Time: Sat May 31 13:11:02 1997
	by primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id HAA23710
	for [address in tool bar]; Sat, 31 May 1997 07:32:12 -0700 (MST)
	by usr09.primenet.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id HAA29674;
	Sat, 31 May 1997 07:27:21 -0700 (MST)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 08:08:18 -0700
To: (Recipient list suppressed)
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: SLS: Rebuttal in U.S.A. v. Knudson

[This text is formatted in Courier 11, non-proportional spacing.]


Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
c/o General Delivery
Hastings [zip code exempt]
NEBRASKA STATE

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved
without prejudice




                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                      DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], )  Case No. 4:CV96-3275
                                )
          Plaintiff [sic],      )  DEFENDANT'S REBUTTAL TO
                                )  PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
     v.                         )  IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
                                )  FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; AND
VANCE E. KNUDSON [sic],         )  NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER
                                )  CASE TO COURT OF COMPETENT
          Defendant [sic].      )  JURISDICTION:  28 U.S.C. 1631,
________________________________)  5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)


COMES NOW Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Nebraska state,

expressly not a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"),

and  Defendant   in  the   above  entitled   matter  (hereinafter

"Defendant"), to submit this, Defendant's REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFFS'

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.

     Defendant herein  addresses issues  in the  order  of  their

appearance in  Plaintiffs' BRIEF  IN  OPPOSITION  TO  MOTION  FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, as follows (quotes in bold):


     Defendant has not proffered any legitimate reason for a stay
     of the April 8, 1997 Judgment.

     Defendant argues that the value judgment implied by the term

"legitimate" is  controverted by  the evidence already on record,

and will  be further  controverted by  testimony  and  additional

evidence to be newly discovered during trial by jury.


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 1
                              of 13


     [D]efendant has  seized upon  this opportunity  to reargue a
     number of tired, stale, tax protestor arguments [sic].

     Defendant submits  that the  evidence recently  filed in the

instant case  is not  only new  (not tired or stale), but protest

has never  been illegal,  inappropriate, or a cause to ignore the

substance of  that protest.   The  Petition Clause  in the  First

Amendment is  rooted in  protest, and  the U.S. Supreme Court has

already held  that the  Petition Clause is the Right conservative

of all  other Rights.  See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207

U.S. 142,  148 (1907).   Defendant's  pleadings are  petitions to

government  which  exercise  a  fundamental  Right  not  allowing

dubious intrusions of any kind whatsoever.

     To the  extent Plaintiffs  seek to gag, muffle, infringe, or

otherwise disparage  Defendant's  fundamental  Right  to  protest

government misconduct,  criminal or  otherwise, they  deprive Him

not only  of a fundamental Right which is guaranteed by the First

Amendment;   they also  deprive Defendant  of all  other  Rights.

Exposing such  a consequence  can  hardly  be  considered  tired,

stale, illegal,  obsolete, improper,  frivolous (or other similar

diminutive).    Matters  arising  under  the  federal  and  state

constitutions are never frivolous.  See 28 U.S.C. 1652.


     Defendant's motion for relief from Judgment should be denied
     in the  absence of  any showing  of mistake  or other reason
     justifying relief.

     Defendant has  made a  proper showing  of mistake  or  other

reasons justifying  relief.   Defendant appreciates the attention

which Plaintiffs  have directed  to FRCP Rule 38(d), which states

that the  failure of a party to serve and file a demand for trial

by jury  constitutes a  waiver by the party of trial by jury.  It

was never  Defendant's knowing  or voluntary intention to waive a


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 2
                              of 13


fundamental Right in this fashion, however.

     Defendant argues  that this  Rule must be viewed against the

statute which  specifically authorizes  the U.S. Supreme Court to

promulgate such  rules.   Although the  U.S. Supreme  Court shall

have the  power  to  prescribe  general  rules  of  practice  and

procedure for  cases in  the United  States district courts [sic]

(hereinafter "USDC"),  pursuant to  28  U.S.C.  2072(a),  compare

section 2072(b)  which clearly  prohibits the  U.S. Supreme Court

from promulgating  any rules  which might  abridge,  enlarge,  or

modify any substantive right:

     2072.  Rules of procedure and evidence;  power to prescribe

     (b)  Such rules  shall not  abridge, enlarge  or modify  any
     substantive right.
                                              [28 U.S.C. 2072(b)]

     Evidently, Congress has failed to authorize the U.S. Supreme

Court to promulgate corresponding rules for the District Court of

the United  States ("DCUS")!    Confer  at  "Inclusio  unius  est

exclusio alterius"  in Black's  Law  Dictionary,  Sixth  Edition.

Omission of the DCUS was intentional.  The Right to trial by jury

is a substantive, fundamental Right.  See Seventh Amendment.

     Moreover,  waivers   of  fundamental  Rights  can  never  be

presumed  by   the  United   States  (federal   government),  and

particularly not  by this USDC, nor by the DCUS.  Acquiescence in

the loss  of fundamental  Rights will  not be presumed.  See Ohio

Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292.

     Competent waivers  of fundamental  Rights must  be  knowing,

intelligent, affirmative  acts done  with sufficient awareness of

the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.  See Brady v.

U.S., 397  U.S. 742  at 748  (1970).   Defendant has made no such


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 3
                              of 13


waivers, notwithstanding  Defendant's failure to date properly to

demand trial by jury, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 38.


     Statutes Involved:
     Section 7402, Title 26, United States Code

     Defendant is  extremely disappointed  that Plaintiffs should

summarily gloss  over Defendant's  detailed analysis of 26 U.S.C.

7402 [sic].  This provision falls within subtitle F and, as such,

has never  taken effect,  because "this  title" [sic]  (Title 26,

U.S.C.), has  never been  enacted into  positive law.  For proof,

see Internal  Revenue Code ("IRC"), section 7851(a)(6)(A).  Title

26, U.S.C., and the IRC are not one and the same.  See also Title

1, U.S.C., section 1 et seq.

     Defendant's construction  of IRC  7851(a)(6)(A) is  correct,

because the exact same construction has already been demonstrated

for the  term "this  title" [sic] in the Historical and Statutory

Notes after 28 U.S.C. 132, to wit:

     ... [T]he  provisions of  this title as set out in section 1
     of said  Act June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization
     of the  court, shall  be  construed  as  a  continuation  of
     existing law ....
                            [West Publishing Co., emphasis added]

Compare said  language with  the corresponding  language from the

Act of June 25, 1948, to wit:

     (b)  The provisions  of title  28,  Judiciary  and  Judicial
     Procedure, of  the United  States Code, set out in section 1
     of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the
     several courts  therein provided  for ... shall be construed
     as continuations of existing law ....

                    [Act June 25, 1948, C. 646, Sections 2 to 39]
                            [62 Stat. 985 to 991, emphasis added]

     Even if Title 26, U.S.C., had been enacted into positive law

(which it  has not),  section 7402  exhibits  the  all  important

distinction between the USDC and the DCUS.  Compare 7402(a), (b),


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 4
                              of 13


(c), and (f) (which authorize only the DCUS), with 7402(e) (which

authorizes only the USDC).  Under IRC 7402, quiet title relief is

the only  subject matter  of which the USDC has any jurisdiction.

The instant  action was  not instituted  in order to quiet title.

Therefore, this honorable USDC has no subject matter jurisdiction

whatsoever pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7402 [sic].


     [T]he pro  se plaintiff,  Vance E.  Knudson, served  his ...
     Motion for  Stay of Execution ... and Motion for Relief from
     Judgment ....

     Vance E. Knudson is the Defendant in the instant case!  As a

Citizen of  Nebraska state  who is expressly not a citizen of the

United States,  by Right of Election, Defendant is now proceeding

In Propria  Persona, not  Pro Se  [sic].   "Se" is a neuter Latin

pronoun which  refers  to  objects  and/or  fictitious  entities;

Defendant is  none of  these.   Confer at "In propria persona" in

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (with pronunciations).

     In  pari   materia,  Defendant   hereby  enters  a  standing

objection  to   the  habitual  use,  by  employees  of  the  U.S.

Department of Justice, of fictitious nommes de guerre to name the

parties of  interest in  all civil and criminal actions which are

brought before this honorable Court.  Defendant does not now use,

and never  has used,  all CAPITAL  LETTERS to  write or print His

Proper Name.  Misnomer is a plea in the nature of abatement.


     [D]efendant was  not entitled  to a  jury trial in this case
     because this civil action, which was commenced by the United
     States [sic] ....

     [D]efendant was  not entitled to a jury trial in this action
     brought by  the United  States  [sic]  for  declaratory  and
     injunctive relief.

     [T]here is no constitutional right to a jury trial in a suit
     against the United States [sic].


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 5
                              of 13


     The instant  case was  brought  by  the  Plaintiffs  "UNITED

STATES OF  AMERICA" [sic], not by the "United States" [sic].  The

United States of America are synonymous with the Union of several

states which  are united  by, and under, the Constitution for the

United States  of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S.

Constitution").   See Preamble;   confer  at "Union" in Bouvier's

Law Dictionary  (1856).   The "United States" is a term which has

three (3)  separate and different meanings.  See Hooven & Allison

Co. v.  Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945);  confer at "United States" in

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

     The  United  States  of  America  have  never  been  granted

standing to  sue, or  be  sued,  in  this  honorable  USDC.    In

contrast, the  United States  [sic] has  been granted standing by

Congress to sue as a civil plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1345;

and the United States [sic] has been granted standing by Congress

to be sued as a civil defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346.

     Since the  United States  is not  a named  defendant in  the

instant case,  the opposition brief which Defendant hereby rebuts

exhibits a serious error for attempting to argue that there is no

constitutional Right to a jury trial in a suit against the United

States.   See 28  U.S.C. 2402.  This point is totally irrelevant,

because the  United States is neither a plaintiff nor a defendant

in the instant case.

     Accordingly,  Defendant   argues  that  such  misconduct  by

attorneys, alleging  falsely to  represent the  United States  of

America (hereinafter  "federal attorneys"),  is sufficient ground

to sanction  said federal  attorneys.    Confer  at  "Attorn"  in

Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1951).


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 6
                              of 13


     [N]o genuine issues of material fact remain for trial.

     On the  contrary, the  federal attorneys  are attempting, by

this statement,  to sweep  under the  rug a  total of eleven (11)

fully documented demands for mandatory judicial notice, filed and

served pursuant  to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

This documentation  was verified  by Defendant,  under penalty of

perjury, pursuant  to 28  U.S.C.  1746(1),  which  rendered  said

documentation the highest form of truth.

     The federal  attorneys in  the instant  case have  failed to

rebut this evidence, point-for-point.  Accordingly, their silence

activates estoppel,  pursuant to  Carmine v.  Bowen,  64  A.  932

(1906), and  it also  constitutes fraud,  because their requisite

oaths of  office create  legal and  moral duties  to  speak,  and

silence can  be equated  with  fraud  where  such  duties  exist,

pursuant to U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (1977).

     To argue  that no genuine issues of material fact remain for

trial, is  to sweep  the entire expanse of American History under

the rug  as well, and to substitute in its place a veritable host

of fictions and fictitious nonsense, of which the American People

now have  had about  all They  are willing to take.  See Dyett v.

Turner,  439  P.2d  266,  270  (1968),  where  "General  Lee  had

surrendered ....";  Full Faith and Credit Clause.

     Defendant will illustrate with but one of the eleven demands

for mandatory  judicial notice,  previously filed.  United States

Representative Barbara  B. Kennelly  has  admitted,  on  official

stationery of  the U.S.  House of  Representatives, that the term

"State" in  26 U.S.  Code 3121(e)  specifically includes only the

named  U.S.  territories  and  possessions  of  the  District  of

Columbia, Puerto  Rico, the  Virgin Islands,  Guam  and  American


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 7
                              of 13


Samoa.   Rep. Kennelly made this statement, after consulting with

experts in  the  offices  of  the  Legislative  Counsel  and  the

Congressional Research Service.

     Defendant hereby expressly reserves His fundamental Right to

convene a qualified and competent federal trial jury, in order to

compel testimony from said experts on this very question.  To say

that  this  admission  is  earth-shaking  is  an  understatement,

pursuant to  applicable rules  of compulsory  discovery.  But, of

course, the  federal attorneys would have Us believe that this is

a "specious assertion" [sic].

     We say, let the jury decide!

     The burden of proof is now upon these same federal attorneys

to prove  otherwise, because  the proponent  of a  rule  has  the

burden of  proving its  application in the instant case.  See, in

particular, 5 U.S.C. 556(d).

     Moreover, if  these startling  revelations do not constitute

"exceptional circumstances," then Defendant is at a total loss to

conceive what,  on Earth,  would qualify  as such in the minds of

federal attorneys who have failed, to date, to exhibit any of the

lawful credentials  required by Article VI, Clause 3, in the U.S.

Constitution, and  also by  5 U.S.C.  3331.   Defendant offers to

prove  that   brainwashing  is   the  better,  and  more  likely,

diagnosis:

     Words "learned  in the  law" were  omitted  as  unnecessary.
     Such requirement  is not made of United States judges and no
     reason appears  to  make  a  distinction  respecting  United
     States attorneys.

                  [28 U.S.C. 541, Historical and Statutory Notes]
                     [Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules]
                          [West Publishing Company, 1996 Edition]
                                                 [emphasis added]


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 8
                              of 13


     This Court  had subject  matter jurisdiction  of this action
     pursuant to  28 U.S.C. Secs. 1340 and 1345 and Sections 7401
     and 7402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.).

     28 U.S.C.  1340 grants  original jurisdiction  to this  USDC

over any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing

for internal  revenue.  This case does not arise under any Act of

Congress providing  for internal  revenue;   it  was  brought  to

declare Defendant's  "Claim of  Commercial Lien and Affidavit" to

be null and void, when said Claim arose under Nebraska state law.

Affidavits cannot  be declared  null and  void by  this honorable

Court, because  to do  so would  constitute a  clear and  present

deprivation of the Petition Clause.  See Chambers supra.

     Moreover, the  instant case  was also  brought to  obtain an

injunction prohibiting  Defendant from  publishing or  filing any

"Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit" or other such common law

lien.   Once again,  such a  goal is  a direct  violation of  the

Petition Clause,  because said  claim(s) by  Defendant constitute

petitions to  government for  redress of grievances, which are to

be afforded  special constitutional  protection, avoiding dubious

intrusions whenever possible.  See Chambers supra.

     28 U.S.C.  1345 grants original jurisdiction to the district

courts over  all civil  actions, suits, and proceedings commenced

by the  United States,  or  by  any  agency  or  officer  thereof

expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.  However, section

1345 is  totally irrelevant, because the "United States" [sic] is

not the  named Plaintiffs in the instant case;  the United States

of America are the named Plaintiffs in the instant case.

     IRC 7401  does not  grant jurisdiction  to this USDC either,

because the  requisite jurisdictional  facts are not exhibited in

the official  record, when  they have  already been  specifically


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 9
                              of 13


denied.   See U.S.A.  [sic] v.  One 1972 Cadillac Coupe De Ville,

355 F.Supp.  513, 515 (1973).  More to this point, Ms. Janet Reno

has failed  to exhibit her Oath of Office required by Article VI,

Clause 3, and by 5 U.S.C. 3331.  Delegation of authority from Ms.

Reno downwards  is now  impossible.   Lex non cogit impossibilia.

Therefore, there  can be  no authorizations required by IRC 7401,

none, until  and unless  a qualified Attorney General is properly

appointed who has executed a valid and lawful Oath of Office.

     IRC 7402(a) has been disposed supra.


     This Court  also properly exercised in personam jurisdiction
     over the  defendant.  In the Memorandum and Order entered in
     this case  on April  8, 1997,  this  Court  determined  that
     defendant had  been properly  served with  process  in  this
     civil action.

     The federal  attorneys have  again missed  the boat (and the

dock) on  this point.   As  a Citizen  of Nebraska  state who  is

expressly not  a citizen  of  the  United  States,  by  Right  of

Election, the  Proper Person of the Defendant cannot be subjected

to the  municipal  jurisdiction  of  the  USDC,  absent  a  valid

contract to the contrary which is in effect and also in evidence,

because the  constitutional origins  of the  USDC are those which

grant plenary,  municipal authority to the United States (federal

government).   See Article  IV, Section  3, Clause  2;   American

Insurance Co.  v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed.

242;   Balzac v.  Porto Rico [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at

312, 66  L.Ed. 627  (1921);  5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).  Defendant is

domiciled  outside   the  municipal   jurisdiction  of  Congress.

Citizenship, strictly  speaking, is a term of municipal law.  See

Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912).


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 10
                              of 13


                NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER CASE

     Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631, Defendant hereby provides formal

written Notice  to all interested party(s), and demands mandatory

judicial notice  by this honorable USDC, of Defendant's intent to

petition the  DCUS for  review of  all administrative  action(s),

specifically  including,   but  not   limited  to,  the  improper

withholding of  certain documents  already requested  of  federal

officers, employees,  and/or agents  who have  touched this case,

pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.

     The  USDC  in  the  instant  case  clearly  suffers  from  a

demonstrated want  of jurisdiction  over the  subject matter, and

over the Proper Person of the Defendant.


                         REMEDY DEMANDED

     In the interests of justice, this honorable USDC is required

by law  to transfer  the instant action to the DCUS, in which the

instant action  should have been brought at the time it was first

filed or noticed;  and the action shall proceed as if it had been

filed in,  or noticed for, the DCUS to which it is transferred on

the date  upon which  it was  actually filed  in, or noticed for,

this USDC.   See  28 U.S.C.  1631.   The term "shall" as found in

section 1631  has a  mandatory, imperative  meaning, under  which

this USDC has no discretion whatsoever.


                          VERIFICATION

I, Vance  E. Knudson,  Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of

perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without

(outside) the  "United States", that the above statement of facts

and laws  is  true  and  correct,  to  the  best  of  My  current

information, knowledge,  and belief,  so help Me God, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1746(1).


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 11
                              of 13


Dated: ______________________________


Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Vance E. Knudson
_____________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 12
                              of 13


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Vance  E. Knudson, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of

perjury, under  the laws of the United States of America, without

the "United  States," that  I am  at least  18 years  of  age,  a

Citizen of  one of  the United  States of  America,  and  that  I

personally served the following document(s):

            DEFENDANT'S REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
     IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT;  AND
                NOTICE OF INTENT TO TRANSFER CASE
               TO COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION:
              28 U.S.C. 1631, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:


SALLY R. JOHNSON                   THOMAS J. MONAGHAN
Office of U.S. Attorney            United States Attorney
487 Federal Building               U.S. Department of Justice
100 Centennial Mall North          c/o P.O. Box 7238
Lincoln [zip code exempt]          Ben Franklin Station
NEBRASKA STATE                     Washington [zip code exempt]
                                   DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT D. METCALFE
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
c/o POB 7238
Ben Franklin Station
Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]


Dated:  __________________________________

/s/ Vance E. Knudson
__________________________________________
Vance E. Knudson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Nebraska state
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


Rebuttal to Brief Opposing Stay and Relief from Judgment: Page 13
                              of 13


                             #  #  #


========================================================================
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.    : Counselor at Law, federal witness
email:       [address in tool bar]   : Eudora Pro 3.0.2 on Intel 586 CPU
web site:  http://www.supremelaw.com : library & law school registration
ship to: c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776 : this is free speech,  at its best
             Tucson, Arizona state   : state zone,  not the federal zone
             Postal Zone 85719/tdc   : USPS delays first class  w/o this
========================================================================


      


Return to Table of Contents for

Supreme Law School:   E-mail