Time: Thu Oct 31 07:11:22 1996
To: 
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell [address in tool bar]
Subject: LLAW: autarchic: Traveling is a right [4/7]
Cc: 
Bcc: liberty lists

<snip>
>--------- Begin forwarded message ----------
>From: autarchic
>To: libertylaw@www.ultimate.org
>Subject: Traveling is a right [4/7]
>Date: Wed, 30 Oct 1996 10:20:42 EST
>Message-ID: <19961030.141739.4327.17.autarchic@juno.com>
>
> >>> Part 4 of 7...
>
>     33.1      It must be an agreement.
>     33.2      There must be at least two parties to the contract.
>     33.3      There must be a consideration.
>     33.4      There must be an obligation or thing to be done.
>34.       Several types of contracts exist but all must contain the
>essential features listed. Contracts can be classified under three
>principal categories:
>     34.1      Express
>     34.2      Implied
>     34.3      Quasi
>35.       Quasi contracts, while being called contracts are not really
>contracts, will not be considered in this discussion of contracts but
>will be considered in a separation section later.
>                   UNILATERAL & BILATERAL CONTRACTS
>36.       There can also be unilateral and bilateral contracts that is
>presumed can exist under some or all the above headings. Let us
>examine each above types of contracts to see if the license obtained
>by this Sovereign falls under any of the
>categories of contract.
>
>     36.1      An express contract is one in which the agreement
>     of the parties is fully stated in words, and it may be
>     either written or oral, or partly written and partly oral.
>     See:
>          Bergh Business Law 30.
>
>     36.2      A true implied contract is an agreement of the
>     parties arrived at from their acts and conduct viewed in the
>     light of surrounding circumstances, and not from their words
>     either spoken or written. Like an express contract, it grows
>     out of the intention of the parties to the transaction and
>     there must be a meeting of the minds.
>     See:
>          McKevitt et al v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 126 P.2d 1077
>          (1942).
>
>     36.3      License -- Authority to do some act or carry on
>     some trade or business, in its nature lawful but prohibited
>     statute, except with the permission of the civil authority
>     or which would otherwise be unlawful.
>     See:
>          Bouvier's Law Dict.
>
>37.       With these definitions in mind, let us examine a driver's
>license to see if it is a contract. The driver's license itself is a
>small plastic card approximately 55 millimeters by 86 millimeters in
>size. It contains the words North Carolina Motor Vehicle Driver's
>license; the name, address, signature, and physical description of the
>user; a pair of identifying numbers; a photograph; and the signature
>of the director of the Department of Law Enforcement. Obviously, this
>cannot be an express agreement because there are no statements to
>constitute an agreement. Are there two parties to the "contract?"
>There are two signatures but both are copies, thus invalidating the
>"contract" so there are no parties to the "contract." Is there a
>consideration? What has the State given this Sovereign in return for
>this Sovereign's obligation? Some may suggest that the State has given
>this Sovereign the privilege of driving on the streets or highways in
>North Carolina. But this Sovereign already has the "RIGHT" to drive on
>the streets or highways in North Carolina, and the State cannot
>require this Sovereign to give up a "RIGHT" to obtain a privilege.
>38.       An Iowa statute that requires that every foreign corporation
>named in it shall as a condition for obtaining a permit to transact
>business in Iowa, stipulate that it will not remove into the federal
>court certain suits that it would by the laws of the United States
>have a "RIGHT" to a permit dependant upon the surrender by the foreign
>corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws
>of the United States. Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Barron v.
>Burnside 121 U.S. 186.
>
>     38.1      The full significance of the clause law of the
>     land is said by Ruffin, C. J. to be that statutes that would
>     deprive a Citizen of the "RIGHTS" of person or property
>     without a regular trial according to the course and usage of
>     the common law would not be the law of the land. (Emphasis
>     added).
>     See:
>          Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C.
>          15, 25 AM Dec 677.
>
>39.       It would be foolish for this Sovereign to exchange a "RIGHT"
>for a privilege since it would mean giving up valuable property in
>exchange for something having less value. Is it possible for this
>Sovereign to do such a thing?
>
>     39.1      Consent -- In criminal Law. No act shall be deemed
>     a crime if done with the consent of the party injured,
>     unless it be committed in public, and is likely to provoke a
>     breach of the peace, or tends to the injury of a third
>     party; provided no consent can be given which will deprive
>     the consenter of any unalienable "RIGHT." (Emphasis added).
>     See:
>          Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
>
>40.       Thus, even if this Sovereign wanted to do so, he could not
>give up his "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in North
>Carolina or exchange it for the privilege of having a driver's
>license. Thus, in exchange for the supposed obligation of this
>Sovereign, the State has given nothing. Thus, there is no
>consideration.
>41.       It may be contended that the seal on the driver's license is
>sufficient consideration by the State. It is true that under the
>common law, the question of consideration could not be raised
>concerning a contract under seal. The seal provided conclusive
>presumption of a consideration. Still, North Carolina has abolished by
>statute the common law presumption of consideration and this statute
>is binding upon all officers and employees of the State. So, though a
>seal may be present, it is not evidence of consideration in North
>Carolina. Of course, the document in question is a contrived and
>copied document and lacks validity in any case as a contract.
>42.       As to an obligation, since the license contains no statement
>of agreement, since there are no parties to any agreement, and since
>there is no consideration, there can be no obligation. The driver's
>license thus is not a contract since it fails to contain any of the
>four essential features of a contract.
>43.       Can the driver's license be an implied contract? The same
>elements must exist in an implied contract as exist in an express
>contract. The only difference is that an implied contract is not
>written or spoken and the elements of the contract are shown by the
>acts and conduct of the parties involved. With respect to this
>Sovereign, there was certainly no meeting of the minds else this brief
>would not result. It was never the intention of this Sovereign to give
>up constitutional "RIGHTS" to accept a privilege from the State. Such
>an action would be ridiculous. This could only be done in a
>socialistic state. There has been no implied agreement in a free
>society. It is possible that there were two parties to the supposed
>contract, the State and this Sovereign. There was no consideration in
>the implied contract for the same reasons that there was no
>consideration in the express contract.
>44.       An obligation is the thing to be done. It may be to pay
>money, to do work, or to deliver goods; or it may be to refrain from
>doing something that the person contracting had a "RIGHT" to do. Some
>may say that the State was obligated to allow this Sovereign to drive
>on the streets or highways in North Carolina and that this Sovereign
>was obligated to obey all the statutes contained in the North Carolina
>General Statutes. It would be just as easy to say that the State could
>not be obligated to allow this Sovereign to travel on the streets or
>highways in North Carolina because they did not have the "RIGHT" or
>the power to prevent him from doing so.
>45.       If the State cannot prevent this Sovereign from traveling on
>the streets or highways in North Carolina, they do not have any
>discretion in the matter and do not have the choice of whether to
>obligate themselves or not. Thus, the obligation of the State cannot
>be to grant this Sovereign the privilege of traveling on the streets
>or highways in North Carolina. The obligation of the State cannot be
>to refrain from prohibiting this Sovereign from traveling on the
>streets or highways in North Carolina since the State did not have the
>"RIGHT" to do this at first.
>46.       It is the contention of this Sovereign that the only
>obligation that this Sovereign incurs when using a vehicle upon the
>streets or highways in North Carolina is the Common Law obligation to
>refrain from any act that causes another person to lose life, liberty,
>or property. In complying with this obligation, this Sovereign does
>comply with many statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes since
>they are, for the most part, only common sense rules by which this
>Sovereign avoids doing damage to others.
>47.       Still, this acquiescence to some statutes of The North
>Carolina General Statutes should not be construed as evidence of a
>contractual obligation by this Sovereign. Neither should it be
>construed as acquiescence to all the statutes of the North Carolina
>General Statutes or to any of them always. Instead, it is merely
>evidence of a want of this Sovereign to travel safely and to do harm
>to no one.
>48.       Thus, the actions of this Sovereign do not supply
>unambiguous evidence of a contract with the State. Instead, the
>actions can, with equal weight, be said to be evidence of the fact
>that this Sovereign was complying with Common Law requirement that he
>does harm to no one. The driver's license is not an implied contract
>because there is no consideration, there may be possibly be two
>parties, but there is no consideration, and there is not clear
>evidence of an obligation. Three of the four elements necessary for a
>contract are missing.
>49.       The question now becomes whether the driver's license
>application is a contract. In completing this document, the applicant
>makes several statements and signs the paper upon which these
>statements are written under oath. The statements concern the
>identity, physical description, address, ability and experience in
>driving a vehicle, and one statement on the physical condition of the
>applicant. None of the statements are as an agreement.
>50.       The application form contains the signature of the applicant
>and the signature of the person taking the oath of the applicant. The
>reverse side of the application contains the results of a vision test
>and rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving
>test. These results are signed by the examiner and not by the
>applicant.
>51.       Thus the application takes the form of an affidavit instead
>of a contract. But let us see if the elements of a contract are
>present in the application.
>     51.1      There is no agreement.
>     51.2      There are not two parties.
>     51.3      There is no consideration.
>     51.4      There is no obligation.
>52.       Since none of the necessary elements of a contract are
>present, the application does not constitute a contract.
>53.       The only other document involved in obtaining a driver's
>license is the document, part of which is copied to make the actual
>driver's license. It contains, besides the information that is used in
>
> >>> Continued to next message...
>--------- End forwarded message ----------
      


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