Time:    Mon Nov 24 19:57:26 1997
Date:    Mon, 24 Nov 1997 19:36:53 -0800
To:     (Recipient list suppressed)
From:    Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Article III judges and taxation --
         U.S. v. Woodley 726 F2d 1328 (1983)

>Date:    Mon, 24 Nov 1997 20:25:50 -0800
>From:   "Timothy I. McCrory" <tmccrory@idt.net>
>Subject: Article III judges and taxation -- 
>         U.S. v. Woodley 726 F.2d 1328 (1983)
>            not only be independent of outside influence in fact, but
>            must also be "above even the suspicion of any influence." Id.
>            at 257, 40 S. Ct. at 554 (quoting Chief Justice Taney in
>            letter to Secretary of Treasury). Thirteen years later, in
>            O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S. Ct. 740, 77
>            L. Ed. 1356 (1933), the Court stated that
>  [47]      the acts of each [department should] never be controlled by,
>            or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive
>            influence of either of the other departments. James Wilson,
>            one of the framers of the Constitution and a justice of this
>            court, in one of his law lectures said that the independence
>            of each department required that its proceedings "should be
>            free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of
>            either of the other two powers."
>  [48]      Id. at 530, 53 S. Ct. at 743. Other cases contain similar
>            language. See, e.g., American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26
>            U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545, 7 L. Ed. 242 (1828) (courts whose
>            judges do not have article III protection are "incapable of
>            receiving" the judicial power conferred by the Constitution
>            on the judicial branch of government).
>  [49]      The preeminence of the constitutional requirement that
>            article III power may not be exercised by judges lacking
>            article III protection has been reemphasized in two more
>            recent cases in which the Court held unconstitutional
>            statutory schemes designed to promote judicial efficiency. In
>            Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 8 L. Ed.
>            2d 671 (1962), the question presented was whether Joseph
>            Jackson, a judge of the United States Court of Customs and
>            Patent Appeals, could preside over a criminal trial in a
>            United States District Court. Jackson sat by virtue of 28
>            U.S.C.  294(d) (1976) which authorizes retired judges to sit
>            by designation of the Chief Justice on either the courts of
>            appeals or the district courts. Lurk, the defendant, alleged
>            that as a member of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
>            Judge Jackson enjoyed only statutory assurance of tenure and
>            compensation. Thus, Lurk claimed, in being tried by such a
>            judge he had been "denied protection of judges with tenure
>            and compensation guaranteed by Article III." Id. at 533, 82
>            S. Ct. at 1464.
>  [50]      The Court held that Judge Jackson could preside over Lurk's
>            trial because the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was, in
>            fact, a court constituted under article III whose judges
>            enjoyed article III protection. The opinion strongly
>            indicates that had the Court not found that Judge Jackson
>            enjoyed the constitutional protections of life tenure and
>            undiminished compensation it would have reached a contrary
>            result. The Court first noted that the "necessity for an
>            [article III] judge is uncontested." Id. at 537, 82 S. Ct. at
>            1466. Regardless whether Lurk's trial was conducted fairly,
>            the Court held,
>  [51]      Article III,  1 . . . is explicit and gives the petitioners
>            . . . a basis for complaint without requiring them to point
>            to particular instances of mistreatment in the record.
>  [52]      Id. at 533, 82 S. Ct. at 1464. The essential question,
>            therefore, was not whether 28 U.S.C.  294(d) provided a
>            useful mechanism by which to lessen the workload of the
>            district courts. The question, instead, was whether the
>            members of courts from which  294(d) judges were drawn
>            enjoyed article III protections. Thus, the Court held that
>            only upon a determination that they did enjoy such
>            protections would they be allowed to exercise article III
>            powers.
>  [53]      In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
>            Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982),
>            the Court once again stressed the importance of judicial
>            independence in the constitutional scheme. That case
>            presented a challenge to the constitutionality of the
>            Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which granted to judges
>            without article III protection jurisdiction over all
>            bankruptcy matters. Bankruptcy judges were appointed for
>            fourteen year terms, could be removed by the judicial council
>            of the circuit in which they sat on grounds of "incompetence,
>            misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental
>            disability," and were not protected from salary diminution by
>            Congress. Id. 102 S. Ct. at 2862. The appellees claimed that
>            they were thus not article III judges and could not exercise
>            article III power. Id. at 2864.
>  [54]      The Marathon Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice
>            Brennan, held that Congress could not delegate article III
>            powers to the bankruptcy courts without granting the judges
>            of those courts article III protection. In dissent, Justice
>            White argued strongly that Congress, in creating the
>            bankruptcy courts, had created an efficient, workable system
>            to address an increasingly pressing problem. Id. at
>            2894-2896. Without disputing the worthiness of Congress'
>            goals or the efficiency of the system Congress had designed,
>            the plurality stated unequivocally:
>  [55]      The inexorable command of [article III] is clear and
>            definite: The judicial power of the United States must be
>            exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Art.
>            III. Those attributes are also clearly set forth:
>  [56]      "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
>            hold their Offices during good Behavior and shall, at stated
>            Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
>            shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."
>            Art. III,  1.
>  [57]      Id. at 2865. The plurality specifically tied its holdings to
>            the mandate of the Constitution that the federal courts be
>            absolutely independent. It noted:
>  [58]      In sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a
>            fundamental principle -- that the "judicial Power of the
>            United States" must be reposed in an independent Judiciary.
>            It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be
>            jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional
>            protections for that independence.
>  [59]      Id. at 2866. Because the Bankruptcy Act vested judicial power
>            in judges without article III protection it violated the
>            constitutional command that such power be vested only in
>            judges who enjoy those safeguards. Thus, Marathon clearly
>            demonstrates that the imperatives of article III take
>            precedence over a statute providing an indisputably efficient
>            solution to a pressing judicial problem. See also Pacemaker
>            Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712
>            F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.1983), reh'g en banc granted, 718 F.2d 971
>            (9th Cir.1983).
>  [60]      In sum, the plain language of the Constitution, the history
>            of the adoption of article II and article III, and decisions
>            of the Supreme Court emphasizing in the strongest terms the
>            necessity of a judiciary independent both in fact and in
>            appearance all demand that we adhere strictly to the
>            constitutional command that only those who enjoy article III
>            protections may exercise article III power. The government
>            argues, however, that the long and accepted practice of
>            recess appointments to article III courts has created a
>            "historical consensus" that judicial appointments made
>            pursuant to the recess appointment clause are not subject to
>            the requirements of article III. It is to that argument that
>            we now turn.
>  [61]      IV
>  [62]      The recess appointment clause was used with some frequency to
>            fill judicial vacancies during the late eighteenth and early
>            nineteenth centuries. By the end of 1823, five recess
>            appointments had been made to the Supreme Court while twenty
>            had been made to the inferior federal courts. Chief Justice
>            Rutledge not only sat on the Supreme Court by virtue of a
>            recess commission but also authored a decision of the Court
>            before his confirmation by the Senate. See United States v.
>            Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 1 L. Ed. 535 (1795) (Rutledge,
>            J.). No evidence exists that the constitutional propriety of
>            these appointments was ever questioned. This fact suggests
>            that recess appointments to the judiciary, if not
>            contemplated or explicitly sanctioned by the Framers, were
>            nonetheless not considered highly objectionable by them. As
>            one author has noted:
>  [63]      During this period, when those who wrote the Constitution
>            were alive and active, not one dissenting voice was raised
>            against the practice. It would seem that the framers must
>            have looked upon recess appointments as an exceptional
>            expedient to fill vacancies on the Court and not as a
>            violation of article III.
>  [64]      Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court --
>            Constitutional But Unwise ? 10 Stan.L.Rev. 124, 132 (1957).
>  [65]      Recess appointments were made to the federal judiciary as
>            frequently after the constitutional period as during it. In
>            all, 283 recess appointments were made to the federal bench
>            -- six of those to the Supreme Court -- between 1823 and
>            1964. The practice, however, fell into disuse a generation
>            ago. Judge Heen's appointment in 1980 was the only recess
>            appointment in the past twenty years. See Appellee's Second
>            Supplemental Brief at A1-A25.
>  [66]      Executive acceptance of the power to make recess appointments
>            to the judiciary is evidenced not only by frequent use of the
>            power, but also by some twenty four opinions of the attorneys
>            general. That of Attorney General Stanberry in 1868 is one of
>            the more elaborate:
>  [67]      For it seems a greater evil to be without officers
>            altogether, than to have officers who hold only by the
>            temporary appointment of the President. I say by the
>            temporary appointment of the President, for, in strict
>            language, the President cannot invest any officer with a full
>            title to the office without the concurrence of the Senate.
>            Whether the President appoints in the session or in the
>            recess, he cannot and does not fill the office without the
>            concurrence of the Senate. He may fill the vacancy in the
>            recess, but only by an appointment which lasts until the end
>            of the next session.
>  [68]      For instance, in filling a vacancy in the office of judge,
>            whose tenure is in effect for life, his appointee can only
>            hold for a fraction of time.
>  [69]      12 Op.Atty.Gen. 82, 41 (1868) (emphasis in original).
>  [70]      Congressional acceptance of presidential power to make recess
>            judicial appointments is equally indisputable. The statute
>            authorizing the payment of recess appointees to all offices
>            makes no exception for judges, and Senator Philip Hart, in
>            support of a resolution requesting the President to use his
>            recess appointment power sparingly in filling judicial
>            vacancies, noted that
>  [71]      if there ever was ground for the argument that the more
>            specific language of Article III of the Constitution would be
>            construed as excluding judiciary appointments from the
>            general authorization given the President in Article II, time
>            has answered it. The President does have that power and this
>            Resolution does not argue otherwise.
>  [72]      106 Cong.Rec. 18,130 (1960).
>  [73]      Thus, both Congress and the Executive have long accepted the
>            power of the President to make recess appointments to the
>            federal bench. But while the members of both the legislative
>            and executive branches are sworn to uphold the Constitution,
>            the courts alone are the final arbiters of its meaning.
>            United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S. Ct. 3090,
>            3105, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
>            Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). The question before us,
>            then, is what weight to attach to these legislative and
>            executive interpretations of the scope of presidential power
>            to make recess appointments.
>  [74]      Early Supreme Court authority suggested that great weight was
>            to be given to historical practice. In Stuart v. Laird, 5
>            U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 2 L. Ed. 115 (1803), the Court
>            considered the question whether judges of the Supreme Court
>            could sit as circuit judges without having a separate
>            commission to sit on the circuit court. The Court held that
>  [75]      practice, and acquiescence under it, for a period of several
>            years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
>            system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed
>            the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the
>            most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong
>            and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the
>            question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.
>  [76]      Id. at 308.
>  [77]      The view that a long and continuous practice is entitled to a
>            presumption of constitutionality gained further currency in
>            the early part of this century. Several Supreme Court cases
>            during this period considered historical practice in
>            resolving constitutional questions. *fn4 The Court best
>            enunciated the theory of these decisions in United States v.
>            Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73, 35 S. Ct. 309, 312-13,
>            59 L. Ed. 673 (1915), stating that
>  [78]      government is a practical affair intended for practical men.
>            Both officers, lawmakers and citizens naturally adjust
>            themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive
>            Department on the presumption that unauthorized acts would
>            not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to
>            crystallize into a regular practice.
>  [79]      This early line of Supreme Court authority, holding that
>            unchallenged historical practice is sufficient evidence of
>            constitutionality, no longer, however, represents the
>            thinking of the Court. Recent Supreme Court discussions of
>            the issue indicate that any practice, no matter how fully
>            accepted or efficient, is "subject to the demands of the
>            Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out just how
>            those powers are to be exercised." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
>            919, 945, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983).
>  [80]      In INS v. Chadha, the Court considered the constitutionality
>            of a statute authorizing one house of Congress to invalidate
>            by resolution a decision of an agency of the executive branch
>            made pursuant to congressionally delegated authority. At the
>            time the Court decided Chadha, the practice of including a
>            one-house veto provision in legislation had become so common
>            as to have indisputably become a practice of long and
>            continuous acceptance. As the dissent noted,
>  [81]      over the past five decades, the legislative veto has been
>            placed in nearly 200 statutes. The device is known in every
>            field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets,
>            foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety,
>            energy, the environment and the economy.
>  [82]      Id. at 968, 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J. dissenting)
>            (footnote omitted). Moreover, the practice of one-house
>            vetoes, accepted as constitutional by Presidents since World
>            War II, id., had become a central tool of the legislative
>            process. It was more than "efficient, convenient, and
>            useful." It was "an important if not indispensable political
>            invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve
>            major constitutional and policy differences, assures the
>            accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and
>            preserves Congress' control over lawmaking." Id. at , 103 S.
>            Ct. at 2795.
>  [83]      Yet, this historic acceptance of the one-house veto did not
>            prevent the Court from holding the practice unconstitutional.
>            In fact, Chief Justice Burger noted for the majority that
>            "our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact
>            that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with
>            increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
>            executive and independent agencies." Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at
>            2781. The Court stated that, regardless of historical
>            practice, "policy arguments supporting even useful 'political
>            inventions' are subject to the demands of the Constitution
>            which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets
>            out just how those powers are to be exercised." Id.
>  [84]      The Court also dispensed quickly with arguments based on
>            governmental efficiency. Claims that the one-house veto had
>            become central in the relationship between the President and
>            Congress would not override constitutional commands. Chief
>            Justice Burger stated emphatically that
>  [85]      convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives --
>            or the hallmarks -- of democratic government. . . .
>  [86]      The choices we discern as having been made in the
>            Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
>            processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
>            unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by
>            men who had lived under a form of government that permitted
>            arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no
>            support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for
>            the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
>            encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional
>            standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the
>            President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
>            U.S. 579 [72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153] (1952). With all the
>            obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse,
>            we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than
>            by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully
>            crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
>  [87]      Id. at , , 103 S. Ct. at 2780, 2788.
>  [88]      The teaching of Chadha is clear. Historical acceptance and
>            governmental efficiency are not unimportant. They will not,
>            however, "save [a practice] if it is contrary to the
>            Constitution." Id. at 944, 103 S. Ct. at 2781. It is
>            undisputed that the practice of recess appointments to the
>            judiciary is widely accepted and may, in some situations,
>            contribute to judicial efficiency. Such appointments,
>            however, offend the explicit and unambiguous command of
>            article III that the judicial power be exercised only by
>            those enjoying life tenure and protection against diminution
>            of compensation. A practice condemned by the Constitution
>            cannot be saved by historical acceptance and present
>            convenience. *fn5 We therefore hold that because he lacks the
>            essential attributes of an article III judge, a recess
>            appointee to the federal bench cannot exercise the judicial
>            power of the United States.
>  [89]      We recognize that the only other court to consider the
>            question we decide today reached a result contrary to ours.
>            In United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), the
>            Second Circuit held that article III does not require the
>            exclusion of judicial offices from the scope of the recess
>            appointment clause. It based this conclusion in part on
>            historical practice and in part on the need for governmental
>            efficiency. Id. at 708-709. But INS v. Chadha, U.S. at , 103
>            S. Ct. at 2780, decided over two decades after Allocco, makes
>            it clear that even consistent acceptance of a practice over
>            many years will not suffice to render an unconstitutional
>            action constitutional. In addition, other recent Supreme
>            Court cases demonstrate that the article III requirement of
>            judicial independence outweighs arguments made in the name of
>            efficiency. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
>            Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. at 2865-2866; Glidden Co.
>            v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 533, 82 S. Ct. at 1463.
>  [90]      We believe the Allocco decision also reflects a
>            misapplication of accepted principles of statutory and
>            constitutional construction. The Second Circuit's opinion
>            implies that the general language of the recess appointment
>            clause takes precedence over the specific language of article
>            III. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d at 708. Precedent is
>            to the contrary. The unusually specific language of article
>            III must supersede the general language of the article II
>            recess appointment clause, which does not mention the
>            judicial office at all. See supra slip op. at 5732-33, at .
>  [91]      Finally, Allocco rests on an overly limited view of the
>            historical record. The Second Circuit commented that "the
>            evils of legislative and executive coercion which petitioner
>            foresees have no support in our nation's history." United
>            States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d at 709. In fact, the Framers
>            themselves were profoundly influenced by the sorry history of
>            a colonial judiciary which lacked the most basic requisites
>            of judicial independence. The Framers based their judgments
>            regarding the protections required in article III on the
>            experience of the colonies and of England. It is precisely
>            because of their command in article III that the "coercion"
>            which the Second Circuit finds absent in more recent history
>            has generally not troubled the federal judiciary. See supra
>            slip op. at 5733, at .
>  [92]      Thus, we reject the holding of Allocco and find that a recess
>            appointee to the federal bench cannot exercise the judicial
>            power of the United States. *fn6
>  [93]      The conviction is VACATED and the case remanded to the United
>            States District Court for the District of Hawaii.
>            --------------------------------------------------------------
>            Opinion Footnotes
>            --------------------------------------------------------------
>  [94]      *fn1 The recess appointment clause provides:
>  [95]      The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
>            may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
>            Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
>            Session.
>  [96]      U.S. Const. art. II,  2.
>  [97]      *fn2 The relevant portion of article III provides:
>  [98]      The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
>            hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated
>            Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
>            shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
>  [99]      U.S. Const. art. III,  1.
>  [100]     *fn3 We note that the Judgment and Probation Commitment Order
>            was issued not by Judge Heen but by Judge Martin Pence. The
>            government does not argue that that fact should affect our
>            treatment of the issues in this case. In any event, we
>            believe that it would not.
>  [101]     *fn4 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175, 47
>            S. Ct. 21, 45, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926); Ex parte Grossman, 267
>            U.S. 87, 118, 45 S. Ct. 332, 336, 69 L. Ed. 527 (1925);
>            Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 307, 21 S. Ct. 648,
>            657, 45 L. Ed. 862 (1901).
>  [102]     *fn5 The government argues that the recent decision of the
>            Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct.
>            3330, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1983), dictates that we accord
>            controlling weight to the fact that recess appointments to
>            the judiciary were made during the early constitutional
>            period. We disagree.
>  [103]     In Marsh, the Court was faced with the question whether the
>            practice of the Nebraska legislature of opening each of its
>            sessions with a prayer offered by a state-paid chaplain
>            violated the establishment clause. In holding that
>            legislative prayer does not offend the first amendment, the
>            Court relied on a uniquely full historical record indicating
>            that the practice was extensively considered and approved by
>            the Founding Fathers. We have no such record in this case.
>  [104]     The first legislative chaplain was appointed during the first
>            Congress. Indeed, three days before final agreement was
>            reached on the language of the Bill of Rights, Congress
>            enacted legislation providing for the appointment of a
>            chaplain. That legislation was not adopted lightly. An
>            extensive debate took place in Congress. The bill to appoint
>            chaplains drew opposition from both John Jay and John
>            Rutledge on the ground that the delegates "were so divided in
>            religious sentiments . . . that could not join in the same
>            act of worship." Id. 103 S. Ct. at 3335. The Court in Marsh
>            cited this record of debate and opposition as evidence that
>            the "subject was considered carefully and the action not
>            taken thoughtlessly." Id. The relationship between the first
>            amendment and the practice of legislative prayer in the
>            thought of the first amendment draftsmen was thus fully
>            illuminated in the record before the Court in Marsh.
>  [105]     In striking contrast, there is no evidence that the Framers
>            ever considered the question whether the recess appointment
>            clause applied to judicial appointments. The clause was
>            adopted without debate, and the provision of the South
>            Carolina constitution upon which it was modeled did not apply
>            to judicial vacancies. In Marsh, the Court states that it
>            "accept the interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen"
>            regarding the practice of legislative prayer and the
>            establishment clause. Id. We have no comparable record of
>            explicit interpretation and debate before us. Mute
>            acquiescence is clearly distinguishable from the affirmative
>            contemporaneous construction of the first amendment available
>            to the Court in Marsh.
>  [106]     *fn6 The issue of whether our holding should be applied
>            retroactively or merely prospectively is not properly before
>            us and should not be decided today. We leave that issue for
>            another day. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S.
>            Ct. 1966, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1973) (determining whether or not
>            to give retroactive effect to a rule formulated in an earlier
>            decision); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S. Ct. 876, 35
>            L. Ed. 2d 29 (1973) (same); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
>            87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967) (same); Tehan v.
>            Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459, 15 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1965)
>            (same); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772,
>            16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966) (same); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
>            U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1964) (same).
> 1997 VersusLaw Inc.

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From ???@??? Mon Nov 24 19:58:20 1997

Date:    Mon, 24 Nov 1997 19:51:33 -0800
To:     (Recipient list suppressed)
From:    Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Citizens' Justice Programs (fwd)

>Hi All! I have not personally checked out this organization but I
>thought it sounded interesting enough to pass along the information.
>The Citizen's Justice Programs claim to teach people "how to sue judges
>and bureaucrats with a lawyer"; and how to "be your own constitutional
>Their web site is located at: http://www.citizensjustice.com
>Their mailing address and telephone number are:
>			Citizens' Justice Programs
>			Post Office Box 90
>			Hull, MA  02045
>			617-451-1884
>They may be worth checking out.

Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris      : Counselor at Law, federal witness 01
B.A.: Political Science, UCLA;   M.S.: Public Administration, U.C.Irvine 02
tel:     (520) 320-1514: machine; fax: (520) 320-1256: 24-hour/day-night 03
email:   [address in tool bar]       : using Eudora Pro 3.0.3 on 586 CPU 04
website: http://supremelaw.com       : visit the Supreme Law Library now 05
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best 06
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone 07
             Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this 08
_____________________________________: Law is authority in written words 09
As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice.  We shall 10
not leave, until our mission is accomplished and justice reigns eternal. 11
======================================================================== 12
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