Time: Fri May 16 02:40:33 1997
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Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 02:39:31 -0700
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From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Knowledge of Pearl Harbor Attack (fwd)
<snip>
>
>The sensational transcript of the German intercept of the Churchill call to
>FDR on 11/26/41!!
>
> Did Churchill Reveal the Pending Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor to
> Roosevelt Two Weeks Before the Attack?
>
>Did FDR know about the December 7 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in
>advance? Case closed now. They discuss Pearl in detail as the target of the
>Jap attack and FDR opines that the Sons of Nippon can't do much damage.
>Churchill neglects to bring up Taranto and FDR states he will turn a deaf
>ear to intell unless it is completely certain that all is known. The
>conversation closes with FDR telling Churchill he will clear out of town
>(which he did -- going to Warm Springs until a frantic Stimson and Hull
>insisted he return). "What I don't know, can't hurt me," he says.
>Unfortunately for 2,100 Americans, they didn't know either.
>
>This was all recorded, read and transcribed by Germany. Leaving open the
>possiblity that the actual wire recording still exists somewhere!
>
>This material has sat in American archives since 1945! The source is
>Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Henrich Muller published in 1995
>by R. J. Bender of San Jose, CA., a well-known militaria publisher. Muller
>was the German intelligence officer in charge of anti-Soviet operations and
>the material about the Soviet Union in the conversations was forwarded to
>him. At the end of the war, the U.S. turned Muller to its own uses and his
>files were lodged in the National Archives - evidently without being
>sanitized. The transcript is located at: National Archives Roll T-175,
>frames 129 et seq. I have transcibed the entire conversation and attached
>it [below]. Transcript from pages 46-50. The bracketed portions represent
>German inserts in the original text to better explain word meanings that
>were thought to be too obscure for German readers.
>
>The original transcript shows Roosevelt as "A" and Churchill as "B". For
>clarity, I have replaced their names for the letters. The Germans were
>reading the radio-telephone transmissions of Roosevelt and Churchill from
>September 7, 1941. I am told (since I haven't read the book yet, just these
>xeroxed pages) that Muller was amazed that the two statesmen took no
>greater care in their conversations than they did. But, of course, he was
>unaware of the even greater blunder of "Enigma" on the German side.
>
>Hot stuff, eh? It reads like a piece of an America First Committee
>nightmare.
>
>MKOT
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> THE GERMAN TRANSCRIPT
>
>November 26, 1941 13:15 hours (Berlin or Holland time?)
>
>Churchill: I am frightfully sorry to disturb you at this hour, Franklin,
>but matters of a most vital import have transpired and I felt that I must
>convey them to you immediately.
>
>Roosevelt: That's perfectly all right, Winston. I'm sure you wouldn't
>trouble me at this hour for trivial concerns.
>
>Churchill: Let me preface my information with an explanation addressing the
>reason I have not alluded to these facts earlier. In the first place, until
>today, the information was not firm. On matters of such gravity, I do not
>like to indulge in idle chatter. Now, I have in my hands, reports from our
>agents in Japan as well as the most specific intelligence in the form of
>the highest level Japanese naval coded messages [conversation broken] for
>some time now.
>
>Roosevelt: I felt that this is what you were about. How serious is it?
>
>Churchill: It could not be worse. A powerful Japanese task force comprising
>[composed of] six of their carriers, two battleships and a number of other
>units to include [including] tankers and cruisers, has sailed yesterday
>from a secret base in the northern Japanese islands.
>
>Roosevelt: We both knew this was coming. There are also reports in my hands
>about a force of some size making up in China and obviously intended to go
>[move] South.
>
>Churchill: Yes, we have all of that. [Interruption]... are far more
>advanced than you in our reading of the Jap naval operations codes. But
>even without that, their moves areevident. And they will indeed move South
>but the force I spoke of is not headed South, Franklin, it is headed
>East...
>
>Roosevelt: Surely you must be...will you repeat that please?
>
>Churchill: I said to the East. This force is sailing to the East...towards
>you.
>
>Roosevelt: Perhaps they set an easterly course to fool any observers and
>then plan to swing South to support the landings in the southern areas. I
>have...
>
>Churchill: No, at this moment, their forces are moving across the northern
>Pacific and I can assure you that their goal is the [conversation broken]
>fleet in Hawaii. At Pearl Harbor.
>
>Roosevelt: This is monstrous. Can you tell me...indicate... the nature of
>your intelligence? [conversation broken] reliable? Without compromising
>your sources...
>
>Churchill: Yes, I will have to be careful. Our agents in Japan have been
>reporting on the gradual [conversation broken] units. And these have
>disappeared from Japanese home waters. We also have highly reliable sources
>in the Japanese foreign service and even in the military...
>
>Roosevelt: How reliable?
>
>Churchill: One of the sources is the individual who supplied us the
>material on the diplomatic codes that [conversation broken] and a naval
>office [sic] whom our service has compromised. You must trust me, Franklin
>and I can not be more specific.
>
>Roosevelt: I accept this.
>
>Churchill: We cannot compromise our codebreaking. You understand this. Only
>myself and a few [conversation broken] not even Hopkins. It will go
>straight to Moscow and I am not sure we want that.
>
>Roosevelt: I am still attempting to...the obvious implication is that the
>Japs are going to do a Port Arthur on us at Pearl Harbor. Do you concur?
>
>Churchill: I do indeed. Unless they add an attack on the Panama Canal to
>this vile business. I can hardly envision the canal as a primary goal,
>especially with your fleet lying athwart their lines of communications with
>Japan. No, if they do strike the canal, they will have to first neutralize
>[destroy] your fleet [conversation broken].
>
>Roosevelt: The worst form of treachery. We can prepare our defenses on the
>islands and give the a warm welcome when they come. It certainly would put
>some iron up Congress' ass [asshole].
>
>Churchill: On the other hand, if they did launch a bombing raid, given that
>the aircraft would only be of the carrier-borne types, how much actual
>damage could they inflict? And on what targets?
>
>Roosevelt: I think torpedoes would be ruled out at the outset. Pearl is far
>too shallow to permit a successful torpedo attack. Probably they would drop
>medium bombs on the ships and then shoot[conversation broken] damage a
>number of ships and no doubt the Japs would attach our airfields. I could
>see some damage there but I don't think either an airfield or a battleship
>could sink very far. What do your people give you as the actual date of the
>attack?
>
>Churchill: The actual date given is the eighth of December. That's a
>Monday.
>
>Roosevelt: The fleet is in harbor over the weekend. They often sortie
>during the week...
>
>Churchill: The Japs are asking [conversation broken] exact dispositions of
>your ships on a regular basis.
>
>Roosevelt: But Monday seems odd. Are you certain?
>
>Churchill: It is in the calendar. Monday is the eighth. [conversation
>broken]
>
>Roosevelt: ...then I will have to consider the entire problem. A Japanese
>attack on us, which would result in war between us...and certainly you as
>well...would certainly fulfill two of the most important requirements of
>our policy. Harry has told me repeatedly...and I have more faith in him
>that I do in the Soviet ambassador...that Stalin is desperate at this
>point. The Nazis are at the gates of Moscow, his armies are melting
>away...the government has evacuated and although Harry and Marshall feel
>that Stalin can hang on and eventually defeat Hitler, there is no saying
>what could transpire [happen] if the Japs suddenly fell on Stalin's rear.
>In spite of all the agreements between them and the Japs dropping Matsuoka,
>there is still strong anti-Russian sentiment in High Japanese military
>circles. I think we have to decide what is more important...keeping Russia
>in the war to bleed the Nazis dry to their own eventual destruction
>[conversation broken] supply Stalin with weapons but do not forget, in fact
>he is your ally, not mine. There are strong isolationist feelings here and
>there are quite a number of anti-communists...
>
>Churchill: Fascists...
>
>Roosevelt: Certainly, but they would do all they could to block any attempt
>on my part to more than give some monetary assistance to Stalin.
>
>Churchill: But we too have our major desperations, Franklin. Our shipping
>upon which our nation depends, is being sunk by the huns faster than we
>could ever replace [conversation broken] the Japs attack both of us in the
>Pacific? We could lose Malaya which is our primary source of rubber and
>tin. And if the Japs get Java and the oil, they could press South to
>Australia and I have told you repeatedly, we cannot hold [conversation
>broken] them much but in truth I cannot deliver. We need every man and
>every ship to fight Hitler in Europe...India too. If the Japs get into
>Malaya, they can press on virtually unopposed into Burma and then India.
>Need I tell you of the resultant destruction of our Empire? We cannot
>survive on this small island, Franklin, [conversation broken] allow the
>nips (knips?) to attack, you can get your war declaration through your
>Congress after all. [Conversation broken]
>
>Roosevelt: ... not as capable as you are at translating their messages and
>the army and navy are very jealous of each other. There is so much coming
>in that everyone is confused. We have no agents in place in Japan and every
>day dozens of messages are [conversation broken] that contradict each other
>or not well translated. I have seen three translations of the same message
>with three entirely different meanings [conversations broken] address your
>concern about British holdings in the Pacific...if the Japanese do attack
>both of us, eventually we will be able to crush them and regain all of the
>lost territories. As for myself, I will be damned glad to be rid of the
>Phillipines. [sic]
>
>Churchill: I see this as a gamble [conversation broken] what would your
>decision be? We cannot procrastinate over this for too long. Eleven or
>twelve days are all we have. Can we not agree in principle now? I should
>mention that several advisors have counseled [advised] against informing
>you of this and allowing it to happen. You see by my notifying you where my
>loyalty lies. Certainly to one who is heart and soul with us against
>Hitler.
>
>Roosevelt: I do appreciate your loyalty, Winston. What on the other hand,
>will happen here if one of our intelligence people is able to intercept,
>decipher and deliver to me the same information you just gave me? I cannot
>ignore it...all of my intelligence people will know about it then. I could
>not ignore this.
>
>Churchill: But if it were just a vague message then?
>
>Roosevelt: No, a specific message. I could not just sweep it under the rug
>like that [conversation broken]
>
>Churchill: Of course not. I think we should let matters develop as they
>will.
>
>Roosevelt: I think that perhaps I can find a reason to absent [leave]
>myself from Washington while this crisis develops. What I don't know can't
>hurt me and I too can misunderstand messages, especially at a distance
>[conversation broken]
>
>Churchill: Completely. My best to you all there.
>
>Roosevelt: Thank you for your call.
>
>National Archives Roll T-175, frames 129 et seq.
>
========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness
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