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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 16:31:27 -0800
To: minutemn@pcl.net (W. M. Kemp)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: Memorandum of Law in support of Habeas Corpus (2 of 3)
Cc: habeascorpus@hotmail.com

[This text is formatted in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]



from whom the Courts' authority is derived, and a substitution in

lieu thereof is being used -- that of the "will of attorneys."

     Bills of rights are, in their origin, reservations of rights
     not surrendered to the prince.  Hamilton, Federalist Papers,
     No. 84.


The right  to have  a "friend" plead one's case, or to assist one

in Court, is a Common Law right secured by the Sixth Amendment.

     History is  clear that  the  first  ten  amendments  to  the
     Constitution were  adopted  to  secure  certain  common  law
     rights  of  the  people  against  invasion  by  the  Federal
     Government.   Bell v.  Hood, 71  F. Supp.,  813, 816  (1947)
     U.S.D.C., So. Dist. Calif.


Our Founding  Fathers spoke  and wrote  in the  vernacular of the

Common Law, and "Counsel" was the word they chose.  The facts are

conclusive  on   this  point,   and  the   record  supports  this

contention.    Interpretation  of  the  word  "Counsel"  to  mean

"attorney only" is a departure from the safeguards of the Bill of

Rights.

     The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier, to protect the
     individual against  arbitrary exactions of ... legislatures,
     (and) courts  ... it  is  the  primary  distinction  between
     democratic and  totalitarian way.  Re Stoller, Supreme Court
     of Florida, en banc, 36 So.2d 443, 445 (1948).


A more  recent confirmation  of fundamental Rights of the Accused

says:

     Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there
     can be  no rule-making  or legislation  which would abrogate
     them.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1968)


     Even though  the Miranda  decision  referred  to  the  Fifth

Amendment right in toto, the above stated principle is of general

application, wherein the word "rights" is not qualified.

/
/


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 16 of 32


                               II

                        DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
                    TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

     In Tarlowski  supra, the Court said, in suppressing evidence

at the request of Tarlowski's motion:

     When a  federal official's  interference with  the right  of
     free association takes the form of limiting the ability of a
     criminal suspect  to consult  with and  be accompanied  by a
     person upon  whom he  relies for  advice and  protection, he
     gravely transgresses.   For  these reasons,  the  Motion  to
     suppress must be granted.


It was  in this  case that Tarlowski was denied the Counsel of an

accountant, not of a lawyer.

     Defendant has  a right  under the  First Amendment freely to

associate with  whom  he  pleases  in  his  defense  and  in  its

preparation and presentation, so long as such is respectful, with

decorum, and  without contempt  for orderly  rules  of  procedure

which do  not deprive  one  of  Rights  guaranteed  by  the  U.S.

Constitution.   To deny  this Right  is also  to deny  his  Fifth

Amendment Right  to Due  Process of  Law,  which  is  actually  a

guarantee of fundamental fairness.


                               III

                  DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PETITION
                    FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES


    The First Amendment states, in pertinent part:

     Congress shall  make no  law ...  abridging ... the right of
     the people  ... to  petition the Government for a redress of
     grievances.


Defendant asks,  "How can I maintain my maximum Right to petition

for redress  of grievances, if that person whom I choose to speak

for me is not permitted to do so?"


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 17 of 32


     If Congress  passes a  statute requiring  a federal court to

abide a  statute of  the State in which it sits, and said statute

of a  state purports  to make  it a  crime for  a Defendant to be

represented by a non-attorney, then Congress has effectively done

not only  what the U.S. Constitution does not authorize it to do,

but it has done what is also expressly forbidden.

     If such  is the  case, then  Congress has made a "law" which

frustrates the  Right of  The  People,  and  the  Defendant,  "to

petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

     Of what  use  is  the  Right  to  Petition  for  Redress  of

Grievances  if   the  Defendant   is  personally  handicapped  by

government?    This  handicap arises  because the Defendant needs

assistance in  his petitioning,  and yet  he is  limited by a bar

association, or  a state,  or a court which says that a competent

"friend" cannot  be permitted to speak for the Petitioner because

said "friend"  has not been brainwashed in certain "approved" law

schools.   It is  in such law schools that the deprivation of the

fundamental Rights,  although set  forth in plain and unambiguous

language  in  the  U.S.  Constitution  itself,  is  not  "settled

doctrine."

     The "licensed attorneys" and "attorney-judges" say that "The

Constitution is  what the Supreme Court says it is."  What if the

Congress passes  a law  saying that  any bureaucrat  can rape any

layman's wife  and the Supreme Court says, "Yes, that's perfectly

in harmony with the Constitution?"

     Then, are we The People to stand for it?  Who gave them said

authority?   Now, what  should The  People do  who  have  such  a

Congress and  such a  Supreme Court?   Are the lower court judges


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 18 of 32


brave enough  to challenge  it, or are they "bound" to follow the

higher Court judges?

     And where  is the  member of the bar, the licensed attorney,

who now  steps forward  and announces  that the  Supreme Court is

mistaken?   Where does  his license  go to?  Now, who is going to

permit him  to appear in Court if he doesn't buckle down and stop

rocking the establishment?

     Obviously, an  extreme example  has been  used;   but it  is

significant.   Laymen would  not have to stand for such nonsense.

Licensed attorneys ... who knows?

     That  laymen   should  be  subjected  to  a  "drifting"  and

"unstable" Constitution -- which happens to be what some justices

"think it  is" at the moment -- can be very frustrating, and that

a jury  cannot hear  a "Counsel"  who is  not beholden  to such a

damnable floating  doctrine, are indeed a denial of "the Right to

Petition (effectively)  for Redress  of Grievances."  To preserve

justice, to  preserve the  semblance  of  a  fair  trial  and  an

impartial  jury,  let  the  Defendant  petition  for  Redress  of

Grievances to  the jury  through "Counsel  of his choice," who is

not beholden  to  a  corrupt  and  degenerate  system  which  has

perverted the  very Law by which it pretends to rule and which it

pretends to protect and uphold.

     Defendant believes  that true religion guarantees freedom of

choice, or  freedom to  choose, to  elect, and  to select, taking

responsibility for the consequences of said choices.

     Defendant further  believes that  he has  the right  to help

others and, in turn, to be helped by those willing voluntarily to

answer his  call for  assistance.   In this case, he particularly


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 19 of 32


means in  the Courtroom  where a  hostile government is violating

its own  laws and  trampling upon  the Rights  of  the  Sovereign

People, which its officers are sworn to protect.

     When all  the mighty  force of an all powerful government is

arrayed against  a lone  individual who  has the courage to point

out  the  government's  inequities,  said  individual  should  be

entitled, most  of  all,  to  the  protection  of  his  religious

convictions and rights.

     Under the  First Amendment,  the right of conscience and the

right to  believe, as  long as the same does not trample upon the

rights  of   others,  is   the  number  one  right  protected  by

government.  In pertinent part, the First Amendment states:

     Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
     religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ....


Defendant's religious  conviction, again,  calls for freedom from

oppression  and   freedom  from  soul-stifling  special  interest

legislation slapped  on a  freedom-loving individual on behalf of

self-serving perpetrators  of special  advantages  to  the  legal

profession, at  the expense  of the long-suffering victims of the

same.  Let the legal profession compete like men with the Counsel

Defendant chooses for his defense, and for the proper exercise of

his religious  Rights, chief  among which  is the  freedom of any

choice which does not trample upon the Rights of others.



                               IV

              DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION

     Defendant's  right  to  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is

guaranteed through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment:


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 20 of 32


     The due  process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees to
     each citizen  the equal protection of the laws and prohibits
     a denial  thereof by  any  Federal  official.    Bolling  v.
     Sharpe, 327 U.S. 497


Defendant asks  the Court  to take  Judicial Notice of an article

from Newsweek, September 2, 1974, which tells how a layman, James

Yager, handled the legal problems of 3,500 clients (see paragraph

1).   The same  paragraph also  speaks of  "His most recent court

appearance," which  took place  in Atlanta.    It  describes  how

"Yager paced the courtroom floor," as he addressed the jury.  Mr.

Yager is engaging in the practice of law, which is his Right as a

Layman, or  laymen, to  assist him  in his  defense, if  they  so

desire.   To deny  this motion  is to  give prisoners more Rights

than to  a Free and Natural Person.  Such inequity before the law

is intolerable.

     Said article mentions various others who have adopted law as

an avocation  and goes  on to mention a Mr. Green, another former

inmate now  on parole,  and says that:  "Green is a familiar face

in the Boston courtrooms, where he maintains his legal activities

by submitting  amicus briefs  for other  felons."   It  would  be

interesting to  know if  Mr. Green and Yeager, like Mr. Jefferson

and James  X, are  also black  men, and if therefore, fundamental

Rights are only available to black men.

     In both United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389

U.S. 217,  and NAACP  v.  Button,  371  U.S.  415,  and  also  in

Brotherhood of  Railhood Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.

1 (1964),  it was  held  that  a  State  may  not  pass  statutes

prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law or to interfere with

the Right to freedom of speech, secured by the First Amendment.

/


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 21 of 32


     Defendant is  entitled to  equal protection  of the laws and

that includes his right to speak through whom he pleases, when he

pleases.   The only  reasonable condition  is that the decorum of

the Court and the rules not in conflict with individual Rights be

maintained;   otherwise there  can be  no valid  denial  of  this

inalienable and legal Right.  Defendant is agreeable to this, and

has every  intention of  obeying the proper rules and maintaining

the decorum of the Court.  To do otherwise is unthinkable.

     Defendant herein  also believes  that it  is  vital  to  his

defense to  seek whatever assistance he can trust, and that if he

decides to  be assisted by either licensed or unlicensed Counsel,

he has  every Right  to do  so.  If the Defendant believes that a

combination of  both may  be to  his advantage,  to deny him this

Right would constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary interference

with his defense, by denying him his fundamental Rights freely to

associate with  whom he  chooses;   to freedom  of  speech;    to

freedom to Petition for Redress of Grievances;  and his religious

Right of conscience and freedom of choice, without which religion

is worth but little.

     Defendant also  asks the  Court to take Judicial Notice that

other Defendants  in criminal  cases are  allowed to  plan  their

defenses without interference by the Courts, and Defendant herein

claims that same Right.

     Surely, we  cannot  have  special  laws  for  attorneys  and

special grants  of privilege  to them  as a class when these very

same  privileges   are  denied   all   other   citizens.      The

Constitutional prohibitions against Titles of Nobility in Article

I, Section 9, clause 7, and in the original Thirteenth Amendment,


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 22 of 32


are  violated   when  "attorney"   becomes  a  Title  of  special

privileges, i.e.  "Nobility."   We must  all have equal access to

the Courts.   Presently,  only those attorneys have access to the

Courts whom  the Courts  approve and, as a result, all "approved"

attorneys are considered Officers of the Court.

     Where does  the defendant  go when  he does  not wish  to be

defended by  an Officer  of the  Court?   To use the power of the

Court to  force the  defense to retain an Officer of the Court at

the defense  table offends  the sensibilities of the Defendant to

the very  core.   Defendant may  wish voluntarily  to  select  an

attorney among  his Counsels, but this Defendant believes that he

should not  be forced  to do  so.   Defendant is  simply  seeking

freedom of  choice in the matter of whether he has no Counsel and

represents himself,  or uses  licensed legal  Counsel (attorney),

mixed Counsel (attorneys and laymen) or lay Counsel only.

     The "stealthy  encroachment" upon  Defendant's  Right  to  a

Counsel who  is not  licensed by  the Bar  is  the  result  of  a

monopoly  of   the  legal  establishment,  both  in  and  out  of

government, State and Federal, to "protect" their "price fixing";

to maintain  artificially high legal fees;  to educate the chosen

few in  law schools  maintained largely  at public  expense;   to

protect attorneys  from competition  from  those  who  know  that

attorneys have  obstructed the  U.S. Constitution  and  left  the

People at  the mercy  of a  swarm  of  bureaucrats  with  endless

attorney-promoted regulations and laws which make "crimes" out of

the exercise  of natural  and Constitutionally  protected Rights,

wherein the  attorney-controlled  government  can  prosecute  the

Sovereign Citizen  and force  him into  the waiting, outstretched


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 23 of 32


arms  of  his  attorney  "brotherhood,"  who  will  "advise"  and

"defend" him for a considerable fee.

     Little wonder  that People  are fed  up with  the profession

when it  is full  of licensed  "Haldemans, Erlichmans, Mitchells,

and  Deans."    Little  wonder  many  People  almost  vomit  when

contemplating what  attorneys have  done  to  this  once  mighty,

powerful, and independent Republic.

     Legal fees  come too  high for  many average Citizens.  Yet,

the same  average Citizen  cannot turn  to laymen who may be well

versed in the necessary legal area, and this restricts the Courts

to attorneys  and those  who can  afford them.  Laymen who cannot

afford attorneys  must suffer  along as  best they can.  It is as

unjust a  system of  justice as one could conjure up.  Of course,

some persons  may qualify  for a  Public Defender.   That is like

being alone in a pit of cobras, and someone comes along and wants

to throw  in another  cobra.   Under those circumstances, what is

needed is  a mongoose  (read "Counsel  of Choice"),  not  another

cobra.  Perhaps the STAR CHAMBERS weren't so bad after all.


                                V

             DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH

     Defendant has  not only  the Right to speak for himself, but

also to  speak through  whom he pleases.  This is inherent in the

First Amendment  Right to  freedom of  speech.   It is also self-

evident as  a part  of the Natural Rights Doctrine.  Those Rights

which are  called inherent  and inalienable  are outlined  in the

Declaration of  Independence,  which  antedates  all  government.

They are  natural or  God-given,  rather  than  government-given,

rights.   Defendant  points  out  that  he  does  not  claim  any


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 24 of 32


"attorney-given" rights,  but demands that his God-given, Natural

Rights not be infringed upon.

     This  fundamental  Right  of  freedom  of  speech  has  been

referred to  previously, but  Defendant  wishes  to  set  it  out

separately to  emphasize it to the Court, and herein refers again

to United  Mine Workers  v. Illinois Bar Association supra, NAACP

v. Button  supra, and  the Brotherhood  of Railroad  Trainmen  v.

Virginia State Bar supra, in support of said Right.

     It is  indicative that  the words  in  the  First  Amendment

embrace freedom "of" speech, and not just freedom "to" speak, and

while Defendant does not wish to prolong this Brief by a detailed

discussion of  the difference  between the  two terms,  he simply

wishes to  bring  to  the  Court's  attention  that  there  is  a

difference, and that its application is obvious.

                               VI

                  DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF COUNSEL
                RESULTS IN A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

     Defendant's request  for the Court to recognize his Right to

non-attorney Counsel  in lieu  of, or  in addition  to,  attorney

Counsel, would  mean that  the Court  would have  to rule  during

trial on  a motion  regarding Defendant's  Right to  non-attorney

assistance, including that of assistant spokesman.

     If presiding Judge of this Honorable Court has, in the past,

ever been  a member  of any  Bar Association or is, at present, a

member of  a Bar  Association, or has close friends or associates

connected  with  a  Bar  Association,  then  Defendant  finds  it

difficult  to   see  how  the  Court  could  possibly  render  an

unprejudiced and impartial ruling on Defendant's motion regarding

his Right to non-attorney Counsel.


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 25 of 32


     It appears  to Defendant that the Court would find itself at

variance with  his own  standards, mainly the Cannons of Judicial

Ethics, No. 29, which states:

     A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any
     judicial act  in which  his personal interests are involved.
     If he  has a personal litigation in the court of which he is
     judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but
     he should,  of course, refrain from any judicial act in such
     controversy.

     It  is   apparent  to  the  Defendant  that  the  denial  of

Defendant's motion  herein would  call for  the thinking,  on the

part of  most reasonable  persons, that  the denial was based, at

least in  part, on a conflict of interest and upon a "hardship of

the case," meaning upon the unfortunate Bar Associations.

     Granting the  motion, however,  could not  be interpreted as

being a  conflict of  interest, but  rather, granting  the motion

would occur  despite personal  interest and in favor of fairness,

of due process, and the justice to which the Sovereign Citizen of

this Republic is entitled under the Sixth Amendment.


                               VII

                   FEDERAL COURT'S ENFORCEMENT
                OF PRACTICE-OF-LAW STATE STATUTE
           ABRIDGES FIRST, NINTH, AND TENTH AMENDMENTS

     The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:

     The powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the
     Constitution, nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are
     reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The power  to abrogate  the Rights  mentioned herein has not been

delegated to  the United States nor to any State through the U.S.

Constitution.  Such a power is an undelegated colorable "office."

     Nothing  in  the  U.S.  Constitution  of  this  Union  state

authorizes a  delegation of  power to  the state  to  thwart  and

frustrate the  foregoing  Rights,  i.e.  freedom  of  speech,  of


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 26 of 32


religion, of  assembly, of petitioning for redress of grievances,

of due  process, of the Right to contract, and of equal treatment

under the law.

     Therefore, assuming  the foregoing is true, then the "power"

remains with  the People,  who are the Sovereigns in this country

as heretofore  pointed out.  Therefore, the Defendant retains the

power for  his choice  of a spokesman in Court, "any Thing in the

Constitution   or   Laws   of   any   State   to   the   Contrary

notwithstanding."   See Article VI, Clause 2.  Regardless of this

state's  statutes   or  any  arbitrary  rule  making,  it  cannot

invalidate the  Defendant's fundamental  Rights protected  by the

U.S. Constitution.    Said  pretended  right  to  "regulate"  the

"practice of law" must fall, or recede, when placed alongside the

Defendant's fundamental  Right to  a fair  trial by  an impartial

jury, with  due  process,  freedom  of  speech,  and  freedom  of

contract, as heretofore demonstrated.

     It is  impossible to  delegate to  another  that  which  the

delegator does  not himself possess.  Defendant does not have the

right to  compel the  inadequate representation  of another  and,

therefore,  this  Defendant  is  powerless  to  delegate  such  a

tyrannical power  to a  legislature, whether or not controlled by

attorneys or any Bar association.

     To summarize  the foregoing,  the Tenth  Amendment prohibits

this  State   and  its   Courts  from   restricting   Defendant's

fundamental Right  to a  non-attorney spokesman  in court.   Such

power is  not given  to the  State by  either the  U.S. or by the

State Constitutions.   Therefore, in civil cases, the Legislature

has usurped, at the prodding of attorneys, the so-called Right to


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 27 of 32


institute a  statute prohibiting  a Defendant,  in a  prosecution

against him  by his  government, from  relying upon  a  preferred

spokesman of  trust and  confidence.  In criminal cases, there is

no valid  reason, statute,  or Court  ruling that  can alter  the

fundamental Right  to Counsel,  and the  Courts, in  denying said

spokesman, are arbitrarily usurping Defendant's Right.

     The Ninth  Amendment  reserves  all  non-enumerated  Rights.

They are  not to  be denied or disparaged, though not enumerated.

The mention  and enumeration  of the  Right to  Counsel under the

Supreme authority  of the  Sixth Amendment cannot be construed to

deny or disparage the Right to that Counsel being a non-attorney,

or a  non-member of  any Bar  Association licensed  to only  plea

bargain and lose.

     It would  appear  that  any  decent  person  would  have  no

difficulty agreeing  with the  above, and  that any  other ruling

would indeed be "frivolous" and without constitutional authority.

     Again, imposing restrictions on Defendant's Counsel violates

and circumvents Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights.  In addition,

it imposes  cruel and  unusual punishment  upon the  Defendant by

forcing him  to seek  legal assistance,  when and if he needs it,

from those whom he either does not trust or cannot afford.

                              VIII

                 DENIAL OF NON-ATTORNEY COUNSEL
                      VIOLATES CIVIL RIGHTS

     Denial of  Defendant's desire  for  a  non-attorney  of  his

choice is  also a  deprivation of his Civil Rights under color of

law, in  violation of Defendant's fundamental Rights as protected

by 42  U.S.C. 1983,  1985, and  1986.   See Owens  v. The City of

Independence.


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 28 of 32


                           CONCLUSION

     Any denial of Counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which

is specifically  prohibited by  the Sixth  Amendment.   The Right

recognized  therein   says  nothing  about  only  "court-approved

counsel," and  that fundamental  Right is  in no way qualified or

limited.

     The U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S.

713, 715,  that if  a statute  is part  of an  unlawful scheme to

reach a  prohibited result, then "... the statute must fail ...."

This was again upheld in McCallen v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620,

630.  Legislators, whether Federal or State, may not restrict the

Courts only to attorneys in order to deny effective assistance of

Counsel to  any Defendant  who evinces a desire to be represented

or  assisted   by  a   "friend,"  in  preference  to  a  licensed

"attorney."   What cannot  be done  by the  front door  cannot be

lawfully done by way of the back door.

     Legislators who  pass laws  do not have to be attorneys, nor

do  those   who  execute   the  law,  i.e.  Sheriffs,  Governors,

Presidents, etc.   Even  the Justices  of the  U.S. Supreme Court

need not  be licensed  attorneys.   To exclude  the  People  from

defending their  "friends" in the Courts turns said Courts into a

playground  for   the  legal  establishment,  and  is  a  blatant

violation of  the Defendant's  fundamental Right  to  Counsel  of

choice, due  process of  law, and equal protection under the law.

Justice Brandeis said:


     Discrimination  is  the  act  of  treating  differently  two
     persons or  things under  like circumstances.  National Life
     Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 630.
/
/


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 29 of 32


     As far  back as  1886, the  U.S. Supreme Court was concerned

with the  unjust and  illegal discriminations  which were running

rampant.   The  Court  frowned  upon  law  administered  with  an

"unequal hand":

     ...  [S]o   as  practically   to  make  unjust  and  illegal
     discrimination  between  persons  in  similar  circumstances
     material to  their rights,  the denial  of equal  justice is
     still within  the prohibition  of the Constitution.  Yick Wo
     v. Hopkins supra.

Therefore, the  Courts cannot  be the  exclusive territory  of  a

legal "elite corps," but must be open to all the Sovereign People

alike --  on an  equal basis,  providing due  process of  Law and

equal protection under that Law.

     The Ninth  and Tenth  Amendments also prohibit the denial of

Counsel of  choice.   Nowhere has  Defendant or  his predecessors

delegated such  restrictive powers to the United States or to any

of the  Union states,  and if  the Court will closely examine the

Ninth and  Tenth Amendments,  it will  find  that  the  Right  to

Counsel of  choice, such  as Defendant  herein  claims,  is  also

secured in  the penumbra  of these  Amendments, particularly  the

Ninth Amendment,  which is protected in the states.  Roe v. Wade,

41 L.W.  4213 (1973);   Shapiro  v. U.S., 641, 394 US 618 (1966);

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).

     Speaking of  controlling constitutional  law, as  opposed to

mere statute law, Chief Justice Marshall said:

     Those  then,   who  controvert   this  principle,  that  the
     Constitution is  to be  considered in  court as  a paramount
     law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts
     must close  their eyes  on the Constitution and see only the
     law.

And the Court concluded that:

     This doctrine  would subvert  the  very  foundation  of  all
     written constitutions.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176


  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 30 of 32


     The United  States Supreme  Court also  pointed out  in this

decision that, in declaring what should be the supreme Law of the

Land, the  U.S. Constitution  itself was first mentioned and "...

not the laws of the United States generally ...."

     The attorneys  who sit  in Our State legislatures and in Our

Congress have  no right  to pass  laws which  infringe  upon,  or

abolish, Our  fundamental Rights  under the U.S. Constitution for

the United  States of  America, as  lawfully  amended,  and  such

unconstitutional laws  which purport  to do  so must  be declared

null and  void and  not binding  upon the Courts.  See Miranda v.

Arizona supra, at 491.


                          VERIFICATION

     The Undersigned  hereby certifies, under penalty of perjury,

under the  laws of  the United  States of  America,  without  the

"United States,"  that the  above statements of fact are true and

correct, to  the best  of My  current information, knowledge, and

belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).



Dated:  March 21, 1997


Respectfully submitted,





__________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris


[end of part 2 of 3]
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)
all Rights reserved without prejudice








  Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus:  Page 31 of 32



========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.    : Counselor at Law, federal witness
email:       [address in tool bar]   : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU
web site:  http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
             Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this
========================================================================


      


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