Time: Mon Oct 06 08:03:13 1997
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Date: Mon, 06 Oct 1997 07:58:36 -0700
To: John Mark Ockerbloom <spok+@gs1.sp.cs.cmu.edu>
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: The IRS and Title 26
Dear Mr. Ockerbloom,
I believe you have missed an admittedly subtle point:
"See 'Continuation of Organization of Court', to wit:"
at beginning of Page 30 of 50 in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF,
particularly as regards the meaning of "this title" [sic],
which then maps directly into "United States Code",
term-for-term, in the Act of June 25, 1948.
So, the average Citizen would be justified to infer that
"this title" must refer to a Title of the United States Code;
plenty of people have answered that it does, when I ask them
this simple question, "What does 'this title' refer to?"
I think you are missing the whole point about vagueness;
the pertinent test is that men of common intelligence differ
as to its application. To say that Title 26 [sic] is merely
a "restatement" of the law, does not change the fact that
it has not been enacted into conclusive evidence of the law,
on authority of the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Thus, all citations to 26 U.S.C. [sic] are rebuttable.
This, in and of itself, is very confusing for people who are not
trained in the intricate subtleties of federal law. They find
it rather confusing and burdensome to yank Statutes at Large
because the provisions of Title 26 are NOT CONCLUSIVE, when
the Statutes at Large ARE CONCLUSIVE.
Congress could make this more difficult, if they tried,
but not much MORE difficult than it already is.
I take it that we agree that Title 28 *is* the law (see above),
because IT HAS been enacted into conclusive evidence of the law.
I also think you missed the whole discussion of "this title"
vis-a-vis the term "United States Code" in the context of the
Historical and Statutory Notes following 28 U.S.C. 132.
In light of your failure to notice this subtlety, you might
want to revise what you wrote below.
Gilbertson's argument here is not a hair-splitting technical one,
like yours, but a more general one about the vagueness and confusion
which are evident, and which the IRC generates, more often than not.
This vagueness is most evident in the confusion having to do
with its territorial application. This is the main thrust
of the summary heading to this section of Gilbertson's
OPENING BRIEF (IRC is void for vagueness), because the
preponderance of evidence now published in "The Federal Zone"
is incorporated in toto by reference.
I do not think you are a man of common intelligence [sic];
you are a man of uncommon intelligence.
The pertinent test is found in Connally et al. vl
General Construction Co.: men of common intelligence
necessarily disagree at its meaning and differ as to its
application, thus, the entire IRC violates the first
essential of due process of law. See evidence from
Rep. Barbara Kennelly as regards the meaning of "State"
at IRC (NOT 26 U.S.C.) 3121(e).
If men of your uncommon intelligence are required to decode
the IRC, then that is sufficient proof that it is too
difficult to understand by those upon whom the tax is
sought to be laid. An unapportioned direct tax is
unconstitutional as applied to state Citizens. See
1:2:3 and 1:9:4; repeals by implication are not favored.
If you would read all of Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF, you
will discover that I am the author of that brief.
/s/ Paul Mitchell
http://supremelaw.com
At 10:17 AM 10/6/97 EDT, you wrote:
>
>First of all, I should retract the portion of my previous letter dealing with
>the "prima facie" rule. I hadn't taken the time to think the whole matter
>through, and I think the statements I made, while accurate in part, only
served
>to muddy the waters. Sorry about that.
>
>But thank you for citing the Gilbertson brief, since I now know what argument
>you're making with respect to the status of the IRS. Unfortunately, his
>argument is fundamentally flawed, relying on making a legal distinction
>at one point which it then ignores at a crucial later point! If you claim
>"A" as one premise and "not A" as another premise, you can of course come to
>any conclusion you like. But don't expect the courts, or a critical reader,
>to buy it.
>
>Let's have a look at the argument (which appears to be an expansion of the
>same argument Paul Mitchell makes in chapter 7 of _The Federal Zone_):
>
>> Title 26, U.S.C., and the Internal
>> Revenue Code ("IRC") are not one and the same, because Title 26
>> as such has never been enacted into positive law.
>
>Technically, it is true that Title 26 "as such" is not law. That's because,
>like much of the rest of the US Code, it's actually a *restatement* of the
law.
>The *actual* law that Title 26 is based on was originally Public Law 591 of
>1954. (There have since been other tax laws passed as well, but for the
>sections of Title 26 that we're looking at, the underlying law would appear
>to be from PL 591.)
>
>(Why have a restatement of the law distinct from the law itself? Because
> the restated form is often more clearly organized, and easier to cite, than
> the original law. A prime local example from this state would be the
> Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. Again, the CS itself is not law, but
> it reorganizes and classifies a whole raftload of actual laws passed in
> the Pennsylvania legislature, and is a lot easier to survey and cite than
> the original collection of the laws is. Normally, one can cite the
> restated code as if it were the law, even though technically it isn't.)
>
>In some cases, Congress has taken a shortcut, and enacted a law directly in
>the form of a numbered title of the US Code. This eliminates a level of
>indirection that would be in other parts of the code. For example,
>most of the laws on the judiciary and judicial procedure were enacted
directly
>*as* Title 28, so title 28 actually *is* the law, and not just a restatement
>of the law. But this direct enactment of a law in the form of a numbered
>title of the US code basically is just a matter of convenience. Title 28
>and PL 591 are both the law of the land; neither is more or less 'positive
>law' than the other. (Well, except for parts of PL 591 that have since been
>superseded by other laws, but that's not relevant to the rest of this
>discussion.)
>
>Gilbertson's argument continues:
>
>> ...Both sections 7401 and 7402 fall
>> within subtitle F, which contains all the enforcement mechanisms
>> of the IRC. As such, said sections have never taken effect,
>> because IRC 7851(a)(6)(A) is controlling, to wit:
>
>> General rule. The provisions of subtitle F shall take
>> effect on the day after the date of enactment of this title
>> [sic] ....
>> [emphasis added]
>
>Gilbertson has made a distinction between Title 26, which technically
>is not (in itself) law, and PL 591 (et al), which is. Therefore, the
>application of the law restated in 26 USC 7851 *also* has to take this
>distinction into account. The actual law 'speaking' underneath 26 USC 7851
>is in PL 591, *not* in Title 26. Therefore, any usage of 'this title'
>in PL 591 cannot refer to Title 26 (since I don't think Title 26 was even
>created until after PL 591 was passed).
>
>Rather, it's a reference to the main body of PL 591 itself. This is made
>clear at the beginning of PL 591, which reads in part as follows:
>
> CHAPTER 736--PUBLIC LAW 591
> [H.R. 8300]
>
> Approved August 16, 1954, 9:45 A.M.--E.D.T.
>
> An Act to Revise the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States.
>
> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
> States of America in Congress assembled, That
>
> (a) Citation.--
>
> (1) The provisions of this Act set forth under the heading "Internal
> Revenue Title" may be cited as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954".
>
> [...]
>
> (d) Enactment of Internal Revenue Title into law.--The Internal Revenue
> Title referred to in subsection (a) (1) is as follows:
>
> [followed by the full text of what was then restated in Title 26.
> I got the quote above from an old Usenet article by Dan Howell
> (message-ID <hgg5$3eb@news.cp10.es.xerox.com>)]
>
>We can see from this that when PL 591 refers to "this title", it is referring
>to the "Internal Revenue Title" mentioned at the start of the law. This,
>including the rules about effective dates that were restated by 26 USC 7851,
>was enacted into law in 1954 along with the rest of PL 591, and therefore
>the enforcement provisions of the law went into effect the next day, as
>stated by the law restated in 26 USC 7851.
>
>Gilbertson does try to take a brief stab at claiming that, no, "this title"
>should really refer to Title 26 anyway. (_The Federal Zone_ doesn't even
>seem to attempt to carry through the argument this far.) Gilbertson says:
>
>> Appellant reminds this honorable Court of the discussion
>> supra concerning the term "this title" at 28 U.S.C. 1867(d) and
>> in the Historical and Statutory Notes after 28 U.S.C. 132 (see
>> Page 30 et seq.). here is no question but that the consistent
>> legislative practice is to use the term "this title" to refer to
>> Titles of the United States Codes (whether enacted or not).
>
>["here is" above should be "There is": I goofed on the cut-n-paste]
>
>Unfortunately, Gilbertson seems to be referencing an argument he doesn't
>actually seem to have made, at least not where he claimed it. (I can't
>find anything corresponding argument on page 30 or on any later pages.)
>His only other explicit citation of 28 USC 1867 is on pp. 15-16, where he
>asserts that "this title" when used there refers directly to Title 28.
>But this is moot, since as we noted earlier, Title 28 is one of the examples
>of a law enacted in the form of a numbered title of the USC. So of course
>the law in that case would be referring to Title 28-- Title 28 is itself
>the law! This does not argue in any way for treating a self-reference
>in PL 591 as a reference to Title 26 instead of to PL 591.
>
>We thus see that Gilbertson's argument falls apart, and also that the
>enforcement provisions allowing the IRS to designated to enforce the tax
>laws have both been enacted and taken effect. By the legal reasoning in
>the case cited in my previous letter, and in other cases, then, the IRS
>is a valid governmental agency of the United States. Unfortunately, once
>this is established, most of the basis of your rebuttal (and of the original
>suit) can be seen to be invalid.
>
>I hope this helps. I apologize for a few typos in this letter; I'm typing
>it in directly and it's too long at this point for me to fix them all. If
>anything in here is confusing as written, let me know and I'll try to
clarify.
>
>This letter is Cc'd to Paul Mitchell, who seems to have emailed me another
>version of the same argument that I've just rebutted above, along with a
>bunch of other material on other topics that aren't relevant to the point
>I'm now arguing. Ny unwillingness to change the subject before finishing
>this particular argument should not be construed as agreement with Michell's
>other claims.
>
>John
>
>
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Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris : Counselor at Law, federal witness 01
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