Time: Thu Mar 27 06:17:06 1997 by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id NAA27247; Thu, 27 Mar 1997 13:35:24 -0700 (MST) by usr08.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id NAA07855; Thu, 27 Mar 1997 13:34:49 -0700 (MST) Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 06:15:17 -0800 To: tjeffoc@sirius.com From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar] Subject: SLS: Comparison of Drug & Alcohol Prohibitions Unless I am mistaken, I believe that Barbara Tuchman also wrote "A Distant Mirror," an historical novel about the black plague, and its contemporary parallels. /s/ Paul Mitchell At 02:57 PM 3/25/97 -0500, you wrote: >The lists seem to be getting a litttle stale of late. The following is >offered in hopes of provoking some discussion: > > >In 1984 the late historian, Barbara Tuchmman advanced the thesis that >otherwise competent governments occasionally adopt policies at odds with >their national best interests. Nevertheless, for one or another reason, the >particular policy continues to be endorsed through successive changes in >government; eventually assuming the dimensions of a national folly. Her >book, "March of Folly," listed three criteria for recognition of the >phenomenon and analyzed US policy toward Viet Nam between 1945 and 1975 as >a contemporary example. Many Americans would also conclude that drug >prohibition, initiated by passage of the Harrison Act in December, 1914 and >still in force as our national policy over eight decades later would easily >meet Tuchman's criteria and thus qualify as a representative folly: >1.) The adverse effects of the policy could have been anticipated, and >indeed were pointed out and warned against by some observers out at the >time of its adoption. >2.) The continuing adverse effects of the policy were either unrecognized >or not admitted to by responsible officials during the time it was in >effect. >3.) The policy continued to be supported through the successive political >lifetimes of more than one change of government.(This eliminates from >consideration the disastrous personal foibles of a dictator.) > >Historically, policy errors which have matured into folly may be ended by >one of several mechanisms, depending on the focus of the policy and the >source of the opposition. Foreign policy follies may end by loss of >territory or influence through either diplomatic or military defeat. >Domestic opposition to a strongly entrenched policy must come from the >grass roots and runs the risk of civil war (as with slavery in the US). In >our recent history, the Viet Nam war was ended by a combination of military >resistance from the North Viet Namese sufficient to deny a US military >victory short of unacceptable escalation in cost. Even so, a wide spread, >persistent, and divisive anti-war movement at home was ultimately necessary >to force the government to abandon its military adventure in Viet Nam, and >modify, if not abandon its disastrous Indo-China policy. > > In the second decade of this century, the US Federal Government embarked >on a complex prohibition experiment composed of two separate programs; one >aimed at alcohol (Prohibition) the other at drugs ( Harrison Narcotic Act, >eventually the current drug war). Although at least partially rooted in >the same optimistic utopianism which characterized the emergent populism of >the day, the practical expression of prohibition theory was bifurcated from >the very outset into two programs; each initiated entirely separately and >by quite different mechanisms. The two prohibitions also differed in the >amount and intensity of public debate attendant on their adoption, and >finally, they were subject to completely separate outcomes in terms of >their ultimate fate as public policy. Alcohol Prohibition was ignominiously >repudiated by the Repeal (23rd) Amendment after a brief 13 year trial. Drug >prohibition not only survived, it has become an overarching component of >our national policy, almost to the point of dogma. It has also been >exported to the entire world via the UN Single Convention Treaty of New >York (1961). It is safe to say that aside from resistance to Communism and >the need to prosecute the Cold War, no item of federal policy has received >such thorough and enduring support as drug prohibition. > >A logical question someone interested in prohibition as an instrument of >public policy might well ask is why two substance prohibition projects with >such similar aims would end up faring so differently following enactment. I >believe there are several historical answers to this question and that >those answers have great practical significance for us, now that some >semblance of an organized opposition to present drug policy seems to be >emerging. > >Comments invited. Why do *you* think Prohibition and the drug war have had >such different outcomes as policy? Does history matter? If so, how should >we be guided? > >Tom O'Connell > > > > ======================================================================== Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness email: [address in tool bar] : Eudora Pro 3.0.1 on Intel 586 CPU web site: http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech, at its best Tucson, Arizona state : state zone, not the federal zone Postal Zone 85719/tdc : USPS delays first class w/o this ========================================================================
Return to Table of Contents for
Supreme Law School: E-mail