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Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 08:07:11 -0800
To: am-her@juno.com (Rusty Lee)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: USDC v. DCUS (1 of 2)

Rusty and friends,

See if this helps.  See also 28 U.S.C. 132, 
Historical and Statutory Notes:

"... provisions of this title ... with respect
to the organization of the court, shall be 
construed as a continuation of existing law ...."

Act June 25, 1948, Section 2(b).

/s/ Paul Mitchell

p.s.  Part 1 of 2 follows:



Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA REPUBLIC

In Propria Persona

Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation Only






                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                
                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
                                
                                
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,       )  Case No. 95-484-WDB
                                )
     Plaintiff,                 )  NOTICE AND DEMAND
                                )  TO DISMISS FOR LACK
     v.                         )  OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
                                )
Sheila Terese, Wallen,          )  28 U.S.C. 1359;
                                )  FRCP Rules 9(b),
     Defendant.                 )  12(b)(1),(2), 12(h)(3)
________________________________)


COMES NOW  Sheila Terese,  Wallen, Sui  Juris, Citizen of Arizona

state and  Defendant in  the above  entitled matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to  demand an  immediate dismissal  of the  instant

criminal case,  with prejudice, for lack of criminal jurisdiction

to proceed  in the first instance, either over the subject matter

or over  the Person  or property of the Defendant, and to provide

formal Notice  to all  interested parties  of  same.    Defendant

hereby incorporates by reference all authorities cited in Exhibit

"A": Federal  Criminal Jurisdiction, and in Her MEMORANDUM OF LAW

IN SUPPORT  OF CHALLENGE  TO CRIMINAL  JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

[i.e. There  is  none.],  Rules  301,  302:    Federal  Rules  of

Evidence, as if all were set forth fully herein.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 1 of 17

                   KNOW ALL BY THESE PRESENTS:

     I, Sheila  Terese, Wallen,  Sui Juris,  and Defendant in the

above  entitled  matter,  hereby  demand  that  this  territorial

(legislative) tribunal  dismiss the  instant criminal  case  with

prejudice because  it lacks exclusive jurisdiction over the exact

geographical  location   where  the   alleged  criminal  activity

mentioned in  the indictment  is alleged  to have taken place.  I

was not  arrested  in  any  fort,  magazine,  arsenal,  dockyard,

"needful building",  or other  federal enclave within the Arizona

Republic, nor  was My  Person or  My  private  property  situated

within any of the aforementioned federal areas (a/k/a the federal

zone).

     A very  recent U.S.  Supreme Court decision, dated April 26,

1995, addressed  the issue  of exclusive legislative jurisdiction

of the  Congress, and  the  powers  of  the  federal  government.

Justice Thomas,  in a  concurring majority  opinion  in  U.S.  v.

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), 131 L.Ed.2d 626, very clearly says:

     Indeed, on  this crucial  point, the  majority  and  Justice
     Breyer  [dissenting]   agree  in  principle:    the  Federal
     Government has  nothing approaching  a police power.  Id. at
     page 64.

     Justice Thomas  went on  to discuss "a regulation of police"

at page 86, wherein he stated as follows:

     U.S. v.  DeWitt, 76  U.S. 41, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L.Ed 593 (1870)
     marked the first time the court struck down a federal law as
     exceeding the  power conveyed by the commerce clause.   In a
     2 page  opinion, the  court  invalidated  a  nationwide  law
     prohibiting all  sales of naptha, and illuminating oils.  In
     so doing,  the court  remarked that the commerce clause "has
     always been  understood as  limited by  its terms;  and as a
     virtual denial  of any  power to interfere with the internal
     trade and business of the separate states."  Id. at page 44.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 2 of 17

     The law  in question  was "plainly  a regulation of police,"

which could  have constitutional  application only where Congress

had exclusive authority, such as the territories.  Id. pp. 44-45.

     Earlier in  the text,  Justice Thomas, Id. at page 85, said,

"Even before  Gibbons, Chief  Justice Marshall,  writing for  the

Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat 264, 5 L.Ed 257

(1821), noted that Congress had no general right to punish murder

committed within  any of the states," and that Congress could not

punish felonies  generally.   However, Congress  could enact laws

for places  where it  enjoyed plenary  powers, for instance, over

the District  of Columbia,  and whatever effect ordinary murders,

or robbery,  or gun  possession might have on interstate commerce

was irrelevant to the question of Congressional power.

     The  first   Federal  Criminal   Act  did  not  establish  a

nationwide prohibition  against murder  and the like.  See Act of

April 30,  1790, Chapter  9 [1  Stat. 112];   rather,  only  when

committed in United States territories and possessions, or on the

high  seas.    With  the  single  exceptions  of  treason  and/or

counterfeiting, and  notwithstanding any  of  the  effects  which

murder, robbery,  and gun  possession might  have  on  interstate

commerce,  Congress   understood  that  it  could  not  establish

nationwide prohibitions.

     Justice Thomas  summed up  his opinion dramatically with the

statement quoted in part herein:

     If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a
     police power to the Federal Government ....

     (1)  "All federal  crimes are statutory."  Doble, "Venue and

Criminal Cases in the United States District Court," Virginia Law

Review, 287,  289 (1926).   "  ...[O]n the  other hand, since all


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 3 of 17

Federal Crimes are statutory and all criminal prosecutions in the

Federal territorial  courts  are  based  on  Acts  of  Congress,"

Federal Rules  of Criminal  Procedure  Rule  26,  in  "taking  of

testimony," notes  of Advisory  Committee on Rules, paragraph no.

2.

     (2)  Rule 54,  Application  and  Exception,  paragraph  (c),

Federal Rules  of Criminal  Procedure, "Act of Congress" includes

any act  of Congress  locally applicable  to and  in force in the

District of  Columbia, in  Puerto Rico,  in a  territory or in an

insular possession.

     (3)  There is  no presumption  in favor of jurisdiction, and

the basis  for jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown.  Hanford

v. Davis, 16 S.Ct. 1051, 163 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157 (1896).

     (4)  See exact  wording of  Article I, Section 8, Clause 17,

Constitution for  the United  States of  America, which  grant of

authority does  not extend  over every  square  inch  of  the  48

contiguous Union States.

     (5)  In principle, the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of

the federal government is not addressed to subject matter, but to

geographical location.  See U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 336

(1818).

     (6)  It is  axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove

territorial jurisdiction  over a  crime in  order  to  sustain  a

conviction therefor.  U.S. v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475 at 481 (1974).

The jurisdictional  challenge issue  can never  be waived  by the

Accused, nor  acquiesced by  the Accused,  in the  absence  of  a

positive showing  upon the  record that  jurisdiction was clearly

and unambiguously established.


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 4 of 17

     (7)  Without proof  of the requisite ownership or possession

by the  United States,  the crime has not been made out.  U.S. v.

Watson, 80  Fed. Supp. 649 (1948, E.D. Va.).  Only in America can

We be forced into the status of subjects of a foreign corporation

by fiat  legislation, and the stroke of a CEO's pen, at the point

of a  gun, and  thereby be  immediately divested  of standing  in

judicio, and  declared to  be debtors  and  enemies  of  our  Own

government.

     (8)  In criminal  prosecutions, where the federal government

is the  moving party, it must not only establish ownership of the

property upon  which the  crime was  allegedly committed,  but it

must also  produce documentation  that the  state has ceded to it

jurisdiction over that property.  It was held by the U.S. Supreme

Court in  the case  of Fort  Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Iowa, 114

U.S. 525 at 531 (1885):

     Where  lands   are  acquired   without  such   consent,  the
     possession  of   the   United   States,   unless   political
     jurisdiction be  ceded to  them in some other way, is simply
     that of an ordinary proprietor.

     (9)  No jurisdiction  exists in the United States to enforce

federal criminal  laws until  consent to accept jurisdiction over

acquired lands  has been  published and  filed in  behalf of  the

United States,  as provided  in 40  U.S.C. 255, and the fact that

the  state   authorized  the  government  to  take  and  exercise

jurisdiction was  immaterial.   See Adams  v. United  States, 319

U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943).

     (10) All courts  of justice  are duty-bound to take judicial

notice of  the territorial extent of jurisdiction, although those

acts are  not formally  put into  evidence, nor  in  accord  with

pleadings.   Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80 (1890).


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 5 of 17

     (11) Where a  federal court  is without  jurisdiction of the

offense, judgment  of conviction  of the court and/or the jury is

void ab  initio, on  its face.  Bauman v. U.S., 156 F.2d 534 (5th

Cir. 1946).

     (12) Federal criminal  jurisdiction is  never presumed;   it

must always  be proven;   and  it can  never be  waived.  U.S. v.

Rogers, 23 Fed. 658 (D.C., W.D. Ark., 1885).

     (13) The federal courts are limited both by the Constitution

and by  Acts of  Congress.  Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

98 S.Ct. 2396, 437 U.S. 365, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978).

     (14) The jurisdiction  of federal  courts is  defined in the

Constitution at  Article III  for judicial  courts;  in Article I

for legislative  courts;   and  in  Article  IV  for  territorial

courts.   Some courts  created by  Acts  of  Congress  have  been

referred  to  as  "Constitutional  Courts,"  whereas  others  are

regarded as  "Legislative Tribunals."   O'Donoghue  v. U.S.,  289

U.S. 516 (1933), 77 L.Ed 1356, 53 S.Ct. 74;  Mookini v. U.S., 303

U.S. 201 at 205 (1938), 82 L.Ed 748, 58 S.Ct. 543.

     (15) Legislative court  judges  do  not  enjoy  Article  III

guarantees;   "inherently judicial"  tasks must  be performed  by

judges deriving  power under  Article III.   See U.S. v. Sanders,

641 F.2d  659 (1981), cert. den. 101 S.Ct. 3055, 452 U.S. 918, 69

L.Ed 422.

     The United  States District  Court creation  and composition

were accomplished  by Acts of Congress on June 25, 1948 [62 Stat.

895], and November 13, 1963 [77 Stat. 331], currently codified at

28  U.S.C.   132;    and  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  previously

demonstrated herein,  i.e. Chapter  85 of  Title 28, lists civil,


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 6 of 17

admiralty, maritime, patent, bankruptcy, etc.,  and does not once

list, mention, or describe any criminal jurisdiction.  It just is

not there, so don't bother looking for it!

     (16) Acts of  Congress creating  the United  States District

Courts do  not vest  said territorial tribunals with any criminal

jurisdiction;   these courts  have only  such jurisdiction  as is

conferred upon  them by  Act of  Congress under the Constitution.

See Hubbard  v. Ammerman,  465 F.2d  1169 (5th Cir., 1972), cert.

den. 93 S.Ct. 967, 410 U.S. 910, 35 L.Ed.2d 272.

     (17) The United  States District  Court is  not a  court  of

general jurisdiction,  and has  no other  power bestowed  upon it

except as  prescribed by Congress.  See Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d

159 (6th Cir., 1976), cert. den. 97 S.Ct. 1106, 429 U.S. 1093, 51

L.Ed.2d 539.

     (18) It is  apparent that  the United  States District Court

for the  District of Arizona was created and established under 28

U.S.C. 132,  and its  jurisdiction  is  defined  and  limited  by

Chapter 85 of Title 28, United States Code.

     (19) The courts  of appropriate  jurisdiction for violations

of Title  18 U.S.C.  are designated at Section 3231, specifically

naming them as "district courts of the United States" [sic].

     (20) There is  a distinct  and definite difference between a

"United States  District Court"  and a  "District  Court  of  the

United States".   The words "District Court of the United States"

commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III

of the  Constitution, not  the legislative courts which have long

been  the   courts  of   the  Territories.     See  International

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 7 of 17

U.S. 237  at 241  (1952), 72  S.Ct. 235,  96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska

536.

     (21) The term "District Court of the United States" commonly

describes Article  III courts  or "courts  of the United States",

and not  legislative courts  of the  territories.   See  American

Insurance Co.  v. 356  Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed

242;   International Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union v.

Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93

L.Ed. 1082,  69 S.Ct.  641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,

69 S.Ct. 936.

     (22) Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the

United States  is a  part of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  phrase

"court of  the United  States" when  used in a federal statute is

generally construed  as not  referring to  "territorial  courts."

See Balzac  v. Porto  Rico, 258  U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.

343, 66 L.Ed. 627.  In Balzac, the High Court stated:

     The United States District Court is not a true United States
     court established  under Article  III of the Constitution to
     administer the  judicial power  of the United States therein
     conveyed.    It  is  created  by  virtue  of  the  sovereign
     congressional faculty,  granted under Article IV, Section 3,
     of  that   instrument,  of  making  all  needful  rules  and
     regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
     States.  The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
     United  States   courts  in   offering  an   opportunity  to
     nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
     influence,  does   not  change   its  character   as   amere
     territorial court.  [emphasis added]

     The distinction  within the dual nature of the federal court

system is  also noted  in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states that

the United  States District  Court for  the Canal Zone shall have

jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the United

States, of  offenses  against  the  laws  of  the  United  States

committed upon the high seas."


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 8 of 17

     This distinction is the reason why federal jurisdiction over

prosecutions  is   more  than   a  technical   concept;    it  is

Constitutional requirement.   See  U.S. v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180,

aff'd 383  U.S. 169  (1966), 86  S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681, cert.

den. 87 S.Ct. 44, 134, and 385 U.S. 846, 17 L.Ed.2d 77, 117.

     (23) Besides the recent Lopez decision, it is interesting to

note that  at least two other courts, i.e. United States District

Courts, have come to the same or similar conclusions.  See U.S.A.

v. Wilson,  Stambaughr, Skott,  Ketchum, Braun,  and Ballin, Case

No. 94-CR-140 (March 16, 1995) (U.S.D.C. Wisconsin);  and U.S. v.

Kearns,  Case  No.  SA-95-CR-201  (October  6,  1995)  (U.S.D.C.,

Texas).

     (24) Interestingly enough,  in a bankruptcy case in the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court,  Middle District  of Pennsylvania (Chapter 13),

Case No.  5-94-00839, titled  In re:  Francis Patrick  Farrell v.

IRS/BATF, the  alleged debtor  sued out a compulsory counterclaim

against the  IRS/BATF after  the alleged  creditor submitted  its

proof of claim.

     The counterclaim showed an extent of corruption unparalleled

in American  history, to which agencies of the federal government

will  often   resort,  specifically  by  placing  a  "T-Code"  on

someone's Individual Master File ("IMF").

     In this  way,  the  IRS/BATF  used  Admiralty  and  Maritime

forfeiture laws  to deprive  a  State  Citizen  of  property  and

assets, and  to mis-classify  Him  as  a  "high  level  narcotics

trafficker."   This occurred on November 17,1995!  Why?  See U.S.

v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492 at 502, footnote 2 (1993).


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 9 of 17

                             SUMMARY

     The  United   States  District   Courts  have   no  criminal

jurisdiction whatsoever  to prosecute  a State Citizen within one

of the  50 States  of the Union which comprises the United States

of America,  until and unless Congress says so.  Until and unless

the federal government can prove ownership over said geographical

land mass,  particularly that parcel of land which is the private

real property of the Defendant, the United States District Courts

have no  criminal jurisdiction  whatsoever within  the  50  Union

States.   Not a  single Act  of Congress  vests the United States

District Courts,  as distinct  from District Courts of the United

States, with anything but "civil" authority.  There is absolutely

no criminal jurisdiction vested in said territorial tribunals.


                         REMEDY DEMANDED

     Therefore, Defendant  hereby demands  that this  Article  IV

legislative  tribunal   establish   exclusive   jurisdiction   by

producing certified documents consisting of the following:

     (a)  Documentation   showing    "United   States"   (federal

government) ownership  of each  and every  geographical  location

mentioned in the instant indictment, wherein the alleged criminal

activity took place;

     (b)  Documentation  from   the  Arizona   Legislature  which

provides evidence  of a  cession by  Arizona  state  surrendering

jurisdiction to the "United States" (federal government) over the

same geographical location as stated in (a) above;

     (c)  Documentation pursuant  to Title 40 U.S.C. 255, wherein

the "United States" (federal government) accepted jurisdiction to

the same  geographical location  as  stated  in  (a)  above,  or,


 Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
                          Page 10 of 17

========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.    : Counselor at Law, federal witness
email:       [address in tool bar]   : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU
web site:  http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
             Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this
========================================================================


      


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