Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and Federal Witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state, USA
zip code exempt (formerly DMM 122.32)

Under Protest and by Special Visitation
with explicit reservation of all rights



IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA      ) Case No. GJ-95-1-6 (JMR)
SERVED ON                      )
                               ) MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
                               ) AND RECONSIDERATION,
                               ) AND CHALLENGE TO HOLDINGS
______________________________ ) OF U.S. SUPREME COURT

COMES NOW  Paul Andrew,  Mitchell, Sui  Juris, Sovereign  Arizona

Citizen (hereinafter  "Counsel") and  Vice  President  for  Legal

Affairs of  New Life  Health Center  Company,  an  Unincorporated

Business Trust domiciled in the Arizona Republic (hereinafter the

"Company"), to  file this  emergency petition  to this  honorable

for:   (1) a  continuance of  the hearing  in the  instant  case,

currently scheduled  for June  10, 1996,  (2) for reconsideration

of its  Order, dated  May 24,  1996, a  copy of which is attached

hereto and  incorporated by  reference  as  if  set  forth  fully

herein,   (3) and  formally to challenge controlling cases of the

United States  Supreme Court  which have  an immediate bearing on

the case at hand.  We herein prove the Supreme Court has erred.

     On behalf of the Company, Counsel strenuously objects to the

lack of  proper and  adequate notice of the hearing now scheduled

for June  10, 1996,  and of  the Order  dated May  24, 1996.  The

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 1 of 29

Company's first  inkling that a hearing might have been scheduled

for this  date was  its receipt of Mr. Robert L. Miskell's MOTION

TO CONTINUE  ORDER TO  SHOW CAUSE, dated June 3, 1996, and mailed

on the  same date  to "NEW  LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY, 4841 EAST

SPEEDWAY, TUCSON,  ARIZONA 85712."   A  copy of  this  MOTION  TO

CONTINUE is also attached and incorporated by reference as if set

forth fully  herein.   In it, Mr. Miskell (hereinafter "Miskell")

raises the  issue of fairness de novo:  "... [I]t would be unfair

to ask  another Assistant  U.S. Attorney  to handle  the matter."

How now, Miskell?  See definitions of "fair" in Black's.

     As Miskell  already well knows, "4841 EAST SPEEDWAY, TUCSON,

ARIZONA 85712"  is NOT  the correct  location, and  NOT the "last

known address"  for service  of process  to  the  Company.    The

Company hereby refuses mail service of said MOTION TO CONTINUE on

grounds of  improper service.  Prior to eventually receiving said

MOTION TO  CONTINUE from  a Company  co-worker, the  Company  had

received absolutely no notice whatsoever of any hearing which had

allegedly been scheduled for June 10, 1996.

     Then,  by   means  of  a  facsimile  transmission  begun  at

approximately 13:34  hours on  Saturday, June  8,  1996,  Counsel

quite by  chance received  a copy  of this  Court's ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE why  Eugene Burns  and New Life Health Center Company shall

not be  found in  contempt for  New Life  Health Center Company's

"failure to  comply" [sic] with the Court's order of May 3, 1996.

This was  the first moment at which the Company had ever received

any notice  of the  hearing scheduled for June 10, 1996, and this

occurred at most two (2) days before the hearing.  How generous.

     The Company  strenuously objects  to this  lack of proper or

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 2 of 29

adequate notice,  and demands to know why it was that the Company

received no  prior written  notice of  the hearing  scheduled for

June 10,  1996, and  why it was that this Court's Order dated May

24, 1996,  was not  presented to  the Company until June 8, 1996,

some fourteen (14) calendar days after said Order was signed.

     Furthermore, said  Order dated  May  24,  1996,  exhibits  a

serious error  for alleging  that Dr.  Burns and  the Company are

ordered "Upon application of the United States ...."  This is not

correct.   The Court  will please take special notice of the fact


his MOTION  TO CONTINUE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, both allege that the

Plaintiff here  is the  "United States  of  America"  (see  first

paragraphs).   The Company  strenuously objects  to the  error in

this inconsistency, for the following substantive reasons:

     Congress has  not granted  standing to the "United States of

America" to  bring the  instant action  before this  Court in the

first instance.   The  "United States of America" and the "Union"

are synonymous  terms which refer to the several states which are

united by  and under  the Constitution  for the  United States of

America (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"):

     UNION.   A popular  term for  the United  States of America:
     as, the Union must and shall be preserved.

     UNITED  STATES   OF  AMERICA.    The  nation  occupying  the
     territory between  British America  on the  north, Mexico on
     the south,  the Atlantic  Ocean and  Gulf of  Mexico on  the
     east, and the Pacific Ocean on the west;  being the republic
     whose organic  law is the constitution adopted by the people
     of the  thirteen states which declared their independence of
     the government  of Great  Britain on the fourth day of July,
                                 [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1870]
                                                 [emphasis added]

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 3 of 29

     Congress has  not granted  standing to the "United States of

America" to  bring the  instant action.    Congress  has  granted

standing to the "United States" to bring the instant action, upon

proper application  alleging probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation.   Said  "application"  continues  unlawfully  to  be

withheld from  the Company  and its  Counsel, for  reasons  which

remain unknown to Them at the present time.  See FOIA requests to

JANET NAPOLITANO  and ROBERT  L. MISKELL,  already filed  in  the

official record  of this  case.  This explicit grant of authority

is found in 28 USC 1345, to wit:

     1345.  United States as plaintiff

          Except as  otherwise provided  by Act  of Congress, the
     district courts  shall have  original  jurisdiction  of  all
     civil actions,  suits or proceedings commenced by the United
     States,  or  by  an  agency  or  officer  thereof  expressly
     authorized to sue by Act of Congress.
                                                 [emphasis added]

     There is  a clear  distinction between  the meanings  of the

term "United  States" and  the term  "United States  of America".

See 28  USC 1746.   The  People of America have been fraudulently

and purposely  misled to  believe, by  a  criminal  syndicate  of

government "agents"  and certain  other unnamed  impostors acting

under color  of law to conceal their principals (The Bank and The

Fund), that  these  terms  are  completely  synonymous  in  every

context,  when   they  are  not,  as  will  now  be  demonstrated

conclusively for the record, as follows, right here and now:

     In Law, the "United States of America" (plural) refer to the

several states  which are "united by and under the Constitution";

the "United  States" (singular)  refers to the federal government

and to  that geographical  area defined  in Article 1, Section 8,

Clause 17  ("1:8:17") and  in Article  4,  Section  3,  Clause  2

(4:3:2) of  the U.S.  Constitution.   The  Constitution  for  the

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 4 of 29

United States  of America,  as such,  does not  extend beyond the

limits of  the states  which are  united by  and under  it.   See

Preamble;   Downes v. Bidwell,  182 U.S. 244 (1901);  also author

Langdell in 12 Harvard Law Review 371, to wit:

     ... [T]he Constitution of the United States as such does not
     extend beyond  the limits  of the States which are united by
     and under  it, --  a proposition the truth of which will, it
     is believed, be placed beyond doubt by an examination of the
     instances in  which the  term "United States" is used in the

                 [Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories" ]
                 [12 Harvard Law Review 365, 371, emphasis added]

     On behalf  of the  Company, Counsel  formally objects to the

majority holding in Downes, for all the reasons stated in Justice

Harlan's eloquent  and prescient  dissent in  said decision.  The

specific limits  on the  concurrent  as  well  as  the  exclusive

legislative  jurisdiction   granted  by   the  U.S.  Constitution

restrain the  United States to the farthest reaches of the entire

Universe created  by Our  Almighty Father  in Heaven, by His Son,

Our Lord  and Savior  Jesus Christ,  and by  the Holy Spirit, and

this shall remain the supreme Law of this Land until such time as

the states united, and no one else, decide otherwise by true Law.

See the  Harvard Law  Review's laudable criticisms of The Insular

Cases, including  Langdell, "The  Status of Our New Territories,"

12 Harvard  Law Review, 365, 371;  Thayer, "Our New Possessions,"

12 Harvard Law Review, 464;  Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in

the Supreme  Court," 15 Harvard Law Review 164;  and Littlefield,

"The Insular Cases," 15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281

     Accordingly, the  Hooven case must, therefore, be overturned

also for  holding, incorrectly,  that the  guarantees of the U.S.

Constitution extend to the federal zone only as Congress has made

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 5 of 29

those guarantees  applicable.   Congress is  not empowered by the

U.S. Constitution  to  withhold,  at  its  arbitrary  legislative

discretion, the  guarantees of that Constitution from the Peoples

or the Territory within the federal zone, no matter how different

their histories or customs, just because They are not (yet) Union

states.  See Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The term "exclusive" at

1:8:17 does not mean, and was never meant to mean, "unrestricted"

or "unrestrained" by the fundamental guarantees  -- the blessings

of  Liberty  --  which  that  sacred  document  was  specifically

ordained and established to ensure.  See Preamble for intent.

     In   1802,   the   "Congress   Assembled"   incorporated   a

geographical area  known as  the "United  States".   The  "United

States" is,  therefore, a  nation-state  which  is  separate  and

unique unto itself.  Furthermore, even though the "United States"

is not  a member  of the "Union of states united by and under the

U.S. Constitution",  it is bound by that Constitution to restrict

its activities  in dealing  with the  several states and with the

Common Law  Citizens of  those freely  associated compact  states

(assuming they  are not  also citizens  of the  United States  by

Right  of  Election,  or  worse,  by  virtue  of  any  rebuttable

presumptions  which   this  Court  might  incorrectly  base  upon

fraudulent voter  registration affidavits  and/or other similarly

fraudulent documentary  evidence, like  signed 1040  Forms or any

other such Information Collection Request ("ICR") forms).

     Under 1:8:17  and 4:3:2  of the  U.S. Constitution, Congress

claims  exclusive   authority  to   legislate  and  regulate  the

inhabitants of  its  geographical  territory  and  its  statutory

"citizens" under  the so-called 14th Amendment, wherever they are

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 6 of 29

"resident", even if they do inhabit one of the 50 sovereign, free

and independent states of the Union.

     The  term   "United  States"  has  always  referred  to  the

"Congress Assembled",  or to  those geographical areas defined in

1:8:17 and  4:3:2 in  the U.S.  Constitution.   The proof of this

fact is found in the Articles of Confederation, to wit:


     Whereas the  Delegates of  the United  States of  America in
     Congress Assembled  did on  the fifteenth day of November in
     the year  of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy
     Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America
     agree to  certain Articles  of Confederation  and  perpetual
     union between the States ....

     ARTICLE I.   The  title of  this confederacy  shall be  "The
     United States of America".

     ARTICLE II.  Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
     independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which
     is not  by this  confederation expressly  delegated  to  the
     United States, in Congress Assembled.

                                                 [emphasis added]

     The term  "United States",  as used  in  Article  II  above,

refers expressly  to "Congress  Assembled" on  behalf of (not the

same as)  the several  states which  comprise the Union of states

united by  and under  the U.S.  Constitution (now  50 in  number,

counting also Hawaii and Texas, arguably).

     As can  readily be  seen from  the Hooven  quote infra, with

three (3)  separate and distinct definitions for the term "United

States", it  becomes absolutely  necessary to separate and define

each use  of this  term in  Law.   It is  equally as necessary to

distinguish and define to whom the Law applies when there are two

(2) classes  of citizenship  existing side-by-side, with separate

and distinct rights, privileges, and immunities for each.

     Such a  separate distinction  is not  made in  the  Internal

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 7 of 29

Revenue Code  ("IRC").   Citizens of  the  Arizona  Republic  are

nowhere defined  in this  Code, nor  in its  regulations, but are

expressly omitted  as such and identified indirectly at best (see

IRC 7701(b)(1)(B)).   At  present, the  term "United  States" has

three separate and distinct meanings in law:

     The term  "United States"  may be used in any one of several
     senses.   It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
     the position  analogous to  that of  other sovereigns  in  a
     family of  nations.   It may  designate territory over which
     sovereignty of  the United  States extends, or it may be the
     collective name  of the States which are united by and under
     the Constitution.

             [Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
              [65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89  L.Ed. 1252, emphasis added]

     The term  "United States",  when used  in its territorial or

geographical meaning,  encompasses the  areas of  land defined in

1:8:17 and 4:3:2, and nothing more.  In this respect, the "United

States" is a separate Nation which is foreign with respect to the

States which  united by  and under the U.S. Constitution, because

the "United  States" as  such has  never applied for admission to

the Union of states known as the "United States of America"!

     Accordingly, statutory  "citizens of the United States", who

are "subject  to the  jurisdiction thereof",  are defined  in the

wording of  the so-called  14th Amendment and of the Civil Rights

Act (1866).   At  best, this  so-called amendment  is a  "private

act", rather  than a  Public Law,  which designates  a  class  of

people who  are unique  to the  territorial jurisdiction  of  the

District of Columbia, to the federal territories and possessions,

and to  the limited  areas of  land which  have been ceded by the

Legislatures of  the 50 states to the foreign nation-state of the

"United States"  for the  erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,

dock-yards and "other needful buildings" (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 8 of 29

     Collectively, this  territorial jurisdiction  is now  termed

"The Federal  Zone" to distinguish it uniquely from the Nation as

a whole, and from the 50 states of the Union.  The whole "Nation"

can, therefore,  be defined  as the  mathematical  union  of  the

federal zone  and of  the 50  states (using  the language  of set

theory).   See U.S.  v. Lopez,  115 S.Ct.  1624 (1995),  in which

Kennedy and  O'Connor concurring utilized the term "federal zone"

as a  common, household term only 3 years after first publication

of a  book by the same name (i.e. The Federal Zone:  Cracking the

Code  of   Internal  Revenue,  San  Rafael,  Account  for  Better

Citizenship, 1992).

     The District of Columbia is technically a corporation and is

only  defined   as  a   "State"  in   its  own  codes  and  under

International Law (e.g., see IRC 7701(a)(10)).  The several Union

states which  are united  by and  under the U.S. Constitution are

guaranteed a  "Republican" (or  "rule of Law") form of government

by Article  4, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution.  However, the

foreign nation-state  created by  Congress and called the "United

States", in  its territorial  sense, is a "legislative democracy"

(or "majority rule" democracy) which is governed by International

Law, rather than the Common Law.  Congress rules there.

     It is  for this  latter reason that the "United States" must

rely upon  admiralty and  maritime law (a/k/a "inland admiralty")

to move against Citizens of the freely associated compact states,

a/k/a Citizens  of one  of  the  states  United.    However,  the

Supplemental Rules  for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as

mentioned in  FRCP 9(h), have not yet been properly published and

are the  subject matter  of a  Freedom of Information Act request

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 9 of 29

which is  presently pending  in the  instant case.    Unpublished

rules have no legal force or effect.  See Federal Register Act.

     Therefore, proceeding  further in  the instant case, without

first producing  said Supplemental  Rules for  the benefit of the

Company and  its Counsel,  constitutes a clear deprivation of due

process of  law.   Are these  rules secret, for some reason, like

the regulations which implement the Buck Act?

     The Company  hereby denies  ever having  elected  to  reside

within any  fictional "State  within a state" created by the Buck

Act, see  4 U.S.C. 104-113, Howard v. Sinking Fund of Louisville,

344 U.S.  624 (1953),  Schwartz v. O'Hara T. P. School Dist., 100

A.2d 621,  625 (1953).   There  are no  regulations  in  the  CFR

imposing these  statutes, see CFR Index and Finding Aids, 1/1/93,

p. 937,  "Referrals to  Department of  Justice or  GAO".  Counsel

reserves His  Right to  compel discovery of these regulations and

to stay  the instant proceedings pending their discovery.  Are We

the People  dealing here  with more  "secrets" again  and, if so,

why?  Why?  WHY?  Do we even need to ask at this point?

     Now, when  the Congress  specifies certain  conditions under

which the  United States  can bring  a civil action in a district

court of  the United  States, such  as this honorable Court, then

this Court must satisfy those conditions;  otherwise, it proceeds

without jurisdiction and thereby places all government players in

imminent danger  of personal  liabilities for  their unlawful and

unconstitutional acts, including the presiding Judge.

     The   doctrine    of   absolute    judicial   immunity    is

unconstitutional, because  "immunity" is  nowhere mentioned  as a

privilege of  any federal  public offices.   See  Privileges  and

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 10 of 29

Immunities Clause,  which does reserve Immunities for Citizens of

the several  states.   Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  We

are allowed to infer that the omission was intentional.

     Remember, the United States as such is also bound by several

international treaties  which explicitly guarantee to Counsel and

to the  Company effective  judicial remedies  for  violations  of

fundamental Rights  even if  those violations  were committed  by

persons acting  in their  official capacities.  Specifically, the

record  in  the  instant  case  does  not  evidence  the  written

authorizations required  for this  action to  proceed beyond  the

garage door.  Lack of jurisdiction is fatal to any action.

     This Court  lacks subject  matter jurisdiction  because  the

record does  not exhibit  the authorizations  required by Section

7401 of the IRC, to wit:

     Sec. 7401.  Authorization.

          No civil  action for  the  collection  or  recovery  of
     taxes, or  of any  fine, penalty,  or forfeiture,  shall  be
     commenced unless  the Secretary  authorizes or sanctions the
     proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs
     that the action be commenced.
                                       [IRC 7401, emphasis added]

Subject matter  jurisdiction can be raised at any time.  There is

no evidence  on  the  record  that  the  Secretary  of  the  U.S.

Department of  the  Treasury,  or  his  delegate,  nor  that  the

Attorney General,  or her delegate, ever authorized or sanctioned

these  proceedings.     Mere   allegations  or   presumptions  of

jurisdiction will not be sustained against proper challenges.

     No such  evidence was ever served on Counsel or the Company,

because the  actors who claim to be "United States Attorneys" and

a "Special  Agent: Internal  Revenue Service" in the instant case

have, to  date, failed  to produce  certified evidence  of  their

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 11 of 29

authority to  exercise the  powers of the office(s) they claim to

occupy (such  as delegations of authority), even weeks after they

were formally challenged to do so.  See the STATUS REPORT of FOIA

requests and appeals now on file in this case.  Thus, the failure

to prove  jurisdictional facts  when specifically denied is fatal

to the maintenance of this action:

     Thus, where  the Congress  prohibits the  commencement of  a
     civil action  unless certain  specific acts  are  performed,
     this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter until
     the requisite conditions are met in fact and such compliance
     is shown  by the pleadings and, where necessary, established
     by proof.  ...  [B]ut the mere allegation of facts necessary
     for  jurisdiction   without  supporting   proof  is  fatally
     defective. ...  This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. Section 7401
     requirements constitute  facts  essential  to  jurisdiction.
     The failure  to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically
     denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action.

                     [U.S.A. v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe de Ville]
                    [355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973), emphasis added]

     This Court will please take specific notice that the alleged

Plaintiff in  the Cadillac case was the "U.S.A.", i.e. the United

States of  America!   The failure  to prove  jurisdictional facts

when specifically  denied is  fatal to  the maintenance  of  this

action.  Congress has not given standing to the several states of

the Union  to bring  this  civil  action  in  this  forum.    The

Attorneys General of the several Union states were never notified

of this action;  they did not bring this action;  and they cannot

bring this  as an  original action  without a  specific grant  of

jurisdictional authority  for them  to do  so  in  this  district


     As one of the "inferior Courts," as that term is utilized in

Article III,  Section 1,  of the  U.S. Constitution, the district

courts are creatures of Congress:  "... [S]uch inferior Courts as

the Congress  may from  time to time ordain and establish", using

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 12 of 29

the same language as found in the Preamble [emphasis added].

     Moreover, there  is serious  doubt as  to whether or not IRC

7401 has  ever taken  effect  (other  than  being  treated  as  a

private, equitable contract clause).  This Court will also please

take specific  notice of the "General rule" at IRC 7851(a)(6)(A),

wherein Congress  has, quite  clearly (We might add), defined the

moment at  which all  of the  provisions within subtitle F of the

IRC shall take effect (but not before):

     (6)  Subtitle F.

          (A)   General rule.  The provisions of subtitle F shall
          take effect  on the  day after the date of enactment of
          this title  and shall be applicable with respect to any
          tax imposed by this title.

                              [IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), emphasis added]

     The bad  news is  that Title  26, as  such, has  never  been

enacted into  positive law.   One necessary inference, therefore,

is that  none of  the provisions  of subtitle  F,  including  IRC

Section 7401, has yet taken effect!  The further bad news is that

IRC 7851  is a  self-referencing statute  with recursive  effects

(Section 7851  is in subtitle F), thus rendering it null and void

for vagueness.   The  Fifth and  Sixth Amendments  guarantee  Our

fundamental Right  to clear and unambiguous laws, both inside and

outside  the   federal  zone.     The   doctrine  of  territorial

heterogeneity  (state   zone/federal  zone)   violates  the  very

principles on which the U.S. Constitution was founded.

     The "void  for vagueness"  doctrine, on  the other  hand, is

deeply rooted  in our  right to  due  process  (under  the  Fifth

Amendment) and  our right  to know  the nature  and cause  of any

accusation (under  the Sixth  Amendment).   The latter right goes

quite far  beyond the  contents of  any criminal indictment.  The

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 13 of 29

right to  know the nature and cause of any accusation starts with

the statute which a defendant is accused of violating.  A statute

must be  sufficiently specific  and unambiguous in all its terms,

in order  to define  and give  adequate notice  of  the  kind  of

conduct which it forbids.  What is "adequate notice"?

     The essential  purpose of  the "void for vagueness doctrine"
     with respect  to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to
     warn individuals  of  the  criminal  consequences  of  their
     conduct. ...   Criminal  statutes which  fail  to  give  due
     notice that  an act has been made criminal before it is done
     are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.

                 [U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     If it  fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just what

conduct the  legislature prohibits, a statute is necessarily void

for uncertainty,  or "void  for vagueness"  as  the  doctrine  is

called.   In the De Cadena case, the U.S. District Court listed a

number of  excellent authorities  for the origin of this doctrine

(see  Lanzetta   v.  New  Jersey,  306  U.S.  451)  and  for  the

development of  the doctrine  (see Screws  v. United  States, 325

U.S. 91, Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, and Jordan v. De

George, 341  U.S. 223).   Any  prosecution which  is based upon a

vague statute  must fail,  together with  the statute  itself.  A

vague criminal  statute is  unconstitutional  for  violating  the

Fifth  and   Sixth  Amendments.    The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  has

emphatically agreed:

     [1] That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
     must be  sufficiently  explicit  to  inform  those  who  are
     subject to  it what  conduct on  their part will render them
     liable to  its penalties  is a  well-recognized requirement,
     consonant alike  with ordinary  notions of fair play and the
     settled rules of law;  and a statute which either forbids or
     requires the  doing of  an act in terms so vague that men of
     common intelligence  must necessarily  guess at  its meaning
     and  differ   as  to  its  application  violates  the  first
     essential of due process of law.

                    [Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.]
                        [269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 14 of 29

     The historical  record documents  undeniable proof  that the

confusion, ambiguity and jurisdictional deceptions now built into

the IRC  were deliberate.   This  historical record  provides the

"smoking gun"  that proves  the real  intent was  deception (read

"fraud").   The first  Internal Revenue  Code was Title 35 of the

Revised Statutes  of June  22, 1874.   On  December 5,  1898, Mr.

Justice Cox of the D.C. Supreme Court delivered an address before

the Columbia  Historical Society.   In this address, he discussed

the history of the District of Columbia as follows:

          In  June  1866,  an  act  was  passed  authorizing  the
     President to appoint three commissioners to revise and bring
     together all  the statutes ....  [T]he act does not seem, in
     terms, to  allude to  the District  of Columbia,  or even to
     embrace it  ....  Without having any express authority to do
     so, they made a separate revision and collection of the acts
     of Congress relating to the District, besides the collection
     of general  statutes relating  to the  whole United  States.
     Each collection was reported to Congress, to be approved and
     enacted into  law ....   [T]he  whole is enacted into law as
     the body  of the statute law of the United States, under the
     title of Revised Statutes as of 22 June 1874. ...

          [T]he general  collection might  perhaps be considered,
     in a  limited sense  as a  code for the United States, as it
     embraced all  the laws  affecting the  whole  United  States
     within  the   constitutional  legislative   jurisdiction  of
     Congress, but there could be no complete code for the entire
     United States, because the subjects which would be proper to
     be regulated  by a  code in  the States are entirely outside
     the legislative authority of Congress.

                  [District of Columbia Code, Historical Section]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     More than half a century later, the deliberate confusion and

ambiguity were  problems  that  not  only  persisted;  they  were

getting  worse   by  the  minute.    In  the  year  1944,  during

Roosevelt's administration,  Senator Barkley  made a  speech from

the floor of the U.S. Senate in which he complained:

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 15 of 29

     Congress is  to blame  for these complexities to the extent,
     and only to the extent, to which it has accepted the advice,
     the  recommendations,  and  the  language  of  the  Treasury
     Department, through its so-called experts who have sat in on
     the passage  of every  tax measure  since  I  can  remember.
     Every member of the House Ways and Means Committee and every
     member of the Senate Finance Committee knows that every time
     we have  undertaken to  write a  new tax bill in the last 10
     years we  have started  out with  the  universal  desire  to
     simplify the  tax laws and the forms through which taxes are
     collected.   We have attempted to adopt policies which would
     simplify them.   When we have agreed upon a policy,  we have
     submitted that  policy to  the Treasury  Department to write
     the appropriate  language to  carry out  that policy;    and
     frequently the Treasury Department, through its experts, has
     brought back  language so complicated and circumambient that
     neither Solomon  nor all  the wise  men of  the  East  could
     understand it or interpret it.

               [Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session]
               [Vol. 90, Part 2, February 23, 1944, pages 1964-5]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     You have,  no doubt,  heard that  ignorance of the law is no

excuse  for   violating  the   law.    Because  it  has  been  so

advantageous for  the United  States, Congress  has allowed  only

rare exceptions  to this  maxim of  the Common Law, e.g. the case

history of  P.L. 93-579,  Section 7  (attached  as  an  exhibit);

Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F.Supp. 1343 (1982):

     ... [A]ssuming  that plaintiff's  refusal  to  disclose  his
     social security  number was  a  clearly  established  right,
     where defendants  could not  as reasonable persons have been
     aware of  that right  and could not have recognized that any
     effort to  compel disclosure  of number or to deny plaintiff
     his refund  violated federal law, damages against defendants
     were barred ....

Here, Congress "hid" P.L. 93-579 by failing to codify it anywhere

within 5 USC, which has been enacted into positive law.

     The general maxim is explicitly stated in the case law which

defines the legal force and effect of administrative regulations.

But, ambiguity  and deception  in the  law are an excuse, and the

ambiguity and  deception in  the IRC  is a  major  cause  of  our

ignorance.  Caveat emptor (more applicable to "judicial sales").

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 16 of 29

     Moreover, this  principle applies  as well  to ambiguity and

deception in  the case  law, the  Downes majority being a premier

example.   See 15  Harvard Law Review 220, quoted infra.  Lack of

specificity leads  to uncertainty,  which leads  in turn to court

decisions which  are also  void for  vagueness.   In addition  to

guaranteeing the  fundamental Right  to effective  assistance  of

Counsel of  choice,  the  Sixth  Amendment  also  guarantees  Our

fundamental Right  to ignore  vague and  ambiguous laws, and this

must be extended to vague and ambiguous case law as well.

     Courts cannot  alter the  U.S.  Constitution  by  syntax  or

grammatical sophistry,  any more  than  Congress  can  do  so  by

legislation.   See Eisner  v. Macomber,  252 U.S.   189,  205-206


     Congress ...  cannot by  legislation alter the Constitution,
     from which  alone it  derives its  power to  legislate,  and
     within  whose   limitations  that   power  can  be  lawfully
                                                 [emphasis added]

     In  light   of  their   enormous  influence  in  laying  the

foundations  for  territorial  heterogeneity  and  a  legislative

democracy  for  the  federal  zone  (cf.  in  The  Federal  Zone,

electronic fourth edition available on the Internet), The Insular

Cases, as exemplified by Downes (the wild pack leader), have been

justly criticized  by peers  for  lacking  the  minimum  judicial

precision required in such cases:

          The Absence  of  Judicial  Precision.  --  Whether  the
     decisions in  the Insular  Cases are  considered correct  or
     incorrect, it  seems generally  admitted that  the  opinions
     rendered  are  deficient  in  clearness  and  in  precision,
     elements  most   essential  in  cases  of  such  importance.
     Elaborate discussions  and irreconcilable  differences  upon
     general principles,  and upon  fascinating  and  fundamental
     problems suggested  by  equally  indiscriminating  dicta  in
     other cases,  complicate, where they do not hide, the points
     at issue.   It  is extremely  difficult to determine exactly
     what has been decided;  the position of the court in similar
     cases arising in the future, or still pending, is entirely a
     matter of conjecture.  ...

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 17 of 29

          It is  still more  to be  regretted that the defects in
     the decision  under discussion  are by no means exceptional.
     From our  system of  allowing judges to express opinion upon
     general principles  and of following judicial precedent, two
     evils almost  inevitably result:   our books are overcrowded
     with dicta,  while dictum  is frequently taken for decision.
     Since  the  questions  involved  are  both  fundamental  and
     political, in  constitutional cases  more than in any others
     the  temptation  to digress,  necessarily strong,  is seldom
     resisted;   at the  same time it is strikingly difficult, in
     these  cases,   to  distinguish   between  decision,   ratio
     decidendi, and  dictum.   Yet because the questions involved
     are both extensive and political, and because the evils of a
     dictum or of an ill-considered decision are of corresponding
     importance,   a    precise   analysis,   with   a   thorough
     consideration  of   the  questions   raised,  and  of  those
     questions only,  is imperative.   The  continued absence  of
     judicial precision may possibly become a matter of political
     importance;   for opinions  such as those rendered cannot be
     allowed a permanent place in our system of government.

                                      [15 Harvard Law Review 220]

     One can  only speculate  why the  author(s) of  this searing

criticism felt  it necessary  to withhold their name(s) from such

exacting language.   Can  it be  that the  United States has been

retaliating against "tax protestors" for a long time now, and the

authors  were   justifiably  fearful   of   possible   reprisals?

Specifically, the  United States  does not  hesitate to order its

overwhelming firepower  against  helpless  children  and  nursing

mothers (Waco,  Ruby Ridge, OKC);  how much harder could it be to

justify liquidating  a  few  naive  law  students  who  dared  to

question a contrived decision of the U.S. Supreme Court?

     When you  have  exhausted  all  moral  authority  you  might

otherwise have  had, the  only persuasive  power you have left is

gun power.   "All  political power  issues from  the barrel  of a

gun," wrote  Chairman Mao  Tse Tung, from a country where aborted

fetus organs  are now  appearing on  high-class restaurant menus.

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 18 of 29

It's BIG  money (yummy  too;   just ask the communists who know).

Those babies  never had  a chance, because these vultures prey on

the weak  and the  helpless like  starving piranha  in a  drought

(Serrasalminae rhombeus, length to 1.5 feet).

     The Third  Reich burned  books in the public square at noon;

in America,  the Fourth  Reich  simply  robs  the  bank  accounts

reserved for  printing  and  publication,  and  nobody  sees  it.

Achtung!  See pages 8-9, "Return to Constitutional Money," by Dr.

Edwin J. Vieira, Jr., an Author this time brave enough to put His

name on  a definitive  critique of  our fascist  banking  system,

which is  attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set

forth fully herein.  "The Courts will do anything to sustain this

system," writes  Bill Conklin, author, illegal tax protestor, and

proud of it (see "Mission Against Deception" (MAD)).  Anything?

     The average  American cannot  be expected  to have the skill

required to  navigate the  verbal swamp  that exists  within  the

bowels of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code,  nor  does  the  average

American have  the time or the motivation required to make such a

journey.   Who would  really want to, anyway?  Chicanery does not

make  good   law  or  good  reading.    The  rules  of  statutory

construction fully support this unavoidable conclusion:

     ... [I]f  it is  intended that  regulations  will  be  of  a
     specific and  definitive nature  then it  will be clear that
     the only  safe method  of interpretation  will be  one  that
     "shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
     suppress subtle  inventions and evasions for the continuance
     of the mischief ...."

       [Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G. Sutherland]
           [3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)]

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 19 of 29

The Supreme  Court has  also agreed,  in no  uncertain terms,  as


     ... [K]eeping in mind the well settled rule that the citizen
     is exempt  from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear
     and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of
     a tax  law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor
     of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.

                         [Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain]
                            [192 U.S. 397 (1903), emphasis added]

     In the  interpretation of  statutes levying  taxes it is the
     established  rule   not  to   extend  their  provisions,  by
     implication, beyond  the clear  import of the language used,
     or to  enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not
     specifically pointed  out.    In  case  of  doubt  they  are
     construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor
     of the citizen.

                     [United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     On what  basis, then, should the Internal Revenue Service be

allowed to  extend the  provisions of  the IRC  beyond the  clear

import of  the language used?  On what basis can the IRS act when

that language  has no  clear import?   On  what basis  is the IRS

justified in  enlarging their operations so as to embrace matters

not specifically  pointed out?   The  answer  is  tyranny.    The

"golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing up the

neighborhood to fetch the gold.  What a service!

     Consider for  a moment the sheer size of the class of people

now affected  by the  fraudulent 16th  Amendment.   First of all,

take into  account all  those Americans who have passed away, but

who paid  taxes into  the Treasury after the year 1913.  How many

of those  correctly understood  all the  rules, when  people like

Frank R.  Brushaber were confused as early as 1914?  See original

pleadings in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).

     Add to  that number  all those Americans who are still alive

today and  who have  paid taxes  to the  IRS because they thought

there was  a  law,  and  they  thought  that  law  was  the  16th

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 20 of 29

Amendment.  After all, they were told as much by numerous federal

officials and  possibly also  their parents,  friends, relatives,

school teachers, scout masters, colleagues, and baseball buddies.

Don't high school civics classes now spend a lot of time teaching

students how to complete IRS 1040 forms and schedules, instead of

teaching the U.S. Constitution?  It would be wrong not to protest

this putrid swamp, overpopulated with slithering reptiles.

     Donald C.  Alexander, when  he was  Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, published  an official statement in the Federal Register

of March  29, 1974,  that the  16th  Amendment  was  the  federal

government's general  authority to tax the incomes of individuals

and corporations  [emphasis added].   Courts  must take  judicial

notice  of  the  Federal  Register.    In  the  section  entitled

"Department  of   the   Treasury,   Internal   Revenue   Service,

Organization and Functions," his statement reads in part:

     (2)   Since 1862, the Internal Revenue Service has undergone
     a period  of  steady  growth  as  the  means  for  financing
     Government operations  shifted from  the levying  of  import
     duties  to   internal  taxation.    Its  expansion  received
     considerable impetus  in 1913  with the  ratification of the
     Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution under which Congress
     received constitutional  authority  to  levy  taxes  on  the
     income of individuals and corporations.

                                    [Vol. 39, No. 62, page 11572]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Sorry, Donald,  you were  wrong.    (See  People  v.  Boxer,

California Supreme Court case number S-030016, December, 1992, to

which Senator-elect  Boxer fell  totally and  completely silent.)

At this  point in  time, it  is impossible  for us  to  determine

whether you  were lying,  or whether you too were a victim of the

fraud.  Silence activates estoppel by acquiescence.

     Just how  many people are in the same general class of those

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 21 of 29

affected by  the fraudulent  16th Amendment?   Is it 200 million?

Is it  300 million?   Whatever it is, the number just boggles the

imagination.   It certainly  does involve  a very large number of

federal "employees" who went to work for Uncle Sam in good faith,

thereby becoming  subject to  the Public  Salary Tax Act of 1939.

The United  States is  the party liable for this fraud, and there

is no statute of limitations on fraud.

     It is  now so  clear, there is a huge difference between the

area covered  by the federal zone, and the area covered by the 50

States (a/k/a  the state  zone).   Money is a powerful motivation

for all  of  us.    Congress  and  its  creditors  had  literally

trillions of  dollars to  gain by  convincing most Americans they

were inside  its revenue  base when, in fact, most Americans were

outside its revenue base, and remain outside even today.  This is

deception on  a grand  scale, and  the proof of this deception is

found in the statutes themselves.

     It is  no wonder why public relations "officials" of the IRS

cringe in  fear when  dedicated Patriots  bravely admit, out loud

and in  Person, that  they have  read the  "laws".   It is  quite

stunning how the carefully crafted definitions of "United States"

and "its"  jurisdiction do  appear to  unlock a  "Code"  that  is

horribly complex and deliberately so.

     As fate  would have  it, these carefully crafted definitions

also expose  perhaps the most sophisticated fiscal fraud that has

ever been  perpetrated upon any People at any time in the history

of the  world.   It is  now time for a shift in the wind, at long

last.   Will we ever find a Judge who will right the sails on Our

Ship of State, and lead us to navigate the stars?

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 22 of 29

     The Company  hereby objects  strenuously to the existence of

any contract,  either verbal  or  written,  either  expressed  or

implied in  fact, between  the presiding  Judge in this Court and

the "Internal Revenue Service" or any other controlling interest,

on grounds of conflict of interest.  A completed IRS Form 1040 is

an expressed,  written contract.   The  Company is guaranteed the

fundamental Right to an independent and unbiased judiciary.

     The existence  of a contract between the presiding Judge and

the IRS  is evidence  of a  conflict of  interest and  proof of a

dependent and  biased judiciary,  see Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp.

167, 169  (1965).   The "Internal  Revenue Service"  is a  proven

alias of  the Federal  Alcohol Administration domiciled in Puerto

Rico (inside  the federal  zone);  it is not a part of the United

States Department  of the  Treasury.  See all the positive law in

31 USC in toto.

Respectfully submitted on June 9, 1996

/s/ Paul Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state,
Counselor at Law, and
Federal Witness

all rights reserved without prejudice

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 23 of 29

                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Neil  Thomas, Nordbrock,  hereby  certify,  under  penalty  of

perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without

the "United  States", that  I am  at least  18 years of age and a

Citizen of  one of  the United  States of  America, that I am not

currently a  Party to  this action,  and that I personally served

the following document(s):

                      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                     MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

by placing  said document(s)  with exhibits in first class United

States Mail,  with postage  prepaid and properly addressed to the

following individuals:

ROBERT L. MISKELL                  John M. Roll
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

JANET NAPOLITANO                   Clerk
Acapulco Building, Suite 8310      U.S. District Court
110 South Church Avenue            55 E. Broadway
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Grand Jury Foreperson              Postmaster
In re: New Life Health Center Co.  U.S. Post Office
55 E. Broadway                     Downtown Station
Tucson, Arizona                    Tucson, Arizona

Judge Alex Kozinski                Evangelina Cardenas
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     "Internal Revenue Service"
125 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 200     300 West Congress
Pasadena, California               Tucson, Arizona

Attorney General                   Solicitor General
Department of Justice              Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W. !      10th and Constitution, N.W. !
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.

Dated:  June 9, 1996

/s/ Neil Nordbrock
Neil Thomas, Nordbrock, Citizen of Arizona state
all rights reserved without prejudice

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 24 of 29

                      Facsimile Containing

                  Court's Order of May 24, 1996

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 25 of 29

                       MOTION TO CONTINUE

                   ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 26 of 29



               Dr. Edwin J. Vieira, Jr., Director
           National Alliance for Constitutional Money

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 27 of 29

                     Definitions of "Union"

                 and "United States of America"

                  in Bouvier's Law Dictionary,

                       Philadelphia (1870)

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 28 of 29

                       Text of Section 7,

                        Public Law 93-579

          (not codified in Title 5, United States Code)

  Motion to Continue, Reconsider, and Challenge Supreme Court:
                          Page 29 of 29

                             #  #  #

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