Time: Fri Jul 04 04:23:26 1997
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Date: Fri, 04 Jul 1997 04:20:52 -0700
To: (Recipient list suppressed)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: SAP National Conference Call (fwd)
References: <>

Dear SAP et al.,

Please explain Treasury Decision 2313, then.
Mr. Brushaber was the stockholder.  The 
Brushaber decision says so, in the very 
first sentence.  So, please don't try to
tell us he was a fiduciary for some other
stockholder.  That assertion assumes facts
not in evidence.  

Have you read the decision?

The Union Pacific Railroad Co. was the domestic
corporation to which the Treasury Decision
refers.  UPRR was chartered by Congress;
"The Federal Zone" cites the Act of Congress
which did so.  So, the ONLY other party to
which the T.D. refers is the stockholder --
Frank Brushaber -- non-resident alien!!

Brushaber was a Citizen of New York state,
and a resident of Brooklyn, in the City of
New York.  He stated his status in his 
original pleadings.  To say anything else
about his status, again, assumes facts which
were not in evidence.  

Have you read his original pleading in which 
he proclaims his status, clearly?

SAP does not understand the implications
of municipal law.  The IRC is a municipal code.

It's either a case of "not invented here,"
or you are deliberately misleading people,
for reasons I do not entirely understand,
and certainly cannot approve, in all honesty.

There are two classes of citizenship in
America.  This you refuse to admit.
Your literature makes the same serious error,
over and over.

This approach was successful in the John Knox
case in San Antonio;  it was the late John Knox 
who first introduced me to this amazing reality.
I was the ONLY one who would listen to him
at the Tax and Monetary Conference in Denver,
in the fall of 1991.  I am so very glad I did.

If SAP persists in telling people false
statements about the Brushaber decision
and T.D. 2313, then I will have to go 
very public in my criticisms of your 
errors, and your organization.  What you
see here is only the beginning.

If you have licensed attorneys on your staff,
they are aliens, pursuant to the original
13th amendment.  They owe their allegiance
ultimately to a foreign power.  They have
forfeited their citizenship (either class),
and they are barred from serving in any 
public office, including officer of the court.

Please do not try fear tactics with me.  

They don't work!

I am waiting (still waiting) for answers
from your organization.

Please stop lying at me.  

That doesn't work either.

/s/ Paul Mitchell

At 11:14 PM 7/3/97 -0400, you wrote:
>SAP often alerts people to such erroneous arguments.  SAP pays them the
>attention they deserve in that they highlight the fact that they are
>erroneous and show how such arguments can cause you to be laughed at in
>court on your way your jail cell.
>> The following essay never received any response
>> whatsoever from the people who received it at
>> the Save-A-Patriot Fellowship.
>> This is Appendix W from "The Federal Zone,"
>> for your information.
>> I don't mean to tarnish SAP's otherwise excellent
>> reputation.  However, I DO think that the issues of
>> law, as discussed in this Appendix, at least deserve
>> an open and healthy debate, in honor of the
>> First Amendment and the Fourth of July, if nothing else.
>> Sincerely,
>> /s/ Paul Mitchell
>> http://www.supremelaw.com
>> [This text is formatted in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
>> TO:       Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
>>           John William Kurowski
>> FROM:     Paul Andrew Mitchell, Author
>>           "The Federal Zone"
>> DATE:     March 24, 1992
>> SUBJECT:  "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
>>           your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
>>           Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
>>      I  was   very  gratified   to  see   such  a   thorough  and
>> authoritative treatment  of "direct  taxation" in the July/August
>> 1991 issue  of the  Reasonable Action  newsletter.   My  research
>> continues to convince me of the extreme constitutional importance
>> of the  apportionment rule  for direct  taxes levied  by Congress
>> within the  50 States  of the  Union.   I am writing this memo to
>> share with  you some  of my thoughts on the subject, and to offer
>> my challenge  to a  few points  which are  not necessarily beyond
>> dispute.   Please understand  that I am in general agreement with
>> most, but  not all  of your  essay.   Permit me  to play "devil's
>> advocate" as  I  focus  on  some  issues  which  deserve  greater
>> elaboration and substantiation.
>>      The so-called 16th Amendment remains highly relevant to this
>> subject, for  a number of important reasons.  First of all, since
>> 1913, several  federal  courts  have  attempted  to  isolate  the
>> precise effects  of a ratified 16th Amendment.  Unfortunately for
>> us, when  all of  these cases  are  assembled  side-by-side,  the
>> rulings are not consistent.  We are forced to admit the existence
>> of separate groups of court decisions that flatly contradict each
>> other.   One group  puts income taxes into the class of indirect,
>> excise taxes.   Another group puts income taxes into the class of
>> direct taxes.   One  group argues  that a ratified 16th Amendment
>> did not  change or  repeal any  other clause of the Constitution.
>> Another group  argues that  a ratified  16th  Amendment  relieved
>> income taxes from the apportionment rule.  Even experts disagree.
>> To illustrate  the range  of  disagreement  on  such  fundamental
>> constitutional issues,  consider the  conclusion of legal scholar
>> Vern Holland:
>>      ...  [T]he   Sixteenth   Amendment   did   not   amend   the
>>      Constitution.   The United States Supreme Court by unanimous
>>      decisions determined  that the  amendment did  not grant any
>>      new powers  of taxation;    that  a  direct  tax  cannot  be
>>      relieved from  the constitutional  mandate of apportionment;
>>      and the  only effect  of the  amendment was  to overturn the
>>      theory advanced in the Pollock case which held that a tax on
>>      income, was  in legal  effect, a  tax on  the sources of the
>>      income.
>>                                   [The Law That Always, page 220]
>> Now consider  the opposing  view of  another  competent  scholar.
>> After much  research and  much litigation,  author  and  attorney
>> Jeffrey A. Dickstein offers the following concise clarification:
>>      A tax  imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
>>      a direct  tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
>>      A tax  imposed on  the "income"  derived  from  those  gross
>>      receipts is  also a  direct tax on property, but as a result
>>      of the  Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
>>      legislation calling  for the  apportionment of a tax on that
>>      income.
>>                [Judicial Income and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]
>> The following  Appellate ruling  is unique among all the relevant
>> federal cases for its clarity and conciseness on this question:
>>      The  constitutional  limitation  upon  direct  taxation  was
>>      modified by  the Sixteenth  Amendment insofar as taxation of
>>      income was  concerned, but  the amendment  was restricted to
>>      income,  leaving   in  effect  the  limitation  upon  direct
>>      taxation of principal.
>>                [Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)]
>>                                                  [emphasis added]
>> Granted, this  is not  a decision  by the  Supreme Court, but the
>> decision is  useful because  it is so clear and concise, and also
>> because it  is very representative of that group of rulings which
>> found that  a ratified  16th Amendment relieved income taxes from
>> the apportionment  rule.   By inference,  if  income  taxes  were
>> controlled by the apportionment rule prior to the 16th Amendment,
>> then they  must be  direct  taxes  (according  to  one  group  of
>> rulings).
>>      Recall now  that 17,000  State-certified documents have been
>> assembled to  prove that  the 16th  Amendment was never ratified.
>> Congress has already been served with several official complaints
>> documenting the  evidence against the 16th Amendment, pursuant to
>> the  First   Amendment  guarantee   for  redress  of  grievances.
>> Congress has  now fallen silent.  I am the author of one of these
>> complaints (see  The Federal  Zone, Appendix  J).  Relying on one
>> group of rulings, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Shaffer decisions
>> leave absolutely  no doubt  about the  consequences of the failed
>> ratification:   the necessity  still exists  for an apportionment
>> among the  50 States  of all  direct taxes,  and income taxes are
>> direct taxes.
>>      Federal courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a
>> ratified 16th  Amendment.   Now that  the  evidence  against  its
>> ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal
>> courts are  unwilling to  identify  the  effects  of  the  failed
>> ratification.   These courts  have opted to call it a "political"
>> question, even  though it  wasn't a  "political" question  in the
>> years immediately  after Philander  C. Knox declared it ratified.
>> I personally  find it hard to believe that the federal courts are
>> incapable of  exercising the  logic required to isolate the legal
>> effects of  the failed ratification.  Quite simply, if a ratified
>> 16th Amendment  had effect  X, then  a failed ratification proves
>> that  X   did  not  happen.    What  is  X?    Their  "political"
>> unwillingness to  exercise basic  logic means  that  the  federal
>> courts have  abdicated their main responsibility -- to uphold the
>> constitution   -- and  that we  must now  do it for them instead.
>> That is  just one  of the  many reasons why I wrote and published
>> The Federal  Zone in the first place.  I believe I have succeeded
>> in accurately  situating the issue of the 16th Amendment inside a
>> much broader context.  What is that much broader context?
>>      Let me  begin my  answer to  that question  by first quoting
>> from your essay, in the section entitled "Documenting the Truth":
>>      The Constitution  still grants  to the Congress the power of
>>      laying an  "apportioned" direct  tax but notwithstanding the
>>      advent of  the 16th  Amendment all  "direct" taxes  must  be
>>      apportioned.  There is no exception to this rule.
>>                                                  [emphasis added]
>>      In a  strictly normative sense, I would certainly agree that
>> this is  the way it should be.  But, in a practical and empirical
>> sense, is  this really  the way  it is?  I say no.  In exercising
>> its exclusive  authority over  the federal  zone, Congress is not
>> subject to  the same constitutional limitations that exist inside
>> the 50  States.   For this  reason, the areas that are inside and
>> outside the  federal zone  are heterogeneous with respect to each
>> other.   This difference  results in  a principle  of territorial
>> heterogeneity:  the areas within (or inside) the federal zone are
>> subject to  one set of rules;  the areas without (or outside) the
>> federal zone  are subject  to a  different set  of  rules.    The
>> Constitution rules  outside the  zone and  inside the  50 States.
>> The Congress  rules inside  the zone  and outside  the 50 States.
>> The 50  States are,  therefore, in one general class, because all
>> constitutional restraints  upon Congress  are in force throughout
>> the 50  States, without  prejudice to  any one  State.  The areas
>> within the federal zone are in a different general class, because
>> these same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress
>> inside that zone (see The Federal Zone, chapters 12 and 13).
>>      I  would   never  ask   you  to  accept  this  principle  of
>> territorial heterogeneity  simply on  faith.  There is solid case
>> law to  substantiate it.   You  may recall, it is the Hooven case
>> which officially defined the three separate and distinct meanings
>> of the  term "United  States".   This same definition can also be
>> found in  Black's Law  Dictionary, Sixth  Edition.   The  Supreme
>> Court ruled  that this  case would  be the  last  time  it  would
>> address  official   definitions  of  the  term  "United  States".
>> Therefore, this  ruling must  be judicially noticed by the entire
>> American legal  (and paralegal)  community.   In my  opinion, the
>> most significant  holding in  Hooven has  to do  with territorial
>> heterogeneity, as follows:
>>      ... [T]he  United States** may acquire territory by conquest
>>      or by  treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the
>>      power of  Congress conferred  by Section  3 of Article IV of
>>      the Constitution ....
>>      In exercising  this power,  Congress is  not subject  to the
>>      same constitutional  limitations, as  when it is legislating
>>      for the  United States***. ... And in general the guaranties
>>      [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon
>>      the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted
>>      for or  over our insular possessions, extend to them only as
>>      Congress, in  the exercise  of its  legislative  power  over
>>      territory belonging  to the  United States**, has made those
>>      guarantees applicable.
>>              [Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
>>                                                  [emphasis added]
>> I have  taken the liberty of adding asterisks ("**","***") to the
>> above, in  order to  identify which meaning of "United States" is
>> being used in each occurrence of the term.  Computer users prefer
>> the term "stars" over "asterisks" because it has fewer syllables.
>>      Return now  to your statement that "there is no exception to
>> this rule"  that all direct taxes must be apportioned.  Using the
>> Hooven case  and others  as our guide, it is more accurate to say
>> that all  direct taxes  must be  apportioned  whenever  they  are
>> levied inside  the 50  States of  the Union.   On the other hand,
>> direct taxes  need NOT  be apportioned  whenever they  are levied
>> outside the  50 States of the Union, and inside the areas of land
>> over which  Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.  The
>> authorities  for  this  exclusive  legislative  jurisdiction  are
>> 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution.  You may disagree with
>> this interpretation  of the  term "exclusive",  and that  is your
>> right, but  in doing  so you  are disagreeing  with  the  Supreme
>> Court.   Evidently, this was not the first, nor the last time the
>> high Court has differed with the Framers of the Constitution.
>>      As it  turns out,  the pivotal  case law  on  this  question
>> predates Hooven  by 44  years, and  predates the  so-called  16th
>> Amendment by  12 years.   In  Downes v.  Bidwell,  182  U.S.  244
>> (1901), the  issue was a discriminatory tariff which Congress had
>> levied on  goods imported from Puerto Rico (or "Porto Rico" as it
>> was spelled  then).   Congress had  recently  obtained  exclusive
>> legislative jurisdiction  over this  territory by  virtue of  the
>> treaty of  peace with  Spain.   The import duty was obviously not
>> uniform, as  required by 1:8:1 in the U.S. Constitution, since it
>> was levied specifically against goods originating in Puerto Rico.
>> In a  5-to-4 decision,  the Supreme Court upheld the import duty,
>> even though  it was  not  uniform,  on  the  principle  that  the
>> uniformity rule  applied only  to the  48 States  and not  to the
>> areas of  land, i.e., enclaves, territories and possessions, over
>> which Congress has exclusive legislative authority.
>>      The  controversy  that  surrounded  Downes  v.  Bidwell  was
>> intense, as  evidenced  by  the  flurry  of  articles  that  were
>> published in  the Harvard  Law Review  on  the  subject  of  "The
>> Insular Cases"  as they  were called.   Perhaps  the  most  lucid
>> criticism of the Downes majority can be found in Justice Harlan's
>> dissent:
>>      The idea prevails with some  --  indeed, it found expression
>>      in arguments  at the  bar   --  that we have in this country
>>      substantially or practically two national governments;  one,
>>      to be  maintained  under  the  Constitution,  with  all  its
>>      restrictions;   the  other  to  be  maintained  by  Congress
>>      outside and  independently of that instrument, by exercising
>>      such powers  as other nations of the earth are accustomed to
>>      exercise.
>>                          [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>>                                                  [emphasis added]
>> To appreciate  how alarmed  Justice Harlan had become as a result
>> of this new "theory", consider the following from his dissent:
>>      I take  leave to  say that  if the principles thus announced
>>      should ever  receive the  sanction of  a  majority  of  this
>>      court, a  radical and  mischievous change  in our  system of
>>      government will be the result.  We will, in that event, pass
>>      from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected
>>      by  a  written  constitution  into  an  era  of  legislative
>>      absolutism. ...
>>      It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of
>>      a government  outside of  the supreme  law of the land finds
>>      lodgment in  our constitutional  jurisprudence.   No  higher
>>      duty rests  upon this court than to exert its full authority
>>      to  prevent   all  violation   of  the   principles  of  the
>>      Constitution.
>>                          [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>>                                                  [emphasis added]
>> This theory has been documented by patriot John Knox as follows:
>>      This  theory   of  a   government  operating   outside   the
>>      Constitution over  its own  territory with  citizens of  the
>>      United States  belonging thereto under Article 4, Section 3,
>>      Clause 2  of the  Constitution was further confirmed in 1922
>>      by the  Supreme Court  in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 300
>>      (EXHIBIT #4) where that Court affirmed that the Constitution
>>      does not  apply outside  the limits  of the 50 States of the
>>      Union at  page 305 quoting Downes, supra and De Lima, supra.
>>      That under  Article IV,  section 3  the "United  States" was
>>      given  exclusive   power  over  the  territories  and  their
>>      citizens of the "United States" residing therein.
>> This quote  is from  an unpublished brief entitled "Memorandum in
>> Support of  Request for the District Court to Consider the T.R.O.
>> and Injunction  by the  Magistrate" by  John Knox,  Knox v. U.S.,
>> United States  District Court  for the Western District of Texas,
>> San Antonio, Texas, Case #SA-89-CA-1308 (see Appendix A supra).
>>      People will  not fully  appreciate a  central thesis  of The
>> Federal Zone  if they  believe that  I  agree  with  the  minimal
>> majority by  which Downes  was decided.   I  don't agree with the
>> majority;  I agree with Harlan.  I have simply tried to describe,
>> in lucid  language, how  Congress is now able to pass legislation
>> which is  not restrained  by the U.S. Constitution as we know it.
>> This type  of legislation  is  also  known  as  "municipal"  law,
>> because Congress  is the  municipal authority  inside the federal
>> zone.   When I  visited the District of Columbia during my senior
>> year at  UCLA as  a summer intern in political science, I asked a
>> Capitol guard  where I could find city hall.  We were standing on
>> the Capitol  lawn when  he pointed  to the  Capitol Building  and
>> said, "THAT is City Hall!"
>>      The Downes  decision  sent  many  shock  waves  through  the
>> American legal  community, as  evidenced by the deep concern that
>> is expressed  by author  Littlefield in  "The Insular  Cases", 15
>> Harvard Law  Review 169,  281.   He points out how the dissenting
>> minority were  of a  single mind,  while the  assenting  majority
>> exploited a multiplicity of conflicting and mutually incompatible
>> themes.  Just one vote turned the tide.  Littlefield's words jump
>> off the page like grease popping off a sizzling griddle.
>>      Accordingly, I now believe that we must go back further than
>> 1913  to   isolate  the  major  turn  in  the  tide  of  American
>> constitutional integrity  and continuity.   Medina  in The Silver
>> Bulletin traces  the fork  to the  tragic American  Civil War  --
>> the counter  revolution   --   when Lincoln  was  murdered  by  a
>> Rothschild  agent,   clearing  the  stage  for  resurrecting  the
>> federalists' heartthrob  --  a central bank.  For example, in the
>> context   of   everything   we   now   know   about   territorial
>> heterogeneity, to  the extent  that it  was a "municipal" statute
>> for the  federal zone, the Federal Reserve Act was constitutional
>> under the rubric of the Downes doctrine.
>>      The consequences  of this  doctrine have  been profound  and
>> far-reaching, just  as Harlan predicted.  One of Lyndon Johnson's
>> first  official   acts  was  to  rescind  JFK's  executive  order
>> authorizing the  circulation of  $4.5  billion  in  interest-free
>> "United  States   Notes"  instead  of  interest-bearing  "Federal
>> Reserve Notes".   It  is a  shame that Oliver Stone did not cover
>> this motive  in his  movie JFK.  All we need to do is connect the
>> dots, and the picture will emerge, clear as day.
>>      Specifically, Title  26 is a municipal statute and, as such,
>> it is  not subject  to the  apportionment rule.   The territorial
>> scope of  Title 26  is the  federal zone;  the political scope of
>> Title 26  is the  set of "persons" who are either citizens and/or
>> residents of that zone: "U.S.** citizens" and "U.S.** residents".
>> The term  "U.S.**" in  this context  refers to  the second of the
>> three Hooven  definitions, namely,  the territory  over which the
>> sovereignty  of   Congress  extends,   i.e.,  the  federal  zone.
>> Incidentally, the  flat tax  provisions in Title 26 do conform to
>> the uniformity rule because the tax rate is uniform across the 50
>> States (see A Ticket To Liberty, by Lori Jacques).
>>      Since involuntary  servitude is  now forbidden everywhere in
>> this land, it is possible under law to acquire citizenship in the
>> federal zone at will via naturalization, even if one is a natural
>> born Sovereign  State Citizen  by birth.   It is also possible to
>> abandon  citizenship   in  the   federal  zone   at   will,   via
>> expatriation.  In this context, it is revealing that the Internal
>> Revenue Code  has provisions  for dealing  with "U.S.** citizens"
>> who expatriate  to avoid  the tax.  Similarly, Americans are free
>> to reside  wherever they  want, under  the law.  If you choose to
>> reside in the federal zone, you are liable for the income tax, by
>> definition (see  26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A) and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b)).
>> Finally, if  you are  a "nonresident  alien" with  respect to the
>> "United States**"  as those  terms are defined in Title 26 and in
>> Title 42,  you are  only liable  for taxes  on  income  which  is
>> effectively connected  with a  U.S.** trade  or business,  and on
>> income which  derives from  U.S.** sources.  All other income for
>> nonresident aliens  is excluded  from the  computation of  "gross
>> income" as defined (see 26 U.S.C. 872(a)).
>>      I hope  this discussion  has provided you with some valuable
>> feedback  concerning   the  16th  Amendment,  direct  taxes,  the
>> apportionment rule,  Title 26 and The Federal Zone.  You have, no
>> doubt, heard  several references  to  the  "secret  jurisdiction"
>> under which  the IRS has been operating.  I now believe that this
>> jurisdiction is  no longer  totally a  secret;   it  issues  from
>> 1:8:17 and  4:3:2 in the Constitution.  Contrary to the statement
>> quoted above  from  your  essay,  there  are  exceptions  to  the
>> apportionment rule  for direct taxes, and there are exceptions to
>> the uniformity rule for indirect taxes.  Inside the federal zone,
>> Congress is  free to  do pretty  much whatever  it wants, per the
>> Downes doctrine.   Inside  the federal  zone, it is a legislative
>> democracy, with  majority rule.  If you want to change the rules,
>> then change the majority.  Our best hope for changing those rules
>> rests, therefore,  in changing  the membership  in the  House and
>> Senate.   As a Sovereign State Citizen, however, I am not subject
>> to those  rules,  primarily  and  most  importantly  because  the
>> Constitution created  the legislature  and We  Sovereigns created
>> the Constitution.   A  Sovereign is  never  subject  to  his  own
>> creation, unless  he volunteers  himself into  that  status,  for
>> whatever reason  (e.g., the  security of  socialism a/k/a  Social
>> Security).
>>      For your edification, the following is a list of Harvard Law
>> Review articles which discuss the insular cases in some detail:
>>      Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories"
>>      12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371
>>      Thayer, "Our New Possessions"
>>      12 Harvard Law Review, 464
>>      Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court"
>>      15 Harvard Law Review 164
>>      Littlefield, "The Insular Cases"
>>      15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281
>>                              #  #  #
>> ========================================================================
>> Paul Andrew Mitchell                 : Counselor at Law, federal witness
>> B.A., Political Science, UCLA;  M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine
>> tel:     (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night
>> email:   [address in tool bar]       : using Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on 586 CPU
>> website: http://www.supremelaw.com   : visit the Supreme Law Library now
>> ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
>>              Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
>>              Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this
>> As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice.  We shall
>> not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal.
>> ========================================================================
>> [This text formatted on-screen in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
>> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Paul Andrew Mitchell                 : Counselor at Law, federal witness
B.A., Political Science, UCLA;  M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine

tel:     (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night
email:   [address in tool bar]       : using Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on 586 CPU
website: http://www.supremelaw.com   : visit the Supreme Law Library now
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
             Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this

As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice.  We shall
not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal.
[This text formatted on-screen in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]


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