Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
c/o General Delivery
Hastings [zip code exempt]
NEBRASKA STATE
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without prejudice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 4:CV96-3275
)
Plaintiff [sic], ) DEFENDANT'S REBUTTAL TO
) PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
v. ) IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
) FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; AND
VANCE E. KNUDSON [sic], ) NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER
) CASE TO COURT OF COMPETENT
Defendant [sic]. ) JURISDICTION: 28 U.S.C. 1631,
________________________________) 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)
COMES NOW Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Nebraska state,
expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"),
and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Defendant"), to submit this, Defendant's REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFFS'
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.
Defendant herein addresses issues in the order of their
appearance in Plaintiffs' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, as follows (quotes in bold):
Defendant has not proffered any legitimate reason for a stay
of the April 8, 1997 Judgment.
Defendant argues that the value judgment implied by the term
"legitimate" is controverted by the evidence already on record,
and will be further controverted by testimony and additional
evidence to be newly discovered during trial by jury.
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 1
of 13
[D]efendant has seized upon this opportunity to reargue a
number of tired, stale, tax protestor arguments [sic].
Defendant submits that the evidence recently filed in the
instant case is not only new (not tired or stale), but protest
has never been illegal, inappropriate, or a cause to ignore the
substance of that protest. The Petition Clause in the First
Amendment is rooted in protest, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
already held that the Petition Clause is the Right conservative
of all other Rights. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207
U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Defendant's pleadings are petitions to
government which exercise a fundamental Right not allowing
dubious intrusions of any kind whatsoever.
To the extent Plaintiffs seek to gag, muffle, infringe, or
otherwise disparage Defendant's fundamental Right to protest
government misconduct, criminal or otherwise, they deprive Him
not only of a fundamental Right which is guaranteed by the First
Amendment; they also deprive Defendant of all other Rights.
Exposing such a consequence can hardly be considered tired,
stale, illegal, obsolete, improper, frivolous (or other similar
diminutive). Matters arising under the federal and state
constitutions are never frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. 1652.
Defendant's motion for relief from Judgment should be denied
in the absence of any showing of mistake or other reason
justifying relief.
Defendant has made a proper showing of mistake or other
reasons justifying relief. Defendant appreciates the attention
which Plaintiffs have directed to FRCP Rule 38(d), which states
that the failure of a party to serve and file a demand for trial
by jury constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. It
was never Defendant's knowing or voluntary intention to waive a
fundamental Right in this fashion, however.
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 2
of 13
Defendant argues that this Rule must be viewed against the
statute which specifically authorizes the U.S. Supreme Court to
promulgate such rules. Although the U.S. Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure for cases in the United States district courts [sic]
(hereinafter "USDC"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072(a), compare
section 2072(b) which clearly prohibits the U.S. Supreme Court
from promulgating any rules which might abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right:
2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.
[28 U.S.C. 2072(b)]
Evidently, Congress has failed to authorize the U.S. Supreme
Court to promulgate corresponding rules for the District Court of
the United States ("DCUS")! Confer at "Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius" in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
Omission of the DCUS was intentional. The Right to trial by jury
is a substantive, fundamental Right. See Seventh Amendment.
Moreover, waivers of fundamental Rights can never be
presumed by the United States (federal government), and
particularly not by this USDC, nor by the DCUS. Acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental Rights will not be presumed. See Ohio
Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292.
Competent waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowing,
intelligent, affirmative acts done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. See Brady v.
U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970). Defendant has made no such
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 3
of 13
waivers, notwithstanding Defendant's failure to date properly to
demand trial by jury, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 38.
Statutes Involved:
Section 7402, Title 26, United States Code
Defendant is extremely disappointed that Plaintiffs should
summarily gloss over Defendant's detailed analysis of 26 U.S.C.
7402 [sic]. This provision falls within subtitle F and, as such,
has never taken effect, because "this title" [sic] (Title 26,
U.S.C.), has never been enacted into positive law. For proof,
see Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), section 7851(a)(6)(A). Title
26, U.S.C., and the IRC are not one and the same. See also Title
1, U.S.C., section 1 et seq.
Defendant's construction of IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) is correct,
because the exact same construction has already been demonstrated
for the term "this title" [sic] in the Historical and Statutory
Notes after 28 U.S.C. 132, to wit:
... [T]he provisions of this title as set out in section 1
of said Act June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization
of the court, shall be construed as a continuation of
existing law ....
[West Publishing Co., emphasis added]
Compare said language with the corresponding language from the
Act of June 25, 1948, to wit:
(b) The provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, of the United States Code, set out in section 1
of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the
several courts therein provided for ... shall be construed
as continuations of existing law ....
[Act June 25, 1948, C. 646, Sections 2 to 39]
[62 Stat. 985 to 991, emphasis added]
Even if Title 26, U.S.C., had been enacted into positive law
(which it has not), section 7402 exhibits the all important
distinction between the USDC and the DCUS. Compare 7402(a), (b),
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 4
of 13
(c), and (f) (which authorize only the DCUS), with 7402(e) (which
authorizes only the USDC). Under IRC 7402, quiet title relief is
the only subject matter of which the USDC has any jurisdiction.
The instant action was not instituted in order to quiet title.
Therefore, this honorable USDC has no subject matter jurisdiction
whatsoever pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7402 [sic].
[T]he pro se plaintiff, Vance E. Knudson, served his ...
Motion for Stay of Execution ... and Motion for Relief from
Judgment ....
Vance E. Knudson is the Defendant in the instant case! As a
Citizen of Nebraska state who is expressly not a citizen of the
United States, by Right of Election, Defendant is now proceeding
In Propria Persona, not Pro Se [sic]. "Se" is a neuter Latin
pronoun which refers to objects and/or fictitious entities;
Defendant is none of these. Confer at "In propria persona" in
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (with pronunciations).
In pari materia, Defendant hereby enters a standing
objection to the habitual use, by employees of the U.S.
Department of Justice, of fictitious nommes de guerre to name the
parties of interest in all civil and criminal actions which are
brought before this honorable Court. Defendant does not now use,
and never has used, all CAPITAL LETTERS to write or print His
Proper Name. Misnomer is a plea in the nature of abatement.
[D]efendant was not entitled to a jury trial in this case
because this civil action, which was commenced by the United
States [sic] ....
[D]efendant was not entitled to a jury trial in this action
brought by the United States [sic] for declaratory and
injunctive relief.
[T]here is no constitutional right to a jury trial in a suit
against the United States [sic].
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 5
of 13
The instant case was brought by the Plaintiffs "UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA" [sic], not by the "United States" [sic]. The
United States of America are synonymous with the Union of several
states which are united by, and under, the Constitution for the
United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S.
Constitution"). See Preamble; confer at "Union" in Bouvier's
Law Dictionary (1856). The "United States" is a term which has
three (3) separate and different meanings. See Hooven & Allison
Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); confer at "United States" in
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
The United States of America have never been granted
standing to sue, or be sued, in this honorable USDC. In
contrast, the United States [sic] has been granted standing by
Congress to sue as a civil plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1345;
and the United States [sic] has been granted standing by Congress
to be sued as a civil defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346.
Since the United States is not a named defendant in the
instant case, the opposition brief which Defendant hereby rebuts
exhibits a serious error for attempting to argue that there is no
constitutional Right to a jury trial in a suit against the United
States. See 28 U.S.C. 2402. This point is totally irrelevant,
because the United States is neither a plaintiff nor a defendant
in the instant case.
Accordingly, Defendant argues that such misconduct by
attorneys, alleging falsely to represent the United States of
America (hereinafter "federal attorneys"), is sufficient ground
to sanction said federal attorneys. Confer at "Attorn" in
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1951).
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 6
of 13
[N]o genuine issues of material fact remain for trial.
On the contrary, the federal attorneys are attempting, by
this statement, to sweep under the rug a total of eleven (11)
fully documented demands for mandatory judicial notice, filed and
served pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
This documentation was verified by Defendant, under penalty of
perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), which rendered said
documentation the highest form of truth.
The federal attorneys in the instant case have failed to
rebut this evidence, point-for-point. Accordingly, their silence
activates estoppel, pursuant to Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932
(1906), and it also constitutes fraud, because their requisite
oaths of office create legal and moral duties to speak, and
silence can be equated with fraud where such duties exist,
pursuant to U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (1977).
To argue that no genuine issues of material fact remain for
trial, is to sweep the entire expanse of American History under
the rug as well, and to substitute in its place a veritable host
of fictions and fictitious nonsense, of which the American People
now have had about all They are willing to take. See Dyett v.
Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968), where "General Lee had
surrendered ...."; Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Defendant will illustrate with but one of the eleven demands
for mandatory judicial notice, previously filed. United States
Representative Barbara B. Kennelly has admitted, on official
stationery of the U.S. House of Representatives, that the term
"State" in 26 U.S. Code 3121(e) specifically includes only the
named U.S. territories and possessions of the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and American
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 7
of 13
Samoa. Rep. Kennelly made this statement, after consulting with
experts in the offices of the Legislative Counsel and the
Congressional Research Service.
Defendant hereby expressly reserves His fundamental Right to
convene a qualified and competent federal trial jury, in order to
compel testimony from said experts on this very question. To say
that this admission is earth-shaking is an understatement,
pursuant to applicable rules of compulsory discovery. But, of
course, the federal attorneys would have Us believe that this is
a "specious assertion" [sic].
We say, let the jury decide!
The burden of proof is now upon these same federal attorneys
to prove otherwise, because the proponent of a rule has the
burden of proving its application in the instant case. See, in
particular, 5 U.S.C. 556(d).
Moreover, if these startling revelations do not constitute
"exceptional circumstances," then Defendant is at a total loss to
conceive what, on Earth, would qualify as such in the minds of
federal attorneys who have failed, to date, to exhibit any of the
lawful credentials required by Article VI, Clause 3, in the U.S.
Constitution, and also by 5 U.S.C. 3331. Defendant offers to
prove that brainwashing is the better, and more likely,
diagnosis:
Words "learned in the law" were omitted as unnecessary.
Such requirement is not made of United States judges and no
reason appears to make a distinction respecting United
States attorneys.
[28 U.S.C. 541, Historical and Statutory Notes]
[Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules]
[West Publishing Company, 1996 Edition]
[emphasis added]
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 8
of 13
This Court had subject matter jurisdiction of this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1340 and 1345 and Sections 7401
and 7402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. 1340 grants original jurisdiction to this USDC
over any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing
for internal revenue. This case does not arise under any Act of
Congress providing for internal revenue; it was brought to
declare Defendant's "Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit" to
be null and void, when said Claim arose under Nebraska state law.
Affidavits cannot be declared null and void by this honorable
Court, because to do so would constitute a clear and present
deprivation of the Petition Clause. See Chambers supra.
Moreover, the instant case was also brought to obtain an
injunction prohibiting Defendant from publishing or filing any
"Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit" or other such common law
lien. Once again, such a goal is a direct violation of the
Petition Clause, because said claim(s) by Defendant constitute
petitions to government for redress of grievances, which are to
be afforded special constitutional protection, avoiding dubious
intrusions whenever possible. See Chambers supra.
28 U.S.C. 1345 grants original jurisdiction to the district
courts over all civil actions, suits, and proceedings commenced
by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof
expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress. However, section
1345 is totally irrelevant, because the "United States" [sic] is
not the named Plaintiffs in the instant case; the United States
of America are the named Plaintiffs in the instant case.
IRC 7401 does not grant jurisdiction to this USDC either,
because the requisite jurisdictional facts are not exhibited in
the official record, when they have already been specifically
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 9
of 13
denied. See U.S.A. [sic] v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe De Ville,
355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973). More to this point, Ms. Janet Reno
has failed to exhibit her Oath of Office required by Article VI,
Clause 3, and by 5 U.S.C. 3331. Delegation of authority from Ms.
Reno downwards is now impossible. Lex non cogit impossibilia.
Therefore, there can be no authorizations required by IRC 7401,
none, until and unless a qualified Attorney General is properly
appointed who has executed a valid and lawful Oath of Office.
IRC 7402(a) has been disposed supra.
This Court also properly exercised in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant. In the Memorandum and Order entered in
this case on April 8, 1997, this Court determined that
defendant had been properly served with process in this
civil action.
The federal attorneys have again missed the boat (and the
dock) on this point. As a Citizen of Nebraska state who is
expressly not a citizen of the United States, by Right of
Election, the Proper Person of the Defendant cannot be subjected
to the municipal jurisdiction of the USDC, absent a valid
contract to the contrary which is in effect and also in evidence,
because the constitutional origins of the USDC are those which
grant plenary, municipal authority to the United States (federal
government). See Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2; American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed.
242; Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at
312, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1921); 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). Defendant is
domiciled outside the municipal jurisdiction of Congress.
Citizenship, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal law. See
Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912).
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 10
of 13
NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER CASE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631, Defendant hereby provides formal
written Notice to all interested party(s), and demands mandatory
judicial notice by this honorable USDC, of Defendant's intent to
petition the DCUS for review of all administrative action(s),
specifically including, but not limited to, the improper
withholding of certain documents already requested of federal
officers, employees, and/or agents who have touched this case,
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.
The USDC in the instant case clearly suffers from a
demonstrated want of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
over the Proper Person of the Defendant.
REMEDY DEMANDED
In the interests of justice, this honorable USDC is required
by law to transfer the instant action to the DCUS, in which the
instant action should have been brought at the time it was first
filed or noticed; and the action shall proceed as if it had been
filed in, or noticed for, the DCUS to which it is transferred on
the date upon which it was actually filed in, or noticed for,
this USDC. See 28 U.S.C. 1631. The term "shall" as found in
section 1631 has a mandatory, imperative meaning, under which
this USDC has no discretion whatsoever.
VERIFICATION
I, Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of
perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without
(outside) the "United States", that the above statement of facts
and laws is true and correct, to the best of My current
information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 11
of 13
Dated: ______________________________
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Vance E. Knudson
_____________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 12
of 13
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of
perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without
the "United States," that I am at least 18 years of age, a
Citizen of one of the United States of America, and that I
personally served the following document(s):
DEFENDANT'S REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; AND
NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER CASE
TO COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION:
28 U.S.C. 1631, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
SALLY R. JOHNSON THOMAS J. MONAGHAN
Office of U.S. Attorney United States Attorney
487 Federal Building U.S. Department of Justice
100 Centennial Mall North c/o P.O. Box 7238
Lincoln [zip code exempt] Ben Franklin Station
NEBRASKA STATE Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT D. METCALFE
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
c/o POB 7238
Ben Franklin Station
Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Dated: __________________________________
/s/ Vance E. Knudson
__________________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 13
of 13
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U.S.A. v. Knudson