Time: Wed Dec 17 05:59:42 1997
To: han-wi@pop.ri.ultranet.com
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: I WROTE IT!
Cc: snetnews@world.std.com
Bcc:
References:
TO: <han-wi@pop.ri.ultranet.com>
One last thing: YOU are in violation
of the copyright restrictions stated
in the Preface.
You have now been lawfully notified.
/s/ Paul Mitchell
Candidate for Congress
http://supremelaw.com
At 07:35 AM 12/17/97, you wrote:
>
>-> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List
>
>Paul Andrew Mitchel posted this memo as the AUTHOR, yet in the book (The
>Federal Zone) the Memo is from Mitch Modeleski to S-A-P. So PAUL which is
>it??? And why did Mitch give you NO credit as the author of the MEMO????
>Have you sued ???
>
>Anyone who wishes to verify this can go to http://www.deoxy.org/fz/fedzone.htm
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>----
><Paul Andrew Mitchel's Post>
>
>MEMO
>
>TO: Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
> John William Kurowski
>
>FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Author
> "The Federal Zone"
>
>DATE: March 24, 1992
>
>SUBJECT: "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
> your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
> Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
>
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
><From the book!!!!>
>
>Appendix W: Memos on Downes vs Bidwell
>
>
>MEMO
>TO: Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
> John William Kurowski
>FROM: Mitch Modeleski, Founder
> Account for Better Citizenship
>DATE: March 24, 1992
>SUBJECT: "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
> your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
> Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
>
>
>
>I was very gratified to see such a thorough and authoritative treatment
>of "direct taxation" in the July/August 1991 issue of the Reasonable
>Action newsletter. My research continues to convince me of the extreme
>constitutional importance of the apportionment rule for direct taxes
>levied by Congress within the 50 States of the Union. I am writing this
>memo to share with you some of my thoughts on the subject, and to offer
>my challenge to a few points which are not necessarily beyond dispute.
>Please understand that I am in general agreement with most, but not all
>of your essay. Permit me to play "devil's advocate" as I focus on some
>issues which deserve greater elaboration and substantiation.
>The so-called 16th Amendment remains highly relevant to this subject,
>for a number of important reasons. First of all, since 1913, several
>federal courts have attempted to isolate the precise effects of a
>ratified 16th Amendment. Unfortunately for us, when all of these cases
>are assembled side-by-side, the rulings are not consistent. We are
>forced to admit the existence of separate groups of court decisions that
>flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class
>of indirect, excise taxes. Another group puts income taxes into the
>class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment
>did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution. Another
>group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment relieved income taxes from
>the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range
>of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider the
>conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland:
>
>
> ... [T]he Sixteenth Amendment did not amend the
> Constitution. The United States Supreme Court by unanimous
> decisions determined that the amendment did not grant any
> new powers of taxation; that a direct tax cannot be
> relieved from the constitutional mandate of apportionment;
> and the only effect of the amendment was to overturn the
> theory advanced in the Pollock case which held that a tax on
> income, was in legal effect, a tax on the sources of the
> income.
> [The Law That Always, page 220]
>
>
>
>Now consider the opposing view of another competent scholar. After much
>research and much litigation, author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein
>offers the following concise clarification:
>
>
> A tax imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
> a direct tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
> A tax imposed on the "income" derived from those gross
> receipts is also a direct tax on property, but as a result
> of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
> legislation calling for the apportionment of a tax on that
> income.
> [Judicial Income and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]
>
>
>
>The following Appellate ruling is unique among all the relevant federal
>cases for its clarity and conciseness on this question:
>
>
> The constitutional limitation upon direct taxation was
> modified by the Sixteenth Amendment insofar as taxation of
> income was concerned, but the amendment was restricted to
> income, leaving in effect the limitation upon direct
> taxation of principal.
> [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)]
> [emphasis added]
>
>
>
>Granted, this is not a decision by the Supreme Court, but the decision
>is useful because it is so clear and concise, and also because it is
>very representative of that group of rulings which found that a ratified
>16th Amendment relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. By
>inference, if income taxes were controlled by the apportionment rule
>prior to the 16th Amendment, then they must be direct taxes (according
>to one group of rulings).
>
>Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been assembled to
>prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified. Congress has already
>been served with several official complaints documenting the evidence
>against the 16th Amendment, pursuant to the First Amendment guarantee
>for redress of grievances. Congress has now fallen silent. I am the
>author of one of these complaints (see The Federal Zone, Appendix J).
>Relying on one group of rulings, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Shaffer
>decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the failed
>ratification: the necessity still exists for an apportionment among the
>50 States of all direct taxes, and income taxes are direct taxes.
>
>Federal courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a ratified
>16th Amendment. Now that the evidence against its ratification is so
>overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts are unwilling to
>identify the effects of the failed ratification. These courts have opted
>to call it a "political" question, even though it wasn't a "political"
>question in the years immedNow that the evidence against its
>ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts
>are unwilling to identify the effects of the failed ratification. These
>courts have opted to call it a "political" question, even though it
>wasn't a "political" question in the years immediately after Philander
>C. Knox declared it ratified. I personally find it hard to believe that
>the federal courts are incapable of exercising the logic required to
>isolate the legal effects of the failed ratification. Quite simply, if a
>ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed ratification proves
>that X did not happen. What is X? Their "political" unwillingness to
>exercise basic logic means that the federal courts have abdicated their
>main responsibility -- to uphold the constitution --
>
>Let me begin my answer to that question by first quoting from your
>essay, in the section entitled "Documenting the Truth":
>
>
> The Constitution still grants to the Congress the power of
> laying an "apportioned" direct tax but notwithstanding the
> advent of the 16th Amendment all "direct" taxes must be
> apportioned. There is no exception to this rule.
> [emphasis added]
>
>
>
>In a strictly normative sense, I would certainly agree that this is the
>way it should be. But, in a practical and empirical sense, is this
>really the way it is? I say no. In exercising its exclusive authority
>over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same
>constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this
>reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are
>heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a
>principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within (or inside) the
>federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or
>outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The
>Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The
>Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States
>are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional
>restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without
>prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a
>different general class, because these same constitutional restraints
>simply do not limit Congress inside that zone (see The Federal Zone,
>chapters 12 and 13).
>
>I would never ask you to accept this principle of territorial
>heterogeneity simply on faith. There is solid case law to substantiate
>it. You may recall, it is the Hooven case which officially defined the
>three separate and distinct meanings of the term "United States". This
>same definition can also be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
>Edition. The Supreme Court ruled that this case would be the last time
>it would address official definitions of the term "United States".
>Therefore, this ruling must be judicially noticed by the entire American
>legal (and paralegal) community. In my opinion, the most significant
>holding in Hooven has to do with territorial heterogeneity, as follows:
>
>
> ... [T]he United States** may acquire territory by conquest
> or by treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the
> power of Congress conferred by Section 3 of Article IV of
> the Constitution ....
> In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the
> same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating
> for the United States***. ... And in general the guaranties
> [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon
> the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted
> for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as
> Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power over
> territory belonging to the United States**, has made those
> guarantees applicable.
> [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
> [emphasis added]
>
>
>
>I have taken the liberty of adding asterisks ("**","***") to the above,
>in order to identify which meaning of "United States" is being used in
>each occurrence of the term. Computer users prefer the term "stars" over
>"asterisks" because it has fewer syllables.
>
>Return now to your statement that "there is no exception to this rule"
>that all direct taxes must be apportioned. Using the Hooven case and
>others as our guide, it is more accurate to say that all direct taxes
>must be apportioned whenever they are levied inside the 50 States of the
>Union. On the other hand, direct taxes need NOT be apportioned whenever
>they are levied outside the 50 States of the Union, and inside the areas
>of land over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The
>authorities for this exclusive legislative jurisdiction are 1:8:17 and
>4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. You may disagree with this
>interpretation of the term "exclusive", and that is your right, but in
>doing so you are disagreeing with the Supreme Court. Evidently, this was
>not the first, nor the last time the high Court has differed with the
>Framers of the Constitution.
>
>As it turns out, the pivotal case law on this question predates Hooven
>by 44 years, and predates the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In
>Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory
>tariff which Congress had levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or
>"Porto Rico" as it was spelled then). Congress had recently obtained
>exclusive legislative jurisdiction over this territory by and predates
>the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S.
>244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory tariff which Congress had
>levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or "Porto Rico" as it was
>spelled then). Congress had recently obtained exclusive legislative
>jurisdiction over this territory by virtue of the treaty of peace with
>Spain. The import duty was obviously not uniform, as required by 1:8:1
>in the U.S. Constitution, since it was levied specifically against goods
>
>
>The controversy that surrounded Downes vs Bidwell was intense, as
>evidenced by the flurry of articles that were published in the Harvard
>Law Review on the subject of "The Insular Cases" as they were called.
>Perhaps the most lucid criticism of the Downes majority can be found in
>Justice Harlan's dissent:
>
>
> The idea prevails with some -- indeed, it found expression
> in arguments at the bar -- that we have in this country
> substantially or practically two national governments; one,
> to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its
> restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress
> outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising
> such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to
> exercise.
> [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
> [emphasis added]
>
>
>
>To appreciate how alarmed Justice Harlan had become as a result of this
>new "theory", consider the following from his dissent:
>
>
> I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced
> should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this
> court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of
> government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass
> from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected
> by a written constitution into an era of legislative
> absolutism. ...
> It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of
> a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds
> lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher
> duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority
> to prevent all violation of the principles of the
> Constitution.
> [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
> [emphasis added]
>
>
>
>This theory has been documented by patriot John Knox as follows:
>
>
> This theory of a government operating outside the
> Constitution over its own territory with citizens of the
> United States belonging thereto under Article 4, Section 3,
> Clause 2 of the Constitution was further confirmed in 1922
> by the Supreme Court in Balzac vs Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 300
> (EXHIBIT #4) where that Court affirmed that the Constitution
> does not apply outside the limits of the 50 States of the
> Union at page 305 quoting Downes, supra and De Lima, supra.
> That under Article IV, section 3 the "United States" was
> given exclusive power over the territories and their
> citizens of the "United States" residing therein.
>
>
>
>This quote is from an unpublished brief entitled "Memorandum in Support
>of Request for the District Court to Consider the T.R.O. and Injunction
>by the Magistrate" by John Knox, Knox vs U.S., United States District
>Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, Case No.
>SA-89-CA-1308.
>
>People will not fully appreciate a central thesis of The Federal Zone if
>they believe that I agree with the minimal majority by which Downes was
>decided. I don't agree with the majority; I agree with Harlan. I have
>simply tried to describe, in lucid language, how Congress is now able to
>pass legislation which is not restrained by the U.S. Constitution as we
>know it. This type of legislation is also known as "municipal" law,
>because Congress is the municipal authority inside the federal zone.
>When I visited the District of Columbia during my senior year at UCLA as
>a summer intern in political science, I asked a Capitol guard where I
>could find city hall. We were standing on the Capitol lawn when he
>pointed to the Capitol Building and said, "That is City Hall!"
>
>The Downes decision sent many shock waves through the American legal
>community, as evidenced by the deep concern that is expressed by author
>Littlefield in "The Insular Cases", 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281. He
>points out how the dissenting minority were of a single mind, while the
>assenting majority exploited a multiplicity of conflicting and mutually
>incompatible themes. Just one vote turned the tide. Littlefield's words
>jump off the page like grease popping off a sizzling griddle.
>
>Accordingly, I now believe that we must go back further than 1913 to
>isolate the major turn in the tide of American constitutional integrity
>and continuity. Medina in The Silver Bulletin traces the fork to the
>tragic American Civil War -- the counter revolution -- when Lincoln was
>murdered by a Rothschild agent, clearing the stage for resurrecting the
>federalists' heartthrob -- a central bank. For example, in the context
>of everything we now know about territorial heterogeneity, to the extent
>that it was a "municipal" statute for the federal zone, the Federal
>Reserve Act was constitutional under the rubric of the Downes doctrine.
>
>The consequences of this doctrine have been profound and far-reaching,
>just as Harlan predicted. One of Lyndon Johnson's first official acts
>was to rescind JFK's executive order authorizing the circulation of $4.5
>billion in interest-free "United States Notes" instead of
>interest-bearing "Federal Reserve Notes". It is a shame that Oliver
>Stone did not cover this motive in his movie JFK. All we need to do is
>connect the dots, and the picture will emerge, clear as day.
>
>Specifically, Title 26 is a municipal statute and, as such, it is not
>subject to the apportionment rule. The territorial scope of Title 26 is
>the federal zone; the political scope of Title 26 is the set of
>"persons" who are either citizens and/or residents of that zone: "U.S.**
>citizens" and "U.S.** residents". The term "U.S.**" in this context
>refers to the second of the three Hooven definitions, namely, the
>territory over which the sovereignty of Congress extends, i.e., the
>federal zone. Incidentally, the flat tax provisions in Title 26 do
>conform to the uniformity rule because the tax rate is uniform across
>the 50 States (see A Ticket To Liberty, by Lori Jacques).
>
>Since involuntary servitude is now forbidden everywhere in this land, it
>is possible under law to acquire citizenship in the federal zone at will
>via naturalization, even if one is a natural born Sovereign State
>Citizen by birth. It is also possible to abandon citizenship in the
>federal zone at will, via expatriation. In this context, it is revealing
>that the Internal Revenue Code has provisions for dealing with "U.S.**
>citizens" who expatriate to avoid the tax. Similarly, Americans are free
>to reside wherever they want, under the law. If you choose to reside in
>the federal zone, you are liable for the income tax, by definition (see
>26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A) and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b)). Finally, if you are a
>"nonresident alien" with respect to the "United States**" as those terms
>are defined in Title 26 and in Title 42, you are only liable for taxes
>on income which is effectively connected with a U.S.** trade or
>business, and on income which derives from U.S.** sources. All other
>income for nonresident aliens is excluded from the computation of "gross
>income" as defined (see 26 U.S.C. 872(a)).
>
>I hope this discussion has provided you with some valuable feedback
>concerning the 16th Amendment, direct taxes, the apportionment rule,
>Title 26 and The Federal Zone. You have, no doubt, heard several
>references to the "secret jurisdiction" under which the IRS has been
>operating. I now believe that this jurisdiction is no longer totally a
>secret; it issues from 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the Constitution. Contrary to
>the statement quoted above from your essay, there are exceptions to the
>apportionment rule for direct taxes, and there are exceptions to the
>uniformity rule for indirect taxes. Inside the federal zone, Congress is
>free to do pretty much whatever it wants, per the Downes doctrine.
>Inside the federal zone, it is a legislative democracy, with majority
>rule. If you want to change the rules, then change the majority. Our
>best hope for changing those rules rests, therefore, in changing the
>membership in the House and Senate. As a Sovereign State Citizen,
>however, I am not subject to those rules, primarily and most importantly
>because the Constitution created the legislature and We Sovereigns
>created the Constitution. A Sovereign is never subject to his own
>creation, unless he volunteers himself into that status, for whatever
>reason (e.g., the security of socialism a/k/a Social Security).
>
>For your edification, the following is a list of Harvard Law Review
>articles which discuss the insular cases in some detail:
>
>
> Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories"
> 12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371
> Thayer, "Our New Possessions"
> 12 Harvard Law Review, 464
> Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court"
> 15 Harvard Law Review 164
> Littlefield, "The Insular Cases"
> 15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281
>
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>
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