Time: Sun Jun 15 19:31:20 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id TAA24045; Sun, 15 Jun 1997 19:29:33 -0700 (MST) by usr02.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id TAA25120; Sun, 15 Jun 1997 19:29:23 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 15 Jun 1997 19:28:01 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: David Myrland; Free Memorandum (fwd) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit <snip> > >> IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE >> WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA >> >>In Re: ) Ch.13 >> ) Case #96-33796 DEBTOR'S >>David Myrland, ) Memorandum of Authority >> Debtor. ) in satisfaction >>of Court’s >> Pro Se. ) Order dated >>2/25/97; >> ) "regular income" under 11 >>USC >> v. ) v. "regular >>income" under 26 >> ) USC. >>C.I.R., ) >> Respondent ) >>_______________________________________________________ >> >> I. INTRODUCTION. >> >> 1.1 COMES NOW, Debtor hereto, seeking to satisfy the court’s >>Order dated February 25, 1997, wherein Debtor was instructed to clarify, >>define, or otherwise explain a perceived ambiguity as it would pertain to >>the term "income" for the purposes of 11 USC and for the purposes of 26 >>USC. The Court’s instruction is termed as follows: >> >> "In view of objection R (Paragraph 1.3 of the objection), >>Debtor shall file a memorandum of authority on the question of >>whether an individual can have regular income for the purposes >>of Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.), but not for >>the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.)..." >> >> 1.2 In its instruction to the Debtor, the Court alluded to issue >>"R" of his objection which Debtor presumes to mean his [tax returns] >>filed as Exhibit F thereto (hereinafter "returns"). On said returns (line >>#6), Debtor has claimed deductions under 26 USC 212 for property which is >>acknowledged as a cost under 26 USC 83 and 1012. All such property was >>indeed disposed of by Debtor in arm’s length transactions within which no >>excess over said property’s fair market value ("FMV") was derived. >> 1.3 Debtor’s conclusions reflected on his returns are derived >>from arguments under issues (C) and (D) of his brief in support of his >>objection to IRS’ proof of claim. >> 1.4 Debtor presumes that this point of contention is the object >>of the Court’s [curiosity] expressed in its Order dated 2/25/97. >> 1.5 debtor would first like to dispose of the Court’s terminology >>used in its Order for its vagueness. The term "regular income" does not >>provide a realm within which specific operations of 11 USC and 26 USC may >>be examined. Within said term must fit more specific categories like >>"profit", "cost", and "gross receipts." The ambiguity perceived by the >>Court is the difference between profit and cost, as said terms relate to >>Debtor’s gross receipts. >> >> II. ISSUES AT LAW. >> >> 2.1 Below, Debtor will present several issues that seek to >>satisfy the Court’s Order for clarification. Also presented for review >>will be simple questions that show Debtor to be on point in his >>conclusions reflected on his returns. >> >>ISSUE (A) STATUTORY LANGUAGE MUST FORM THE BASIS OF ALL JUDICIAL AND >>INDIVIDUAL DETERMINATIONS OF PROPER COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE PROVISIONS >>OF LAW. >> >> (A)1 As the Court observed in reading the Debtor’s brief, he has >>relied upon only statutory language for form his conclusions and issues. >> (A)2 Below, the Court will find excerpts from certain decisions >>outlining the importance of legislative intent and the lack of authority >>held by judicial officers to create exceptions thereto. >> (A)3 The quotes below are from the Supreme Court in Carminetti v. >>United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916), taken from throughout the opinion of >>the Court. >> >> "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the >>first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is >>framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the >>constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed >>it, the sole function of the court is to enforce it according >>to its terms. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 671; >>Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33; United >>States v. Lexington Mill and Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409; United >> States v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258." >> >> "Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one >>meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules >>which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion. Hamilton >>v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421. There is no ambiguity in this >>act." >> >> "In [United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393] this court said: "All >>will admit that full effect must be given to the intention of >>Congress as gathered from the words of the statute." >> >> "If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is >>neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter >>speculative fields in search of a different meaning." >> >> "In other words, the language being plain, and not leading to >>absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole >>evidence of the ultimate legislative intent. See Macenzie v. >>Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308." >> >> (A)4 Below is the explanation of how to read a statute, as >>articulated by Circuit Judge Magill, in the case of Security Bank of >>Minnesota v. Commissioner of IRS, 994 F.2d 432 (8th Cir.1993). Most of >>the cases that he cites will be omitted, along with specific reference to >>particular provisions in controversy. What is important is his >>description of what to look for in the law and the fact that it is >>consistent with the 1916 Supreme Court case quoted above. >> >> At pg.435: The parties provide vastly differing >>interpretations of the statutory language, and both contend >>that the language clearly supports their position. >> >> At pg.436: The Commissioner’s argument has considerable force, >>if one focuses solely on the language of sections 1281 and 1283 >>and divorces them from the broader statutory context. But we >>cannot do that. The Supreme Court has noted that, "the true >>meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting as >>complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its >>language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from >>related sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history >>of the income tax legislation of which it is an integral part." (Cite >> omitted) According to the Court, the construing court’s duty is >>"to find that interpretation which can most fairly be >>said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most >>harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that >>Congress manifested.’" (Cite omitted) The circumstances of the >>enactment of particular legislation may be particular relevant >>to this inquiry. (Cite omitted) Finally, when there is >>reasonable doubt about the meaning of a revenue statute, the doubt is >> resolved in favor of those taxed. (Cite omitted) As in all cases >>of statutory interpretation, we must start with the text of >>the statute. But we cannot simply focus on sections 1281 >>through 1283 because they do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, we >>must consider the context provided by the more general >>statutory scheme of which [they] are a part. >> >> At pg.437: Thus, the statutory scheme into which [the >>provisions] fit shows a concern with the treatment of >>discounted obligations. We find no mention in this scheme of >>the treatment of bank loans made in the ordinary course of >>business. Given this context, we would expect that if >>Congress initially covered loans without discount, as the >>commissioner contends, it would provide language clearly stating such >> an intention. We next examine the statutory text to see if it >>contains such a clear statement. >> >> We conclude that the statutory text does not clearly cover >>obligations containing only stated interest. First, nothing >>in either the sections at issue or in the broader statutory >>scheme specifically refers to loans [of that type]. Second, we >>conclude that the actual text of the provisions is ambiguous >>with regard to whether such obligations are covered. >> >> At pg.438: We are not convinced that the language is as clear as >>the Commissioner contends. >> >> At pg.441: An examination of the statutory context, the text of >>the relevant provisions, and the legislative history convinces us >>that the construction that is "most harmonious with its >>scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested." >>(Cite omitted) Moreover, because the application of [the >>provision] to these loans is ambiguous, we follow the venerable >>rule that "[i]n the interpretation of statutes levying taxes >>...[courts must not] enlarge their operation so as to embrace >>matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are >>construed most strongly against the government." >> >> (A)5 One judge dissented, saying that the statute DID require the >>reporting. Only in disagreement as to the clarity of the statute, the >>dissenting Circuit Judge Beam states, "‘I respectfully dissent. If the >>[statutory] intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter. >>Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, >>81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)." >> (A)6 The Supreme Court failed to list case law as an authority to >>consider when seeking to structure one’s own affairs. The Supreme Court >>also failed to permit judicial officers and administrators to stray from >>the clear language of Congressional intent expressed in statute. >> (A)7 State Courts share in this prescription for interpretation >>of legislative intent. The following excerpt is taken from Cook v. State, >>83 Wash.2d 725, 735, 521 P.2d 725 (1974). >> >> "Whether the legislature acted wisely by creating the challenged >> restriction is not a proper subject for judicial determination. >>McKinney v. Estate of McDonald, 71 Wash.2d 262, 264, 427 P.2d 974 >>(1967); Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wash.2d 181, 192, 324 P.2d >>438 (1958). The fact that the legislature made no exception for >>minors does not give rise to some latent judicial power to do so >>by means of a volunteered additional provisio. This is true even >>if it could be said the legislative omission was inadvertant. >>State v. Roth, 78 Wash.2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55 (1971); Boeing v. >>King County, 75 Wash.2d 160, 166, 449 P.2d 404 (1969); State ex >>rel. Hagan v. Chinook Hotel, 65 Wash.2d 573, 578, 399 P.2d 8 >>(1965); Vannoy v. Pacific Power and Light Company, 59 Wash.2d >>623, 629, 369 P.2d 848 (1962). If there is a need for such an >>exception, it must be initiated by the legislature, not by the >>courts. Boeing v. King County, supra; State ex rel. Hagan v. >>Chinook Hotel, supra." >> >> (A)8 Similar limitations upon judicial authority are outlined by >>the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249, 40 S.Ct. 550, 551 >>(1920). >> >> "The particular need for making the judiciary independent was >> elaborately pointed out by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, >> No.78, from which we excerpt the following: >> >> "The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the >>sword of the community. The Legislature not only commands the >>purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights >>of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the >>contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; >>no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the >>society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may >>truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment." >> >> (A)9 Debtor claims that statutory language validates his >>calculations of tax liability reflected on his returns. >> >>ISSUE (B) FAILURE TO HEW TO THE LAW WITH INDIFFERENCE WOULD VIOLATE >>DEBTOR’S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY AND TO DUE PROCESS. >> >> (B)1 Regulation reflects that the letter of the law shall guide >>individuals and officials in any determination of tax liability. >> >> 26 CFR 601.106(f)(1) "Rule 1. An exaction by the U.S. >>Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or >>otherwise, is a taking of property without due process of law, >>in violation of the [5th Amendment]. Accordingly, an appeals >>representative in his or her conclusions of fact or application >>of the law, shall hew to the law and the recognized standards >>of legal construction. It shall be his or her duty to determine >>the correct amount of the tax, with strict impartiality as >>between the taxpayer and the Government, and without favoritism >>or discrimination as between taxpayers." >> >> (B)2 Debtor, in his objection to IRS’ proof of claim, has >>attempted nothing more than to have the IRS held to the precise and >>perfectly structured letter of 26 USC and 4 USC 72. While Debtor’s >>clients’ victimization in every court would fully justify his use of >>violence to protect his property from the Respondent, Debtor has chosen >>to place himself at risk for the same victimization at the [hands] of >>this Court by trying once again to hold the IRS to the letter of the law >>upon which he has relied, protections therein being starkly manifest. >> >>ISSUE (C) LABOR, BEING PROPERTY WITHIN WHICH DEBTOR HAS NO BASIS, IS >>STILL PROPERTY RECOGNIZED AS A COST TO DEBTOR UNDER 26 USC. >> >> (C)1 The standing and recognition of labor as property cannot be >>doubted. >> >> "As in our intercourse with our fellow men certain principles >>of morality are assumed to exist, without which society would >>be impossible, so certain inherent rights lie at the >>foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of them alone >>can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights >>have never been more happily expressed than in the Declaration >>of Independence, that new evangel of liberty to the people; >>"We hold these truths to be self evident," that is so plain >>that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement, "that >>all men are endowed," not by edicts of Emperors, or decrees of >>Parliament, or acts of congress, but, "by their Creator with certain >> inalienable rights," that is, rights which cannot be bartered away, >>or given away, or taken away except in punishment of crime, >>"and among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of >>happiness, and to secure these," not grant them but secure >>them, "governments are instituted among men, deriving >>their just powers from the consent of the governed." >> >> "Among these rights, as proclaimed in that document, is the >>right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the >>right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner >>not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may >>increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to >>give their highest enjoyment." >> >> "The common callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, >>which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in >>all communities from time immemorial, must, therefore, be free >>in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The >>right to pursue them without let or hindrance, except that >>which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, >>condition, is a distinguished privilege of citizens of the United >> States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as >> their birthright." >> >> "It has well been said that, "The property which every man has >>is his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other >>property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The >>patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of >>his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and >>dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to >>his neighbor, is a plain violation of the most sacred >>property." Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 >> (1883) >> >> "Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, >>as generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully >>deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his >>will..." The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 >> >> "The authorities we have cited show that labor is a doom, and if >> submitted to with fidelity, secures a blessing to the >>human family. The obligation to labor being imperious, confers >>a right to labor, which right is property; and it cannot be >>withdrawn or destroyed by arbitrary legislation without a >>violation of natural right. This right is a social right, and >>constitutions have been made to secure it from invasion. No state >> of the American Union can deprive a man of his title by arbitrary >>edict; and arbitrary institutions to limit, depress, impair or >>to take away this right, cannot be favored or maintained." >>Slaughterhouse Case, 16 Wall. 36 (1872) >> >> "Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of >>private property, partaking of the nature of each is the right >>to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among >>such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor >>and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of >>property." Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) >> >> (C)2 Debtor’s Exhibit H is Tax Court’s decision #339-95 where the >>only argument for labor’s exclusion from cost under 26 USC 83 and 1012 is >>that it is property within which one has no basis. >> (C)3 Statute and regulation, after embracing ALL property as a >>cost, then fail to expressly exclude from cost property within which one >>has no basis. >> >> 26 CFR 1.83-3(g) Amount paid. For the purposes of section 83 >> and the regulations thereunder, the term "amount paid" refers to >> the value of any money or property paid for the transfer of >> property to which § 83 applies. >> >> 26 CFR 1.83-4(b)(2) If property to which 1.83-1 applies is >> transferred at an arm's length, the basis of the property in the >> hands of the transferee shall be determined under section 1012 >> and the regulations thereunder. >> >> 26 CFR 1.1012-1(a) ...The cost is the amount paid for such >> property in cash or other property. >> >> (C)4 If the authorities cited in issue (A), supra, mean anything >>at all, they dictate that, if legislative exclusion of some property from >>cost cannot be identified, if property within which the Debtor has no >>basis is not statutorily excluded from cost, Debtor’s labor must be so >>acknowledged, its FMV deductible as cost under 26 USC 212. >> (C)5 It follows that any tax purporting to be an "income tax", >>property embraced as a cost, and disposed of to obtain other property, is >>not to have its FMV placed in the category of profit or "gross income." >>This contention forms the basis for the conclusions of tax liability >>reflected on Debtor’s returns, as outlined under issues (C) and (D) of >>his brief in support of his objection to IRS’ proof of claim. >> >>ISSUE (D) DEBTOR’S PLAN UNDER 11 USC PROVIDES FOR PAYMENT FROM GROSS >>RECEIPTS, WHILE DEBTOR’S RETURNS REFLECT PROFIT AND COST FOUND WITHIN >>SAID GROSS RECEIPTS. >> >> (D)1 Debtor’s ch.13 plan provides for payment of alleged debts by >>outlining cashflow and demands thereon. While such amounts are (God >>willing) incoming, any amounts therein that are lawfully recognized as >>FMV of property embraced as a cost under 26 USC are, of course, not >>"income" or "gain" for the purposes of 16th Amendment taxation (See 26 >>USC 212; Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179, 184-188 (1918); Eisner v. >>Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)). >> (D)2 The amounts from which Debtor proposes to satisfy alleged >>debts are derived through the same activity(s) from which the Debtor >>derived amounts reported on his returns; compensation for services. >> (D)3 If Debtor’s labor (property within which he has no basis) is >>embraced as a cost to him, its FMV is not "income" (gain) for the >>purposes of 26 USC 1, 1401, 3101, or 3402, but its FMV is an amount from >>which Debtor may satisfy debts alleged by IRS as "income tax" owed; >>"gross income" v. "gross receipts." >> (D)4 Debtor claims that the terms of 26 CFR 1.83-3(g) ("the value >>of any money or property") and of 26 CFR 1.1012-1(a) ("cash or other >>property") leave no room for exclusion from cost of "property within >>which one has no basis" as would justify taxation as gain the FMV of >>Debtor’s labor; all property is cost, unless excluded by law (clear >>language provision for exclusion). >> (D)5 "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of >>what otherwise would be is taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means >>which the law permits, cannot be doubted." (See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 >>U.S. 465 (1935), also U.S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506; Superior Oil Co. >>v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-6; Jones v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. >>204; 71 F.2d 214, 217)). >> (D)6 A tax must be imposed by clear and unequivocal language. >>Where the construction of a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be >>resolved in favor of whom upon which the tax is sought to be laid. (See >>Spreckles Sugar Refining v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 416 (1904); Gould v. >>Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917); Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, >>257 U.S. 602, 606, 42 S.Ct. 223, 224, 66 L.Ed. 391 (1922); Lucas v. >>Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 51 >>S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930); Burnet v. Niagra Falls Brewing Co., 282 >>U.S. 648, 654, 51 S.Ct. 262, 264, 75 L.Ed. 594 (1931); Miller v. Standard >>Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508, 52 S.Ct. 260, 262, 76 L.Ed. 422 >>(1932); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S.Ct. 266, 267, 79 >>L.Ed. 596 (1935); Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938); U.S. v. >>Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1978)). >> (D)7 This holding is echoed in decisions rendered [today]. (See >>Security Bank of Minnesota v. C.I.R., 994 F.2d 432, 436 (CA8 1993)). >> (D)8 What does not exist in regulation or statute does not exist >>at all. (See Carminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485, 489-493 (1916), >>citing (on 485) Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 671; Bate >>Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33; U.S. v. Lexington Mill >>and Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409; U.S. v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258. See >>also Security Bank of Minnesota v. C.I.R., supra, (CA8 1993)). >> >> QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: >>Under Issue (C) of Debtor’s brief: >>1. Since section 83 is applicable to amounts now sought to be included in >>gross income, it is clear that either the Respondent or the Debtor is in >>violation of it but, silence abounds. Does it apply and, if so, how does >>it operate and how is the Debtor to comply with it in the future so as to >>avoid annual confrontations with the Respondent? >> >>2. Where, under the Law [26 USC 1012], does it provide that only property >>within which one has a basis is to be recognized as a cost or, that >>intangible personal property is excluded from that which is cost? >> >>3. If such exclusions alluded to in #2 above do not exist, can "income >>tax" approach such property's FMV, as contemplated under the Sixteenth >>Amendment (See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920))? >> >>4. Is the FMV of Labor (contract value) appropriately termed "gain >>derived from Labor" as stated in Eisner, supra? >> >>5. For the sake of argument, even if Labor was excluded from cost, if >>section 83 applies to Debtor's compensation and, if Labor is property, >>doesn't 26 CFR 1.83-3(g) place its FMV in the category of cost ("amount >>paid")? Whose Labor does it do it for? >> >>6. Is the FMV of Labor excluded from gross income by Law (See 26 USC 83, >>212, 1001, 1012; 26 CFR 1.83-3(g), 1.1012-1(a), 1.1001-1(a))? >> >> >>Under Issue (D) of Debtor’s brief: >> >>7. Do the provisions cited in #6 above also apply in other chapters >>imposing "income taxes"? If so, how have they operated and how is the >>Debtor to apply and comply with them? >> >>8. With accepted applicability of section 83, 1001, 1011, and 1012 to all >>compensation, and the Respondent's plethora of case law saying that all >>compensation is section 61(a) gross income, would it not follow that >>deduction statutes 63(c) and 151(d) would also apply to section 3121(a) >>wages, permitting the single employee a deduction of several thousands of >>dollars from the amount to be taxed under chapter 21 FICA? >> >>9. If those several chapter 1 provisions apply to FICA wages (section >>61(a), 83, 1012, 1011, 1001), why do sections 63(c) and 151(d) not also >>apply? Debtor cannot be an employer without this information. >> >> 2.2 Debtor’s arguments, explanation, and questions presented for >>review should suffice to answer the Court’s order that Debtor outline: >>"In view of objection R (Paragraph 1.3 of the objection), Debtor shall >>file a memorandum of authority on the question of whether an individual >>can have regular income for the purposes of Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy >>Code (11 U.S.C.), but not for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code >>(26 U.S.C.)..." >> 2.3 Debtor has placed these same questions in most cases for >>which he has written pleadings in his quest for a judicial interpretation >>of American Law. Debtor would like to thank the Court for this >>opportunity to further articulate his STATUTORY claims that the law >>protects him in his rights to freely labor and to freely contract. >> >>Dated:______________ Presented by: >> >>Judge's comment: "I don't think that you have answered the question." >> >> > > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew Mitchell : Counselor at Law, federal witness B.A., Political Science, UCLA; M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine tel: (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night email: [address in tool bar] : using Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on 586 CPU website: http://www.supremelaw.com : visit the Supreme Law Library now ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice. We shall not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal. ======================================================================== [This text formatted on-screen in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
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