Time: Sat Jul 12 05:46:22 1997
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Date: Sat, 12 Jul 1997 05:13:10 -0700
To: (Recipient list suppressed)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: U.S. Air Force Confirms Multiple Blasts (OKC) (fwd)

>by William F. Jasper, President, John Birch Society
>A new study analyzing explosive tests conducted by the U.S. Air Force against
>a reinforced concrete structure may provide an important key to understanding
>the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City,
>which took 168 lives. The report, based on testing data and photographs
>supplied by the Armament Directorate, Wright Laboratory at Eglin Air Force
>Base in Florida, lends powerful support to the arguments of those experts who
>have challenged the
>official government position that a single, large ammonium nitrate/fuel oil
>(ANFO) truck bomb parked outside the Murrah Building was solely responsible
>for the massive death and destruction.
>Led by Brigadier General Benton K. Partin (USAF, ret.), former director of
>the Air Force Armament Technology Laboratory and one of the world's premier
>explosives and ordnance authorities, critics have argued compellingly that
>the blast wave from the ANFO truck bomb was totally inadequate to cause the
>collapse of the massive,
>steel-reinforced concrete columns of the federal building in Oklahoma City.
>This fact, together with much other forensic evidence from the crime scene,
>they contend, points inescapably to the conclusion that additional demolition
>charges had to have been placed on columns inside the building. Which means
>that this terror bombing was a much more sophisticated operation than the
>federal authorities admit, requiring more hands, brains, and brawn than any
>lone bomber could supply. If that is true, the other bombers are being let
>off the hook by the government's insistence that Timothy McVeigh was the sole
>efficient cause and the truck bomb was the instrumental cause of "the
>deadliest terrorist attack on American soil."
>The new Eglin blast study convincingly proves the fundamental points set
>forth by General Partin: That air blast is an inefficient mechanism against
>hardened, reinforced concrete structures, and that "the pattern of damage [to
>the Murrah Building] would have been technically impossible without
>supplementing demolition charges." Entitled Case Study Relating Blast Effects
>to the Events of April 19, 1995 Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma
>City, Oklahoma, (hereafter referred to as the Eglin Blast Effects Study, or
>EBES), the 56-page report includes photographs and data from the Eglin blast
>tests, as well as extensive technical analysis of those tests, conducted by
>construction and demolition expert John Culbertson. The study relates the
>Eglin parametric data to the Murrah Building and presents a serious challenge
>to the federal prosecutors'  official bombing scenario. The report also
>ontains letters from engineers and technical experts who have reviewed the
>study for The New American.
>The blast effects tests conducted by the Wright Laboratory at Eglin Air Force
>Base involved a three-story reinforced concrete structure 80 feet in length,
>40 feet in width, and a total height of 30 feet. The Eglin Test Structure
>(ETS), according to the EBES, "while not as large as the Alfred P. Murrah
>Building in Oklahoma City, has many
>similarities and therefore provides an excellent source for data." The study
>     The ETS is similar to Murrah in its basic layout with three rows of
>     in the long axis and a series of narrow bays in the short axis. The ETS
>     constructed of six-inch-thick concrete panels similar to the
>     floor panels of Murrah. In addition, a series of 14-inch square columns 
>     supported the panels in the corners of each room and at the edge of the 
>     floor panels. This configuration bears a similarity to the Murrah
>     system of columns, T-beams and floor panels.
>While noting the similarities in structural layout of the ETS and Murrah, the
>EBES also makes note of the major differences in construction methods and
>overall structural integrity between the two buildings, stating that the ETS
>"must be considered an inferior structure in terms of strength and blast
>resistance," and that
>the ETS "is actually more indicative of some structures to be found in third
>world countries and is not representative of concrete structures to be found
>in the United States." The Murrah Building's floor panels were reinforced
>"with approximately five times the amount of steel" used in the Eglin
>structure's panels. An even greater contrast is found in the columns and
>beams, where "the steel fill in the Murrah Building was much higher than the
>ETS, in most cases by a factor of 10 or more." The study also observes that
>"while the ETS did not use stirrups in its columns and beams, the Murrah
>Federal Building did, thereby increasing strength to a level far above the
>Additionally, the ETS lacked a roof panel, which "reduces the overall
>rigidity of the structure, and in particular the third story wall panels,
>making the third story more susceptible to damage from an explosive device."
>Finally, since concrete develops strength with time, the relatively fresh
>concrete of the ETS must be considered
>weaker than the mature strength of the Murrah Building's concrete.
>All of the foregoing is of particular significance since, as the Air force
>tests demonstrated, air blast alone was singularly ineffective in causing
>major damage to the ETS. And if air blast could not effect catastrophic
>failure to the decidedly inferior Eglin structure, it becomes all the more
>difficult to believe that it was responsible for
>the destruction of the much stronger Murrah Building.
>Three different explosives tests were conducted on the Eglin Test Structure.
>The first test used 704 pounds of Tritonal, which is equivalent to 830 pounds
>of TNT, or roughly 2,200 pounds of a properly prepared ammonium nitrate/fuel
>oil (ANFO) mixture. The Tritonal was contained in a light aluminum case and
>was placed outside the structure at ground level 25 feet from the vertical
>surface of the 40-foot side wall. This test most closely parallels the truck
>bomb at the Murrah Building and provides important parametric data for
>assessing blast-wave damage at the Oklahoma City site. Besides being external
>to the ETS, the aluminum casing provided a container similar to the light
>shell of the Ryder truck. Like the truck bomb, the Tritonal test attempted to
>effect damage to the concrete structure with an air-couple blast wave without
>the help of heavy shrapnel.
>By contrast, the second and third tests used steel-cased warheads detonated
>inside the ETS. The second test used a standard Mk-82 warhead (equivalent to
>180 pounds of TNT) placed within the first floor corner room approximately
>four feet from the exterior wall. The third test involved a 250-pound
>penetrating warhead (having an
>equivalent explosive weight of 35 pounds TNT) which was placed in the corner
>of a second floor room approximately two and a half feet from the adjoining
>walls. As the photographs from Wright Laboratory graphically show, these two
>explosive devices, although much smaller than the Tritonal device, effected
>far greater damage to the ETS. This disproportionate destruction was largely
>a function of three critical factors: distance, mechanical coupling of the
>blast wave, mechanical coupling via shrapnel, and contained pressure (due to
>being confined within the structure).
>As General Partin has taken great pains to emphasize, the inefficiency of a
>blast wave through air is dramatic,  particularly outdoors, where the blast
>energy is dissipated in all directions  with its pressure and destructive
>force falling off more rapidly than an inverse function of the distance cubed
>(distance expressed in radius
>units). This means that the blast wave from an explosive device which yields
>a maximum blast pressure of one-and-a-half million pounds per square inch at
>the center of the device will have dropped off to under 200 pounds per square
>inch by the time it has traveled 20 radii. This makes air blast alone very
>ineffective against hardened concrete structures, such as heavy,
>steel-reinforced columns.
>The photograph from Wright Laboratory of the first test involving the
>external Tritonal explosion confirms this very important principle of blast
>effects. The six-inch-thick concrete wall panels on the first floor were
>demolished by the air blast, though the reinforcing steel bars were for the
>most part left in place. The 14-inch columns remained unaffected either by
>the blast pressure wave or the stresses produced by the pull of the
>reinforcing steel in the wall panels as they broke up. Damage to the second
>floor wall panels is considerably less than that to the first floor walls,
>and very little damage can be seen to the third floor wall panels, even
>though there is no ceiling to provide stability.
>A detailed pressure map matrix for the entire vertical face of the ETS was
>prepared for the EBES, providing a one-foot grid which gives the maximum
>potential blast pressures for any given point on the face. According to the
>pressure map, the vertical face in the first test experienced a range of
>maximum blast pressure from 34 psi (pounds per square inch) to 174 psi (page
>32). Maximum blast pressure on the
>six-inch-thick wall panels for the first floor ranged from 74 psi to 174 psi.
>Wall panels on the second floor had a maximum blast pressure ranging from 53
>psi to 141 psi. The third-floor panels had blast pressures of 34 psi to 84
>psi, yet experienced no damage even though a significant portion of the
>panels was subjected to pressures exceeding the 70 psi yield factor for the
>six-inch-thick walls.
>Computing the blast pressure for the Ryder truck's estimated 4,800-pound ANFO
>bomb, the EBES determines that the radius from the center of the device that
>would manifest a pressure of 70 psi or more would be 42.37 feet.   It can
>therefore be expected, explains the study, that within a radius of 42.37 feet
>from the center of the explosive, any six-inch reinforced concrete panel
>positioned so as to have a major face perpendicular or nearly perpendicular
>to the travel path of the blast pressure wave from the explosion would be
>damaged.       The study notes that the floor
>panels in the Murrah Building were of the same thickness as the ETS panels
>and, starting with the third floor, had a similar positional relationship to
>the device as the panels in the Eglin test. Accordingly, the EBES found:  A
>limited area of the third and fourth floors of the Murrah Federal Building
>immediately adjacent to the position of the Ryder truck would be affected. On
>the third floor a roughly circular shape extending into the building and
>approximately 40 feet down the north face of the building from the center
>point of the explosive, which was located some 14.5 feet north of the north
>face of the building. This circular area contained approximately 1,250 square
>feet of six-inch panel.... The fourth floor panel that experienced 70 psi and
>above was limited to a roughly circular-shaped pattern of approximately 400
>square feet.
>The conclusions of the Eglin Blast Effects Study are compelling and carry
>stunning implications. With the ETS having significantly less integral
>strength than the Murrah Building, the EBES conclusions have a built-in
>margin of error that, if anything, overstate the extent of damage to be
>expected at the Murrah Building. Moreover, the
>computations for the Ryder truck bomb also are overly generous.  Because ANFO
>is also a low-energy explosive (approximately 30% that of TNT) and due to the
>inherent inefficiency of eight barrels forming the explosive assembly
>[according to the government's estimates], it is doubtful that the device
>produced blast pressures close to the calculated maximum potential blast
>pressure,  the study asserts.    This being the case, it is doubtful that the
>radius of damage even approached the 42.37 foot range as calculated herein.
>   Finally, the EBES concludes:
>     Due to these conditions, it is impossible to ascribe the damage that 
>     occurred on April 19, 1995 to a single truck bomb containing 4,800 lbs. 
>     of ANFO. In fact, the maximum predicted damage to the floor panels of 
>     the Murrah Federal Building is equal to approximately 1% of the total 
>     floor area of the building.   Furthermore, due to the lack of
>     damage pattern at the Murrah Building, it would be inconsistent with the
>     results of the ETS test [number] one to state that all of the damage to 
>     the Murrah Building is the result of the truck bomb.
>     The damage to the Murrah Federal Building is consistent with damage
>     resulting from mechanically coupled devices placed locally within the 
>     structure....
>     It must be concluded that the damage at the Murrah Federal Building is 
>     not the result of the truck bomb itself, but rather due to other factors
>     such as locally placed charges within the building itself.... The
>     used to cause the damage to the Murrah Building are therefore more 
>     involved and complex than simply parking a truck and leaving....
>Mike Smith, a civil engineer in Cartersville, Georgia commissioned to review 
>the Eglin Blast Effects Study, states:
>The results of the Blast Effect Test One on the Eglin Test Structure present
>strong evidence that a single Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil device of
>approximately 4800 lbs. placed inside a truck could not have caused the
>damage to the Murrah federal Building experienced on April 19, 1995. Even
>assuming that the building had structural deficiencies and that the ANFO
>device was constructed with racing fuel, the air-coupled blast produced from
>this 4800 lb. device would not have damaged the columns and beams of the
>Murrah Building enough to produce a catastrophic failure.
>Robert Frias, president of Frias Engineering of Arlington, Texas, after
>examining the EBES, concluded:   The Murrah Building would still be standing
>and the upper floors would be intact had the truck loaded with explosives
>been the only culprit.    Moreover, Frias, a practicing engineer for over 40
>years and a registered engineer in
>Texas, New Mexico, and Louisiana, stated:  Explosives had to have been placed
>near, or on, the structural columns inside the building to cause the collapse
>that occurred to the Murrah Building.
>Likewise, Alvin Norberg, a licensed professional engineer in Auburn,
>California with over 50 years of engineering experience on over 5,000
>construction projects, writes that evidence from the ETS data verifies that
>the severe structural damage to the Murrah Building was not caused by a truck
>bomb outside the building, and that  the collapse of the Murrah Federal
>Building was the result of mechanically coupled devices  (bombs) placed
>locally within the structure adjacent to the critical columns.
>Kenneth Gow of Whittier, California, with over one-half century of
>engineering experience in the aerospace industry, writes in his evaluation of
>the EBES:  The Eglin Test Structure report ... further reinforces the
>conclusion that a substantial portion of the Murrah Building damage was by
>internal explosions.
>                           =========================
>               The full EBES report is available for $25.00 postpaid from 
>               The New American, P.O. Box 8040, Appleton, WI 54913.
>            from <http://www.accessone.com/~rivero/POLITICS/OK/multibla.html
>                                            \\\\|////
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Paul Andrew Mitchell                 : Counselor at Law, federal witness
B.A., Political Science, UCLA;  M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine

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