Time: Thu Jul 17 18:20:13 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id SAA01849 for [address in tool bar]; Thu, 17 Jul 1997 18:16:03 -0700 (MST) by usr07.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id SAA00966; Thu, 17 Jul 1997 18:14:26 -0700 (MST) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 18:13:59 -0700 To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Appendix "G" (fwd) <snip> > >Hallejuluh! Here it is. > >Carol Moore in D.C.--Belly of the Bully Boys >cmoore@capaccess.org > >Report of >THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY > on the > BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS > Investigation >of >Vernon Wayne Howell > also known as > David Koresh > September 1993 > >Appendix G > >A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL FIREARMS >ENFORCEMENT > > Frederick S. Calhoun, Ph.D. >Historian >Federal Law Enforcement Training Center > > The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and >Firearms (ATF) is a relatively young law >enforcement organization, >having been created formally in 1972. Yet, >measured by the federal laws related to the >regulation and taxing of >alcohol, tobacco, and firearms--the laws ATF >now enforces--the history of the >bureau's duties and responsibilities >stretches across the full two centuries of >American history. As early as 1791, revenue >acts taxed both alcohol and >tobacco and created the offices of tax >inspector, collector, and supervisor. >During the next century, the offices >changed names as frequently as the tax >rates changed, but the federal interest in >raising revenues from alcohol >and tobacco remained strong. Indeed, the >formal organization of an independent >bureau within the Department >of Treasury specializing in alcohol, >tobacco, and firearms law enforcement >belatedly recognized the distinct need >for such an agency. > After the Civil War, revenue agents > battled moonshiners throughout the South >in some of the bloodiest >opposition ever to federal law enforcement. >Revenue agents and deputy U.S. marshals by >the score were killed as >they roamed the hills and hollows searching >out illicit stills. Prohibition changed the >government's focus from taxing >whiskey to banning it, yet the revenue >agent's job remained as dangerous. After >experimenting in social adjustment >a dozen years, Prohibition was rescinded. >Spawned by the 1933 repeal of Prohibition, >the Alcohol Tax Unit was >established as a tax-collecting branch >within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). > Continued concern over the violent, >organized mobs that plagued the major >cities compelled the federal >government to try to curb the gangsters' >ability to arm themselves. Rather than ban >outright the purchase of >machineguns and sawed-off shotguns--the >weapons of choice for the >mobsters--Congress in 1934 simply imposed >a tax those weapons. Paying the tax >required registering the weapon. The >registration requirement was intended >to discourage ownership of such weapons >without outlawing them. No self-respecting >gangster would want to >register, much less pay the tax, on his Tommygun. >Their evasion of the tax gave the >government another legal tool >to use in arresting the gangsters and >breaking up the mobs. > Because it was a tax rather than a >prohibition, it fell to Treasury to enforce >the law as part of Treasury's >role in collecting all funds due the >government. Within Treasury, the Alcohol >Tax Unit seemed the logical branch >to enforce the new law. Registering and >taxing stills required many of the same >procedures and investigatory >talents that would be needed to register >and tax weapons. In the end, the new >assignment proved comparatively >easy. The unit was not overwhelmed with >registrations nor by the 1940s were the >investigations into evasions of >the tax very time-consuming. As the >gangsters declined in number and power, so >did their use of machineguns and >sawed-off shotguns. Enforcing the alcohol >taxes again occupied most of the unit's >attention. > In 1951, the Alcohol Tax Unit began >enforcing federal taxes on tobacco, thus >prompting a name change >in 1952 to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax >Division. Once again, the logic seemed to >be that collecting the tax on >tobacco closely resembled the work >necessary to collect the tax on alcohol, >machineguns, and sawed-off shotguns. >The 1968 passage of the Omnibus Crime >Control and Safe Streets Act and the Gun >Control Act expanded the IRS >unit's jurisdiction to the criminal use of >explosives and bombs. The new laws also >defined specific federal offenses >involving firearms, including >transportation across state lines and use >in organized crimes. In recognition of this >new enforcement responsibility, the Alcohol >and Tobacco Tax Division changed its name >to the Alcohol, Tobacco, >and Firearms Division (ATFD). Two years >later, Congress passed the Explosives >Control Act defining certain >bombings and acts of arson as federal >crimes. It assigned jurisdiction for >enforcing this new law to ATFD. > With these expanded responsibilities, >the Treasury Department on July 1, 1972 >created the Bureau of >Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms under the >general oversight of the Assistant >Secretary of the Treasury for >Enforcement, Tariffs and Trade, and >Operations. For the past twenty-one years, >ATF has enforced the collection >of federal taxes on alcohol and tobacco and >the federal controls and regulations on >firearms, with particular >attention to their use by criminals. >Although on its face the bureau seems a >discordant collection of separate duties, >the techniques for enforcing the taxes and >ferreting out the illicit products, whether >cases of whiskey, cartons of >cigarettes, crates of automatic weapons, or >containers of bombs, are strikingly >similar. > Subsequent laws have expanded ATF's >jurisdiction. The 1976 Arms Export Control >Act focused the >bureau's attention on international gun >smuggling. The 1982 Anti-Arson Act gave ATF >authority to investigate the >destruction of property by fire as well as >by explosives. Increased taxes on >cigarettes and alcohol, and enhanced >regulatory measures such as the 1978 >Contraband Cigarette Act, have also >enhanced the bureau's responsibility >to ensure the government receives its >lawful taxes. > The bureau has been an effective force >in law enforcement. Supplies of illicit >alcohol and smuggled tobacco >have steadily decreased, and tax revenues >have risen. During 1991, for example, ATF >collected $7.7 billion in alcohol >taxes and $4.8 billion in tobacco taxes. > ATF agents have also focused on tracking >down armed career criminals and >criminal gang members. Investigations in >Florida resulted in the arrest of 45 >Warlock motorcycle gang members >in 1991. Members of the Gullymen Posse, a >gang of Jamaican drug dealers known for its >propensity to commit >murder, were arrested in New York by ATF >agents in January 1991. Similarly, an ATF >investigation into the >activities of the Born to Kill gang >culminated in the arrest of a dozen gang >members in August 1991. Sixteen >members of the San Diego chapter of the >Hells Angels were convicted in 1992. As a >result of these and similar >investigations, ATF has become the nation's >principal repository for gang-related >information and intelligence. The >bureau has also earned an excellent >reputation for working well with federal, >state, and local law enforcement >agencies. > ATF agents also specialize in >identifying anonymous bombers by their >"signature" habits in making bombs. >For example, in 1990, the assassin of >Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge >Robert Vance was ultimately >identified by ATF agents who recognized the >way the bomb was constructed. Similarly, in >the midst of the tragedy >in Waco, Texas, ATF agents investigating >the World Trade Center bombing helped to >identify the van that was >used to hold the bomb. This early >identification led FBI agents to the rental >car company and thereafter to arrests >of the terrorists before they could escape >the country. > The bureau has developed considerable >expertise in arson investigations. At the >request of the National >Fire Protection Agency, ATF began developing nationwide standards for >fire investigators. The State Department's >Diplomatic Security Service invited ATF to >develop a protocol >establishing an International Response Team >of investigators trained to search blast >scenes involving U.S. property >abroad. Despite a rather eclectic array of >duties, ATF has succeeded in developing >considerable expertise in each >area of its enforcement responsibilities. > The raid by ATF agents on the Branch >Davidian compound resulted from its >enforcement of >contemporary federal firearms laws. In a >larger sense, however, the raid fit within >an historic, well-established and >well-defended government interest in >prohibiting and breaking up all organized >groups that sought to arm or fortify >themselves. The 1934 law taxing weapons was >only the first time the federal government >addressed private >ownership of weapons; it was not the first >federal effort to control firearms. From >its earliest formation, the federal >government has actively suppressed any >effort by disgruntled or rebellious >citizens to coalesce into an armed group, >however small the group, petty its >complaint, or grandiose its ambition. The >collection of large arsenals by organized >groups lent itself, ultimately, to the >violent use of those weapons against the >government itself or portions of its >citizenry. Indeed, federal agents who tried >to disband the groups frequently became the >targets. > The discomfort over armed organizations >predated the Constitution. The outbreak of >what became known >as Shays' Rebellion in 1786 gave added >urgency to the establishment of a strong >national government. During the >rebellion, hundreds of angry Massachusetts >farmers, most veterans of the Revolution >and facing foreclosures on >their farms, banded together to keep the >courts from issuing any executions. Calling >themselves Regulators, the >farmers quickly organized into a small >army. Significantly, their first foray was >to capture the arsenal at Spring >field. Although the Regulators failed, the >specter survived. Five months, delegates >from each of the thirteen states >met in Philadelphia to design a new >experiment in government. > The lesson of Shays' Rebellion was not >forgotten, even after the new government >was formed. In 1792, >Congress passed a law empowering the >president to call out the state militias to >suppress insurrections if either >an associate justice of the Supreme Court >or a local district court judge certified >that opposition to the laws was >beyond the powers of the civil authority to >suppress. Ironically, the first occasion to >resort to that law grew out >of the violent, organized, and armed >resistance to the federal government's >whiskey tax. Thus, two of the duties >that ATF would later inherent--enforcing >alcohol taxes and controlling >firearms--combusted in 1794 into the >Whiskey Rebellion, the first violent >opposition to the new federal government. >(1) > Across the next century, succeeding >presidents had sporadic, though no less >fearsome, occasion to >dispatch the Army and the state militias to >suppress various outbreaks of armed >opposition to federal laws, taxes, >and interests. In 1799, Fries Rebellion >against a federal tax on houses forced >President John Adams to muster the >militia. Fugitive slave rescues during the >1850s prompted the government to call out >the military. Organized >resistance in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, >New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin raised a >troublesome specter. "The main >opposition," President Millard Fillmore >warned Congress in December 1851, "is aimed >against the Constitution >itself." At the end of the decade, John >Brown's ill-fated raid on > >----------------------------------- >(1) Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia, p. >287; Frederick S. Calhoun, The Lawmen. >United States Marshals >and Their Deputies, 1789-1989, (Washington, >D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press~ 1990), >p. 32. >Harper's Ferry, Virginia, sparked the >government to decisive action. Brown chose >Harper's Ferry because of the >federal arsenal there. His intent was to >distribute the weapons among Southern >slaves and lead them in revolt for >their freedom. Federal troops, however, >thwarted the plan.(2) > After the Civil War, the federal >government battled unrepentant Southerners >to protect the rights of >the freedmen. Nonetheless, federal >officials acted only after the innumerable >Klan-style attacks were finally >perceived as organized. "Outrages of >various descriptions," Attorney General >George Williams advised southern U.S. >Attorneys and Marshals in 1874, "and in >some cases atrocious murders have been >committed in your district by >bodies of armed men, sometimes in disguise >and with the view it is believed of >overawing and intimidating >peaceable and law abiding citizens and >depriving them of the rights guaranteed to >them by the Constitution and >laws of the United States." The attorney >general ordered his attorneys and marshals >"to detect, expose, arrest, and >punish the perpetrators of these >crimes.''(3) > Throughout the western territories and >along the Mexican border, the federal >government found >occasional need to suppress armed bands of >outlaws, ganged together to steal cattle or >rob the mails. General >William Tecumseh Sherman, sent to the >Arizona border in April 1882 to investigate >the outlaw troubles there, >advised President Chester A. Arthur that >"the >-------------------------------- >(2) Fillmore quoted in W.U. Hensel, The >Christiana Rio and the Treason Trials of >1851. An Historical >Sketch, (New York: Negro Universities >Press, 1911), pp. 92-3; Calhoun, The >Lawmen. pp. 82-93. >(3) Attorney General George Williams, >circular letter to U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, September 3, 1874, >Attorney General Instruction Book E, Record >Group 60, Records of the Department of >Justice, National >Archives. >Civil Officers have not sufficient forces >to make arrests, to hold prisoners for >trial or punish when convicted." The >President promptly proclaimed on May 31 >that the areas plagued by the outlaws were >in a state of rebellion.(4) > The federal government looked no more >kindly on the labor strikes that broke out >in the closing years >of the nineteenth century and the opening >years of the twentieth. What seemed so >dangerous about events such >as the 1894 Pullman strike was not just the >disruption of the mails, which was the >legal basis on which the >government relied to break the strike, but >the fact that the mails were being >violently disrupted by organized >groups. "We have been brought to the ragged >edge of anarchy," Attorney General Richard >Olney frantically >explained when he ordered that the trains >be kept running. Eventually, Eugene Debs >and his colleagues in the >American Railway Union, which took the lead >in the strike, were indicted and convicted. >Once again, it was the >volatile mixture of violence and >organization--combinations determined >difficult to suppress--that evoked the full >power of the federal government.(5) > The passage of the National Firearms >Act of 1934, the first federal effort to >control private ownership >of firearms, grew out of this historic fear >of armed organizations. The various >collections of gangsters that >proliferated during Prohibition were the >true targets of the law, which required a >tax and registration on the sale >of their weapons of choice--machineguns > >----------------------------------- > (4) General William Tecumseh Sherman to >Attorney General Benjamin Brewster, April >12, 1882, >Source-Chronological Files, Record Group >60, National Archives; Calhoun, The Lawmen, >p. 196; Larry Ball, United >States Marshals of Arizona and New Mexico, >1846-1912, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, >1978), pp. 125-6. > (5) Almont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike, >(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, >1967), p. 245, 274-92; Calhoun, >The Lawmen, 209, 214. >and sawed-off shotguns. Subsequent federal >firearms laws have been of a piece. Other >than the 1968 ban on >mail-order sales, which was in direct, >though delayed, response to the >assassination of President Kennedy, federal >gun laws have typically been concerned with >the weapons of considerable destructive >power generally preferred >by organized groups--bombs, machineguns, >and automatic weapons. > In recent times, the federal government >has shown itself even less patient with >armed groups than it had >historically. Radical extremists of both >the Right and the Left have been pursued >aggressively once they began >breaking the law. For instance, after the >Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) launched >its self-styled "people's war" >by kidnapping newspaper heiress Patty >Hearst and committing a number of daring >bankrobberies, the federal >government dedicated its full resources to >tracking the group down. Within >approximately three months, FBI >agents and Los Angeles police closed in on >the group at a house just outside what was >then known as Watts. >During an intense gun battle and fire, >every member of the SLA in the house was >killed.(6) > Gordon Kahl, who stood at the opposite >end of the political spectrum from the SLA, >met a similar end. >Kahl belonged to the Posse Comitatus which >refused to recognize the authority of any >government above the >county level. Accordingly, Kahl >consistently refused to pay his federal >taxes, even after he served time in prison >for not doing so. When U.S. Marshals >attempted to arrest him for violating the >terms of his probation, Kahl killed >two of them. For the next five months, Kahl >hid among his friends and sympathizers >until FBI agents located him >---------------------------------- >(6) Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1974. >in a farmhouse just outside Smithville, >Arkansas. After refusing to surrender, Kahl >was killed, and the farmhouse >was burned down.(7) > Robert Matthews, the head of a group of >right-wing fanatics known as the Order, >embraced many of >Kahl's beliefs. Unlike Kahl, whose >resistance was essentially passive until >the marshals tried to arrest him, >Matthews and the Order launched an >aggressive private war against the country. >Like the SLA, the Order >committed a series of bank and armored car >robberies, netting $3.6 million in one >heist alone. The Order also >assassinated Alan Berg, a radio talk show >host in Denver, Colorado. > The FBI began an equally aggressive >pursuit. After a brief, violent skirmish in >Idaho and another in >Portland, Oregon, FBI agents finally closed >in on Matthews hiding out among three >adjoining houses on Whidbey >Island, some fifty miles north of Seattle. >After negotiating his surrender for two >days, Matthews began firing on >an FBI Hostage Response Team that attempted >to enter the house. Protected by a full >suit of body armor, >Matthews ran from the first floor to the >second floor firing automatic weapons. The >FBI dropped a magnesium flare >from a helicopter. The flare landed on the >roof of the house and burned through it to >the room where Matthews >had stored his ammunition and explosives. >These ignited, setting off a roaring, >exploding fire that consumed >Matthews.(8) > >------------------------------------- > (7) James Corcoran, Bitter Harvest >Gordon Kahl and the Posse Comitatus: Murder >in the Heartland, (New >York: Viking Press, 1990). > > (8) James Coates, Armed and >Dangerous. The Rise of the Survivalist >Right, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), >pp. 41-76. > A year later, in the spring of 1985, >ATF collected considerable evidence that an >80-member group styling >itself the Covenant of the Sword and the >Arm of the Lord (CSA) had stockpiled a >large arsenal at its fortified >compound in Arkansas. The group had >collected over 150 firearms, (including 35 >machineguns), two anti-personnel >mines, three anti-aircraft rockets, 50 >pounds of military plastic explosives, 300 >blasting caps, 2,000 feet of >detonating cord, and around 100 explosive >devices. CSA had also stockpiled food, >water, and supplies. > ATF led the assault on the CSA compound >on April 20, 1985. CSA members retreated >farther into the >compound, barricading themselves behind >their defenses. The agents set up a siege >perimeter and settled in to >wait. The group used the wait to destroy >many of the weapons (and hence evidence) >illegally obtained. Negotiators >from the FBI arrived and began the tedious, >frustrating process of talking the group >out. Three days later, on April >22, 1985, James D. Ellison and the 75 >members of the CSA surrendered.(9) > As both history and recent events >clearly show, the United States has never >tolerated armed groups >residing within its borders. The intent of >the particular organization, whether >ideological or criminal, mattered little. >If the group was building an illegal >arsenal, the group was subject to a federal >enforcement action. To this day, >ATF's enforcement focus retains the flavor >of that historic concern with armed >organizations. The agency has >developed considerable expertise and >success in investigating the activities of >motorcycle, street, and drug gangs, >all of which share in common a proclivity >to amass large arsenals of powerful >weapons. >---------------------------------- > (9) James Coates, Armed and Dangerous. >The Rise of the Survivalist Right, (New >York: Hill and Wang, 1987), >pp. 142-4. > >The raid on the Branch Davidian compound >occurred in the context of that historical >background. > >END Appendix G Treasury Dept. Report on Waco > <snip> ======================================================================== Paul Andrew Mitchell : Counselor at Law, federal witness B.A., Political Science, UCLA; M.S., Public Administration, U.C. Irvine tel: (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night email: [address in tool bar] : using Eudora Pro 3.0.3 on 586 CPU website: http://www.supremelaw.com : visit the Supreme Law Library now ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice. We shall not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal. ======================================================================== [This text formatted on-screen in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]
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