Time: Wed Dec 17 06:09:07 1997
To: snetnews@world.std.com
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: WHO WROTE IT?
Bcc: sls, friends

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I hereby lodge My formal complaint against:


Here are the markings of an Internet thief
(see proof below):

1.  no name or other identifying information;

2.  admits and shares knowledge about a known
    copyright violation;

3.  too stupid to realize the pen name helps
    track the stolen copies;

4.  will most likely resort to ad hominems
    to weasel out of the obvious liabilities;

5.  will refuse to reveal a name and address
    for lawful service of process (we ARE
    enforcing the copyright restrictions);

6.  does not realize that the HTML version
    was stolen and modified, against the
    copyright restrictions stated in the Preface;

7.  is conspiring with "Dimitri" and America On-Line,
    the latter of which has been formally served
    with a demand to cease and desist, and now 
    refuses to honor the author's copyrights.

Fortunately for the author, AOL has deep pockets.

If you want to take sides, please don't let us
stop you.

/s/ Paul Mitchell,
Candidate for Congress

At 07:35 AM 12/17/97, you wrote:
>->  SearchNet's   SNETNEWS   Mailing List
>Paul Andrew Mitchel posted this memo as the AUTHOR, yet in the book (The
>Federal Zone) the Memo is from Mitch Modeleski to S-A-P.  So PAUL which is
>it??? And why did Mitch give you NO credit as the author of the MEMO????
>Have you sued ??? 
>Anyone who wishes to verify this can go to http://www.deoxy.org/fz/fedzone.htm
><Paul Andrew Mitchel's Post>
>TO:       Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
>          John William Kurowski
>FROM:     Paul Andrew Mitchell, Author
>          "The Federal Zone"
>DATE:     March 24, 1992
>SUBJECT:  "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
>          your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
>          Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
><From the book!!!!>
>Appendix W: Memos on Downes vs Bidwell
>TO:       Edward A. Ellison, Jr., J.D.
>          John William Kurowski
>FROM:     Mitch Modeleski, Founder
>          Account for Better Citizenship
>DATE:     March 24, 1992
>SUBJECT:  "Direct Taxation and the 1990 Census"
>          your essay in Reasonable Action newsletter,
>          Save-A-Patriot Fellowship, July/August 1991
>I was very gratified to see such a thorough and authoritative treatment 
>of "direct taxation" in the July/August 1991 issue of the Reasonable 
>Action newsletter. My research continues to convince me of the extreme 
>constitutional importance of the apportionment rule for direct taxes 
>levied by Congress within the 50 States of the Union. I am writing this 
>memo to share with you some of my thoughts on the subject, and to offer 
>my challenge to a few points which are not necessarily beyond dispute. 
>Please understand that I am in general agreement with most, but not all 
>of your essay. Permit me to play "devil's advocate" as I focus on some 
>issues which deserve greater elaboration and substantiation. 
>The so-called 16th Amendment remains highly relevant to this subject, 
>for a number of important reasons. First of all, since 1913, several 
>federal courts have attempted to isolate the precise effects of a 
>ratified 16th Amendment. Unfortunately for us, when all of these cases 
>are assembled side-by-side, the rulings are not consistent. We are 
>forced to admit the existence of separate groups of court decisions that 
>flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class 
>of indirect, excise taxes. Another group puts income taxes into the 
>class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment 
>did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution. Another 
>group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment relieved income taxes from 
>the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range 
>of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider the 
>conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland: 
>     ...  [T]he   Sixteenth   Amendment   did   not   amend   the
>     Constitution.   The United States Supreme Court by unanimous
>     decisions determined  that the  amendment did  not grant any
>     new powers  of taxation;    that  a  direct  tax  cannot  be
>     relieved from  the constitutional  mandate of apportionment;
>     and the  only effect  of the  amendment was  to overturn the
>     theory advanced in the Pollock case which held that a tax on
>     income, was  in legal  effect, a  tax on  the sources of the
>     income.
>                                  [The Law That Always, page 220]
>Now consider the opposing view of another competent scholar. After much 
>research and much litigation, author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein 
>offers the following concise clarification: 
>     A tax  imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
>     a direct  tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
>     A tax  imposed on  the "income"  derived  from  those  gross
>     receipts is  also a  direct tax on property, but as a result
>     of the  Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
>     legislation calling  for the  apportionment of a tax on that
>     income.
>               [Judicial Income and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]
>The following Appellate ruling is unique among all the relevant federal 
>cases for its clarity and conciseness on this question: 
>     The  constitutional  limitation  upon  direct  taxation  was
>     modified by  the Sixteenth  Amendment insofar as taxation of
>     income was  concerned, but  the amendment  was restricted to
>     income,  leaving   in  effect  the  limitation  upon  direct
>     taxation of principal.
>               [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>Granted, this is not a decision by the Supreme Court, but the decision 
>is useful because it is so clear and concise, and also because it is 
>very representative of that group of rulings which found that a ratified 
>16th Amendment relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. By 
>inference, if income taxes were controlled by the apportionment rule 
>prior to the 16th Amendment, then they must be direct taxes (according 
>to one group of rulings). 
>Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been assembled to 
>prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified. Congress has already 
>been served with several official complaints documenting the evidence 
>against the 16th Amendment, pursuant to the First Amendment guarantee 
>for redress of grievances. Congress has now fallen silent. I am the 
>author of one of these complaints (see The Federal Zone, Appendix J). 
>Relying on one group of rulings, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Shaffer 
>decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the failed 
>ratification: the necessity still exists for an apportionment among the 
>50 States of all direct taxes, and income taxes are direct taxes. 
>Federal courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a ratified 
>16th Amendment. Now that the evidence against its ratification is so 
>overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts are unwilling to 
>identify the effects of the failed ratification. These courts have opted 
>to call it a "political" question, even though it wasn't a "political" 
>question in the years immedNow that the evidence against its 
>ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal courts 
>are unwilling to identify the effects of the failed ratification. These 
>courts have opted to call it a "political" question, even though it 
>wasn't a "political" question in the years immediately after Philander 
>C. Knox declared it ratified. I personally find it hard to believe that 
>the federal courts are incapable of exercising the logic required to 
>isolate the legal effects of the failed ratification. Quite simply, if a 
>ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed ratification proves 
>that X did not happen. What is X? Their "political" unwillingness to 
>exercise basic logic means that the federal courts have abdicated their 
>main responsibility -- to uphold the constitution --
>Let me begin my answer to that question by first quoting from your 
>essay, in the section entitled "Documenting the Truth": 
>     The Constitution  still grants  to the Congress the power of
>     laying an  "apportioned" direct  tax but notwithstanding the
>     advent of  the 16th  Amendment all  "direct" taxes  must  be
>     apportioned.  There is no exception to this rule.
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>In a strictly normative sense, I would certainly agree that this is the 
>way it should be. But, in a practical and empirical sense, is this 
>really the way it is? I say no. In exercising its exclusive authority 
>over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same 
>constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this 
>reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal zone are 
>heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a 
>principle of territorial heterogeneity: the areas within (or inside) the 
>federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or 
>outside) the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules. The 
>Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The 
>Congress rules inside the zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States 
>are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional 
>restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without 
>prejudice to any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a 
>different general class, because these same constitutional restraints 
>simply do not limit Congress inside that zone (see The Federal Zone, 
>chapters 12 and 13). 
>I would never ask you to accept this principle of territorial 
>heterogeneity simply on faith. There is solid case law to substantiate 
>it. You may recall, it is the Hooven case which officially defined the 
>three separate and distinct meanings of the term "United States". This 
>same definition can also be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth 
>Edition. The Supreme Court ruled that this case would be the last time 
>it would address official definitions of the term "United States". 
>Therefore, this ruling must be judicially noticed by the entire American 
>legal (and paralegal) community. In my opinion, the most significant 
>holding in Hooven has to do with territorial heterogeneity, as follows: 
>     ... [T]he  United States** may acquire territory by conquest
>     or by  treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the
>     power of  Congress conferred  by Section  3 of Article IV of
>     the Constitution ....
>     In exercising  this power,  Congress is  not subject  to the
>     same constitutional  limitations, as  when it is legislating
>     for the  United States***. ... And in general the guaranties
>     [sic] of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon
>     the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted
>     for or  over our insular possessions, extend to them only as
>     Congress, in  the exercise  of its  legislative  power  over
>     territory belonging  to the  United States**, has made those
>     guarantees applicable.
>             [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>I have taken the liberty of adding asterisks ("**","***") to the above, 
>in order to identify which meaning of "United States" is being used in 
>each occurrence of the term. Computer users prefer the term "stars" over 
>"asterisks" because it has fewer syllables. 
>Return now to your statement that "there is no exception to this rule" 
>that all direct taxes must be apportioned. Using the Hooven case and 
>others as our guide, it is more accurate to say that all direct taxes 
>must be apportioned whenever they are levied inside the 50 States of the 
>Union. On the other hand, direct taxes need NOT be apportioned whenever 
>they are levied outside the 50 States of the Union, and inside the areas 
>of land over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The 
>authorities for this exclusive legislative jurisdiction are 1:8:17 and 
>4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. You may disagree with this 
>interpretation of the term "exclusive", and that is your right, but in 
>doing so you are disagreeing with the Supreme Court. Evidently, this was 
>not the first, nor the last time the high Court has differed with the 
>Framers of the Constitution. 
>As it turns out, the pivotal case law on this question predates Hooven 
>by 44 years, and predates the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In 
>Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory 
>tariff which Congress had levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or 
>"Porto Rico" as it was spelled then). Congress had recently obtained 
>exclusive legislative jurisdiction over this territory by and predates 
>the so-called 16th Amendment by 12 years. In Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
>244 (1901), the issue was a discriminatory tariff which Congress had 
>levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico (or "Porto Rico" as it was 
>spelled then). Congress had recently obtained exclusive legislative 
>jurisdiction over this territory by virtue of the treaty of peace with 
>Spain. The import duty was obviously not uniform, as required by 1:8:1 
>in the U.S. Constitution, since it was levied specifically against goods 
>The controversy that surrounded Downes vs Bidwell was intense, as 
>evidenced by the flurry of articles that were published in the Harvard 
>Law Review on the subject of "The Insular Cases" as they were called. 
>Perhaps the most lucid criticism of the Downes majority can be found in 
>Justice Harlan's dissent: 
>     The idea prevails with some  --  indeed, it found expression
>     in arguments  at the  bar   --  that we have in this country
>     substantially or practically two national governments;  one,
>     to be  maintained  under  the  Constitution,  with  all  its
>     restrictions;   the  other  to  be  maintained  by  Congress
>     outside and  independently of that instrument, by exercising
>     such powers  as other nations of the earth are accustomed to
>     exercise.
>                         [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>To appreciate how alarmed Justice Harlan had become as a result of this 
>new "theory", consider the following from his dissent: 
>     I take  leave to  say that  if the principles thus announced
>     should ever  receive the  sanction of  a  majority  of  this
>     court, a  radical and  mischievous change  in our  system of
>     government will be the result.  We will, in that event, pass
>     from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected
>     by  a  written  constitution  into  an  era  of  legislative
>     absolutism. ...
>     It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of
>     a government  outside of  the supreme  law of the land finds
>     lodgment in  our constitutional  jurisprudence.   No  higher
>     duty rests  upon this court than to exert its full authority
>     to  prevent   all  violation   of  the   principles  of  the
>     Constitution.
>                         [Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
>                                                 [emphasis added]
>This theory has been documented by patriot John Knox as follows: 
>     This  theory   of  a   government  operating   outside   the
>     Constitution over  its own  territory with  citizens of  the
>     United States  belonging thereto under Article 4, Section 3,
>     Clause 2  of the  Constitution was further confirmed in 1922
>     by the  Supreme Court  in Balzac vs Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 300
>     (EXHIBIT #4) where that Court affirmed that the Constitution
>     does not  apply outside  the limits  of the 50 States of the
>     Union at  page 305 quoting Downes, supra and De Lima, supra.
>     That under  Article IV,  section 3  the "United  States" was
>     given  exclusive   power  over  the  territories  and  their
>     citizens of the "United States" residing therein.
>This quote is from an unpublished brief entitled "Memorandum in Support 
>of Request for the District Court to Consider the T.R.O. and Injunction 
>by the Magistrate" by John Knox, Knox vs U.S., United States District 
>Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, Case No. 
>People will not fully appreciate a central thesis of The Federal Zone if 
>they believe that I agree with the minimal majority by which Downes was 
>decided. I don't agree with the majority; I agree with Harlan. I have 
>simply tried to describe, in lucid language, how Congress is now able to 
>pass legislation which is not restrained by the U.S. Constitution as we 
>know it. This type of legislation is also known as "municipal" law, 
>because Congress is the municipal authority inside the federal zone. 
>When I visited the District of Columbia during my senior year at UCLA as 
>a summer intern in political science, I asked a Capitol guard where I 
>could find city hall. We were standing on the Capitol lawn when he 
>pointed to the Capitol Building and said, "That is City Hall!" 
>The Downes decision sent many shock waves through the American legal 
>community, as evidenced by the deep concern that is expressed by author 
>Littlefield in "The Insular Cases", 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281. He 
>points out how the dissenting minority were of a single mind, while the 
>assenting majority exploited a multiplicity of conflicting and mutually 
>incompatible themes. Just one vote turned the tide. Littlefield's words 
>jump off the page like grease popping off a sizzling griddle. 
>Accordingly, I now believe that we must go back further than 1913 to 
>isolate the major turn in the tide of American constitutional integrity 
>and continuity. Medina in The Silver Bulletin traces the fork to the 
>tragic American Civil War -- the counter revolution -- when Lincoln was 
>murdered by a Rothschild agent, clearing the stage for resurrecting the 
>federalists' heartthrob -- a central bank. For example, in the context 
>of everything we now know about territorial heterogeneity, to the extent 
>that it was a "municipal" statute for the federal zone, the Federal 
>Reserve Act was constitutional under the rubric of the Downes doctrine. 
>The consequences of this doctrine have been profound and far-reaching, 
>just as Harlan predicted. One of Lyndon Johnson's first official acts 
>was to rescind JFK's executive order authorizing the circulation of $4.5 
>billion in interest-free "United States Notes" instead of 
>interest-bearing "Federal Reserve Notes". It is a shame that Oliver 
>Stone did not cover this motive in his movie JFK. All we need to do is 
>connect the dots, and the picture will emerge, clear as day. 
>Specifically, Title 26 is a municipal statute and, as such, it is not 
>subject to the apportionment rule. The territorial scope of Title 26 is 
>the federal zone; the political scope of Title 26 is the set of 
>"persons" who are either citizens and/or residents of that zone: "U.S.** 
>citizens" and "U.S.** residents". The term "U.S.**" in this context 
>refers to the second of the three Hooven definitions, namely, the 
>territory over which the sovereignty of Congress extends, i.e., the 
>federal zone. Incidentally, the flat tax provisions in Title 26 do 
>conform to the uniformity rule because the tax rate is uniform across 
>the 50 States (see A Ticket To Liberty, by Lori Jacques). 
>Since involuntary servitude is now forbidden everywhere in this land, it 
>is possible under law to acquire citizenship in the federal zone at will 
>via naturalization, even if one is a natural born Sovereign State 
>Citizen by birth. It is also possible to abandon citizenship in the 
>federal zone at will, via expatriation. In this context, it is revealing 
>that the Internal Revenue Code has provisions for dealing with "U.S.** 
>citizens" who expatriate to avoid the tax. Similarly, Americans are free 
>to reside wherever they want, under the law. If you choose to reside in 
>the federal zone, you are liable for the income tax, by definition (see 
>26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A) and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(b)). Finally, if you are a 
>"nonresident alien" with respect to the "United States**" as those terms 
>are defined in Title 26 and in Title 42, you are only liable for taxes 
>on income which is effectively connected with a U.S.** trade or 
>business, and on income which derives from U.S.** sources. All other 
>income for nonresident aliens is excluded from the computation of "gross 
>income" as defined (see 26 U.S.C. 872(a)). 
>I hope this discussion has provided you with some valuable feedback 
>concerning the 16th Amendment, direct taxes, the apportionment rule, 
>Title 26 and The Federal Zone. You have, no doubt, heard several 
>references to the "secret jurisdiction" under which the IRS has been 
>operating. I now believe that this jurisdiction is no longer totally a 
>secret; it issues from 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the Constitution. Contrary to 
>the statement quoted above from your essay, there are exceptions to the 
>apportionment rule for direct taxes, and there are exceptions to the 
>uniformity rule for indirect taxes. Inside the federal zone, Congress is 
>free to do pretty much whatever it wants, per the Downes doctrine. 
>Inside the federal zone, it is a legislative democracy, with majority 
>rule. If you want to change the rules, then change the majority. Our 
>best hope for changing those rules rests, therefore, in changing the 
>membership in the House and Senate. As a Sovereign State Citizen, 
>however, I am not subject to those rules, primarily and most importantly 
>because the Constitution created the legislature and We Sovereigns 
>created the Constitution. A Sovereign is never subject to his own 
>creation, unless he volunteers himself into that status, for whatever 
>reason (e.g., the security of socialism a/k/a Social Security). 
>For your edification, the following is a list of Harvard Law Review 
>articles which discuss the insular cases in some detail: 
>     Langdell, "The Status of Our New Territories"
>     12 Harvard Law Review, 365, 371
>     Thayer, "Our New Possessions"
>     12 Harvard Law Review, 464
>     Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court"     
>     15 Harvard Law Review 164
>     Littlefield, "The Insular Cases"
>     15 Harvard Law Review, 169, 281
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