JOHN S. WISE
                     EDWARD THOMPSON COMPANY
                  NORTHPORT, LONG ISLAND, N.Y.


     It is  believed that  in it  will be found every decision of
the Supreme Court upon the questions discussed.

     No effort has been made to pad the volume with the arguments
pro and  con upon points decided, or to cite opinions on the same
point, distinguishing one case from another.

     The principles  decided have  been given  their  appropriate
places.   The discussions concerning why one case decided did not
fall within  the principle  decided by  another case,  have  been
purposely omitted  as tending  to make  a volume  of case  law as
distinguished from  one of  legal principles.   Such  discussions
tend to  befog the  legal principle  decided rather  than make it
plain, and  to weary  even the  professional man.   They  must be
encountered when the authorities cited are examined.

     The whole  object of  the author has been attained if he has
succeeded in  putting the  origin, nature, and obligations of the
citizen  in   form  sufficiently  attractive  to  enlist  a  more
widespread understanding among educated Americans of their rights
and obligations  as American  citizens; for the present ignorance
of our  people and  the confusion  in their  apprehension of  the
subject would be something incredible in older countries.

     In the  hope that  the need  of the  book is  real, and  not
imaginary, that  it may  be accepted  in a spirit of charity, and
that some  one better equipped may soon arise to improve upon it,
it is  respectfully  submitted  to  the  profession  and  to  the

                                                     JOHN S. WISE
                                                         New York

                      TABLE OF CONTENTS.

     NOTE: Page numbers listed are those from the original print
     edition and do not correspond to the electronic form.  They
     are included for reference purposes only should one care to
     check them against the original.

 Definition of Citizenship.......................................... 2
 American Citizenship-Its Origin and Kinds.......................... 4
 State Citizenship.................................................. 5
 Citizenship of the Northwest Territory............................ 13
 Citizenship of the United States.................................. 17
 Qualified Citizenship in Territorial and Acquired Possessions..... 34
 Hawaii - Its Goverment............................................ 37
 Puerto Rico ...................................................... 39
 Guam.............................................................. 42
 Philippine Islands................................................ 42
 Citizenship in Our Insular Possessions............................ 46


 In the Nation:
     By Birth...................................................... 51
     By Naturalization............................................. 53
     Length of Residence Necessary................................. 55
 In a State:
     By Birth...................................................... 61
     By State Enactments........................................... 61
     By Federal Enactments......................................... 62
 Outside the Nation or States...................................... 62
 Of the Persons who May he Citizens................................ 63
 National and State Citizenship Not Necessarily Coexistent......... 66


 Allegiance........................................................ 68
 Different Kinds of Allegiance..................................... 69
 Formal Compact Not Necessary to Create Allegiance................. 69
 Of Dual Allegiance................................................ 70
 Of Patriolism..................................................... 73
 Of Treason........................................................ 74
 Of Dual Treason................................................... 80
 Elements of the Offense .......................................... 83


 In General........................................................ 92
 Source of American Plan of Government and Rights of Citizenship... 93
 Rights of Citizens of the States.................................. 98
 State Bills of Rights............................................ 100
 National Declaration of Independence............................. 104
 The Federal Constitution......................................... 106
 Rights, Privileges, and Immunities Granted or Guaranteed to
     the Citizen of the United States ............................ 111
 Taxation of the Citizen.......................................... 152
 Of the Immunity of the Citizen from Arrest, While Attending
      Congress, and in Going to and Returning from the Same,
      and from Being Questioned in any other Place for any
      Speech or Debate............................................ 153
 Of the Immunity of the Citizen from State Interference with
     the Regulation of Commerce with Foreign Nations and
     among the Several States and with the Indian Tribes.......... 154
 Right of the Citizen to the Writ of Habeas Corpus................ 159
 Of the Immunity of the Citizen Against Bills of Attainder and
     Ex Post Facto Laws........................................... 163
 Of the Immunity of the Citizen Against STATE Lawn Impairing
     the Obligation of Contracts.................................. 165
 Of the Right of the Citizens of Each State to All the Privileges
     and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States............. 167
 Of the Federal Guarantee of Extradition of Fugitives from
          Justice................................................. 174
 The Guarantee to the Citizen that Persons Held to Service or
     Labor in one State and Escaping to another Shall Not Be
     Discharged Thereby from Such Service or Labor but Shall
     Be Delivered up...............................................178
 Of the Federal Guarantee to the Citizen that His State Shall
     have a Republican Form of Government......................... 178
 The Immunity of the Citizen Against any Law of Congress Respecting
     an Establishment of Religion or Prohibiting the
     free Exercise Thereof........................................ 185
 Of the Right of the Citizen to Free Speech....................... 188
 Of the Freedom of the Press...................................... 189
 Rights Guaranteed by Amendments II to VIII, XI, and XII...........190


 The Thirteenth Amendment......................................... 192
 The Fourteenth Amendment......................................... 194
 Of the Regulation of Ordinary Business Pursuits by the states.... 211
 The Right to Regulate Woman's Rights............................. 214
 The Right to Regulate the Practice of Professions................ 215
 Of Suffrage...................................................... 215
 Reduction of the Representation of the States In Congress........ 223
 The Right of States to Regulate State Procedure Especially
 Concerning the summoning and Constitution of Juries.............. 235
 Of the Power of the State to Control and Regulate the Business
 of Corporations In the State..................................... 241
 Its Right to Control the Conduct of Individuals and Bodies of
 Citizens In Public Places........................................ 243
 Of the Power of the State to Regulate State Taxation............. 246
 Of the Right of the State to Control State Elections............. 249
 Due Process of Law............................................... 249
 Of the Equal Protection of the Law............................... 254
 The Fifteenth Amendment.......................................... 257



 Expatriation..................................................... 263
 Immigration of Chinese............................................275

                           CHAPTER 1:

                    OF CITIZENSHIP GENERALLY

     It is  not proposed,  in this  work, to  cast  back  in  the
history of  government, to the ethnic origin of the terms citizen
and citizenship,  or to  institute of any comparisons between the
grade or  quality citizenship enjoyed by those who are subject to
the jurisdiction  of the  United States,  or the States composing
it, and  that possessed by citizens of other governments, ancient
or modern.   Such researches and comparisons, however interesting
they might prove, would be almost endless, and, in a book of this
character, would  tend to  divert the student from a study of the
origin and  nature of  American citizenship,  national and state,
without shedding  any practical  light upon  the real question to
which the volume is addressed.

     We shall  therefore proceed  to  ascertain  the  origin  and
define  the   nature  and   quality  of  citizenship  enjoyed  by
individuals who  are subject  to the  jurisdiction of  the United
States, either  as citizens  of the United States, or as citizens
of some  particular component  State, Territory, or possession of
the United States.


                    Definition of Citizenship

     The latest  approved definition  of the  term citizenship is
that found  in the Standard Dictionary (1898), which describes it
as "the  status of a citizen with its rights and privileges." (1)
The status of a citizen implies the existence of:

     [1]  A political  body established  to promote  the  general
          welfare and  collective, as  well as individual, rights
          of those composing it.

     [2]  Individuals  who   have   established,   or   submitted
          themselves to the dominion of, that political body. (2)

     [3]  Such   benefit   from,   or   participation   in,   the
          administration  of   that   political   body   by   the
          individuals composing  it, that  they may be designated
          as citizens, and not as mere subjects of a despot or an
          absolute monarch  under whom  they  have  no  voice  in

     The same  authority above  quoted defines  a citizen  as  "a
member of a nation or sovereign state, especially a republic; one
who owes allegiance to a government and is entitled to protection
from it." That definition is broad enough to make every subject a
citizen of  the government  to which be owes allegiance, and from
which he  receives protection;  but the  term citizen,  as it  is
commonly understood,  implies membership  of a  political body in
which the  individual enjoys popular liberty to a greater or less
degree. (3)  It does not necessarily follow from this definition,
that the  grade or  quality or  privileges of citizenship must be
identical in  all citizens,  even in  republican governments.  In
the Roman  government, a  citizen might  or might not be invested
with all  the civil  privileges of  the government.  (4)  In Many
cases arising  under our  system, it  has been repeatedly decided
that the  bestowal Of  political Privileges upon an individual is
not essential to Constitute him a citizen(5)

     Ordinarily the  term citizen, applied to the individual unit
in any  government, implies  that he  enjoys a  greater degree of
participation in  the affairs  of his  government than  would  be
implied if he were referred to as a subject.

     In  a   constitutional  monarchy  like  Great  Britain,  the
individual units  composing it  are referred  to indifferently as
citizens or  as subjects.   In  an absolute monarchy like Russia,
the  idea   of  subjection  to  the  ruler  overshadows  that  of
citizenship, and  the individual subject is seldom referred to as
a  citizen,   except  in   diplomatic  intercourse   between  his
government and other nations.

     In a  free democracy  like the United States, where there is
no sovereign  and no  subject, the  units composing the political
body are  properly designated  as  citizens.    This  subject  is
discussed in  a most  interesting way by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Minor v. Happersett. (6)

                      American Citizenship

                      Its Origin and Kinds

     In the  seventeenth and  eighteenth centuries,  the  British
government planted  or acquired thirteen distinct colonies on the
continent of  North America,  and governed them, prior to July 4,
1776, under the system of English laws as applied by the colonial
policy of  Great Britain,  with George  III as  a  constitutional
monarch.   Each of  these colonies  had been  founded or acquired
separately and  at a  different time, and each was governed under
its own  distinct charter  or commission.  The inhabitants of all
the colonies  were British  citizens or  subjects.   The  several
local  governments,   under  which   the  colonies   respectively
conducted their  domestic affairs, were not independent political
societies, of  which they  might be  said to  be citizens.  While
they were  inhabitants of  their respective  colonies, they  were
citizens of  Great Britain, and their local governments were mere
dependencies,  acting   under   concessions   from   the   parent
government.        A   comparison   of   the   several   colonial
administrations of  these colonies  will make  plain at  once how
different were  their  several  domestic  administrations.    The
colonial organization  of Massachusetts  was altogether different
from that of Maryland; that of Virginia altogether different from
that of Rhode Island.  The charters of the colonial organizations
of South  Carolina and  New York  had little  resemblance to each
other, and so on with all the colonies.

     The mother  country, while  exacting paramount allegiance to
herself from  all her  colonies, had,  in her dealings with them,
permitted each  to indulge its idiosyncrasies in matters of local
concern, with  so little  regard to uniformity of administration,
that the  thirteen colonies  grew up with little of similitude in
their charter  rights, and  little in common in their local forms
of government.   What  they  had  in  common  was  their  British
citizenship, and  their  common  grievances  against  the  parent
government, which,  as they  conceived, had  deprived them of the
right of  local self-government.   This  British citizenship,  in
common, was  the germ  of their  united  action,  and  afterwards
became the  foundation of  a new  citizenship, known  as American
citizenship, on  which all  citizenship, whether  of  the  United
States, or  of the States and Territories and possessions subject
to its jurisdiction, now rests.  And this brings us to -

                        State Citizenship

     The  thirteen  independent  American  colonies  by  a  joint
Declaration of  Independence dated  July 4,  1776, asserted their
common purpose  to maintain that they were free, independent, and
sovereign States.   That declaration, if it could be successfully
maintained, carried  with it  as a  result, that their respective
inhabitants were no longer citizens or subjects of Great Britain,
but were  thenceforth  citizens  of  the  States  in  which  they
respectively resided.   England  resisted this  contention  until
September 3,  1783, at  which time  she entered into a definitive
treaty of  peace with  the  representatives  of  these  colonies,
recognizing the colonies, name by name, as free, independent, and
sovereign States.

     After thus  gaining their  independence, some  of the States
proceeded to  adopt new constitutions forthwith, conforming their
government to  their changed conditions; while others found their
royal charters  so well  adapted to  a free government, that they
continued to live under them for many years.  The most remarkable
instance of this is the State of Rhode Island, which continued to
govern itself under the forms of its royal charter until the year
1843.   Even then,  the  attempt  to  adopt  a  new  constitution
resulted in  a domestic  conflict,  familiarly  known  as  Dorr's
Rebellion, for  a full  account of  which see  the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the case of Luther v. Borden. (7)

     While  the  revolutionary  struggle  lasted,  the  colonies,
calling themselves States, cooperated with each other through the
device  of  a  league  under  the  name  of  the  United  States,
represented by  a Continental  Congress.   The objects  for which
this league  and  congress  were  created,  were  to  assert  and
prosecute measures  in common  for attaining  the independence of
the States.   Through  this league, they also bound themselves by
mutual obligations,  not to negotiate for peace, or for any other
purpose, with  the parent country, save through the appointees of
the  Continental  Congress;  and  the  peace  which  was  finally
negotiated was  brought about  by a treaty entered into on behalf
of  the  United  Colonies,  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the
Continental Congress.

     But the  independence  demanded  by  the  colonies  and  the
citizenship recognized by Great Britain were the independence and
citizenship of thirteen sovereign and independent States, and not
of any  one national  political body.   This  could not have been
otherwise,  for  the  words  "United  States,"  while  they  were
employed in  the Declaration  of Independence and in the Articles
of Confederation  under  which  the  revolutionary  struggle  was
conducted, were  manifestly used in a plural sense, as expressing
the States  united, and  the compact  entered  into  between  the
colonies shows,  upon its  face, that  it was not entered into to
create a  new political  body reaching or operating upon the unit
of the  citizen.   All the  powers possessed  by the confederated
government were derived from and to be exercised upon and through
the legislatures  which created  it, representing  States and not
individuals.   Any effort  of the federal authority to command or
enforce allegiance  to it  directly from  the citizens  of  those
States, save in a few particulars provided for in the Articles of
Confederation, would  have aroused  indignant protests  from  the
States, and would, perhaps, have resulted in a dissolution of the

     The date  insisted upon  by the  thirteen States, as that at
which their  inhabitants ceased  to be colonial subjects of Great
Britain, and became citizens of their respective States, was July
4, 1776.   The  English authorities,  on the  other  hand,  fixed
September  3,   1783,  the   date  of   the   definitive   treaty
acknowledging the  independence of  the States,  as the true date
from which to reckon. (8)  This question has long since ceased to
be of  any importance as bearing upon any property rights, and in
so far  as it  relates to  whether  State  citizenship  antedated
national citizenship,  it  makes  no  difference  which  date  is
assumed to  be correct;  for the  relations of  the States to the
federal compact were substantially the same in 1776 as in 1783.

     The Declaration  of Independence  affirmed that  the  United
Colonies ought  to be  free and independent States.  The Articles
of Confederation were agreed upon by delegates November 15, 1777.
After announcing  a name  for the confederacy between the States,
it  proceeded   to  declare   that  each   State  retained   "its
sovereignty,  freedom   and  independence,   and   every   power,
jurisdiction and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  confederation
expressly delegated  to the United States in Congress assembled."
The Congress  was composed of delegates chosen annually, as State
legislatures might  direct, and  the delegates were maintained by
the States.  In determining questions in the Congress, each State
had one  vote.   The duty  of raising  their respective quotas of
troops was  imposed upon  the States, and the privilege of naming
all officers  of or  under the  rank  of  colonel.    The  States
undertook to  supply all  funds to  the common  treasury, and the
taxes for  defraying the  expenses of  the confederacy were to be
laid and  levied by  the state legislature, each State paying her
proportion.   There was  no president  or common  ruler over  the
confederacy  of   States,  and   the  limited  federal  authority
conferred upon  Congress by  the Articles  of  Confederation  was
intrusted  to  the  control  and  direction  of  a  committee  of

     Such was  the confederacy  existing between  the States when
Great Britain  acknowledged them as independent sovereign States.
It requires  little argument  to demonstrate  that a  mere agency
such as this, operating under a limited authorization and without
any power to levy taxes or draft troops, was not a political body
entitled to  claim that any individual was its citizen, and while
State citizenship necessarily followed at once to the inhabitants
of the  colonies, respectively,  upon the acknowledgment of their
independence, no  citizenship of the United States was recognized
or even existed.

     The writings  of Mr.  Hamilton and Mr. Madison, preserved in
The Federalist,  written long  after the  acknowledgment  of  the
independence of  the colonies, are full of complaints against the
Articles of Confederation, on this score.  They are appeals for a
change from  this condition,  and urge  upon the people to remedy
these defects  by adopting the proposed constitution and creating
the new  citizenship.   The Constitution of the United States was
proposed September 17, 1787, and the operations of the government
began under it March 4, 1789.  The Federalist papers were written
in that  interval, urging the adoption of the Constitution by the
States.   In the  fifteenth paper  of The  Federalist (9),    Mr.
Hamilton   discusses    "the   insufficiency   of   the   present
confederation to the preservation of the Union," as follows:

     "The great  and radical  vice in  the  construction  of  the
     existing confederation  is the  principle of legislation for
     states or  governments, in  their  corporate  or  collective
     capacities, and  as contradistinguished from the individuals
     of which  they consist  ....   Except  as  to  the  rule  of
     appointment, the  United States has an indefinite discretion
     to make  requisitions for  men and  money; but  they have no
     authority to  raise either,  by regulations extending to the
     individual citizens of America.  The consequence of this is,
     that although  in theory  their resolutions concerning those
     objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of
     the Union,  yet in  practice they  are mere  recommendations
     which the  States observe  or disregard at their option.  If
     we still  adhere to  the design of a national government ...
     we must  extend the authority of the Union to the Persons of
     the citizens the only proper objects of government."

     Again, in  the twenty-third  paper (10) the same illustrious
authority declared:  "If we are in earnest about giving the Union
energy  and  duration,  we  must  abandon  the  vain  project  of
legislating upon  the States  in their  collective capacities; we
must extend  the laws of the federal government to the individual
citizens of America."

     The  above  citations,  which  are  but  two  of  many,  are
sufficient to demonstrate that under the peculiar organization of
the United  States, as  it was  originally formed,  the powers or
authority  of   the  general   government  did   not  extend   to
individuals,  gave   in  a   few  isolated  instances,  and  that
consequently the  only real  citizenship was that of States.  Mr.
Hamilton, in  both his references to citizens, spoke of them, not
as citizens  of the  United States,  but, as citizens of America,
doubtless adopting  that form  of expression  as more  correct in
describing the citizens of the States generally.

     Until the  ratification of  the Constitution  of the  United
States by  nine States,  it was a nullity.  New Hampshire was the
ninth State to ratify.  The date of its action was June 21, 1788.
Virginia and New York ratified the Constitution a few days later,
and before  the date  fixed for  commencing the operations of the
government.   Thus, for the first time, there was such a thing as
citizenship of  the United  States.   That  citizenship  did  not
extend to  North Carolina  until January  28, 1790,  or to  Rhode
Island until  June  1,  1790,  for  those  States  delayed  their
ratifications until  after the  operations of  the government had

     In the United States custom house at New York, one may see a
list of the vessels which entered the port of New York during the
first year  after the Constitution of the United States went into
effect, and  in that  list,  entered  as  vessels  arriving  from
"foreign ports," are several ships from Rhode Island.

     Thus we  see that,  in eleven  of the original States, State
citizenship antedated Federal citizenship over five years, and in
two other States nearly seven years.

     Speaking of  the interim  between the  acknowledgment of the
independence  of   the  colonies   and  the   adoption   of   the
Constitution, John  Fiske, in  his History  of the United States,

     "Perhaps the  only thing that kept the Union from falling to
     pieces in  1786 was the Northwestern Territory, which George
     Rogers Clark  had  conquered  in  1779,  and  which  skilful
     diplomacy had  enabled us  to keep when the treaty was drawn
     in 1782.   Virginia claimed this territory and actually held
     it, but  New York,  Massachusetts, and  Connecticut also had
     claims upon  it.   It was  the idea  of Maryland that such a
     vast region  ought not  to be  added to  any one  State,  or
     divided between  two or three of the States, but ought to be
     the common  property of  the Union.  Maryland had refused to
     ratify the  Articles of  Confederation until the four States
     that claimed  the Northwestern  Territory should yield their
     claims to the United States.  This was done between 1780 and
     1786, and  thus, for  the  first  time,  the  United  States
     government was  put in possession of valuable property which
     could be  made to yield an income and this piece of property
     was about  the pay  debts.  This piece of property was about
     the first  thing in which all the American people were alike
     interested, after they had won their independence." (11)

     In the  light of  the above  historical  facts,  it  is  not
strange that  the discussions,  prior to  the great Civil War, on
the question whether paramount allegiance was due to their State,
or to  their Nation,  by the citizens of the States respectively,
led to a difference of opinion on that question between citizens.

             Citizenship of the Northwest Territory

     The United  States, as  constituted under  the  Articles  of
Confederation, having come into possession of the large unsettled
territory above  referred to, by the cession of Great Britain and
the subsequent  cession of  their rights  by the  several  States
which laid  claim to  it the  Continental Congress  undertook  to
pass,  in   1787,  the  famous  ordinances  laying  down  certain
fundamental laws  for the  government of  that territory,  and in
States which,  might thereafter  be formed out of that territory.
The States  of Ohio,  Indiana, Illinois,  Michigan, and Wisconsin
were subsequently  erected and admitted into the Union, and those
five embrace what was then known as the Northwest Territory.

     Of the  action of  the Continental  Congress in  assuming to
pass these  ordinances, Mr.  Madison says,  in the thirty-seventh
paper of  The Federalist  (12), that  in proceeding  to form  new
States, to  erect temporary  governments, to appoint officers for
them, and to prescribe the conditions on which such States should
be admitted into the confederacy, the Congress acted "without the
least color  of constitutional  authority." The justification for
this action stated by him was:

     "The public  interest, the  necessity of  the case,  imposed
     upon them  the  task  of  overleaping  their  constitutional
     limits." From this necessity of violating the constitutional
     authority, he  proceeded to  argue: "But  is not the fact an
     alarming proof  of the  danger resulting  from a  government
     which does  not possess  regular powers  commensurate to its
     objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma
     to which it is continually exposed."

     Whether the  Continental Congress  did or  did  not  possess
power to  enact the  ordinances of  1787, the necessity that some
one should  take steps to that end was manifest to every one, and
the action of the Continental Congress was not only acquiesced in
by all  the States,  but the ordinance has come down to posterity
as one  of the  wisest charts  of government  ever framed.   This
territory had come into the possession of the United States under
the following circumstances:

     When the  treaty of peace was negotiated between England and
the  United  States,  the  boundary  lying  between  the  English
possessions and  the country whose independence was acknowledged,
was fixed  as running through the centres of Lakes Ontario, Erie,
Huron, and  Superior, and thence westward through the Lake of the
Woods to  the Mississippi, whereby the vast and rich domain Lying
in between  the Great  Lakes and  the Ohio and Mississippi rivers
became  a  part  of  the  country  acknowledged  as  independent.
Settlers rapidly  flocked to that territory, and conditions there
called for  the organization  of some  sort of political body for
its government.  Neither the Federal government, nor the State of
Virginia, had been able to discharge their debts to Revolutionary
soldiers, and  Virginia, before  the cession  of her territory to
the United  States, had  issued many military land grants in this
territory to  her soldiers.  When the Continental army at Newburg
threatened to  march upon  Philadelphia in the year 1783, because
it had  not been paid, its violence was allayed by the assurances
of General Washington that he would do all in his power to induce
the government  to make provision for discharging its obligations
to the soldiers, in part at least, by military land grants in the
Northwest Territory.   Pursuant to that pledge, Congress did make
large land grants in the Northwest Territory, in that portion now
known as  Ohio, to Revolutionary soldiers.  After the armies were
disbanded, large  colonies of  people from  the  original  States
promptly settled  in the  Ohio territory, under the leadership of
Paul  Carrington   of  Virginia,  and  General  Rufus  Putnam  of
Connecticut, and  thus it  came about  that at  the time  of  the
passage  of   this   famous   ordinance,   a   considerable   and
representative body  of unorganized  people were  in occupancy of
the Northwest  Territory, demanding  some form  of government and
some right of representation.

     The ordinance passed by the Continental Congress pursuant to
this urgency,  announced certain  fundamental articles which were
to rest upon any and all governments formed in the territory, and
declared  that   the  obligation   to  adopt   these  fundamental
principles should  be regarded  as a compact between the original
States and  the people  and States  in said  territory, and that,
having been  adopted, they  should  forever  remain  unalterable,
unless by common consent.

     It will  be noted,  that Congress was so doubtful of its own
powers, that  it made  the compact  obligatory, not  between  the
United States  and the  people of this territory, but between the
original States and the people.

     It is  unnecessary to  enumerate at  length the  fundamental
principles  laid   down  for  the  government  of  the  Northwest
Territory. (13)   The  Act  provided  for  the  erection  of  the
territory into  a district; for a law of descents; and for a form
of civil  government, under a governor and secretary appointed by
Congress.  It gave the people of the territory the light to elect
a general  assembly by  popular election.    In  prescribing  the
qualifications of  a candidate,  and of  voters, it required that
they should  have been citizens of one of the United States for a
certain time.   It  gave the territorial legislature the right to
elect a  delegate to Congress, who was to possess a seat with the
right of debate, but no vote.  Without going into further details
of  this  government,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  was
acceptable  to   the  people   and  a   remarkable  spectacle  of
government.   For the United States, which had no citizens of its
own, undertook  to create and erect a government of citizens, and
to prescribe,  to  the  minutest  detail,  their  obligations  of
citizenship.   It is  inconceivable that the Continental Congress
would have  made the  qualifications  of  candidates  and  voters
depend on  their citizenship  of one  of the  original States, if
there had  been such  a thing  at the  time as citizenship of the
United States.   The  only reference  in the Ordinance of 1787 to
"citizens of  the United  States" is  in Article  IV.    That  is
manifestly a  reference to  conditions in  future, made  with the
knowledge that  the Constitution was then in process of formation
and likely  to be  adopted, whereby citizens of the United States
would come into existence.

     Thus we  have the  second class  of American citizenship, to
wit, citizenship  of  the  Northwest  Territory,  both  of  which
classes  of  citizenship  antedated  citizenship  of  the  United

                Citizenship of the United States

     When the  Constitution was  ratified by  nine of  the States
composing the  old confederacy,  and not until then, was there an
actual and  real citizenship  of the  United States, however much
the term  may have been theretofore loosely employed.  The States
ratified the Constitution in the following order:

     1. Delaware, December 7, 1787;
     2. Pennsylvania, December 12, 1787;
     3. New Jersey, December 18, 1787;
     4. Georgia, January 2, 1788;
     5. Connecticut, January 9, 1788;
     6. Massachusetts, February 6, 1788;
     7. Maryland, April 28, 1788;
     8. South Carolina, May 23, 1788;
     9. New Hampshire, June 21, 1788.

     The   Constitution   provides,   Article   VII,   that   the
ratification  of   the  conventions  of  nine  States  should  be
sufficient for  the establishment of the Constitution between the
States so  ratifying  the  same.    The  Constitution  became  an
established form of government June 21, 1788, in nine States, and
the remaining  States, Virginia,  New York,  North Carolina,  and
Rhode Island,  when they  ratified it,  came  into  a  government
already established.   This attitude of Virginia and New York was
a technical  rather than  an actual  delay, for Virginia ratified
the Constitution  June 26,  1788, and New York July 26, 1788, and
the operations  of the  government under the new Constitution did
not begin until March 4, 1789.

     The radical  changes in  the form  of  the  federal  compact
altered the  status of the people subject to its jurisdiction, so
that, whereas  they had  theretofore been  only citizens  of  the
States, they  now became also citizens of the United States. (14)
The first  of these  organic changes was the provision of Article
VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution, which declared the laws of the
United States  made pursuant thereto, and all treaties made under
its authority,  to be  the supreme  law of the land, any thing in
the  constitution   or  laws   of  any   State  to  the  contrary

     In  the   next  place,   the  government   created  by   the
Constitution was  clothed with  ample powers,  independent of the
States, to  maintain itself,  and to reach, command, direct, and,
if  need   be,  to   punish,  every  individual  subject  to  its

     Without going  into an  enumeration of  those powers,  it is
sufficient to say that the government created by the Constitution
became a government with citizens of its own, and was no longer a
mere government over States.

     Yet  radical   as  was   this  change   in  the  nature  and
constitution of  the federal  government, the  new citizenship is
referred to  only three times in the entire instrument, as it was
originally  framed,  and  then  only  incidentally.    The  first
reference is in Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 2.  In describing
the qualifications  of a  member of the House of Representatives,
one of the qualifications was declared to be, that be should have
been "seven  years a  citizen of  the United  States." The second
reference is  in Article  1, Section 3, Clause 3, which makes one
of the  qualifications of  a senator,  that he  should have  been
"nine years  a citizen of the United States." The third reference
is in  Article II,  Section 1,  Clause 5,  which enacted that "no
person, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United
States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the office of President."

     If these requirements had been literally conformed to, there
could have  been no  election for representatives to Congress for
seven years  after the  adoption of  the Constitution, and no one
would have  been eligible as a senator for nine years thereafter.
The language  employed by  the convention  was less  careful than
that which had been used by Congress in July of the same year, in
framing  the  ordinance  for  the  government  of  the  Northwest
Territory.    Congress  had  made  the  qualification  rest  upon
citizenship of "one of the United States," and this was doubtless
the intent  of the  convention which framed the Constitution, for
it cannot have meant anything else.

     The silence  of the  Constitution and  its failure to define
the meaning  of the  word citizen,  either by way of inclusion or
exclusion, has  been the  subject of  much judicial comment. (16)
Perhaps the  best expression concerning it is that of the Supreme
Court of  the United  States, when it declares: "In this respect,
as in  other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the
common law,  the principles  and history of which were familiarly
known to the framers of the Constitution. (17)

     In the  famous case  of Dred  Scott v. Sandford (18), it was
said that the words "people of the United States " and "citizens"
are synonymous  terms;   that they  "describe the  political body
which,  according  to  our  republican  institutions,  forms  the
sovereignty which  holds the  power and  conducts the  government
through its representatives."

     Sundry opinions  of  the  attorney-generals  of  the  United
States are  to the  same effect.   In  one of  these, rendered in
1862, it is said: "The Constitution of the United States does not
declare who  are and who are not citizens, nor does it attempt to
describe the  constituent elements of citizenship; it leaves that
quality where  it found it, resting on the fact of home birth and
upon the laws of the several States." (19)

     It was  not difficult  to ascertain, on the principles above
announced, who  were citizens  of the  United  States  under  the
original Constitution.   The  citizens of  Vermont and  Kentucky,
when those  States were  admitted, assumed their relations to the
Union as  naturally as  did those  of any of the original States.
So, also,  the citizens of the region now constituting five great
States erected  in the Northwest Territory became citizens of the
United States the instant the Constitution was adopted. (20)

     By the  Constitution, power  was given Congress (Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2) to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting  the territory or other property belonging
to the United States.  Under this power, the process of governing
the Territories  and organizing  them into States was simplified.

     By easy  transition the territory acquired from France known
as the  Louisiana Territory,  and the Florida cession from Spain,
and the  territory acquired  from Mexico  by conquest, were first
governed territorially.   Under these territorial governments the
inhabitants made their first attornment as citizens of the United
States to the Federal authority, and when the States created from
this territory  were organized  and admitted,  they assumed their
obligations of  dual citizenship to State and Nation, of a nature
and a quality identical with that of citizens of the old States.

     Besides these  citizens, who  became such  in a body, a vast
number of  citizens of  the United  States were created under the
powers  of   naturalization  conferred   upon  Congress   by  the

     Among the first powers conferred upon Congress by Article 1,
Section 8,  Clause  4,  was  "to  establish  a  uniform  rule  of
naturalization." (22)

     Laws were  passed, and  the  naturalized  citizens  admitted
under these  laws distributed  themselves among the several State
or Territorial  communities of which they became members.  But it
did not  follow as  a necessary,  consequence that  a naturalized
citizen of  the United  States became also a citizen of any State
or Territory.

     The  original  Constitution  remained  unchanged  concerning
citizenship, from  1789 until  July 28, 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment to  the Constitution was adopted.  Before entering into
a discussion  of the  effect upon  citizenship, and the manner of
enforcement, of  that amendment,  a brief historical statement is

     Even prior  to the  adoption of  the Constitution, sectional
jealousies  existed   between  the   States.     The   basis   of
representation in  the national Congress was a fruitful source of
controversy  between  them.    The  population  of  the  northern
colonies was  almost exclusively  white and free, whereas that of
the southern  colonies consisted,  to a  large extent,  of  black
slaves.   The extent  to which  this black  population was  to be
considered in  arranging a  basis of  representation gave rise to
many of the controversies between the sections, at the outset.

     The  basis  of  representation  in  Congress  fixed  by  the
Constitution,  Article   1,  Section  2,  Clause  3,  apportioned
representatives among  the  several  States  according  to  their
respective numbers,  which were to be determined by adding to the
whole number  of free persons, three-fifths of all other persons,
exclusive of Indians not taxed.

     The Constitution  conferred power  on Congress to dispose of
and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the
territory, or  other property,  belonging to  the United  States.
(23)   It likewise conferred upon Congress the power to admit new
States into the Union. (24)

     The Constitution  contained a  provision that no person held
to service  or labor  in  one  State,  under  the  laws  thereof,
escaping into  another State, should in consequence of any law or
regulation therein  be discharged from such service or labor, but
that he  should be  delivered up  on claim  of such party to whom
such service or labor might be due. (25)

     The relative  strength of  the sections North and, South was
altogether different  at that  time from  what it  is at present;
even the  white population  of  the  southern  States,  in  which
slavery existed,  as compared  with that  of the northern States,
where slavery did not exist was proportionately larger than it is
at present,  and on the basis set forth above the northern States
were jealous  of the preponderance of representation given to the
southern  States.    It  was  argued  by  those  opposed  to  the
Constitution in  the North,  that it  placed the northern States,
especially the  small ones,  at the mercy of the southern States,
in the  Union.   It was  this argument, no doubt, that made Rhode
Island reluctant  to become  a member of the Union.  On the other
hand, the  southern States  realized that  the population  of the
North was  growing much  more rapidly than that of the South, and
that it  was spreading into the Territories and would demand that
those Territories be formed into new States and admitted into the
Union as  free States.   It  was argued  by those  opposed to the
Union in  the South, that such a result was inevitable; that in a
short time  the slave-holding  States would  be dominated  by the
free States  of the North and West, and that they, by the control
thus gained  in Congress  over the Territories and concerning the
admission of free States, would put the slave States at the mercy
of the  free States  in federal  affairs.   It was  doubtless  by
arguments like  this, that  North Carolina was restrained so long
from becoming a member of the Union.

     The Constitution  contained no  definite expression upon the
right of  the States  to withdraw  from the  Union if they became
dissatisfied.   In spite  of many  attempts to  have  that  right
defined, the convention refused to do so.

     These  conditions   gave  rise   from  the  outset  to  such
antagonism between  the sections, that it was found impossible to
procure the  assent of  Congress to  the admission of new States,
except in  couplets, one  with and  one without  slavery.    This
method of  admitting States  began with the States of Vermont and
Kentucky,  and   continued  until   the  controversies  over  the
regulation of  slavery  in  the  Territories,  the  returning  of
fugitive slaves,  and the  right of States to secede, culminating
in an  attempt in the year 1861, on the part of the slave States,
to withdraw  from the Union, and a consequent civil war, in which
the northern States were triumphant.

     While the controversy over slavery was at its height, a case
was decided  by the  Supreme Court of the United States, in which
the status  of  the  negro  race,  under  the  Constitution,  was
defined.   The decision  was rendered  in the  year 1857, and the
question involved  was deemed  to be  of such importance that the
opinions delivered  occupied two  hundred and  forty pages of the
volume in  which they appear.  The points relating to citizenship
decided by  the Supreme  Court, in  an  opinion  of  great  power
delivered by  Chief Justice  Taney, were:  "A free  negro of  the
African race  whose ancestors  were brought  to this  country and
sold as  slaves, is  not a  'citizen' within  the meaning  of the
Constitution of the United States....   When the Constitution was
adopted, they  were not  regarded in any of the States as members
of the  community which  constituted  the  State,  and  were  not
numbered among its 'people or Citizens.' Consequently the special
rights and  immunities guaranteed  to citizens  do not  apply  to
them....  The only two clauses in the Constitution which point to
this race  treat them  as persons  whom it  was morally lawful to
deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves."

     This finally  adjudged status of the negro race continued to
be the  law of  the land  until it  was changed  by the following

     In December, 1862, the war between the United States and the
States which  had attempted to secede from the Union, having then
been flagrant  for nearly  two years,  with its  result still  in
doubt, the  President of  the United States issued a proclamation
conditionally emancipating  all the  slaves in  the States  whose
armed forces  were opposed  to those  of the  United States.   By
subsequent proclamations,  this conditional  emancipation of  the
slaves was made absolute.  The President did not claim to justify
this proclamation by any express warrant of the Constitution, but
it was  claimed by him to be a war measure, legitimate as a means
of weakening  and injuring  an  enemy  in  arms.    We  need  not
therefore consider  it further  as a  measure of  law.    It  was
emphatically a measure of the war.

     In April,  1865, the  armies of  the United States conquered
the armies  of the  States which  attempted to  secede, and those
States, with  their people,  were at  the mercy of the conqueror,
subject to  such terms  as it saw fit to impose.  In anticipation
of this  victory, the  Congress of the United States, February 1,
1865, proposed  to the  legislatures of  the  several  States  an
amendment, known  as Article  XIII, in addition to, and amendment
of, the  Constitution of  the United  States, in  the  words  and
figures following:

                          ARTICLE XIII.

     "SECTION 1.   Neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude,
     except as  a punishment  for crime  whereof the  party shall
     have been  duly convicted,  shall exist  within  the  United
     States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

     December 18,  1865, the  secretary of  state proclaimed that
twenty-seven  of   the   thirty-six   State's   had,   by   their
legislatures,   ratified   this   amendment.      This   included
ratification by  the legislatures  of  the  States  of  Virginia,
Louisiana, Tennessee,  Arkansas, South  Carolina, Alabama,  North
Carolina, and  Georgia, all  of which  States  had  attempted  to
secede, and  were completely  within the  control of  the Federal
military power  at the date of their alleged ratification of this
amendment.  It has since been claimed that they were under duress
at the time of their alleged ratifications, but the Supreme Court
of  the  United  States,  in  the  case  of  White  v.  Hart,(27)
considered and  disposed of this plea of duress, as it related to
the State  of Georgia,  in a way so effectual that it need not be
further referred to. (28)

     The negro  having thus been emancipated by the power of war,
and his  status changed from that of a slave to a freeman, it was
proposed, for  reasons satisfactory  to the  dominant  party,  to
alter his  civil and  political status  as it had been defined by
the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.  Accordingly, the Congress of
the  United   States,  on  January  16,  1866,  proposed  to  the
legislatures of the several States the following amendment to the

                          ARTICLE XIV.

     "Section 1.   All  persons born or naturalized in the United
     States,  and   subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are
     citizens of  the United States and of the State wherein they
     reside.   No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
     abridge the  privileges and  immunities of  citizens of  the
     United States;  nor shall  any State  deprive any  person of
     life, liberty,  or property, without due process of law; nor
     deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal
     protection of the laws." (29)

     The amendment  contains three  other sections,  but none  of
them refers to citizenship.

     July 21,  1868, by  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress,  the
Fourteenth Amendment was declared to have been adopted.  Not only
did it  work a  revolution in  the citizenship of the negro race,
but  its   effect  upon   United  States  citizenship,  upon  the
citizenship of  States, upon  the status of every class of people
in the  United States,  and upon the relations between the United
States and  the States,  has given  rise to  more discussion, and
been the  subject of  more decisions,  than any other part of the
Federal Constitution.  (30)   The Supreme  Court  of  the  United
States alone  has, in  a period  of thirty-five  years,  rendered
about three  hundred decisions  on questions  arising  upon  this

     To discuss  those decisions;  at length is impossible within
the limits  of any  one volume.   Many  of them  relate  to  laws
abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens; many to what
constitutes due  process of  law; many to the denial of the equal
protection of the laws.  A few, defining the reasons which led to
the adoption  of the  amendment, and the effects of the amendment
upon the  rights of citizens, will suffice in this chapter, while
others will  be considered  when we come to discuss the method by
which this defined citizenship may be acquired or protected.

     In the  Slaughter-House Cases  (31) which  were the first to
arise under  this amendment  and in which opinions of unsurpassed
ability were  rendered, it  is said:  "This clause  declares that
persons may  be citizens  of the  United States without regard to
their citizenship  of a  particular State,  and it  overturns the
Dred Scott  decision by making all persons born within the United
States and  subject to  its jurisdiction  citizens of  the United

     And in  the case  of U.S.  v. Wong Kim Ark (32), it is again

     "The  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  in  the
     declaration that  'all persons  born or  naturalized in  the
     United States,  and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
     citizens of  the United States and of the State wherein they
     reside,' contemplates  two sources  of citizenship,  and two
     only:   birth    and   naturalization.      Citizenship   by
     naturalization can  only be acquired by naturalization under
     the authority  and in  the forms of law.  But citizenship by
     birth is  established by  the mere  fact of  birth under the
     circumstances defined  in the  Constitution.   Every  person
     born in  the United  States, and subject to the jurisdiction
     thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and
     needs no naturalization."

     "The  real   object  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the
     Constitution, in  qualifying the words, 'All persons born in
     the United  States,' by  the addition,  land subject  to the
     jurisdiction thereof,'  would appear to have been to exclude
     by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members
     of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the
     national government,  unknown to  the common  law), the  two
     classes of  cases -   children  born  of  alien  enemies  in
     hostile   occupation,    and    children    of    diplomatic
     representatives of  a foreign  state - both of which, as has
     already been  shown, by  the law  of England, and by our own
     law, from  the time  of the  first settlement of the English
     colonies in  America, had  been recognized exceptions to the
     fundamental  rule   of  citizenship   by  birth  within  the

  Qualified Citizenship in Territorial and Acquired Possessions

     Recent events,  the result  of which  was not foreseen, have
created an  entirely new  and unprecedented  citizenship  in  the
United States.   It is the limited and rudimentary citizenship of
the inhabitants of our newly acquired territory in Alaska, Puerto
Rico, the Philippine and the Ladrone Islands, and in Hawaii.  The
status of  those citizens  is the result of changed conditions in
the  territory   which  they   inhabit.    The  oldest  of  these
possessions is  Alaska,  purchased  by  the  United  States  from
Russia, and  governed as  a Territory.   The latest expression of
the Supreme  Court of  the United  States, defining the status of
Alaskan citizenship,  is in  an opinion delivered April 10, 1905.

     In April,  1898, the  United States declared war against the
Kingdom of Spain, in a quarrel between the two nations concerning
the government  by  Spain  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  a  Spanish
possession.   In May, 1898, the naval forces of the United States
invaded the  Philippine Islands, another Spanish possession, soon
followed by the land forces of the United States.  In July, 1898,
the military  forces of  the United  States invaded the island of
Puerto Rico,  another Spanish  possession.   By a  protocol dated
August 12,  1898 (34),  hostilities were  suspended  between  the
United States  and Spain, upon the understanding that Spain would
cede to  the United States:  the island of Puerto Rico, and other
islands under  Spanish sovereignty  in the  West Indies,  also an
island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

     By a  treaty dated  December 10,  1898 (35),  Spain actually
ceded to  the United  States the  island of  Puerto Rico, and the
other islands  under Spanish  sovereignty in the West Indies, and
the island  of Guam  in the Ladrone group, and by the same treaty
she ceded  to the  United States  the archipelago  known  as  the
Philippine Islands,  by boundaries.   Provision  was made  in the
treaty for  the protection  of Spanish  subjects, natives  of the
peninsula residing  in the ceded territory, for the protection of
the religion of the inhabitants of the territories ceded, and for
the protection  of certain  civil rights.    By  a  treaty  dated
November 7,  1900 (36),  Spain ceded all islands belonging to the
Philippine archipelago,  lying outside the lines described in the
prior treaty, particularly the islands of Sulu and Sibitu.

     By a protocol dated March 29, 1900 (37), the period fixed by
the former treaty for Spanish subjects to declare their intention
to retain their Spanish nationality was extended six months.

     Thus, within a year from the outbreak of the war with Spain,
the United States acquired all the above named islands, with many
millions of  inhabitants, and  undertook by  Article  IX  of  the
Treaty of December 10, 1898, that "the civil rights and political
status of  the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress."

     While these  events were transpiring the Republic of Hawaii,
whose government extended over a group of islands in the Pacific,
known as the Hawaiian Islands, formally signified its consent, in
the manner  provided by  its constitution, to cede absolutely and
without reservation  to the  United States of America, all rights
of sovereignty  of whatsoever  kind  in  and  over  the  Hawaiian
Islands or  their dependencies,  and also to cede and transfer to
the United  States the  absolute fee and ownership of all public,
government, or  crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports,
harbors, military  equipment, and  all other  public property  of
every kind  and description  belonging to  the government  of the
Hawaiian Islands,  together with  every  right  and  appurtenance
thereunto appertaining.   This  proposition was  presented to the
Congress of  the United  States, and  accepted July 7, 1898, by a
joint resolution  (38), which  provided  that  "said  cession  is
accepted, ratified,  and confirmed,  and that  the said  Hawaiian
Islands and  their dependencies  be, and they are hereby, annexed
as part  of the territory of the United States and are subject to
the sovereign  dominion thereof,  and that  all and  singular the
property and  rights hereinbefore  mentioned are  vested  in  the
United States of America."

     It was  further provided  that "until Congress shall provide
for the  government of  such islands all the civil, judicial, and
military  powers  exercised  by  the  officers  of  the  existing
government in  said islands  shall be  vested in  such person  or
persons, and  shall be exercised in such manner, as the President
of the  United States  shall direct; and the President shall have
power  to   remove  said  officers  and  fill  the  vacancies  so
occasioned." The  municipal legislation  of the Hawaiian Islands,
subject to  certain limitations, was to remain in force until the
Congress of  the United  States should  otherwise determine.  The
United States government assumed the debts of the islands, not to
exceed $4,000,000.   As act was passed forbidding the immigration
of  Chinese.     The  President  was  required  to  appoint  five
commissioners  to   recommend  to   Congress   such   legislation
concerning the  Hawaiian Islands as they should deem necessary or
proper. (39)

     Thus it  will be  seen, that  in the  year 1898  the  United
States gained  an immense  accession of  citizenship in territory
lying far  beyond its  original  confines,  inhabited  by  people
altogether different  from those who had constituted its citizens
theretofore.   It will also be seen, both in the joint resolution
accepting sovereignty  over the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  in  the
treaty accepting the cession of the Spanish possessions, that the
United States  assumed complete authority to govern all the newly
acquired territory.

     Let us  now consider  what government  it  has,  up  to  the
present  time,   provided  for   these  several  possessions,  an
examination essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  grade  and
quality of citizenship which their inhabitants enjoy.

                    HAWAII -- ITS GOVERNMENT

     Congress, by  an Act approved April 30, 1900 (40), passed an
Act to  provide a  government for  the Territory  of Hawaii.   In
Chapter I,  Section 4,  of that  Act it  was set  forth that  all
persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12,
1898, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States and
citizens of  the Territory  of Hawaii;  and all  citizens of  the
United States residing there on or since August 12, 1898, and all
citizens of  the United  States who shall hereafter reside in the
Territory of  Hawaii for  one year,  shall  be  citizens  of  the
Territory of  Hawaii.    The  fifth  section  declared  that  the
Constitution and  laws of  the United  States, except such as are
locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect in the
Territory  as  elsewhere  in  the  United  States,  with  certain
specific exceptions.

     The Act  provides for a legislature composed of a senate and
a house  of representatives,  for general elections, and that all
legislative  proceedings   shall  be  conducted  in  the  English
language.   It confers  a large  degree of legislative power upon
the legislature, and extends a broad franchise to all inhabitants
who are  citizens of  the United  States and  have resided in the
Territory not less than a year, twenty-one years old, registered,
and able  to speak,  read, and  write the English or the Hawaiian
language.   It provides,  however, for  the  appointment  by  the
President of  the United  States of  a governor, secretary, chief
justice and  justices of  the Supreme  Court, and  judges of  the
circuit courts; and that the governor shall nominate, and, by and
with the  advice and  consent of  the  senate  of  the  Territory
appoint, an  attorney general,  treasurer, commissioner of public
lands, commissioner  of agriculture  and forestry, superintendent
of public  works, superintendent  of public instruction, auditor,
and other  officers; but all the officers appointed under the Act
are to  be citizens  of the  Territory.  By the terms of the Act,
Section 85,  the delegate  to the House of Representatives of the
United States, to serve during each Congress, shall be elected by
the voters  qualified  to  vote  for  members  of  the  house  of
representatives of  the legislature;  such delegate shall possess
the qualifications  necessary for membership of the Senate of the
legislature of  Hawaii.   Every delegate shall have a seat in the
United States  House of Representatives, with the right of debate
but not of voting.

     From  the   foregoing  recital   of  the   Constitution  and
government of  Hawaii,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  government
organized in  that Territory  is  very  similar  in  its  general
characteristics to  that organized  in the Northwest Territory by
the Ordinance of 1787.

                           PUERTO RICO

     Congress  proceeded   April  12,  1900,  to  enact  a  civil
government for  the island  of Puerto  Rico and adjacent islands.
(41)   The Act provides that all inhabitants continuing to reside
in Puerto  Rico, who  were Spanish  subjects on  the 11th  day of
April, 1899,  and then resided in Puerto Rico, and their children
born subsequent  thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of Puerto  Rico, and  as such  entitled to  the protection of the
United States,  and they,  together with  such  citizens  of  the
United States  as may  reside in  Puerto Rico, shall constitute a
body politic  under the  name of  The People of Puerto Rico, with
governmental powers  as conferred in the Act.  By Section 14, the
statutory laws  of the  United States  not locally  inapplicable,
except as  otherwise provided,  and except  the  internal-revenue
laws, are  to have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in
the United States.  Section 16 provides that all judicial process
shall run in the name of the United States, to wit, the President
of the  United States,  and that  all penal  prosecutions in  the
local courts  shall be  conducted  in  the  name  and  under  the
authority of  the people  of Puerto  Rico, and that all officials
authorized  by  the  Act  shall  take  an  oath  to  support  the
Constitution of the United States and the laws of Puerto Rico.

     The legislative  authority provided by the Act was empowered
to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law or ordinance, civil or
criminal.  Congress, however, retained the right in the President
to appoint a governor and other executive officers and members of
an executive  council.   The legislative  body  consists  of  the
executive council and the house of delegates, and is known as the
Legislative Assembly  of Puerto  Rico;  the  house  of  delegates
comprises thirty-five members elected biennially by the qualified
voters from the seven districts into which the island is divided.
All citizens  of Puerto Rico, bona fide residents for a year, and
possessed of  other qualifications  under the  laws and  military
orders, are  allowed to  vote.  The legislative authority extends
to  all   matters  of   a  legislative   character  not   locally
inapplicable, including  the power  to create,  consolidate,  and
reorganize the  municipalities, and  to amend,  alter, modify, or
repeal all  laws and  ordinances of Puerto Rico, not inconsistent
with the  provisions of  the bill.   A judicial power is created,
but the  judges are  appointed by  the President  of  the  United
States, and  Puerto Rico  is made  a judicial  district  for  the
purposes of  Federal jurisdiction,  with appeal  to  the  Supreme
Court of  the United  States.   The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is
extended to  the Territory,  and a  commission was  appointed  to
compile and revise the laws of Puerto Rico and report a permanent
plan of government within a year.

     By acts  passed in  1902,  a  cadet  at  West  Point  and  a
midshipman at  Annapolis are  authorized from  the  Territory  of
Puerto Rico  (42), and  citizens of Puerto Rico are made eligible
for enlistment  in the  Puerto Rico  regiment, with  the right to
order them outside the service of the island.

     By  a  proclamation  dated  July  25,  1901,  the  President
declared that  the civil  government  of  Puerto  Rico  had  been
organized in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of
Congress. (43)

     From the  foregoing, it  will be seen that the government of
Puerto Rico  is even  more like  that provided  for the Northwest
Territory, than the government of Hawaii, as the legislative body
of Puerto  Rico consists of an executive council appointed by the
President to  act in conjunction with the house of delegates; but
the acknowledgment  that  the  inhabitants  of  Puerto  Rico  are
citizens of  the United  States  is  expressly  withheld  in  the
declaration of  the Act of Congress of April 12, 1900, Section 7,
which says  that all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish  subjects on  the 11th  day of April, 1899, and then
resided in  Puerto  Rico,  and  their  children  born  subsequent
thereto, should  be deemed and held to be citizens of Puerto Rico
and as  such entitled to the protection of the United States, and
they, together  with such  citizens of  the United  States as may
reside in  Puerto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the
name of The People of Puerto Rico.


     No special  provision of  law seems  to  have  been  enacted
concerning the inhabitants of the island of Guam, or defining the
status of their citizenship.

                     THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

     The Philippine Islands occupy an immense space upon the map.
Their inhabitants  consist of a vast number of tribes, varying in
intelligence and  civilization.   By an  Act of  Congress  passed
March 2,  1901, the President of the United States was authorized
to establish  a temporary  civil government  over the  Philippine
Islands (44),  in the  following language:  "All military, civil,
and judicial  powers necessary  to govern the Philippine Islands,
acquired from  Spain by  the treaties  concluded at  Paris on the
10th day  of December,  1898, and at Washington on the 7th day of
November, 1900,  shall, until  otherwise provided by Congress, be
vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such
manner, as  the President  of the United States shall direct, for
the establishment  of civil  government and  for maintaining  and
protecting the  inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment
of their liberty, property, and religion," etc.

     Pursuant to  the powers  vested in him, the President of the
United States  created a  civil commission,  which has, from that
time until  the present,  continued to  administer the affairs of
the Philippine Islands.

     By an  Act passed  July 1,  1902, Congress(45)  approved and
ratified and  confirmed the  action of  the President in creating
the Philippine  Commission, and  in authorizing the commission to
exercise the powers of government to the extent and in the manner
and form  and subject  to the regulation and control set forth in
the instructions  of the  President to  the Philippine Commission
dated April  7, 1900;  in creating  the offices of civil governor
and vice-governor of the Philippine Islands, and authorizing said
civil governor  and  vice-governor  to  exercise  the  powers  of
government to  the extent and in the manner and form set forth in
the executive  order dated June 21,1901, and in establishing four
executive departments  of government in the islands, as set forth
in the Act of the Philippine Commission.

     It is  necessary to  go into the details of the organization
of that  commission.   It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  was
organized for  the purpose  of securing to the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands  a stable  and safe  government by  the United
States until such time as its people shall be deemed capable of a
larger degree of self-government.

     Congress by  the Act  of  July  1,  1902,  Section  5  (46),
provided a  series of  safeguards for  the protection of life and
liberty of  the inhabitants  of  the  Philippines.    The  rights
guaranteed by that section are those set forth in the Declaration
of Independence,  modified by  the condition  of the inhabitants.
Among those  rights are,  the guarantee  that no  person shall be
deprived of  life, liberty  or property,  without due  process of
law;   the right  of the  criminal to  be heard  by  himself  and
counsel and  to demand  the nature  and cause  of the accusation;
the guarantee  that no  person shall be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense or be compelled to testify against himself;  the
right to  bail;   that no  law  shall  be  passed  impairing  the
obligation of  contracts;    that  there shall be no imprisonment
for debt;  that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended;
that no  ex post  facto law or bill of attainder shall be passed;
in fact,  all the  civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States.
     Section 4  (47) of  the Act declares that all inhabitants of
the Philippine  Islands continuing  to reside  therein  who  were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided
in said  islands, and  their children  born  subsequent  thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands
and as  such entitled to the protection of the United States.  It
expressly fails  to declare that they shall be deemed citizens of
the United States.

     Section 6 (48) provides for a census.

     Section 7  (49) provides  for a  general election  two years
after the  completion of  the census,  on certain  conditions, to
choose delegates  to a  popular assembly,  and  that  after  such
assembly shall have convened and organized, the legislative power
theretofore conferred  on the  Philippine Commission  in all that
part of  the islands  not inhabited  by Moros  and  non-Christian
tribes should  be vested  in  a  legislature  consisting  of  two
houses, the  Philippine Commission  and the  Philippine Assembly.
The qualification  of electors  shall be the same as now provided
by law  in the  case of electors in municipal elections.  The act
contains sundry  other provisions  looking to an enjoyment of the
rights of citizenship for the inhabitants of the islands.

     By the  same Act  a Bureau  of Insular  Affairs of  the  War
Department is  created.   The business  assigned to  that  bureau
embraces all  matters relating  to the  civil government  in  the
island  possessions   of  the   United  States,  subject  to  the
jurisdiction of the War Department.

     Under the  foregoing acts,  a most  thorough  and  efficient
government has  been provided  for the Philippine Islands.  There
is little  doubt that the inhabitants of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines  are better  governed than  they were before, and
with the  humane and  gentle tyranny  to which the inhabitants of
the Philippines  are subjected  by the  United States,  they  are
doubtless being  stimulated to a degree of intelligent conception
of our  ideals of  liberty and self-government, and to a standard
of civilization much higher than they ever heretofore conceived.

             Citizenship in Our Insular Possessions.

     These ends may be invoked to justify the means employed, but
four  facts  concerning  the  inhabitants  of  Puerto  Rico,  the
Philippines, and Guam remain undisputed, as follows:

 1.  That the United States commands their allegiance.

 2.  That they never did voluntarily assume that allegiance.

 3.  That the  qualified citizenship, the restricted liberty, and
     the limited right of self-government which they Possess, are
     of a nature far inferior to those enjoyed by the inhabitants
     of the  continent of  North America  who are  subject to the
     jurisdiction of the United States.

 4.  That both  the qualified citizenship conferred upon them and
     the form  of government imposed upon them are different from
     any citizenship  or government  that was contemplated by the
     framers of  the Constitution  of the  United States, when it
     was proposed and adopted.

     As a  legal proposition,  there can  be little  doubt of the
power of  the United States to acquire all these possessions, and
of the  obligation resting  upon it  to govern  them  wisely  and
judiciously after acquiring them.

     The Supreme  Court of  the United States has had occasion to
consider and  define the  status of these lands.  A careful study
of the case of De Lima v. Bidwell (50), and the group of cases in
the same  volume collectively  designated as  the "insular tariff
cases,"  is  recommended  to  the  student  who  is  particularly
interested in  this subject.   The  arguments and  the  decisions
rendered place  the reader  in full  possession of  the facts and
circumstances under  which these  possessions were  acquired, the
status of  the people as regards the United States, the nature of
the governments  under which  their affairs are administered, and
the constitutional provisions, civil and military, relied upon to
justify and  sustain the  United States  in the government it has
established.   Not the  least surprising  result of  such a study
will be  the discovery of a great divergence of opinion among the
learned and  able lawyers  who compose  the Supreme  Court of the
United States,  concerning the  ground on  which the right of the
United States  to govern  these people  rests, and  the status of
their inhabitants  as citizens  of the  government of  the United
States.  By far the ablest and most concise statement of the law,
justifying the  acquisition of  these islands  and sustaining the
authority of Congress to define and determine the status of their
inhabitants, is  found in  the concurring  opinion of Mr. Justice
Gray, in the case of Downes v. Bidwell. (51)

     The power  granted to the United States to make war and make
treaties, unquestionably  involved the  right  to  acquire  these
territories by conquest, and the power to govern them seems to be
a necessary  incident of  the power  to acquire  them. (52)   The
semi-barbarous inhabitants  of the  Philippines, at  least,  have
everything to  gain and  nothing to lose, from the protection and
qualified citizenship  accorded to them by the American Republic,
but the  wisdom of  assumption by the United States of this class
of guardianship  over outlying  territory has  given rise to much

     The  territorial  government  heretofore  exercised  by  the
United States  over national  territory contiguous  to the States
was a  temporary government.   It  was only  intended to last and
only lasted, until the new settlers, flowing from the States into
the  organized  Territories,  attained  such  numbers  and  other
requisites as  justified their  organization into new States.  In
such cases  the transition  from the  territorial condition  into
Statehood was  easy, rapid,  and sure.   The  difference  in  the
nature and  quality of  the citizenship  between  inhabitants  of
Territories and  those of  States was  only a difference in name,
and State  citizenship only brought with it a few added political
rights.   But there  can be  no such  progressive development and
rapid growth  to independence  of Federal  supervision  in  these
insular acquisitions.   Possession of them involves the necessary
strengthening of  our naval  power, and  an increased  danger  of
foreign complications.   Their  inhabitants are of an alien stock
which has never comprehended our ideals of government, or had any
conception of  the principles of republican liberty or democratic
self-rule, such as we have understood and practiced.  If they are
ever able  to comprehend them, it will only be after generations,
if not  centuries, of paternal rule and education to elevate them
to our  standard.  It is doubtful if they will ever assimilate to
our institutions  and whether  they will not always need a strong
government.   It is  questionable whether  the injury to our home
government from  the ill effects on its simplicity resulting from
this practice  of strong  government upon our alien subjects will
not be  greater than any benefit which we are likely to bestow on

     These are  the  arguments  which  have  arisen  against  the
inauguration of  this new insular policy and the adoption of this
surprising new  citizenship.   In a  treatise like  this,  it  is
sufficient to  state the  argument  without  attempting  to  draw
conclusions.  What these insular governments may some day become,
the  future   alone  will   disclose.     At  present,  they  are
substantially citizens  without a  voice in their government, and
subjects without a king.  They are free, provided they conform to
the standard  of right and wrong fixed for them by a well-meaning
and  benevolent   despot,  fixed   from  a  viewpoint  altogether
different from their own.

     The United  States had  its birth  in the  protest of  Henry
against  the  dictation  of  foreign  rulers.    Summing  up  and
denouncing the  usurpations of  King George, he said: "If this be
treason, make the most of it." The nation which sprung into being
upon this  issue has  now become  the foreign  ruler of  an alien
people by  conquest.   It has assumed to revolutionize their mode
of existence,  mental, moral,  physical, and  political.   In its
determination to bear the torch of liberty to the remotest people
of the  earth, it  has marched  among them, planted its standard,
proclaimed its  rule, and  answered their  every protest with the
announcement, "This  is liberty,  and you  must make  the most of
it."  History   will  record   the  success  or  failure  of  the
     This completes  the enumeration  of the  different kinds  of
citizenship existing under our system of government.

Footnotes to Chapter I:

(1)  See also  Webster's Dictionary;   Century Dictionary;  6 Am.
     and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.) 15;  Abrigo v. State, (1890)
     29 Tex. App. 149.

(2)  "Citizens are  the members  of the  political  community  to
     which they  belong.   They are  the people  who compose  the
     community, and  who,  in  their  associated  capacity,  have
     established or  submitted themselves  to the  dominion of  a
     government for  the promotion  of their  general welfare and
     the  protection   of  their  individual  as  well  as  their
     collective rights."  U.S. v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U.S. 542.

(3)  For the purpose of designating by a title the person and the
     relation he  bears  to  the  nation,  the  words  `subject,'
     `inhabitant,' and  `citizen' have  been used, and the choice
     between them  is sometimes  made to  depend upon the form of
     the government.   'Citizen'  is now  more commonly employed,
     however, and  as it has been considered better suited to the
     description of  one living under a republican government, it
     was  adopted   by  nearly  all  of  the  States  upon  their
     separation from Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in
     the Articles of Confederation and in the Constitution of the
     United States."   Minor  v. Happersett, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S.

     "The word  in never  used of the people in a monarchy, since
     it involves  an idea  not enjoyed  by subjects,  to wit: the
     inherent right  to partake in the government.  The republics
     of the  Old World were cities, and the word citizen has been
     usually in  human history  only applied  to  inhabitants  of
     cities.  As, (4) (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 1.

     However, states  have in  modern times arisen, and republics
     have been  established, in which the word subjects could not
     be properly  applied.   The people  of those  republics have
     been called citizens, for the simple and obvious reason that
     their relation  to the state was such an was the relation of
     citizens to  the city.   They were a part of its sovereignty
     --  they  were  entitled  to  its  privileges,  its  rights,
     immunities and franchises.  White v. Clements, (1896) 39 Ga.

(5)  Thomasson v.  State, (1960)  15 Ind.  449;   Amy  v.  Smith,
     (1822) 1 Litt. (Ky.) 332.

(6)  6 Am.  & Eng.  Encyc. of  Law, 15 and cases cited;  Minor v.
     Happersett, (1874)  21 Wall. U.S. 162;  Lyons v. Cunningham,
     (1884) 66  Cal. 42;   Blanck v. pausch,  (1885) 113 111. 60;
     Laurent v.  State, (1863)  1 Kan. 313;  Opinion of Justices,
     44 Me.  507;  Pomeroy's Municipal Law, pt. 11, c. 2, p. 425;
     Dred Scott  9. Sandford,  (1856) 19  How. U.S. 422;  U.S. v.
     Morris. (1903) 125 Fed. Rep. 325;  Dorsey v. Brigham, (I898)
     177 111.  258,69Am.St.Rep.232;  Gougar v. Timberlake, (1897)
     148 Ind. 41, 62 Am. St. Rep. 489.

(7)  (1849) 7 How. U.S. 1.

(8)  Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, (1830) 3 Pet. (U. S.) 121.

(9)  The Federalist (Lodge, 1892), p. 86.

(10) The Federalist (Lodge, 1892), p. 137.

(11) Edition 1900.

(12) Lodge, 1902, p.231.

(13) See the  text of  ordinance in  Vol.  8,  Federal  Statutes,
     Annotated, p. 17.

(14) Every person, and every clan and description of persons, who
     were at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution
     recognized as  citizens in  the several  States, became also
     citizens of  this  new  political  body."    Dred  Scott  v.
     Sandford, (1856) 19 How. (U. S.) 406.

(15) "Whoever ... was one of the people of either of these States
     when the  Constitution of  the United  States  was  adopted,
     became ipso  facto a  citizen --  a  member  of  the  nation
     created  by  its  adoption.    He  was  one  of  the  people
     associating  together   to  form   the  nation,   and   was,
     consequently, one  of its  original citizens.   And  to this
     there has  never been  a doubt.   Disputes have arisen as to
     whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons
     were part  of the  people at the time, but never as to their
     citizenship as  they were."   Minor v. Happersett, (1874) 21
     Wall. (U. S.) 162.

(16) Prior to  the 14th  article  of  amendment  to  the  Federal
     Constitution no  definition of the term "citizenship" was to
     be found  in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made
     to define  it by  Act of Congress.  It had been the occasion
     of  much   discussion  in   the  courts,  by  the  executive
     departments, and  in the  public journals.   Slaughter House
     Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. (U. S.) 72.

(17) U.S. v.  Wong Kim  Ark, (1897)  169 U.  S. 654.   "The  term
     'citizen' was  used in  the  Constitution  as  a  word,  the
     meaning  of   which  was   already  established   and   well
     understood.   And the  Constitution itself contains a direct
     recognition of  the subsisting  common-law principle, in the
     section which  defines the  qualification of  the President:
     'No person  except a  natural born  citizen, or a citizen of
     the United  States at  the time  of  the  adoption  of  this
     Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President.'
     etc.   The   only standard  which then  existed of a natural
     born citizen  was  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  and  no
     different standard has been adopted since." Lynch v. Clarke,
     (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 656.

     "The term  'citizen,' as understood in our law, is precisely
     analogous to  the term  'subject' in the common law, and the
     change of  phrase had  entirely resulted  from the change of
     government.   The sovereignty  has been transferred from one
     man to  the collective  body of  the people  -- and  he  who
     before was  a subject  of the  king, is now a citizen of the
     state."   State v.  Manuel, (1838)  4 Devs & B. L. (N. Car.)
     26, quoted  U.S. v.  Rhodes, (1866)  1 Abb. U.S. 39. 27 Fed.
     Cas. No. 16,151.

(18) Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856) 19 How. (U. S.) 393.

(19) Citizenship, (1862) 10 0p. Atty.Gen. 382.

(20) Admission on  an equal  footing with the original States, in
     all respects  whatever, involves  equality of constitutional
     right and  power, which cannot afterwards he controlled, and
     it also  involves the  adoption as  citizens of  the  United
     States of those whom Congress makes members of the political
     community, and  who are  recognized as such in the formation
     of the  new State  with the  consent of  Congress.   Boyd v.
     Thayer, (1891) 143 U. S. 143.

(21) McCulloch v.  Maryland. (1819)  4 Wheat  U.S. 316;  American
     Ins. Co.  v. 356 Bales Cotton, (1828) 1 Pet. U.S. 511;  U.S.
     v. Gratiot,  (1840) 14  Pet. U.S.  526;   U. S.  v.  Rogers,
     (1846) 4  How. U. S. 667;  Crone V. Harrison, (1853) 16 How.
     U.S. 164;  U.S. v. Coxe. (1855) 18 How. U.S. 100;  Gibson v.
     Chouteau, (1871)  13 Wall. U.S. 92;  Clinton v. Englebrecht,
     (1871) 13  Wall. U.S.  434;   Beals 9. New Mexico, (1872) 16
     Wall. U.S. 535.

     "The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  (article  four,
     section three)  provides, 'that Congress shall have power to
     dispose of  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations
     respecting the  territory, or  other property,  belonging to
     the United  States.' The  term territory,  as here  used, is
     merely  descriptive  of  one  kind  of  property;    and  is
     equivalent to  the word  lands.   And Congress  has the same
     power over  it and  over any other property belonging to the
     United States;  and this power is vested in Congress without
     limitation;   and has  been considered  the foundation  upon
     which the  territorial governments  rest."  U.S. v. Gratiot,
     (1840) 14 Pet. U.S. 537.

     The Constitution  empowers Congress  "to  make  all  needful
     rules and  regulations, respecting  the territory  or  other
     property belonging  to the  United States;   and perhaps the
     power of  governing a  territory  belonging  to  the  United
     States, which  has not,  by becoming  a State,  acquired the
     means of  self-government, may  result necessarily from fact
     that it  is not  within the  jurisdiction of  any particular
     State, and  is within  the power  and  jurisdiction  of  the
     United States.   The  right to  govern may be the inevitable
     consequence of  the right  to acquire  territory.  Whichever
     may be  the  source  whence    the  power  is  derived,  the
     possession  of   it  is  unquestioned."  Per  Chief  Justice
     Marshall in  American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales Cotton, (1828) 1
     Pet. U.S.  511.  To the same effect, Sere v. Pitot, (1810) 6
     Cranch U.S. 332.

(22) Gassies v.  Ballon, (1832)  6 Pet.  U.S. 761;  Dred Scott v.
     Sandford, (1856)  19 How.  U.S. 393;   Minneapolis  v. Reum,
     (C.C.A. 1893)  56 Fed.  Rep. 580.  See also the notes on the
     Constitution dealing  with this  subject in  Vol. 8, Federal
     Statutes, Annotated, p. 579.

     "The Constitution  declares that  the citizens of each State
     shall be  entitled to  all the  privileges and immunities of
     citizens in  the several  States ....   It  made all  alike,
     citizens of  the newly organized nation, and in this respect
     a homogeneous  people.   And the  very necessity  for such a
     provision to  bring all upon a common platform, exhibited in
     the strongest  light the  absolute need  of guarding against
     different and discordant rules for establishing the right of
     citizenship in  future.   We therefore  find that one of the
     first powers  conferred upon  Congress was  "to establish an
     uniform  rule   of  naturalization   throughout  the  United
     States."   Lynch v. Clarke, (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 841,

(23) Const, Art.  IV, Sec.  3, Cl.  2;   M'Culloch  v.  Maryland,
     (1819) 4  Wheat U.S.  316;   American Ins.  Co. v. 356 Bales
     Cotton, (1828) 1 Pet. U.S. 511;  U. S. v. Gratist, (1840) 14
     Pet. U.S   526;   U.  S. v.  Rogers, (1846) 4 How. U.S. 56T;
     Cross v.  Harrison, (1853)  16 How. U.S. 164;  U.S. v. Coxe,
     (1855) 18  How. U.S.  100;   Gibson v.  Chouteau, (1871)  13
     Wall. U.S. 92;  Clinton v. Englebrecht, (1871) 13 Wall. U.S.
     434;   Beall v. New Mexico. (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 535;  Davis
     v. Beason,  (1890) 133  U.S. 333;  Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v.
     Price County,  (1890) 133  U. S. 496;  Cope v. Cope, (1891 )
     137 U.S.  682;   Church of  Jesus Christ v. U.S., (1890) 136
     U.S. 1;   Dooley  v. U.S.,  (1901) 192  U.S. 222;  Downes v.
     Bidwell, (1901)  182 U.S.  244;   Dooley v. U.S., (1901) 183
     U.S. 151.

(24) Const., Art.  IV, Sec.  3, Cl.  1;  American Ins. Co. v. 354
     Bales Cotton,  (1828) 1  Pet. U.S.  511;   Pollard v. Hagan,
     (1945) 3  How. U.S. 212;  Crosis v. Harrison, (1853) 16 How.
     U.S. 164.

(25) Const., Art.  IV, Sec.  2, Cl.  3;   Prigg v.  Pennsylvania,
     (1842) 16  Pet. U.S. 539;  Jones v. Van Zandt, (1847) 5 How.
     U.S. 215;  Strader v. Graham, (1850) 10 How. U.S. 82;  Moore
     v. Illinois,  (1852)  14  How.  U.S.  13;    Dred  Scott  v.
     Sandford, (1856) 19 How. U.S. 393;  Ableman v. Booth, (1858)
     21 How.  U.S. 516;   Callan  v. Wilson, (1888) 127 U.S. 540;
     Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, (1888) 128 U.S. 96.

     "Historically, it  is well  known that  the object  of  this
     clause was  to secure  to the  citizens of the slave-holding
     States the  complete right  and title  of ownership in their
     slaves, as  property, in every State in the Union into which
     they might  escape from  the State  where they  were held in
     servitude.  The full recognition of this right and title was
     indispensable to the security of this species of property in
     all the  slave-holding States;  and, indeed, was so vital to
     the   preservation   of   their   domestic   interests   and
     institutions,  that   it  cannot  not  be  doubted  that  it
     constituted a  fundamental article,  without the adoption of
     which the Union could not have been formed.  Its true design
     was to  guard against  the doctrine and principles prevalent
     in the  non-slaveholding States,  by  preventing  them  from
     intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights
     of the  owners of  slaves.   Prigg. v.  Pennsylvania, (1842)
     16Pet. (U.S. 611.

(26) White v.  Hart,  (1871)  13  Wall.  U.S.  646;    Osborn  v.
     Nicholson, (1871) 13 Wall. U.S. 654;  Slaughter-House Cases.
     (1872) 16  Wall. U.S. 36;  Strander v. West Virginia, (1879)
     100 U.S.  303;   Exp. Virginia,  (1879) 100 U.S. 339;  Civil
     Rights Case,  (1883) 109 U.S. 3;  Plesey v. Ferguson, (1896)
     163 U.S. 537;  Robertson 9. Baldwin, (1897) 165 U.S. 275.

     "When the  armies of  freedom found themselves upon the soil
     of slavery  they could  do nothing  less than  free the poor
     victims whose  enforced servitude  was the foundation of the
     quarrel  ....     The   proclamation  of  President  Lincoln
     expressed an accomplished fact and to a large portion of the
     insurrectionary  districts,   when   he   declared   slavery
     abolished in  them all.   But  the war being over, those who
     had  succeeded  in  re-establishing  the  authority  of  the
     Federal government were not content to permit this great act
     of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest
     or the  proclamation of  the Executive,  both of which might
     have been  questioned in  aftertimes, and they determined to
     place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution
     of the  restored Union  as one  of its fundamental articles.
     Hence  the   thirteenth  article   of  amendment   of   that
     instrument."   Slaughter-House Cases,  (1872) 16  Wall. U.S.

(27) 13 Wall. 646.

(28) The power  exercised in  putting down  the late rebellion is
     given expressly  by the Constitution to Congress.  That body
     made the  laws and  the President executed them. The granted
     power carried  with it  not only  the right to use requisite
     means, but  it reached  further and  carried  with  it  also
     authority to  guard against the renewal of the conflict, and
     to remedy  the evils arising from it in so far as that could
     be effected by appropriate legislation.  At no time were the
     rebellious States  out of  the pale  of the  Union.    Their
     rights  under  the  Constitution  were  suspended,  but  not
     destroyed.  Their constitutional duties and obligations were
     unaffected, and remained the same.  White v. Hart, (1871) 13
     Wall. U.S. 651.

(29) Among the  first acts  of legislation  adopted by several of
     the States  in the legislative bodies which claimed to be in
     their normal  relations with  the Federal  government,  were
     laws  which   imposed  upon   the   colored   race   onerous
     disabilities and  burdens, and curtailed their rights in the
     pursuit of  life, liberty,  and property  to such  an extent
     that their  freedom was  of little value, while they had the
     protection which  they had received from their former owners
     from motives  both of  interest and  humanity  ....    These
     circumstances, whatever  of falsehood  or misconception  may
     have been  mingled with  their presentation, forced upon the
     statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety
     through  the   rebellion,  and  who  supposed  that  by  the
     thirteenth article  of amendment they had secured the result
     of their  labors, the  conviction that  something  more  was
     necessary in  the way  of constitutional  protection to  the
     unfortunate race who had suffered so much.  They accordingly
     passed through  Congress the  proposition for the fourteenth
     amendment, and  they declined  to treat as restored to their
     full participation  in the  government of  the Union  of the
     States which  had been  in insurrection, until they ratified
     that article  by a  formal vote  of their legislative bodies
     Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) I6 Wall. U.S. 70.

(30) See the  exhaustive collection  of authorities  in  Vol.  9,
     Federal Statutes, Annotated.

(31) Slaughter House  Cases, (1872)  16Wall. U.S.  73;   to  same
     effect see Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U.S.101;  U.S. v. Wong
     Kim Ark, (1898) 169 U.S. 676.

(32) U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, (1898) 169 U.S. 682.

(33) Rassmussen v.  U.S. (1905)  107 U. S. 516 U. S. Stat. at L.,
     Vol. 30. p. 1742.

(34) U.S. Stat. at Large, Vol. 30, p.1742.

(35) See U.S.  Stat. at  Large, Vol.  30, p.  1755, 7  Fed. Stat.
     Annot. 814.

(36) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 31, p. 1842, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot.

(37) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 31. p. 1882, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot.

(38) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 30,  p. 750, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot.

(39) See title  "Hawaiian Islands,"  in Vol. 3, Fed. Stat. Annot.

(40) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 31,  p. 141, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot.

(41) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 31,  p. 77,  etc., 5  Fed. Stat.

(42) U.S. Stat. at large. Vol. 32. Part 1. p. 1011, 1198, 934.

(43) U.S. Stat. at large, Vol. 32  Part 2, p. 183.

(44) U. S.  Stat. at  large, Vol. 31, p. 910, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.

(45) U.S. Stat.  at Large,  Vol. 32, Part 1, p. 691, 5 Fed. Stat.
     Annot. 718.

(46) 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.719.

(47) 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.719.

(48) 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 720.

(49) 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.720.

(50) (1901) 182 U.S. 1.

(51) (1901) 182 U.S. 345.

(52) Sere v.  Pitot, (1910) 6 Cranch U.S. 332;  American Ins. Co.
     v. 356  Bales Cotton, (1828) 1 Pet. U.S. 511;  Dred Scott v.
     Sandford, (1856)  19 How. U.S. 393;  Stewart V. Kahn, (1870)

(53) 1 U.S. 5O7;  Shivley v. Bowlby, (1894) 152 U.S. 48;  De Lima
     v. Bidwell,  (1901) 182 U.S. 196;  Downes v. Bidwell, (1901)
     U.S. 250;   U.S. v. Nelson, (1886) 29 Fed. Rep. 2024, (1887)
     Fed. Rep.  115;   Gardiner v.  Miller, (1874)  47 Cal.  575;
     Franklin v. U.S. (1867) 1 Colo. 38.

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John S. Wise