Time: Wed May 28 17:19:51 1997
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Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 17:06:45 -0700
To: (Recipient list suppressed)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: CLINTON v. JONES (fwd)
<snip>
Paul Mitchell comments:
Paula Jones is a federal citizen,
to have standing under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
/s/ Paul Mitchell
http://www.supremelaw.com
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------
> AN E-BULLETIN
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>The following decisions have just arrived via the LII's
>direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court.
>
>These are not the decisions themselves nor excerpts from them,
>but summaries (syllabi) prepared by the Court's Reporter of
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>these decisions are provided at the end of this bulletin.
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>===============================================================
>[snip]
>===============================================================
>CLINTON v. JONES
>
>certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth
>circuit
>
>No. 95-1853. Argued January 13, 1997 -- Decided May 27, 1997
>
>===============================================================
>Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas
>law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of
>the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was
>Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances
>to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to
>punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the
>time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that
>he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity
>grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be
>deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court
>granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
>without prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of
>limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge denied
>dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go
>forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's
>Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
>denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional
>equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner
>was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the
>President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that
>apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an
>official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts,
>and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where
>only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The
>court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is
>available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive
>Branch would violate separation of powers.
>
>Held:
>
>1. This Court need not address two important constitutional
>issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the
>certiorari petition: (1) whether a claim comparable to
>petitioner's assertion of immunity might succeed in a state
>tribunal, and (2) whether a court may compel the President's
>attendance at any specific time or place. Pp. 7-9.
>
>2. Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends
>is not constitutionally required. Pp. 7-28.
>
>(a) Petitioner's principal submission--that in all but the most
>exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President
>temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of
>events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained
>on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording
>Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official
>acts--i.e., to enable them to perform their designated functions
>effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise
>to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
>731, 749, 752, and n. 32--provides no support for an immunity for
>unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within
>official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function
>performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
>Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229. The Court is also
>unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds
>little light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by
>conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the
>doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and
>rejection of the immunity claim in this case. Pp. 9-15.
>
>(b) The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal
>courts to stay all private actions against the President until he
>leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the
>Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that
>that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to
>proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard against
>the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co equal
>branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v.
>Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122. But in this case there is no suggestion
>that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function
>that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is
>merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III
>jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the
>outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will
>curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The
>Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as
>the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the
>Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn--may place unacceptable
>burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his
>official duties. That assertion finds little support either in
>history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting
>Presidents for their private actions, or in therelatively narrow
>compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater
>significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely
>burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the
>President's official conduct, see e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube
>Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, and may direct appropriate process
>to the President himself, see e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418
>U.S. 683. It must follow that the federal courts have power to
>determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The
>reasons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts
>to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well
>to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in
>all but the most exceptional cases." Pp. 15-24.
>
>(c) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the District Court's
>stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an
>unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the
>District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an
>incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g.,
>Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254. Moreover, the
>potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are
>appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its management
>of the case, and the high respect owed the Presidency is a matter
>that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding.
>Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of
>discretion because it took no account of the importance of
>respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial, and because
>it was premature in that there was nothing in the record to
>enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the
>completion of discovery would be warranted. Pp. 25-27.
>
>(d) The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged
>risks that this decision will generate a large volume of
>politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that
>national security concerns might prevent the President from
>explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has
>confidence in the ability of federal judges to deal with both
>concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the
>President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation.
>Pp. 27-28.
>
>72 F.3d 1354, affirmed.
>
>Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
>Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
>and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion
>concurring in the judgment.
>
>===============================================================
>[snip]
>===============================================================
>These and all other recent Supreme Court decisions are
>archived in full text at
> http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/
> (in hypertext versions prepared by the LII and the
> original word-processing files received from the Court)
>---------------------------------------------------------------
>[end quote]
========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S. : Counselor at Law, federal witness
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