Posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on September 30, 1998 at 17:25:00:
In Reply to: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, from posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on September 29, 1998 at 15:39:19:
Dear Dan Meador et al.,
Here are the results of the analysis which I proposed
in an earlier message. In that message, I itemized
the sections of the Act of March 3, 1911, which had
NOT been repealed on June 25, 1948. Now, I have
reduced the number of those sections to include ONLY
those which mention "district court" or "district courts":
Section Mentions
------- --------
...10...."District courts"
...25...."district courts"
...65...."any court of the United States"
..133...."district courts"
..244...."district courts"
..247...."district courts"
..248...."district courts of the United States" <---!!!
..263...."district court"
..270...."district courts"
..271...."district courts"
..282...."district court"
..284...."district court"
..285...."district courts"
..291...."district courts"
Now, study two other provisions in federal law,
very VERY carefully. One is section 2(b)
in the Act of June 25, 1948 (near the end).
If you have trouble finding it, I quote
it in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF.
Note, in particularly, that there shall be:
(1) NO LOSS OF RIGHTS;
(2) NO INTERRUPTION OF JURISDICTION;
(3) NO PREJUDICE TO MATTERS PENDING.
This section 2(b) is an unequivocal example
of clear and explicit legislative intent.
That intent is also discussed in Gilbertson's
OPENING BRIEF.
The other provision is the Ex Post Facto Clause,
which prohibits ex post facto legislation by Congress.
As applied to the Act of June 25, 1948,
we can show that Congress was then prohibited from
applying a DIFFERENT definition of "district court"
retroactively to the sections listed above,
particularly when Congress has said, in so
many words, that it never intended to disrupt
the jurisdiction of those courts, per 2(b).
In other words, notwithstanding the Act of
June 25, 1948, the prohibition against
ex post facto laws forces us to conclude
that the "district courts" mentioned in the
surviving (non-repealed) sections of the
Act of March 3, 1911, MUST continue to refer
to the Article III districts court of the
United States.
This is dramatically demonstrated by
section 248 in that Act of March 3, 1911,
because it expressly mentions courts named
"district courts of the United States".
Such statutes must be strictly construed!
These are, of course, the "district courts"
and the ONLY "district courts" mentioned
throughout the Act of March 3, 1911
(with the possible exception of the other
district courts convened inside the federal zone
at that point in time).
So, in conclusion, the above analysis proved
to be very productive: sections of the Act of
March 3, 1911, which were NOT repealed by the
Act of June 25, 1948, do refer to the DCUS and thus
provide stunning proof for the continued existence,
even AFTER June 25, 1948, of those Article III courts
within the federal court system.
The prohibition against ex post facto laws
can be used to show that legislative attempts
to re-define the term "district court" were
unconstitutional, insofar as those
attempts were motivated by an intent
to abolish the Article III DCUS.
Congress cannot change the meaning of those
statutes AFTER THE FACT, particularly when
those statutes were not repealed.
Just as repeals by implication are not favored,
we need extend this logic only slightly to prove
that abolition of an entire system of courts
by implication is not favored either!
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness,
and Private Attorney General