Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
c/o General Delivery
Hastings [zip code exempt]
NEBRASKA STATE

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved
without prejudice





                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                      DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 4:CV96-3275
                                )
          Plaintiff [sic],      )  NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                                )  MOTION FOR RELIEF
     v.                         )  FROM JUDGMENT:
                                )
VANCE E. KNUDSON [sic],         )  FRCP Rule 60(b), 62(b), 38
                                )
          Defendant [sic].      )
________________________________)


COMES NOW Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Nebraska state,

expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"),

and  Defendant   in  the   above  entitled   matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to  move this  honorable Court,  pursuant  to  Rule

60(b) of  the Federal  Rules of  Civil  Procedure  ("FRCP"),  for

relief from  this Court's ORDER and JUDGMENT dated April 8, 1997,

and to provide Notice of same to all interested party(s).

     A motion  under Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of a

judgment or  suspend its operation, however.  Defendant therefore

also requests  formal Notice by this Court, and by all interested

party(s), of  Defendant's MOTION  FOR STAY  OF EXECUTION  AND FOR

STAY  OF   PROCEEDINGS  TO   ENFORCE  JUDGMENT,  which  is  filed

separately and concurrently with the instant Motion.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 1 of
                               16


     According to FRCP Rule 60(b), Defendant may seek relief from

a final  judgment, order, or proceeding within a reasonable time,

and not  more  than  one  year  after  the  judgment,  order,  or

proceeding was entered or taken, for the following reasons:

     (1)  mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

     (2)  newly discovered  evidence which by due diligence could
          not have  been discovered  in time  to move  for a  new
          trial under Rule 59(b);

     (3)  fraud  (whether  heretofore  denominated  intrinsic  or
          extrinsic), misrepresentation,  or other  misconduct of
          an adverse party.

     Defendant will also show infra that:

     (4)  the judgment is void;  and,

     (5)  other reasons justify relief from the operation of the
          judgment (see Rule 60(b)(6)).

     This Court's  ORDER and  JUDGMENT, both dated April 8, 1997,

(hereinafter "ORDER  of April 8") both make a number of plain and

prejudicial errors,  which Defendant  will now  enumerate in  the

sequence of their appearance in same.

     The ORDER  of April  8 alleges  that the  instant case  is a

civil action  brought by the United States of America [sic].  The

term "United  States of  America" is  a plural,  collective  noun

which identifies  the Union of several states which are united by

and under  the Constitution  for the  United States  of  America.

Confer at "Union" and "United States of America" in Bouvier's Law

Dictionary (1856).   The  "United States  of America"  have never

been granted  standing as  such, by  Act of  Congress, to bring a

civil action before the United States District Court ("USDC").


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 2 of
                               16


     The "United  States", on  the other hand, has been expressly

authorized to  commence a  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1345:  United States as plaintiff.  See the

companion statute at 28 U.S.C. 1346:  United States as defendant.

     Accordingly, the  "United States  of America" could not have

brought the  instant civil action, because they have no standing.

For further  authorities as  to standing,  confer in  Defendant's

third NOTICE  AND DEMAND  FOR  MANDATORY  JUDICIAL  NOTICE  filed

separately and concurrently with the instant Motion.

     The ORDER  of April  8  alleges  that  the  Plaintiffs  seek

declaratory and  injunctive relief pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7401 and

7402.   Title 26,  U.S.C., and  the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")

are not one and the same, because Title 26 as such has never been

enacted into  positive law.   See pertinent rules for prima facie

and conclusive evidence of the law, as defined in Title 1, U.S.C.

Both sections  7401 and  7402 fall  within IRC  subtitle F, which

contains all  the enforcement  mechanisms of  the IRC.   As such,

said sections  have never taken effect, because IRC 7851(a)(6)(A)

is controlling, to wit:

     General rule.   The  provisions of  subtitle  F  shall  take
     effect on  the day after the date of enactment of this title
     ....

     To make  matters worse,  IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) also falls within

subtitle F,  raising the  specter of  vagueness for  exhibiting a

recursive self-reference.   Defendant  enjoys and  hereby asserts

His fundamental  Right to  clear and unambiguous laws.  See "Void

for Vagueness"  doctrine.  In U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202,

204 (1952),  the U.S. District Court listed a number of excellent

authorities for  the origin of this doctrine (see Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306  U.S. 451)  and for  the development  of the doctrine


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 3 of
                               16


(see Screws  v. United  States, 325  U.S. 91,  Williams v. United

States, 341 U.S. 97, and Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223):

     ... [A]  statute which  either forbids or requires the doing
     of an  act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
     must necessarily  guess at  its meaning and differ as to its
     application violates  the first  essential of due process of
     law.
                    [Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.]
                        [269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]

     Even if  section 7401  had taken  effect, by some magical or

fictional presumption,  it likewise  controls for  requiring that

civil actions  for the  collection or recover of internal revenue

taxes, or  of any  fine, penalty,  or forfeiture,  must first  be

authorized by  the Attorney  General (or  his delegate)  and  the

Secretary of the Treasury (or his delegate).

     This  Court  lacks  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter

because the record does not exhibit the authorization required by

IRC 7401.   There  is no  evidence on  the record that the United

States Attorney  General, the  Secretary  of  the  United  States

Department of the Treasury, or their lawful delegates, authorized

or sanctioned  these proceedings.   No  such  evidence  was  ever

served on Defendant:

     Thus, where  the Congress  prohibits the  commencement of  a
     civil action  unless certain  specific acts  are  performed,
     this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter until
     the requisite conditions are met in fact and such compliance
     is shown  by the pleadings and, where necessary, established
     by proof.  ... [B]ut  the mere allegation of facts necessary
     for  jurisdiction   without  supporting   proof  is  fatally
     defective. ...  This Court holds that 26 U.S.C. Section 7401
     requirements constitute  facts  essential  to  jurisdiction.
     The failure  to prove jurisdictional facts when specifically
     denied is fatal to the maintenance of this action.

                     [U.S.A. v. One 1972 Cadillac Coupe De Ville]
                    [355 F.Supp. 513, 515 (1973), emphasis added]


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 4 of
                               16


     Likewise, even  if section 7402 had taken effect, it clearly

grants specific authorities to the "district courts of the United

States" [sic] ("DCUS") at 7402(a), 7402(b), 7402(c), and 7402(f).

This honorable USDC is only mentioned at 7402(e):

     (e)  To quiet title.

     The  United   States  district   courts  [sic]   shall  have
     jurisdiction of  any action  brought by  the  United  States
     [sic] to quiet title to property if the title claimed by the
     United States  [sic]  to  such  property  was  derived  from
     enforcement of a lien under this title.
                                                 [emphasis added]

IRC 7402(d)  was repealed  by  P.L.  92-310,  title  II,  section

230(d), June 6, 1972.

     The  jurisdiction  of  federal  courts  is  defined  in  the

Constitution at  Article III  for judicial  courts;  in Article I

for legislative  courts;   and  in  Article  IV  for  territorial

courts.   Some courts  created by  Acts  of  Congress  have  been

referred  to  as  "Constitutional  Courts,"  whereas  others  are

regarded as  "Legislative Tribunals."   O'Donoghue  v. U.S.,  289

U.S. 516 (1933), 77 L.Ed 1356, 53 S.Ct. 74;  Mookini v. U.S., 303

U.S. 201 at 205 (1938), 82 L.Ed 748, 58 S.Ct. 543.

     The   USDC   is   a   legislative,   territorial   tribunal.

Legislative court  judges do  not enjoy  Article III  guarantees;

"inherently judicial"  tasks must be performed by judges deriving

power under  Article III.   See  U.S. v.  Sanders, 641  F.2d  659

(1981), cert. den. 101 S.Ct. 3055, 452 U.S. 918, 69 L.Ed 422.

     Creation and  composition of  the USDC  were accomplished by

Acts of  Congress on  June 25,  1948 [62 Stat. 895], and November

13, 1963  [77 Stat.  331], currently  codified at  28 U.S.C. 132;

and the  jurisdiction thereof  is strictly limited by IRC 7402 to


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 5 of
                               16


actions brought  by the  United States  [sic] to  quiet title  to

property if the title claim by the United States to such property

was derived  from enforcement  of a  lien under  this title (i.e.

Title 26, U.S.C.)

     Acts  of  Congress  creating  the  USDC  do  not  vest  said

territorial tribunals  with general  civil jurisdiction;    these

courts have  only such  jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by

Act of Congress under the Constitution.  See Hubbard v. Ammerman,

465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972), cert. den. 93 S.Ct. 967, 410 U.S.

910, 35 L.Ed.2d 272.  See IRC 7402(e) quoted supra.

     The USDC  is not a court of general jurisdiction, and has no

other power  bestowed upon  it, except as prescribed by Congress.

See Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir., 1976), cert. den. 97

S.Ct. 1106,  429 U.S.  1093, 51  L.Ed.2d 539.  Inclusio unius est

exclusio alterius.

     It is  apparent that  the USDC  for the District of Nebraska

was  created  and  established  under  28  U.S.C.  132,  and  its

jurisdiction is  defined and  limited by  Chapter 85 of Title 28,

U.S.C.   The Historical  and Statutory  Notes under 28 U.S.C. 132

contain the  following important  qualification  in  the  section

entitled "Continuation of Organization of Court", to wit:

     Section 2(b) of Act June 25, 1948, provided in part that the
     provisions of this title as set out in section 1 of said Act
     June 25,  1948, with  respect to  the  organization  of  the
     court, shall  be construed as a continuation of existing law
     ....
                                                 [emphasis added]

     The distinction between the USDC and the DCUS dates at least

from American  Insurance infra  in 1828,  and Title  28 expressly

continues that  law.   The Act  of June  25, 1948,  contains  the

following corresponding language, to wit:


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 6 of
                               16


     (b)  The provisions  of title  28,  Judiciary  and  Judicial
     Procedure, of  the United  States Code, set out in section 1
     of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the
     several courts  therein provided  for ... shall be construed
     as continuations  of existing  law. ...   No loss of rights,
     interruption  of   jurisdiction,  or  prejudice  to  matters
     pending in  any of such courts on the effective date of this
     Act shall result from its enactment.
                                                 [emphasis added]

Defendant submits the following construction of this provision of

the Act of June 25, 1948:

     No loss of rights shall result from its enactment;

     No  interruption  of  jurisdiction  shall  result  from  its
     enactment;  and,

     No prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the
     effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.

     The truth  is that the United States District Court ("USDC")

is designed  to adjudicate  matters that arise within the federal

zone, and  the District  Court of  the United  States ("DCUS") is

designed to  adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone.

See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), Kennedy concurring.

     There is  a  distinct  and  definite  difference  between  a

"United States  District Court" ("USDC") and a "District Court of

the United  States" ("DCUS").   The  words "District Court of the

United States"  commonly describe  constitutional courts  created

under Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative courts

which have  long  been  the  courts  of  the  Territories.    See

International Longshoremen's  & Warehousemen's  Union  v.  Juneau

Spruce Corp.,  342 U.S. 237 at 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed.

275, 13 Alaska 536.

     The term  "District Court  of the  United  States"  commonly

describes Article  III courts,  or "courts of the United States",

and not  legislative courts  of the  territories.   See  American


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 7 of
                               16


Insurance Co.  v. 356  Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed

242;   International Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union v.

Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93

L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 69 S.Ct. 936.

     Though the  judicial system  set up  in a  territory of  the

United States  is a  part of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  phrase

"court of  the United States", when used in a federal statute, is

generally construed  as not  referring to  "territorial  courts".

See Balzac  v. Porto  Rico, 258  U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.

343, 66 L.Ed. 627.  In Balzac, the High Court stated:

     The United States District Court is not a true United States
     court established  under Article  III of the Constitution to
     administer the  judicial power  of the United States therein
     conveyed.    It  is  created  by  virtue  of  the  sovereign
     congressional faculty,  granted under Article IV, Section 3,
     of  that   instrument,  of  making  all  needful  rules  and
     regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
     States.  The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
     United  States   courts  in   offering  an   opportunity  to
     nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
     influence,  does   not  change   its  character  as  a  mere
     territorial court.
                                                 [emphasis added]

     The distinction  within the dual nature of the federal court

system is  also noted  in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states that

the United  States District  Court for  the Canal Zone shall have

jurisdiction "...  concurrently with  the district  courts of the

United States,  of offenses against the laws of the United States

committed upon the high seas."  [emphasis added]

     This distinction is the reason why federal jurisdiction over

prosecutions  is   more  than   a  technical   concept;    it  is

Constitutional requirement.   See  U.S. v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180,

aff'd 383  U.S. 169  (1966), 86  S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681, cert.

den. 87 S.Ct. 44, 134, and 385 U.S. 846, 17 L.Ed.2d 77, 117.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 8 of
                               16


     The distinction  between  "district  courts  of  the  United

States" and  "United States  district  courts"  is  also  readily

apparent in  the Section  of Title 18 dealing with civil remedies

for activities  prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1962 (i.e. racketeering).

Subsection (a)  of 18 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the

Article III "district courts of the United States", as follows:

     (a)  The district  courts of  the United  States shall  have
     jurisdiction to  prevent and  restrain violations of section
     1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders ....

                                                 [emphasis added]

Subsection (c)  of 18 U.S.C. 1964 makes explicit reference to the

Article IV "United States district court", as follows:

     (c)  Any person  injured in  his  business  or  property  by
     reason of  a violation  of section  1962 of this chapter may
     sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
     ....
                                                 [emphasis added]

     The language of these two subsections is almost identical in

scope, with  the important  difference resulting from an apparent

need to legislate separate and distinct court authorities for the

Article  III   and  for  the  Article  IV  forums,  respectively.

Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  See also 28 U.S.C. 1441 et

seq., in  which Congress  appears to  have confused the USDC with

the DCUS throughout the removal statutes codified therein.

     For the  edification  of  this  honorable  Court,  Defendant

directs its  attention to  the  essay  entitled  "Karma  and  the

Federal Courts,"  which has  been  filed  concurrently  with  the

instant motion  and separately  in Defendant's  fifth NOTICE  AND

DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 9 of
                               16


     The ORDER  of April  8 goes  on to mention "employees of the

Internal Revenue  Service of  the United  States (hereafter IRS)"

[sic].  The IRS is not a department or bureau authorized to exist

within the  executive branch of the United States.  The IRS is an

alias for  Trust #62,  domiciled in Puerto Rico under the Federal

Alcohol Administration which was declared unconstitutional in the

year 1935  by the  U.S. Supreme Court.  See the document entitled

"BATF/IRS  --   Criminal  Fraud,"   by  author   William   Cooper

(hereinafter "The  Cooper File"),  filed  concurrently  with  the

instant motion  and separately  in Defendant's  first NOTICE  AND

DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE.

     As such,  employees of  the IRS  have,  at  best,  extremely

limited authorities  which do  not  extend  into  the  geographic

territory bounded  by the state lines surrounding Nebraska state.

The ORDER  of April 8 makes frequent reference to "acts performed

by them  as part  of their  official  IRS  offices,  under  their

authority as  IRS officers, or under the direction of officers of

the United  States of  America" [sic].   Even a cursory glance at

The Cooper  File belies  these references;   all  the more  so do

these revelations cast the colorable claims of IRS employees into

a completely different light.

     More to  the  point,  Defendant  has  now  submitted  proper

requests, under  the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), for the

lawful credentials  of all  IRS agents  who have  come in contact

with the  instant case.   Copies  of said FOIA requests have been

filed concurrently  with the  instant Motion  and  separately  in

Defendant's eleventh  NOTICE AND  DEMAND FOR  MANDATORY  JUDICIAL

NOTICE.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 10 of
                               16


     Defendant argues that He is entitled to a stay of execution,

and a  stay of  further proceedings to enforce the ORDER of April

8, pending  final judicial  determination of  the  existence  and

validity of said credentials, by jury trial.  See FRCP Rule 38.

     For these  many reasons, the ORDER of April 8 makes a severe

and prejudicial  error to  hold, against  the evidence plainly on

record, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in

the instant  case, and  that the  moving party  was  entitled  to

summary judgment.   It  is obvious  to  any  casual  reader  that

Defendant  properly  challenged  the  government  actors  in  the

instant  case  to  establish  and  demonstrate  their  authority,

jurisdiction, and  venue.   See Defendant's RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

AND DISCLAIMER, in which Defendant responded to the United States

Attorney's MOTION  FOR  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  (hereinafter  "Special

Appearance"), to wit:

     ... [T]hey  routinely  refuse  and  fail  to  establish  any
     authority, jurisdiction or venue for their action within the
     Defendants [sic]  country of  Nebraska.    Now  their  [sic]
     seeking to  involve a  federal court  and a judge to further
     extend their fraud, deception, collusion and conspiracy over
     the American  People, and  the inhabitants of the country of
     Nebraska in particular.
                                    [Page #3, Special Appearance]

This honorable  Court will  please take formal judicial notice of

the law  at 28 U.S.C. 297, in which Congress refers to the freely

associated compact states as "countries", to wit:

     (b)  The Congress  consents to  the acceptance and retention
     by  any  judge  so  authorized  of  reimbursement  from  the
     countries referred to in subsection (a) ....

                                                 [emphasis added]

     The ORDER  of April  8 also  makes an  isolated reference to

"U.S. Const.  amend. XVI"  [sic].  This so-called "amendment" was

never lawfully  ratified.   See evidence  documented in People v.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 11 of
                               16


Boxer,   California   Supreme   Court   case   number   S-030016;

plaintiffs'  pleadings   in  People  v.  Boxer  supra  are  filed

concurrently  with   the  instant   Motion  and   separately   in

Defendant's fourth  NOTICE  AND  DEMAND  FOR  MANDATORY  JUDICIAL

NOTICE.   The manifold implications of the failed ratification of

the so-called  16th amendment  are detailed in Defendant's eighth

NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE, filed separately

and concurrently with the instant Motion.

     Without belaboring  all other  plain and  prejudicial errors

which are  evident  in  the  ORDER  of  April  8,  Defendant  has

sufficiently established  that the instant case exhibits a record

which now proves that:

     (1)  this Court  does not  have proper jurisdiction over the
          subject matter;

     (2)  Defendant is  not subject  to this Court's jurisdiction
          in personam;

     (3)  venue is not proper;  and,

     (4)  service of the complaint was not effective, since there
          is no verified complaint on record.

As further proof of this claim, Defendant hereby incorporates the

following additional  documents, as  if all  were set forth fully

herein, which  documents are filed separately in the instant case

and concurrently with the instant Motion, to wit:

     1.   eleven (11)  separate  pleadings  entitled  NOTICE  AND
          DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE;

     2.   MEMORANDUM  OF   POINTS  AND  AUTHORITIES  PROVING  THE
          VOLUNTARY NATURE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES;  and,

     3.   NOTICE OF  MOTION AND  MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND
          FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 12 of
                               16


     Defendant admits  to having  made a  mistake with respect to

His political  status in  previous pleadings.  Having studied the

pertinent laws  and court  cases, Defendant now lays claim to the

status of  a Citizen  of Nebraska state who is not also a citizen

of the  United States  ("federal citizen").  See Gardina v. Board

of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155, 48 S. 788, 791 (1909).

     Defendant  also  alleges  misrepresentation  by  the  United

States Attorneys  assigned to  the instant  case, because they do

not have  any powers  of attorney  to  represent  the  plaintiffs

United States  of America.  Only the respective Attorneys General

of the  several states  are authorized  to represent  the  United

States  of  America.    The  United  States  Attorneys  are  only

authorized to represent the United States, provided that they can

demonstrate the  requisite credentials for said office, including

but not limited to the Oath of Office and delegation of authority

from the President of the United States.

     The federal  judge currently presiding over the instant case

is also  paying federal  income taxes  upon his  judicial pay, in

violation of  fundamental guarantee found at Article III, Section

1, and  the holding  of the  U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore,

253 U.S.  245 (1920) (never overturned).  Subsequent decisions of

the high  court were  based on  the false  premises that there is

only one  class of  citizenship (there are two classes), and that

all judges  are citizens  (there is  no such  requirement).   See

O'Malley v.  Woodrough, 307  U.S. 277  (1939);   UCLA Law Review,

Vol. 24, No. 2, December 1976, p. 308.


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 13 of
                               16


     Defendant  is   guaranteed  an   independent  and   unbiased

judiciary, as  explained in  Evans supra.  Federal judges who pay

taxes upon  their judicial  compensation are subject to the undue

influence of  the IRS.   See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169

(1965), which contains a written admission of undue influence.

     Accordingly, all  premises  considered,  and  all  mistakes,

newly discovered  evidence, fraud,  misrepresentation, and  other

reasons having been duly considered also, Defendant thereby shows

that the  judgment of this Court is void as to its MEMORANDUM AND

ORDER, and  its separate  JUDGMENT, both dated April 8, 1997, and

both should  be vacated  so as  to  relieve  Defendant  from  the

operation of said ORDER and JUDGMENT.


                        REMEDY REQUESTED

     Wherefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the ORDER of

April 8,  1997, be  vacated, for  all the  reasons stated  above,

pending declaratory relief from a competent and qualified federal

trial  jury,  pursuant  to  FRCP  Rule  38,  and  final  judicial

determination of the existence and validity of requisite employee

credentials and  of all other authorities and prerequisites which

are necessary  for this  Court to pronounce final judgment in the

instant case.

                          VERIFICATION

I, Vance  E. Knudson,  Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of

perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without

(outside) the  "United States",  that the above statement of fact

and law  is a  true and  correct,  to  the  best  of  My  current

information, knowledge,  and belief,  so help Me God, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1746(1).


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 14 of
                               16


Dated: ______________________________


Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Vance E. Knudson
_____________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 15 of
                               16


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Vance  E. Knudson, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of

perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without

the "United  States," that  I am  at least  18 years  of  age,  a

Citizen of  one of  the United  States of  America,  and  that  I

personally served the following document(s):

                      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT:
                   FRCP Rules 60(b), 62(b), 38

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:

SALLY R. JOHNSON
Office of U.S. Attorney
487 Federal Building
100 Centennial Mall North
Lincoln [zip code exempt]
NEBRASKA STATE

ROBERT D. METCALFE
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
c/o POB 7238, Ben Franklin Station
Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


Dated:  __________________________________

/s/ Vance E. Knudson
__________________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice

[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]


Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Judgment:  Page 16 of
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U.S.A. v. Knudson