Time: Mon Jan 27 06:06:43 1997
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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 06:14:17 -0700 (MST)
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From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: Philip Freneau
>Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 05:53:52
>From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
>Subject: Philip Freneau
>Bcc: liberty lists
>
>[This text is formatted in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
>
>
> Philip Freneau:
>
> Rules for Changing a Republic
> [into a Democracy and then]
> into a Monarchy
>
>
> from:
>
>
> Organizing the New Nation
>
> THE ANNALS OF AMERICA
>
> Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
>
> 1784-1796
>
>
>
> Those who had opposed the constitution thought their fears
>justified by the conduct of the government that began to function
>in 1789. Under the aggressive leadership of Alexander Hamilton,
>the Secretary of the Treasury, economic measures were taken that
>favored the few, while a effective party machine was organized
>and the army strengthened in such a way as to suggest an intent
>to control rather than to represent the many. The whole tone of
>Washington's administration was aristocratic, favoring as it did
>the educated, the wealthy, the clergy and the press, who were
>fearful of "mob rule" and preferred to see what Hamilton called
>"gentlemen of principle and property" in command. As Hamilton
>had at his service a newspaper -- John Fenno's Gazette of the
>United States -- to support his policies, his opponents, led by
>Jefferson and Madison, decided to establish a rival newspaper,
>the National Gazette. Philip Freneau, an experienced journalist
>of known democratic leanings, was chosen to edit the paper. The
>editorial, reprinted here, is typical of those in which Freneau
>criticized the Hamiltonian program from 1791 to 1793.
>
>
>Source: American Museum, July 1792: "Rules for Changing a Limited
>Republican Government into an Unlimited Hereditary One."
>
>
> Reformatted for Microsoft WORD 5.0 for DOS
>
> by
>
> John E. Trumane
> Account for Better Citizenship
> December 21, 1992
>
> [Read aloud with heavy British accent.]
>
>
>
> Rules for changing a limited republican government into an
>unlimited hereditary one:
>
> 1. It being necessary in order to effect the change, to
>get rid of constitutional shackles and popular prejudices, all
>possible means and occasions are to be used for both these
>purposes.
>
> 2. Nothing being more likely to prepare the vulgar mind
>for aristocratical ranks and hereditary powers than titles,
>endeavor in the offset of the government to confer these on its
>most dignified officers. If the principal magistrate should
>happen to be particularly venerable in the eyes of the people,
>take advantage of that fortunate circumstance in setting the
>example.
>
> 3. Should the attempt fail through his republican aversion
>to it, or from the danger of alarming the people, do not abandon
>the enterprise altogether, but lay up the proposition in the
>record. Time may gain it respect, and it will be there always
>ready, cut and dried, for any favorable conjuncture that may
>offer.
>
> 4. In drawing all bills, resolutions and reports, keep
>constantly in view that the limitations in the Constitution are
>ultimately to be explained away. Precedents and phrases may thus
>be shuffled in, without being adverted to by candid or weak
>people, of which good use may afterward be made.
>
> 5. As the novelty and bustle of inaugurating the
>government will for some time keep the public mind in a heedless
>and unsettled state, let the press during this period be busy in
>propagating the doctrines of monarchy and aristocracy. For this
>purpose, it will be particularly useful to confound a mobbish
>democracy with a representative republic, that by exhibiting all
>the turbulent examples and enormities of the former, an odium may
>be thrown on the character of the latter. Review all the civil
>contests, convulsions, factions, broils, squabbles, bickering,
>black eyes and bloody noses of ancient, middle and modern ages;
>caricature them into the most frightful forms and colors that can
>be imagined, and unfold one scene of horrible tragedy after
>another till the people be made, if possible, to tremble at their
>own shadows. Let the discourses on Davila then contrast with
>these pictures of terror the quiet hereditary succession, the
>reverence claimed by birth and nobility, and the fascinating
>influence of stars, and ribbons and garters, cautiously
>suppressing all the bloody tragedies and unceasing oppressions
>which form the history of this species of government. No pains
>should be spared in this part of the undertaking, for the
>greatest will be wanted, it being extremely difficult, especially
>when a people have been taught to reason and feel their rights,
>to convince them that a king, who is always an enemy to the
>people, and a nobility, who are perhaps still more so, will take
>better care of the people than the people will take of
>themselves.
>
> 6. But the grand nostrum will be a public debt, provided
>enough of it can be got and it be medicated with the proper
>ingredients. If by good fortune a debt be ready at hand, the
>most is to be made of it. Stretch it and swell it to the utmost
>the items will bear. Allow as many extra claims as decency will
>permit. Assume all the debts of your neighbors -- in a word, get
>as much debt as can be raked and scraped together, and when you
>have got all you can, "advertise" for more, and have the debt
>made as big as possible. This object being accomplished, the
>next will be to make it as perpetual as possible; and the next
>to that, to get it into as few hands as possible. The more
>effectually to bring this about, modify the debt, complicate it,
>divide it, subdivide it, subtract it, postpone it, let there be
>one-third of two-thirds, and two-thirds of one-third, and two-
>thirds of two-thirds; let there be 3 percents, and 4 percents,
>and 6 percents, and present 6 percents, and future 6 percents.
>To be brief, let the whole be such a mystery that a few only can
>understand it; and let all possible opportunities and
>informations fall in the way of these few to cinch their
>advantages over the many.
>
> 7. It must not be forgotten that the members of the
>legislative body are to have a deep stake in the game. This is
>an essential point, and happily is attended with no difficulty.
>A sufficient number, properly disposed, can alternately legislate
>and speculate, and speculate and legislate, and buy and sell, and
>sell and buy, until a due portion of the property of their
>constituents has passed into their hands to give them an interest
>against their constituents, and to ensure the part they are to
>act. All this, however, must be carried on under the cover of
>the closest secrecy; and it is particularly lucky that dealings
>in paper admit of more secrecy that any other. Should a
>discovery take place, the whole plan may be blown up.
>
> 8. The ways in which a great debt, so constituted and
>applied, will contribute to the ultimate end in view are both
>numerous and obvious:
>
>
>(1) The favorite few, thus possessed of it, whether within or
> without the government, will feel the staunchest fealty to
> it, and will go through thick and thin to support it in all
> its oppressions and usurpations.
>
>(2) Their money will give them consequence and influence, even
> among those who have been tricked out of it.
>
>(3) They will be the readiest materials that can be found for a
> hereditary aristocratic order, whenever matters are ripe for
> one.
>
>(4) A great debt will require great taxes; great taxes, many
> tax gatherers and other officers; and all officers are
> auxiliaries of power.
>
>(5) Heavy taxes may produce discontents; these may threaten
> resistance; and in proportion to this danger will be the
> pretense for a standing army to repel it.
>
>(6) A standing army, in its turn, will increase the moral force
> of the government by means of its appointments, and give it
> physical force by means of the sword, thus doubly forwarding
> the main object.
>
>
> 9. The management of a great funded debt and a extensive
>system of taxes will afford a plea, not to be neglected, for
>establishment of a great incorporated bank. The use of such a
>machine is well understood. If the Constitution, according to
>its fair meaning, should not authorize it, so much the better.
>Push it through by a forced meaning and you will get in the
>bargain an admirable precedent for future misconstructions.
>
> In fashioning the bank, remember that it is to be made
>particularly instrumental in enriching and aggrandizing the elect
>few, who are to be called in due season to the honors and
>felicities of the kingdom preparing for them, and who are the
>pillars that must support it. It will be easy to throw the
>benefit entirely into their hands, and to make it a solid
>addition of 50, or 60, or 70 percent to their former capitals of
>800 percent, or 900 percent, without costing them a shilling;
>while it will be difficult to explain to the people that this
>gain of the few is at the cost of the many, that the contrary may
>be boldly and safely pretended. The bank will be pregnant with
>other important advantages. It will admit the same men to be, at
>the same time, members of the bank and members of the government.
>The two institutions will thus be soldered together, and each
>made stronger. Money will be put under the direction of the
>government, and government under the direction of money. To
>crown the whole, the bank will have a proper interest in swelling
>and perpetuating the public debt and public taxes, with all the
>blessings of both, because its agency and its profits will be
>extended in exact proportion.
>
> 10. "Divide and govern" is a maxim consecrated by the
>experience of ages, and should be familiar in its use to every
>politician as the knife he carries in his pocket. In the work
>here to be executed, the best effects may be produced by this
>maxim, and with peculiar facility. An extensive republic made up
>of lesser republics necessarily contains various sorts of people,
>distinguished by local and other interests and prejudices. Let
>the whole group be well examined in all its parts and relations,
>geographical and political, metaphysical and metaphorical; let
>there be first a northern and a southern section, by a line
>running east and west, and then an eastern and western section,
>by a line running north and south. By a suitable nomenclature,
>the landholders cultivating different articles can be
>discriminated from one another, all from the class of merchants,
>and both from that of manufacturers.
>
> One of the subordinate republics may be represented as a
>commercial state, another as a navigation state, another as a
>manufacturing state, others as agricultural states; and although
>the great body of people in each be really agricultural, and the
>other characters be more or less common to all, still it will be
>politic to take advantage of such an arrangement. Should the
>members of the great republic be of different sizes, and subject
>to little jealousies on that account, another important division
>will be ready formed to your hand. Add again the division that
>may be carved out of personal interests, political opinions, and
>local parties. With so convenient an assortment of votes,
>especially with the help of the marked ones, a majority may be
>packed for any question with as much ease as the odd trick by an
>adroit gamester, and any measure whatever carried or defeated, as
>the great revolution to be brought about may require.
>
> It is only necessary, therefore, to recommend that full use
>be made of the resource; and to remark that, besides the direct
>benefit to be drawn from these artificial divisions, they will
>tend to smother the true and natural one, existing in all
>societies, between the few who are always impatient of political
>equality and the many who can never rise above it; between those
>who are to mount to the prerogatives and those who are to be
>saddled with the burdens of the hereditary government to be
>introduced -- in one word, between the general mass of the
>people, attached to their republican government and republican
>interests, and the chosen band devoted to monarchy and Mammon.
>It is of infinite importance that this distinction should be kept
>out of sight. The success of the project absolutely requires it.
>
> 11. As soon as sufficient progress in the intended change
>shall have been made, and the public mind duly prepared according
>to the rules already laid down, it will be proper to venture on
>another and a bolder step toward a removal of the constitutional
>landmarks. Here the aid of the former encroachments and all the
>other precedents and way-paving maneuvers will be called in of
>course. But, in order to render the success more certain, it
>will be of special moment to give the most plausible and popular
>name that can be found to the power that is to be usurped. It
>may be called, for example, a power for the common safety or the
>public good, or, "the general welfare." If the people should not
>be too much enlightened, the name will have a most imposing
>effect. It will escape attention that it means, in fact, the
>same thing with a power to do anything the government pleases "in
>all cases whatsoever." To oppose the power may consequently seem
>to the ignorant, and be called by artful, opposing the "general
>welfare", and may be cried down under that deception.
>
> As the people, however, may not run so readily into the
>snare as might be wished, it will be prudent to bait it well with
>some specious popular interest, such as the encouragement of
>manufactures, or even of agriculture, taking due care not even to
>mention any unpopular object to which the power is equally
>applicable, such as religion, etc. By this contrivance,
>particular classes of people may possibly be taken in who will be
>a valuable reinforcement.
>
> With respect to the patronage of agriculture there is not
>indeed much to be expected from it. It will be too quickly seen
>through by the owners and tillers of the soil, that to tax them
>with one hand and pay back a part only with the other is a losing
>game on their side. From the power over manufactures more is to
>be hoped. It will not be so easily perceived that the premium
>bestowed may not be equal to the circuitous tax on consumption
>which pays it. There are particular reasons, too, for pushing
>the experiment on this class of citizens:
>
>
>(1) As they live in towns and can act together, it is of vast
> consequence to gain them over to the interest of monarchy.
>
>(2) If the power over them be once established, the government
> can grant favors or monopolies, as it pleases; can raise or
> depress this or that place, as it pleases; in a word, by
> creating a dependence in so numerous and important a class
> of citizens, it will increase its own independence of every
> class and be more free to pursue the grand object in
> contemplation.
>
>(3) The expense of this operation will not in the end cost the
> government a shilling, for the moment any branch of
> manufacture has been brought to a state of tolerable
> maturity, the excise man will be ready with his constable
> and his search warrant to demand a reimbursement, and as
> much more as can be squeezed out of the article. All this,
> it is to be remembered, supposes that the manufacturers will
> be weak enough to be cheated, in some respects, out of their
> own interests, and wicked enough, in others, to betray those
> of their fellow citizens; a supposition that, if known,
> would totally mar the experiment. Great care, therefore,
> must be taken to prevent it from leaking out.
>
>
> 12. The expediency of seizing every occasion of external
>danger for augmenting and perpetuating the standing military
>force is too obvious to escape. So important is this matter that
>for any loss or disaster whatever attending the national arms,
>there will be ample consolation and compensation in the
>opportunity for enlarging the establishment. A military defeat
>will become a political victory, and the loss of a little vulgar
>blood contribute to ennoble that which flows in the veins of our
>future dukes and marquesses.
>
> 13. The same prudence will improve the opportunity afforded
>by an increase of military expenditures for perpetuating the
>taxes required for them. If the inconsistency and absurdity of
>establishing a perpetual tax for a temporary service should
>produce any difficulty in the business, Rule 10 must be resorted
>to. Throw in as many extraneous motives as will make up a
>majority, and the thing is effected in an instant. What was
>before evil would become good as easily as black could be made
>white by the same magical operation.
>
> 14. Throughout this great undertaking it will be wise to
>have some particular model constantly in view. The work can then
>be carried on more systematically, and every measure be
>fortified, in the progress, by apt illustrations and authorities.
>Should there exist a particular monarchy against which there are
>fewer prejudices than against any other, should it contain a
>mixture of the representative principle so as to present on one
>side the semblance of a republican aspect, should it, moreover,
>have a great, funded, complicated, irredeemable debt, with all
>the apparatus and appurtenances of excises, banks, etc., upon
>that a steady eye is to be kept. In all cases it will assist,
>and in most its statute books will furnish a precise pattern by
>which there may be cut out any moneyed or monarchical project
>that may be wanted.
>
> 15. As it is not to be expected that the change of a
>republic into a monarchy, with the rapidity desired, can be
>carried through without occasional suspicions and alarms, it will
>be necessary to be prepared for such events. The best general
>rule on the subject is to be taken from the example of crying
>"Stop thief" first -- neither lungs nor pens must be spared in
>charging every man who whispers, or even thinks, that the
>revolution on foot is meditated, with being himself an enemy to
>the established government and meaning to overturn it. Let the
>charge be reiterated and reverberated till at last such confusion
>and uncertainty be produced that the people, being not able to
>find out where the truth lies, withdraw their attention from the
>contest.
>
> Many other rules of great wisdom and efficacy might be
>added; but it is conceived that the above will be abundantly
>enough for the purpose. This will certainly be the case if the
>people can be either kept asleep so as not to discover, or be
>thrown into artificial divisions so as not to resist, what is
>silently going forward. Should it be found impossible, however,
>to prevent the people from awaking and uniting; should all
>artificial distinctions give way to the natural divisions between
>the lordly minded few and the well disposed many; should all who
>have common interest make a common cause and show a inflexible
>attachment to republicanism in opposition to a government of
>monarchy and or money, why then ....
>
>
> # # #
>
========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness
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