court of Etowah County  Department of Justice
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue          10th and Constitution, N.W.
Gadsden, Alabama state          Washington, D.C.


Executed on January 14, 1997

/s/ Mike Kemp
_________________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
all Rights reserved without prejudice


           Notice of Refusal for Cause:  Page 10 of 10


                             #  #  #


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Alabama v. Kemp