The  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  now  enjoyed  by
citizens of  the States  composing the  United States, whether as
citizens of  the States  or of  the United  States, originated in
rights possessed  or claimed  by the  inhabitants of the thirteen
American colonies, while they were dependencies of Great Britain.
The struggle of the American colonists for independence was based
upon the  claim that  they were denied, by the parent government,
rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  which  were  their  common
heritage as  British freemen, or which had from time to time been
granted specifically to the American colonies.

     No written  chart  in  existence,  then  or  now,  has  ever
attempted to  enumerate, clarify,  and  define  in  one  succinct
expression, the  rights, liberties,  and franchises  possessed by
English subjects, nor is it the purpose of this volume to attempt
to do  that. It is sufficient to say that the liberties and right
of self-government  of the  British people,  beginning  with  the
declarations of  Magna Carte,  have been ascertained and declared
from time  to time,  during six centuries of conflict between the
people of  the British  realm and  their  successive  sovereigns,
until  they   are  now  well  established  and  quite  thoroughly

     Notwithstanding the  British people  have retained  in their
government the  form of a limited monarchy, they have established
for themselves as against their constitutional monarch, a measure
of popular  sovereignty and  personal liberty  as great  as  that
possessed by  any other  people in  the world.  Our boast is that
ours is a free republic; that it is doubtful whether, although we
have a  president instead  of a  king, and  a supreme  court with
certain power  to control  both executive and legislative action,
the King  of England, on the whole, possesses as much independent
authority as the President of the United States.

     Although the  struggle of  the American  colonists was based
upon the  claim that the parent government denied the inhabitants
of the  colonies the  guaranteed rights  of British citizens, the
American colonists,  even under  British dominion,  were accorded
and actually  enjoyed many  rights, privileges,  and  franchises,
peculiar to  themselves, not  enjoyed by  Englishmen at  home, or
even of British origin; some of which have not, to this day, been
adopted in their entirety in England.

              Source of American Plan of Government
                    and Rights of Citizenship

     Many of  the declarations of popular rights set forth in the
American Declaration  of Independence  were of  rights which were
not of  English  origin.    The  American  colonists  had  become
familiar with  the  rights  of  citizenship  possessed  in  other
countries, both  from the  fact that  some  of  them  resided  in
Holland for  a time,  before they  came to  America, and from the
further fact  that the  New York  colony was essentially Dutch in
its original  settlement and  government. It  is plain to see, by
comparison with other historic documents, that the Declaration of
Independence of  1776 was  modeled, to  a large  extent, not upon
English precedents,  but upon  the written  constitution  of  the
Netherlands Republic, called The Union of Utrecht, of 1579.

     The manifesto  issued by  the rebels  at the time of Bacon's
Rebellion in Virginia in 1676 contains much from the same source.
The Union  of Utrecht and Bacon's Rebellion antedated, one by one
hundred years  and the other by three years, the Exclusion Act of
1679, by  which James  ][I of  England was deposed, and which, by
some writers,  has been  referred to as the source from which the
claim set forth in the Declaration of Independence were derived.

     Nor did  the American  ideas of a written constitution and a
supreme court  emanate altogether  from Englishmen. They were the
results of  the co-operative  labors of  Puritans and  Cavaliers,
Dutchmen, Huguenots, and Scotch-Irishmen, assembled in convention
in America,  working for  a common  end, upon models derived from
many countries  with whose  governments they  were familiar.  For
example, the demand for the separation of Church and State, which
is a  leading tenet  of American  government, is  not of  British
origin. Virginia  was foremost  in this contention. She abolished
tithes and  forfeited glebe  lands. The  change was brought about
through the  influence of  Patrick Henry, a Scotch dissenter; and
of Thomas  Jefferson, a  man of  Welsh origin, with views derived
from a study of Dutch precedents.

     So, too,  the abolition of privileged classes was distinctly

     The American  system  of  land  tenures,  the  abolition  of
entails and  primogenitures, and  our methods of transfer of real
estate,  are  all  anti-English  in  their  origin.  Entails  and
primogenitures were cherished institutions of England. Our system
of transferring  real estate  by the  registration of  deeds came
from Holland,  and has  not, even  to the present day, been fully
adopted in  England. Our  laws governing the transfer of personal
property and  our whole  system of mercantile law are adaptations
of Continental  and Roman  methods, modified  so as  to make them
applicable to  our modern  conditions. We  owe nothing to England
for our  system of  elections or  for our public prosecutors. The
idea of  a public prosecutor or commonwealth's attorney came from
     Our  system   of  charitable  institutions,  hospitals,  and
prisons is  not modeled  upon English  precedents. The charitable
institutions, hospitals,  and prisons  of the  colonies antedated
those in  England. The first of these established in the American
colonies were  copied from Dutch models, and the admirable system
now existing  in England  is derived  largely from  a  study  and
adoption of  those which  were first  established  in  the  Dutch
colony of New York and in the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania.

     So, too,  the American  citizen derived  his  principles  of
religious toleration,  not from  England, but  from the Dutch. As
late as  1663, when  the representatives  of  the  Crown  in  the
English colonies  were, under  orders from  England,  persecuting
Quakers and  Anabaptists and demanding that they take the oath of
allegiance and  conformity or  suffer punishment;  when  Puritans
were driving  Pilgrims from  Massachusetts into Rhode Island, and
Virginians placing  the King's  broad  arrow  on  the  houses  of
dissenters  in  Maryland,  the  Dutch  colony  of  New  York  was
receiving orders  from Amsterdam  proclaiming that the conscience
of men  ought to  remain free.  The orders  read: "Let  every one
remain free  as long  as he  is modest,  moderate, his  political
conduct irreproachable,  and as long as he does not offend others
or oppose  the government"(1)  This was  twenty years before Penn
came to  America, and,  even after  he came, the Scotch-Irish and
Germans were  driven  from  Pennsylvania  by  Logan's  oppressive
administration of  the Quaker  laws, and  sought  asylum  in  the
Shenandoah valley of Virginia.

     The  Pilgrims  in  Rhode  Island  proscribed  Catholics  and
deprived them  of suffrage,  on account  of their  religion, from
1719 to 1783.

     Mr. Madison  is authority for the statement that the example
of  Holland   led  to  the  constitutional  provision  forbidding
Congress from  making any  enactment "respecting an establishment
of religion" or abridging the freedom of the press.

     Perhaps there  is no other thing in which the citizen of the
United States  takes greater  pride than  in our system of public
education. The  privilege  of  public-school  education  for  his
children is  possessed by  every citizen  of the United States in
the State  of which  he is  a citizen,  no matter  how humble  or
ignorant he may be or how limited his own rights. This privilege,
like the  others named,  is distinctly  not of English origin. At
the time  of tho departure of the original colonists from England
for America,  no system  of public  education  existed  in  Great
Britain. None  exists there  to-day, comparable, in thoroughness,
with our own. Long residence in Holland made some of the earliest
American settlers  familiar with the benefits of public education
and the  advantages of the free school system of the Dutch. But a
thorough system  of free  education was  installed in  the  Dutch
colony of  New York  fully twenty  years before any school system
was adopted  by the New England colony,. Sparseness of population
in  the   southern  colonies   rendered   free   schools   almost
impracticable there.  But they  were established  in the populous
Dutch communities  and among  the Scotch-Irish  of the Shenandoah
valley in  Virginia, from  the time  of the  earliest settlements

     Notwithstanding the  southern colonies  were  backward,  the
greatest impetus  to public education in the Northwest Territory,
after the  colonies were  independent,  came  from  the  southern
section; for  when Virginia  ceded her  rights in  the  Northwest
Territory to  the Federal  government, she  demanded through  her
representatives  in   Congress,  Richard   Henry  Lee   and  Paul
Carrington,  the   condition  in  the  Ohio  ordinance  of  1787,
requiring that  alternate sections  of the public lands should be
dedicated to purposes of public education.(2)

     Having now  traced  the  ideas  of  the  American  colonists
concerning plans  of government  and rights of citizenship to the
sources whence  they sprung,  let us  next consider how far these
rights have  been incorporated  in  the  governments  which  they

                Rights of Citizens of the States

     Let us  first examine  the rights of citizens as citizens of
the States;  for these  clearly  antedate  whatever  rights  they
possess as  citizens of  the United  States, by a period equal to
that which elapsed between the acknowledgment of the independence
of the  thirteen independent  colonies by  Great Britain, and the
formation of the Union by the States themselves.

     No State  in the  Union has  ever sought  to embody  in  one
written chart  a full  expression of  all the rights, privileges,
and immunities of its citizens. Nor will the attempt now be made.
On this  subject we  shall content ourselves with the language of
Mr. Justice Washington, construing Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution of  the United  States, which provides: "Citizens of
each State  shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States." He said:

     "The inquiry  is, What  are the privileges and immunities of
citizens  in  the  several  States?  We  feel  no  hesitation  in
confining these  expressions to  those privileges  and immunities
which are  in their  nature fundamental, which belong of right to
the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times
been enjoyed  by the citizens of the several States which compose
this Union,  from the  time of  their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign.  What these  fundamental principles  are, it would
perhaps be  more tedious  than difficult  to enumerate. They may,
however, be  all comprehended  under the following general beads:
protection by  the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject, nevertheless,
to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole."(4)

     Mr. Justice  Miller, in  the Slaughter-House Cases,(5) said,
with reference to this observation of Mr. Justice Washington:

     "The description,  when taken  to include  others not named,
     but which are of the same general character, embraces nearly
     every civil  right for  the establishment  and protection of
     which organized government is instituted."

     While it  is undoubtedly  true that the attempt to enumerate
these rights of citizenship would be more tedious than difficult,
and while  it may  be unnecessary to enumerate and classify them,
especially as  the order  of  their  enumeration  varies  in  the
different States,  it seems  proper  to  advert  to  the  earlier
expressions in  the first  bill of  rights framed  by one  of the
original States,  to ascertain what our Revolutionary forefathers
conceived to  be the  most important of the rights for which they
were contending.

                      State Bills of Rights

     The Bill  of Rights of Virginia, drafted by George Mason, is
perhaps the  most famous of all these bills of rights, and may be
taken as  an example,  as it  was made  the model  of many States
afterwards formed.  It was  unanimously adopted  by the  Virginia
convention, June  12, 1776.(6)  It recites the following as basic
and foundational principles of government, and declares that they
pertain  to  the  good  people  of  the  commonwealth  and  their

     1.   That all  men are  by nature equally free, independent,
          and have  certain inherent  rights, of which, when they
          enter into  a state  of society,  they cannot,  by  any
          compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the
          enjoyment of  life  and  liberty,  with  the  means  of
          acquiring and  possessing property,  and  pursuing  and
          obtaining happiness and safety.

     2.   That all  power is  vested in, and consequently derived
          from, the  people; that  magistrates are their trustees
          and servants, and at all times amenable.

     3.   That government  is, or ought to be, instituted for the
          common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
          nation, or  community; of  all the  various  forms  and
          modes of  government, that  is beat which is capable of
          producing the  greatest degree of happiness and safety,
          and is  most effectually secured against the, danger of
          maladministration; and  that, when any government shall
          be found  inadequate or  contrary to  these purposes, a
          majority  of   the  community   hath  an   indubitable,
          unalienable, and  indefeasible right  to reform, alter,
          or abolish  it in  such manner  as shall be judged most
          conducive to the public weal.

     4.   That no  man, or  set of men, are entitled to exclusive
          or  separate   emoluments  or   privileges   from   the
          community, but  in consideration  of  public  services;
          which not  being descendible, neither ought the offices
          of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.

     5.   That the  legislative and executive powers of the State
          should be  separate and  distinct from  the  judiciary;
          and,  that   the  members  of  the  two  first  may  be
          restrained   from    oppression,   by    feeling    and
          participating the  burdens of  the people, they should,
          at fixed  periods, be  reduced to  a  private  station,
          return into  the body  from which  they were originally
          taken, and  the  vacancies  be  supplied  by  frequent,
          certain, and  regular elections,  in which  all or  any
          part of  the former  members to  be again  eligible, or
          ineligible, as the laws shall direct.

     6.   That election of members to serve as representatives of
          the people, in assembly, ought to be free; and that all
          men having  sufficient  evidence  of  permanent  common
          interest with and attachment to the community, have the
          right of  suffrage, and  cannot be taxed or deprived of
          their property  for  public  uses,  without  their  own
          consent, or  that of  their representatives so elected,
          nor bound  by any  law to  which they  have not in like
          manner assented for the public good.

     7.   That all  power of suspending laws, or the execution of
          laws,  by   any  authority,   without  consent  of  the
          representatives of  the people,  is injurious  to their
          rights, and ought not to be exercised.

     8.   That, in  all capital  or criminal  prosecutions, a man
          hath a  right to  demand the  cause and  nature of  his
          accusation, to  be confronted  with  the  accusers  and
          witnesses, to  call for evidence in his favor, and to a
          speedy trial  and impartial by of his vicinage, without
          whose unanimous  consent he cannot be found guilty; nor
          can he  be compelled  to give evidence against himself;
          that no  mun be  deprived of  his liberty except by the
          law of the land, or the judgment of his pears.

     9.   That excessive  bail ought  not  to  be  required,  nor
          excessive  fines   imposed,  nor   cruel  and   unusual
          punishments indicted.

     10.  That general  warrants, whereby an officer or messenger
          may be  commanded to  search  suspected  place  without
          evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or
          persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly
          described and  supported by  evidence, are grievous and
          oppressive and ought not to be granted.

     11.  That, in  controversies  respecting  property,  and  in
          suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is
          preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.

     12.  That the  freedom of  the press  is one  of  the  great
          bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by
          despotic governments.

     13.  That a  well-regulated militia, composed of the body of
          the people,  trained to  arms, is  the proper, natural,
          and safe defense of a free state; that standing armies,
          in time  of peace,  should be  avoided, us dangerous to
          liberty; and  that in  all cases the military should be
          under strict  subordination to,  and governed  by,  the
          civil power.

     14.  That the people have a right to uniform government; and
          therefore,  that   no  government   separate  from,  or
          independent of,  the government of Virginia ought to be
          erected or established within the limits thereof.

     15.  That no  free government,  or the blessings of liberty,
          can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence
          to  justice,  moderation,  temperance,  frugality,  and
          virtue,  and  by  frequent  recurrence  to  fundamental

     16.  That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator,
          and the  manner of discharging it, can be directed only
          by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and
          therefore all  men are  equally entitled  to  the  free
          exercise of  religion, according  to  the  dictates  of
          conscience, and  that it  is the  mutual duty of all to
          practice  Christian   forbearance,  love  and  charity,
          towards each other.

     This immortal  declaration  of  the  principles  of  popular
sovereignty has  been set  forth at length because it embodies in
itself the  substance of  all similar  declarations in  the other
colonial  conventions,  and  was  either  incorporated  into  the
Declaration of  Independence itself, which was adopted twenty-two
days later,  or into  the earliest amendments of the Constitution
of the  United  States.  Of  the  first  ten  amendments  to  the
Constitution of  the United  States, which  may be  considered as
adopted  contemporaneously  with  the  Constitution  itself,  six
merely reaffirm  the principles enunciated in George Mason's bill
of rights.

              National Declaration of Independence

     When we  come to  a study of the Declaration of Independence
itself we find a reassertion of c concerning the equality of men,
their unalienable rights, that government is instituted to secure
those rights,  that it derives its just power from the consent of
the governed,  and the  right of  the  people,  when  it  becomes
destructive of those ends, to alter or abolish it and institute a
new government.

     After declaring that long established governments should not
be changed for light and transient causes, it proceeds to arraign
the  British   government  for   a  long   train  of  abuses  and
usurpations. We may gather, from the enumeration of those abuses,
the following  claims made  by the  revolutionists concerning the
rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens:

     1.   The right of representation in the legislature, a right
          inestimable to them.

     2.   The right  to have  representative bodies  assembled at
          usual  and   comfortable  places   convenient  to   the
          depository of their public records.

     3.   The right to have frequent sessions of the legislature.

     4.   The right to have a system of naturalization laws.

     5.   The right to have an independent judiciary.

     6.   The right to oppose a multitude of offices.

     7.   The right to oppose standing armies in time of peace.

     8.   The right  to have  the civil  power  superior  to  the
          military power.

     9.   The right  to resist  quartering of  armed troops among

     10.  The right to trade with the outside world.

     11.  The right to as voice in taxation.

     12.  The right to trial by a jury of the vicinage.

     13.  The right of Local self-government.

                    The Federal Constitution

     We have  already seen  that during  the period  in which the
States co-operated  under articles  of confederation, the rights,
privileges,  and   immunities  of  their  citizens  were  derived
exclusively from  their respective  States, and that the power of
the  United   States  did  not  extend  to  the  control  of  the
individual, save  in a  few limited and specified cases; and that
as then constituted the United States did not attempt to grant or
guarantee to  the individual  citizen any  rights, privileges, or
immunities, save to citizens of one State in another State.(7)

     When, upon the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Federal
power operated  directly upon  individual citizens of the limited
States, the  number of  Federal guarantees  of their  rights  was
extended also.  These guarantees  were the necessary correlatives
of the specific powers granted to the Federal government, and are
the supreme law of the land on the subjects to which they refer.

     But it  by no  means follows  from  this  that  the  Federal
government is  supreme concerning all the rights, privileges, and
immunities of  the citizen.  On the contrary, while it is supreme
in its sphere and possesses ample authority to enforce the powers
expressly delegated  to it  by the  Constitution, it  is  only  a
government of  delegated and  limited powers,  and the States, in
forming it,  expressly retained  and reserved  in themselves  the
absolute control,  direction, and sovereignty over their citizens
concerning a  vast residuum of rights, privileges, and immunities
which, prior  to the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  they  had
regulated  exclusively.(8)   For  instance,  it  has  never  been
contended that the Constitution, as originally framed, created in
the Federal  government  any  power  to  establish  any  code  of
municipal law  applicable to  the States composing it, regulative
of all  private rights  between man  and man  in society, or that
Congress may  usurp the  powers of  State legislatures concerning
such legislation.  The Supreme  Court of  the United  States  has
repeatedly taken occasion to point out that no such power exists,
either under the original Constitution or by virtue of any of the
amendments.(9) As we shall see later, a vast amount of litigation
which has  arisen under  the constitutional  amendments has  been
based  upon  a  confused  notion  that  the  XIII,  XIV,  and  XV
Amendments in  some way altered and extended the general scope of
Federal powers,  even to  the point of effecting this fundamental
change. But an unbroken line of Federal decisions has denied that
such a  change in the organic structure of the Federal government
was either  contemplated or effected by the amendments, and point
out that  the legislation  which Congress  is authorized to enact
under the  amendments is  not general legislation upon the rights
of citizens,  but only certain corrective legislation, if such be
necessary, to  counteract State  legislation  prohibited  by  the
amendments upon special subjects named in the amendments.(10)

     When we  come to  examine the multitudinous decisions of the
Supreme Court on questions which have arisen under the amendments
it will  be seen  that the  cases have  for  the  most  part  not
originated in  any alleged act of the Federal government invading
the sphere  of State  action, but  upon the  contention  made  by
citizens of  the States  that Federal  powers, as enlarged by the
amendments, are much more far-reaching and restrictive upon State
powers than  the Federal  courts themselves  have been willing to
admit. The  decisions rendered  by the  Supreme Court  have in an
overwhelming majority  of cases  been against the broad effect of
the constitutional  amendments as  authorizing  extended  Federal
powers, or  as restricting  State powers,  contended for  by  the
citizens; and  they declare  unanimously the  continuing power of
the  States,   notwithstanding  the   amendments,   to   regulate
exclusively the  rights, privileges,  and immunities  of citizens
upon the  matters  in  issue,  subject  only  to  the  particular
limitations named in the amendments.(10)

     Seeing now  that the  rights, privileges,  and immunities of
the citizens  are dependent,  for acknowledgment  and protection,
upon dual  governments, just  as the allegiance of the citizen is
due to  dual governments, let us next consider the safeguards and
protections of those rights offered to the citizen by the Federal
and State  governments. And,  as the Federal government, although
limited in  its sphere,  is supreme, and as all other rights, not
derived from  or guaranteed  by it,  depend for their recognition
and  protection   upon  the   States,  the   orderly  method   of
consideration would  seem to  be, to inquire first what rights of
the citizen  the  Federal  government  grants  or  undertakes  to
protect, and  what it  has  neither  granted  nor  undertaken  to
guarantee. For  all rights  not so  granted or  guaranteed by the
Federal government  are dependent  for their  existence and their
continuance  upon   the  State  of  which  the  individual  is  a

          Rights, Privileges, and Immunities Granted or
         Guaranteed to the Citizen by the United States

     These may be classified as follows:

     1.   Rights granted or guaranteed by the Constitution of the
          United States  as originally  framed, or  by the  first
          twelve amendments thereto.

     2.   Rights granted  or guaranteed  by the XIII, XIV, and XV

      First,  then, the rights, privileges, or immunities granted
or guaranteed  to the  citizen by  the Constitution of the United
States as  originally framed,  or by  the first twelve amendments
thereto, are,  in the order of their enumeration, or by necessary
implication, as follows:

     1.   A right,  That citizens  of the  States  composing  the
          Union, having the qualifications requisite for electors
          of the  most numerous  branch of the State legislature,
          shall possess  the right  and privilege of electors for
          members of  the House  of Representatives of the United
          States chosen  every second  year by  the people of the
          United States. (Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl. 1.) (12)

     2.   A privilege.  That such  citizens shall  be eligible to
          membership of  the House  of Representatives,  if  they
          possess  certain   qualifications  of  age,  length  of
          citizenship, and  are inhabitants  of  the  State  from
          which they are chosen. (Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl. 2.)

     3.   A right. That representatives and direct taxes shall be
          apportioned, among  the several  States,  according  to
          their respective  numbers, which shall be determined by
          adding to  the whole  number of free persons, including
          those bound  to  service  for  a  term  of  years,  and
          excluding Indians  not taxed, three-fifths of all other
          persons. This  clause is, however., amended, in respect
          to  apportionment   of  representation,   by  the   XIV
          Amendment, Sec. 2. (13)

     4.   A right.  To have  an enumeration  or census, every ten
          years, according  to law,  to determine  the  basis  of
          representation, but with a proviso that representatives
          shall not  exceed one  for every  30,000, but that each
          State shall  have at least one representative. (Art. I,
          Sec. 2, Cl.3, Par. 2) (14)

     5.   A   privilege.   That   citizens   possessing   defined
          (qualifications  of   age,  length  of  residence,  and
          habitation,  shall   be  eligible   as  United   Staten
          senators. (Art. I, @. 3, 01. 3.)

     6.   An immunity.  Against the  trial of impeachments by any
          other body  than the  Senate, or  conviction without  a
          concurrence of  two-thirds of  the members present; and
          against any  judgment in  such case  extending  further
          than to  removal from  office and  disqualification  to
          hold and  enjoy any  office of  honor, trust, or profit
          under the United States. (Art. I, @. 3, Cl. 6.)(15)

     7.   An immunity.  From arrest,  except for treason, felony,
          or breach  of the  peace, while attending Congress as a
          member or going to or returning from the same; and from
          being questioned  for any  speech or  debate in  either
          House. (Art. I, Sec. 6, Cl. 1.)(16)

     8.   A right.  That all  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall
          originate in  the House  of Representatives.  (Art.  I,
          Sec. 7, Cl. 1.)(17)

     9.   A right.  To have  the executive  sanction of  all laws
          before they  become effective,  unless they  be  passed
          over the  President's veto.  (Art. I,  Sec. 7,  Cl. 2.)

     10.  A right.  That all duties, imposts, and excises imposed
          by Congress  shall be  uniform  throughout  the  United
          States. (Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 1.)(19)

     11.  An immunity.  From any  laws passed  by any  State,  or
          other authority than Congress, regulating commerce with
          foreign nations  and among the several States, and with
          the Indian tribes. (Art. I. Sec. 8, Cl. 3.)(20)

     12.  A right.  To uniform Federal laws of naturalization and
          bankruptcy throughout  the United States. (Art. 1, Sec.
          8, Cl. 4.)(21)

     13.  A right.  To a  Federal coinage and standard of weights
          and measures. (Art. 1, See. 8. Cl. 5.)(22)

     14.  A right.  To an  established Federal  postal system and
          post roads. (Art. I, See. 8, CL 6.)(23)

     15.  A right.  To a  Federal system  of  patent  rights  and
          copyrights. (Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.)(24)

     16.  A right.  To a  supreme court  and a  system of federal
          courts inferior to the supreme court. (Art. HI, Bees. I
          and 2; Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 9.)(25)

     17.  A right  To Federal  protection  against  piracies  and
          felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas  and  offenses
          against the  law of  nations.  (Art.  1,  Sec.  8,  Cl.

     18.  An immunity.  Against any  declaration of  war  or  the
          granting of  letters of  marque and  reprisal except by
          the United Staten. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 4.)(27)

     19.  An  immunity.   Against  any   appropriations  for  war
          purposes by  Congress, under  its power  to  raise  and
          support armies, for a longer term than two years. (Art.
          I, See. 8, Cl. 12.)(28)
     20.  A right.  To the  creation and maintenance of a navy by
          the Federal government (Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 13.)(29)

     21.  A right.  To the  use of  the militia under the call of
          the Federal  government, for  executing the laws of the
          Union,   suppressing   insurrections,   and   repelling
          invasions. (Art. 1, See. 8, 01. 15.)(30)

     22.  A right.  To exclusive  Federal legislation by Congress
          over a  territory not  exceeding ten  miles square as a
          seat of  government, and like authority over all places
          purchased   for   forts,   magazines,   arsenals,   and
          dockyards. (Art. 1, See. 8, Cl. 17.)(31)

     23.  A right. To the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
          save when  it may  be suspended  for public  safety, in
          time of  rebellion or  invasion. (Art.  1, Sec.  9, Cl.

     24.  An immunity.  Against any  bill of attainder or ex post
          facto law. (Art. 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 3.)(33)

     25.  An immunity. Against any capitation or other direct tax
          except in  proportion to the census above provided for.
          (Art. 1, See. 9, Cl. 4.)(34)

     26.  An immunity.  Against  any  tax  or  duty  on  articles
          exported from any State. (Art, I, See. 9, Cl. 5.)(35)

     27.  An immunity. Against any preference to the ports of one
          State over  those of another; and against the entrance,
          clearance, or  payment of duties by vessels bound to or
          from the  ports of  one State  to or  from the ports of
          another State. (Art. 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 6.)(36)

     28.  An immunity.  Against the  granting of  any  titles  of
          nobility by  the United  States. (Art.  1, Sec.  9, Cl.

     29.  Immunities.   Against    any   treaty,   alliance,   or
          confederation  entered  into  by  any  State,  and  the
          granting of letters of marque or reprisal by any State,
          and against  the coinage  of money or emission of bills
          of credit  by any  State and the making of anything but
          gold and  silver coin  a tender  in payment of debts by
          any State;  and the passage of any bill of attainder or
          ex post  facto law,  or law impairing the obligation of
          contracts, or  grant of  any title  of nobility  by any
          State. (Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 1.)(38)

     30.  An immunity. From the laying of any impost or duties on
          imports or exports by any State, without the consent of
          Congress. (Art. I, See. 10, Cl. 2.)(39)

     31.  Immunities. From  any duty of tonnage laid by any State
          without the  consent of  Congress, or  the  keeping  of
          troops or  ships of  war in time of peace by any State,
          or the  entering into  an  agreement  or  compact  with
          another State  or a  foreign power,  or engaging in war
          unless actually  invaded or in such immediate danger as
          will not admit of delay. (Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 3.)(40)

     32.  A   privilege.   Of   being   presidential   and   vice
          presidential elector  in the  manner  provided  by  the
          legislation of.  the State.  (Art. 11, Sec. 1, Cl.1 and

     33.  A privilege.  Of being  President provided  the citizen
          possesses the  requisite qualifications  of birth, age,
          and residence. (Art II, Sec. 1, Cl. 4.)(42)

     34.  A privilege.  Of being  Vice-President subject  to  the
          same qualifications  as last  named. (Art.  11, Sec. 1,
          Cl. 4.)

     35.  A privilege.  Of suing  in the  federal courts,  on the
          terms and subject to the conditions of jurisdiction set
          forth in  the Constitution and laws. (Art. Ill, Secs. I
          Cl. 2.)

     36.  A right.  To trial by jury in the State where the crime
          is charged  to have  been committed  in any  trial  for
          crime  in   a  federal   court,  except   in  case   of
          impeachment, and when the crime is not committed within
          any State  the trial  to be  at such place or places as
          Congress directs. (Art. 111, Sec. 2.)(43)

     37.  An immunity.  From the  charge of  treason against  the
          United States,  except for levying war against them, or
          for adhering  to their  enemies, giving  them  aid  and
          comfort (Art III, Sec. 3, Cl. 1. See Of Treason, supra,
          pp. 74 et seq.)

     38.  A right.  To demand, in cases of trial for treason, the
          testimony of  two witnesses to the same overt act, or a
          confession  in  open  court,  as  the  only  basis,  of
          conviction. (Art. III, Sec. 3, Cl. 1.)(44)

     39.  An Immunity.  Against any  attainder of treason working
          corruption of  blood or  forfeiture, except  during the
          life of  the person  attainted. (Art.  III, Sec. 3, Cl.

     40.  A right.  To demand  that each  State shall  give  full
          faith and credit to the public acts, records, etc., and
          judicial proceedings  of every  other State.  (Art. IV,
          Sec. 1.)(46)

     41.  A right. In the citizens of each State to enjoy all the
          Privileges and  immunities of  citizens in  the several
          States. (Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 1.)(47)

     42.  A right.  To demand  from any State the extradition and
          removal of  any person  who shall  flee thereto, who is
          charged, in  another State,  with treason,  felony,  or
          other crane. (Art. IV, Sec. 21 Cl. 2)(48)

     43.  A right.  To demand the delivery, on claim of the party
          entitled, of  any person  held to  service or labor, in
          one State,  who has escaped to another State. (Art. IV,
          Sec. 2, 01. 3.)(49)

     44.  A right.  To the  performance of  the guarantee  of the
          United States  that every State in the Union shall have
          a republican  form of  government, and  that the United
          States will  protect each  of them  from  invasion  and
          against domestic violence. (Art. IV, Sec. 4.)(50)

     45.  A right. In each State to equal suffrage in the Senate.
          (Art. V.)

     These being  the only  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities
guaranteed to  citizens by the Constitution itself, the following
additional  appear   in  the   first  twelve  amendments  to  the
Constitution: (51)

     46.  An immunity.  Against any law of Congress respecting an
          establishment of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free
          exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or
          of the press. (Art. 1.)(52)

     47.  A right.  Of the  people peaceably  to assemble, and to
          petition the  government for  a redress  of grievances.
          (Art. I)(53)

     48.  A right.  Of the  people to keep and bear arms. A right
          not to be infringed. (Art. II.)(54)

     49.  An immunity. From the quartering of troops in any house
          in time  of peace  without the consent of the owner, or
          in time  of war, except in a manner to be prescribed by
          law. (Art. III.)

     50.  An immunity. Against unreasonable searches or seizures.
          (Art. IV.)(55)

     51.  A right. To demand that search warrants shall not issue
          except  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by  oath  or
          affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
          searched, and  the person or things to be seized. (Art.

     52.  A right.  That no  citizen be  held to  answer  to  the
          Federal government  for a capital or otherwise infamous
          crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
          jury, except  in cases  arising in  the land  or  naval
          forces, or  in the  militia, when  in  actual  service.
          (Art. V.)(57)

     53.  An immunity.  From being  twice put in jeopardy of life
          or Limb for the same offense. (Art. V.)(58)

     54.  An immunity.  From being  a  witness  against  himself.
          (Art. V.)(59)

     55.  A right. To due process of law before being deprived of
          life, liberty, or property. (Art. V.)(60)

     56.  A right.  To just  compensation for  any property taken
          for public use. (Art. V.)(61)

     57.  A right.  To speedy  and public  trial in  all cases of
          criminal prosecutions  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the
          district wherein  any crime  is charged  to  have  been
          committed,  the   district  to   have  been  previously
          ascertained by  law; to  be informed of the nature and,
          cause of  the accusation;  to be  confronted  with  the
          witnesses against  him; to  have compulsory process for
          obtaining witnesses  in his  favor;  and  to  have  the
          assistance of counsel for his defense. (Art. VI.)(62)

     58.  A right.  In suits  at common  law, involving  a  value
          exceeding twenty  dollars, to  a trial  by jury.  (Art.

     59.  An immunity.  From having  any fact tried by a jury re-
          examined in  any court  of the United States, otherwise
          than according  to  the  rules  of  common  law.  (Art.

     60.  An immunity. Against the requirement of excessive bail,
          against the  imposition of excessive fines, and against
          the infliction  of cruel and unusual punishments. (Art.

     61.  A declaration. That the enumeration in the Constitution
          of certain  rights shall  not be  construed to  deny or
          disparage others retained by the people. (Art. IX.)(66)

     62.  A guarantee.  That the  powers  not  delegated  to  the
          United States  by the  Constitution, nor  prohibited to
          the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
          to the people. (Art. X.)(67)

     In Lloyd  v. Dollinson,  decided on May 16,1904, the Supreme
Court said that the first eight amendments to the Constitution of
the United  States have  reference to  powers  exercised  by  the
government  of  the  United  States  and  not  to  those  of  the

     The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution relates simply to
a limitation of Federal judicial power, and the Twelfth Amendment
to  the   manner  in  which  presidential  and  vice-presidential
electors shall  meet and cast and certify the electoral vote, and
to the manner of deciding the result; so that they have no direct
significance or bearing on the rights of citizenship.

     The first  ten amendments  to the Constitution were proposed
to the  legislatures of the several States by the First Congress,
September 25,  1789. They  were ratified by the States, beginning
with New  jersey, November  20, 1789,  and ending  with Virginia,
December 15,  1791. There  is no  evidence  on  the  journals  of
Congress  that  the  legislatures  of  Connecticut,  Georgia,  or
Massachusetts ratified  them. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed
to the  legislatures of the several States by the Third Congress,
September 5,  1794, and was declared to have been ratified by the
legislatures of  three-fourths of  the States,  in a message from
the President to Congress dated January 8, 1798.

     The Twelfth  Amendment to  the Constitution  was proposed to
the legislatures  of the  several States  by the Eighth Congress,
December 12,  1803;, in  lieu of  the original third paragraph of
the first section of the second article, and was declared adopted
in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, September 25, 1804.

     From 1804  to 1865  the Constitution  and twelve  amendments
remained unchanged.

     It was  not until  February 1,  1865,  that  the  Thirteenth
Amendment or first of the great "war amendments" was proposed. It
was declared adopted in a proclamation of the secretary of state,
dated December  18, 1865.  The Fourteenth  Amendment was proposed
June 16,  1866, and declared adopted July 21, 1868. The Fifteenth
Amendment  was  proposed  February  27,1869,  and  proclaimed  as
adopted March 30, 1870.

     Let  us   now  inquire  into  the  rights,  privileges,  and
immunities of  citizens, as  citizens of the United States and of
their respective  States, during  the first  seventy-six years of
the Union,  and afterwards examine how far these rights have been
modified, or  State and  Federal control  of them changed, by the
amendments consequent upon the great Civil War.
     The following  reflections must  result to  every student of
the subject, from the foregoing recital.

     First.   That the  correlative relations  of government  and
citizenship were  absolute and  unqualified as between the States
and their citizens after the States gained independence and prior
to the formation of the Union.

     Second.   That the Federal government when formed was one of
limited   scope    and   powers,   and   after   its   formation,
notwithstanding the  creation and  recognition of  the  sixty-odd
Federal rights,  privileges, and  immunities as  citizens of  the
Union, above set forth, a vast residuum of power and control over
the rights, privileges, and immunities of their citizens remained
in the States.

     Third.   That the  Federal government,  while supreme in its
sphere, was not framed to reach, and its creation did not affect,
the undelegated  powers of the States, in municipal affairs, over
their own  citizens and  that its  power over  such was expressly
negatived by the instrument which brought it into being.

     This is  so manifest  that the  Constitution might well have
begun with  the language of the last of the ten first amendments,
for the  States existed  before their representatives created the
Union by the delegation of certain enumerated powers, and it goes
without saying  that "the  powers not  delegated  to  the  United
States  by   the  Constitution   are  reserved   to  the   States
respectively or to the people."

     The rights  of citizens,  both as  citizens  of  the  United
States and  of the  States, under  nearly  every  clause  of  the
Constitution  and   the  first   twelve  amendments,  were  fully
considered and  defined before  the outbreak  of our  great Civil
War, by  the Supreme  Court of  the United  States. To  the great
glory  of   that  tribunal   it  may   be  truly  said  that  its
interpretations  have   been  universally   recognized  as  wise,
conservative and  just; that  if it  has erred at all it has been
either towards  the reserved powers of the States than towards an
enlargement of  Federal power  by implication;  that for the most
part its  judgments have  remained unaffected  by the excitements
and changes  of civil conflict; and that, even concerning such of
its decisions  as have  been reversed by the logic of events, the
wisdom and  justice of its action upon the law and the facts then
before it are now universally admitted, however bitterly they may
have been aspersed at the time those decisions were rendered.

     The footnotes  on the  foregoing pages  have set forth every
decision  of   the  Supreme   Court  upon  every  clause  of  the
Constitution and  amendments, bearing  on the rights, privileges,
and  immunities  of  citizens,  and  a  careful  study  of  those
decisions, as  they relate  to each  of the  subjects  above  set
forth, must  be the  only satisfactory  road to  a mastery of the
subjects. What  follows is  a mere surface index of the substance
of the  decisions upon  the most  important of  those  questions,
intended to stimulate to a thorough study of the cases.

     The citation  of authorities  in connection with a statement
of the minor topics is deemed a sufficient reference to them.

     Proceeding to  consider the  more important  topics  in  the
order of their presentation above, we come first to the subject -

                    Taxation of the Citizens
                         (Right 3 above)

     The power  of taxation  of the  citizen  by  the  States  is
unlimited by  law save  concerning taxes on exports or imports or
tonnage duties.  It is limited in the United States by only three
conditions, the  first being  that it  cannot  tax  exports,  the
second that  direct taxes  shall be apportioned among the several
States according  to their respective numbers, and the third that
all duties,  imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States. (69)

     The grant  of taxing  power to  the  United  States  by  the
Constitution has  been held  to be an absolute grant subject only
to  the  above  limitations.  Moreover,  the  power  of  taxation
possessed by  the United  States over citizens of the District of
Columbia has  been held  to be  as unlimited as that possessed by
the States over their citizens.

     Many cases have arisen in which the question was whether the
particular tax  involved in the controversy was a direct tax; but
in all  such cases  the decision turned on that, as a question of
fact, and  was not  instructive beyond  the understanding  of the
particular statute  involved; for,  with the  nature of  the  tax
settled, the  legal principles applicable to it were those stated

     A most  thorough and exhaustive discussion of the nature and
extent of  Federal taxing  power and  of what  does and  does not
constitute a  direct tax  will be found in the case of Pollock v.
Farmers' L. & T. Co.(70)

           Of the Immunity of the Citizen from Arrest,
          while Attending Congress, and in Going to and
             Returning from the Same, and from Being
     Questioned in Any Other Place for Any Speech or Debate
                       (Immunity 7 above)

     This is  an old and salutary provision intended to secure to
the representative  the utmost degree of freedom in the discharge
of his  public duties.  A similar  provision will be found in the
constitutions of  most  of  the  States  concerning  their  State
legislators, and  the provision  was adopted  from the privileges
accorded to  members of  the British Parliament. As to the nature
and extent of the privilege, the case of Kilbourn v. Thompson(71)
will be  found instructive. Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries
on the  Constitution (Sw. 866) refers to it as a "great and vital

            Of the Immunity of the Citizen from State
          Interference with the Regulation of Commerce
           with Foreign Nations, and among the Several
                States and with the Indian Tribes
                       (Immunity 11 above)

     This exclusive  power of  regulating commerce  was conferred
upon Congress  for a  reason. It was the offspring of many short-
sighted, vexatious, and discriminating regulations imposed by the
States upon vessels from other States entering their ports, while
they retained  the power  to legislate  on the  subject under the
Articles  of  Confederation.  The  transfer  of  the  subject  to
exclusive Federal  control  was  made  deliberately  after  these
embarrassing experiences.  Nearly a hundred years ago the Supreme
Court declared  that it  was doubtful whether any of the evils of
weakness under  the Articles of Confederation contributed more to
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  than  the  conviction  that
commerce ought to be regulated by Congress."

     No clause of the Federal Constitution has given rise to more
litigation than  this so-called  commerce clause.  It  was  first
interpreted by  Chief Justice  Marshall in  Gibbons v. Ogden,(72)
and its  scope and  legal effect have been under consideration in
about two  hundred and  fifty cases  since then  decided  by  the
Supreme Court  of the  United  States.  Many  volumes  have  been
written concerning  the rights of citizens under this clause, and
it would  be beyond  the scope  of this work to set forth even an
epitome of  the decisions interpreting it rendered by the Supreme

     We shall  content ourselves with a statement of a few of the
leading principles  settled by  the adjudicated  cases,  and  the
remark that  the litigation has, for the most part, arisen out of
acts  of  State  legislatures,  which  have  been  challenged  as
invading  the   exclusive  province   of  Congress   to  regulate
interstate commerce, etc.

     The first  important case  arising under this clause was, as
above  stated,  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,(73)  and  the  last  case  of
importance decided  by the  Supreme Court  is the  celebrated so-
called "merger decision," involving the right of Congress, in the
exercise  of  its  power  to  regulate  commerce,  to  pass  laws
forbidding  the   merger  of  corporations  owning  parallel  and
competing lines and engaged in interstate commerce.(74)

     The master  mind of Marshall in the first case announced the
following fundamental principles, which remain undisturbed:

     1.   That  the   grant  of   powers  to   Congress,  in  the
          particulars named,  was not  only absolute and embraced
          the power  to regulate navigation, but was exclusive of
          any rights of States to legislate on the subject.

     2.   That it  did not  affect the  right of  the  States  to
          legislate on  purely  internal  commerce  or  to  enact
          inspection laws  and  health  laws,  or  purely  police

     3.   That the  laws last  named  "form  a  portion  of  that
          immense mass  of legislation  which embraces everything
          within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the
          general   government;    all   which    can   be   most
          advantageously  exercised  by  the  States  themselves.
          Inspection laws,  quarantine laws, health laws of every
          description,  as   well  as  laws  for  regulating  the
          internal commerce  of a  State, and those which respect
          turnpike roads,  ferries, etc.,  are component parts of
          this mass.  No direct  general power over these objects
          is granted  to Congress,  and consequently  they remain
          subject to State legislation."

     4.   But where  the States,  in the  exercise of  the powers
          last mentioned,  enact laws which come in conflict with
          Federal laws regulating commerce, the acts of the State
          must yield to the laws of Congress. That the nullity of
          all such  acts is  produced by the declaration that the
          Constitution is supreme.(75)

     Throughout  all   the  multitudinous  litigation  which  has
followed  arising  under  this  clause  the  soundness  of  these
principles has never been questioned. If the case has arisen upon
a State  statute the  question has  been, does  the State statute
directly legislate  on the  forbidden subject? If so, it is void.
Does it  although within the general scope of State power, in its
effect regulate  interstate commerce,  etc.? If so, it must yield
to the exclusive power of Congress to control.(76)

     If it  be a  mere regulation  of inspection,  or health,  or
exercise of  the unquestioned police powers of the State, and its
effect on  commerce be  utterly incidental and not determinative,
then it is a law within the powers of the State.

     If the question has arisen upon a Federal statute, the first
inquiry has  invariably been,  Is the  law, fairly  construed,  a
regulation of  that class  of commerce  committed absolutely  and
exclusively by the Constitution to the regulation of Congress? If
so, it  is a valid law, for the power to legislate is as broad as
the grant of exclusive control.

     These  questions   have  arisen   in  infinite  variety  and
complexity, presenting  new aspects  in each successive case, and
it is  impossible to  generalize them  in  this  discussion.  The
opposing views  in each case are the result of two theories which
have given  rise to most of the controversies between Federal and
State authority,  viz., on  the one  hand, the  theory  of  broad
latitudinarian construction of Federal powers, and, on the other,
the theory  of strict construction. Pursuing the one or the other
of these  theories, men  of the  highest intellect  and character
have, from  the foundation  of the  government, been  arrayed  in
opposition  to  each  other  upon  every  important  question  of
construction that  has  arisen,  and  perhaps  no  more  striking
illustration of  this irreconcilable  conflict of  views  may  be
found in  our whole  judicial literature  than  in  the  earnest,
almost angry,  discordance of  our  Supreme  Court  in  the  last
important decision on this commerce clause.(77)

     But the  constitutional  inhibition  does  not  prevent  the
States  from  enacting  laws  which  prevent  non-residents  from
engaging in  certain classes  of employments within their limits.
Such, for  example, is the right of a State to limit the right to
fish and  hunt, within  her borders  to her  own citizens. It has
been held  that the  States did not invest the Federal government
with any  portion of  their power  and control  over fishing  and
hunting within  their borders;  that the  fish and  shellfish and
game in  every State belong to, peculiarly and of right, and form
part of the food supply of, the people in each State, and that it
is within  the police  powers of  the State, without any right of
interference by Federal authority, to determine who shall and who
shall not  take the fish and game within her borders, and even to
prohibit the shipping of the same beyond the limits of the State.
Thus when  a Virginia  law punished  a citizen  of  Maryland  for
taking oysters  from Virginia oyster beds, and he claimed that he
was engaged  in commerce,  the Supreme  Court sustained the State
law, and  denied the  claim of license to fish in Virginia waters
as a  matter of  commercial right.(78)  So, a  law of Connecticut
regulating the manner of taking game in that State and forbidding
its exportation  was held  valid.(79) The  duty of preserving the
game was  declared to  be a  trust for  her own people. And State
laws prohibiting  exhaustive methods  of fishing in waters within
State jurisdiction,  or the  use of  destructive instruments, are
within the powers of the State.(80)

     The Right of the Citizen to the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Right
23 above)

     Blackstone  calls  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  "the  most
celebrated writ  in the  English law,"(81)  and he  refers to the
ruinous Habeas  Corpus Act  of England,  31 Charles  II, c. 2, as
"frequently considered as another Magna Carte."

     The Supreme Court of the United States has characterized it:
"The great  writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed
the best  and only  sufficient defense  of personal  freedom.  In
England, after  a long  struggle, it was firmly guaranteed by the
famous Habeati  Corpus Act of May 27, 1679. - - It was brought to
America by  the colonists  and claimed  as among  the  immemorial
rights descended  to them  from their ancestors.(82) Of this writ
it may  be said  truly that  it bas  elicited more encomiums from
bench and  bar than any other in the book, and that discussion of
it seems to arouse whatever of eloquence judges and advocates may

     In form  it is  a writ  emanating from  the judicial  source
intrusted  with   its  keeping  and  issuance,  directed  to  the
custodian of any person detained on a criminal or a civil charge,
directing him  to produce  the body of the person in custody at a
time and  place designated  in the writ, together with the causes
of his  detention, and  then and  there to  submit to and receive
whatever judgment  the judge  or court  awarding the  writ  shall
consider in  that behalf.  The name of the writ originated in the
fact that  at the time it came into use all writs in England were
written in Latin, and this particular writ directed the custodian
of the prisoner "habeas corpus," "thou shalt have the body" of so
and so, at such and such time and place.

     It is  not within  the purpose of this work to elaborate the
different kinds  of writs  of habeas  corpus  aud  the  different
purposes for  which  they  are  invoked.  That  may  be  seen  by
reference to  the authorities  quoted. There were writs of habeas
corpus ad  respondendum, or  to enable the party applying for the
writ to  obtain an answer of some sort from the party in custody;
and writs  ad satisfaciendum,  or to  satisfy a judgment or other
demand, which writ does not exist with us; or ad proseguendum, ad
testificandum,  ad   deliberandum,  to  prosecute  something,  to
testify about  something, to  deliberate about something. It is a
common thing,  for example,  where a prisoner confined in jail or
penitentiary is  a necessary  witness at  a trial,  to  have  him
produced in  court by  a writ  of habeas  corpus ad testificandum
issued by the trial judge or other authority.

     But the  common writ the one cherished as none other, is the
writ of  habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum, commanding
the custodian  to produce  the body of his prisoner and submit to
and receive  whatever judgment  the judge  or court  awarding the
writ shall  see fit  to render.  The power  of the judge or court
issuing the  writ is, upon the production of the accused together
with the  causes of  his detention,  and after hearing the matter
fully, to  discharge him,  admit him  to bail,  or remand  him to
custody. Nearly  all the States have guarantees of the privileges
of the writ of habeas corpus in their constitutions, and all have
statutes providing for the manner of its issuing.

     But there is this distinction between writs of habeas corpus
issued by  Federal courts  and judges  and those  issued by State
courts and  judges. A  writ may issue from Federal authority to a
person holding  another in  custody  under  State  authority,  in
certain cases.(83) But a State court or judge cannot issue a writ
of habeas  corpus against  a person  having a prisoner in custody
under the authority of the United States.(84)

     The reason  for the distinction is obvious from the frame of
the government,  for the  Federal jurisdiction is, in its sphere,
supreme, and  where Federal  and State  laws conflict  the latter
must yield  to the  former, and  the view  of their  jurisdiction
taken by Federal tribunals must prevail. So that while an inquiry
by a  Federal tribunal  into a  detention under  State  authority
would be determinative, a like inquiry by a State tribunal into a
detention under  Federal authority  would not be determinative or
obligatory on the Federal authority.(85)

     The cases  cited above in the note attached to the statement
of the  rights of  the citizen to the writ of habeas corpus (note
4, p. 125) will furnish the Student with such further information
as he  may desire  concerning the  origin, nature and history of,
and the  manner of applying for, the writ, and the cases to which
it does  not extend, as well as those to which it does extend. We
may leave  the subject  with the final remark that the suspension
of the  writ, no  matter what may have been the exigency on which
such action  has been  justified, has always been viewed with the
utmost jealousy  by the American people, and the opinion of Chief
Justice Taney in the habeas corpus case of Ex p. Milligan (86) is
one of  the finest  pieces  of  judicial  eloquence  in  American

         Of the Immunity of the Citizen Against Bills of
                Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws
                       (Immunity 24 above)

     This immunity  is guaranteed, both as against the Nation and
the State  (Art. 1,  Sec. 9,  Cl. 3,  and Art.  I, See.  10,  Cl.

     A bill  of attainder  is a  legislative act  which  inflicts
punishments without  a judicial  trial.(88) Such  bills were,  in
England, sometimes  directed  against  individuals  by  name  and
sometimes against a class. They were contrary to the whole spirit
of our  institutions, and so were forbidden by general consent in
the Constitution, both as against the Nation and the State.

     No question  of importance  arose from  any attempt  to pass
such measures  until the  period of  our  Civil  War,  when  laws
enacted by Missouri and West Virginia, and even the rules adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States itself, were challenged
as in effect bills of attainder. The discussions in the arguments
and opinions  in the  case of Cummings v. Missouri,(89) and Ex p.
Garland,(90) are full of historical and legal information on this
subject, and should be carefully read by the student.

     "An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable
in  a  manner  in  which  it  was  not  punishable  when  it  was
committed." The  State legislature  can pass  no  ex  post  facto
law.(91) This  is the  language of  Chief Justice Marshall in the
first case  in which  such legislation  came under the eye of the
Supreme Court.  And of  the reasons  leading to  the adoption  of
those clauses  of the  Constitution forbidding  such  legislation
either by  the Nation  or the  State, he  said: "Whatever respect
might have been felt for the State sovereignties, it is not to be
disguised that  the framers  of the Constitution viewed with some
apprehension the  violent  acts  which  might  grow  out  of  the
feelings of  the moment....  The restrictions  on the legislative
power of the States are obviously founded in this sentiment."

     But an  act imposing a succession tax on an estate after its
devolution, during  the period of administration, was held not to
be an ex post facto law. (92)

        Of the Immunity of the Citizen Against State Laws
              Impairing the Obligation of Contracts
                       (Immunity 29 above)

     The  same  reasons  which  prompted  the  Federal  guarantee
against the  passage of  bills of attainder or ex post facto laws
by the  States doubtless produced this guarantee also.(93) It has
given rise  to an  immense amount of litigation. The principle is
so plain  that a  statement of  the law  is sufficient,  but  the
difficulty and  doubt in  the many cases that have cussion of the
nature and  extent of  the rights  off the  arisen have  been  in
determining whether  the State  law assailed in a Particular case
did impair the vested right claimed.

     As may  be seen by reference to the long list of authorities
cited in connection with the statement of this immunity, it would
be impossible  to consider,  in this  volume, the numerous phases
which the  discussion of  the nature  and extent of the rights of
the citizen  under this  clause has  assumed. That  would make  a
volume in itself.

     The case which sets forth with most learning and ability the
nature and  extent of  this particular Federal guarantee, and the
one most  frequently cited,  is Charles  River Bridge  v.  Warren
Bridge.(94) It  was decided in 1837, and the opinion of the court
was delivered  by Chief  Justice Taney in one of the strongest of
his many  able opinions.  But  there  were  three  dissents.  The
dissenting opinions  of Mr. Justice McLean and Mr. Justice Story,
the latter  concurred  in  by  Mr.  Justice  Thompson,  are  such
striking, powerful  presentations of  opposing views that in them
is found  the germ  of many  a subsequent effort made to unsettle
the principles  fixed  by  the  great  decision.  This  case  was
confined, however,  to a  discussion of  how far public grants of
franchises are  revocable by  State legislation without violating
the clause  of the  Constitution above  referred to.  It did  not
involve consideration  of many other classes of State legislation
upon which  the question  of  the  impairment  of  contracts  has

     One  leading   distinction,  however,  running  through  the
decisions, should be briefly referred to, to wit: The prohibition
does not restrain the States from changing remedies, and a change
in a  remedy provided  to enforce  a right  is not necessarily an
impairment of the right itself.(95)

     To a  full comprehension  by the  practicing lawyer  of  the
meaning of  this clause and its bearing upon State legislation, a
study of  the authorities  cited in  the footnote  is  necessary,
indeed indispensable.  As there  is no middle ground between this
brief consideration,  and one  so elaborate  that it would occupy
unwarranted space  in this  general treatise, the subject is left
to some other author who shall deal with it as a specialty.

           Of the Right of the Citizens of Each State
             to All the Privileges and Immunities of
                 Citizens in the Several States
                        (Right 41 above)

     This provision was in the Articles of Confederation. Indeed,
it was  the only  direct guarantee  from the United States to the
individual citizen contained in that instrument.

     In the  first case  decided by  the Supreme Court, involving
the construction of this clause, Chief Justice Marshall said that
a corporation was "Certainly not a citizen" in the sense that the
word is  used in the clause referred to.(96) And in the next case
the same  illustrious authority held that a citizen of the United
States, residing  in any State of the Union, is a citizen of that
State.(97) In  later cases  it has  been repeatedly  decided that
corporations are  not citizens  of the  State of  their  creation
within the  meaning of  the clause  now under consideration; that
they are  creatures of  the local  law  of  the  place  of  their
creation, without  any absolute  right to  recognition  in  other

     A State  statute denying  jurisdiction to  the State  courts
over  a   suit  by   a  foreign  corporation  against  a  foreign
corporation has  been held  not to  violate this  clause  of  the
Constitution.(99) But  when a  State law  made it a condition for
the admission  of a  foreign corporation  to do  business in  the
State  that  the  corporation  so  admitted  would  abstain  from
removing any  suits brought  against it or otherwise resorting to
the federal  courts, the  condition was  held to  be void  as  in
conflict with  the Constitution  of the  United States.  This was
decided, however,  rather as  an abridgement of the rights of the
corporation under  Amendment XIV than as against its right as the
citizen of another State.(100)

     A State  law admitting  a foreign corporation to do business
in the  State on  the condition that creditors who were residents
of the  State granting  the permit  should have  priority in  the
distribution  of   its  assets  over  nonresident  creditors  was
likewise held  to violate  the constitutional  guarantee  against
discrimination.(101) It  was said,  in one of the cases, that the
only limit  of the  State's right to exclude foreign corporations
is where  they are  employed by  the Federal  government  or  are
strictly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.(102)

     A State  law which  imposes a tax upon resident merchants at
one rate,  and another  tax upon non-residents, for the privilege
of transacting  the same  character of  business, at  a higher or
discriminating rate,  is a  violation of  the  provision  we  are

     In some  of the  cases which have been decided the State law
has been  assailed on  the double  ground that  it  discriminated
against citizens of other States and was regulative of interstate
commerce. The  decisions rendered have in some instances held the
law to  be unconstitutional on the latter ground and have ignored
the former, although it was apparently equally tenable.(104)

     Under the  decision in  the famous  Dred Scott  case a  free
negro whose  ancestors were  brought to  this country and sold as
slaves was  held not to be a "Citizen" in the sense that the word
was used  in the  Constitution. Bitterly  as  this  decision  was
assailed at  the time it was rendered, its logic was unanswerable
as the  law then  stood. This  has been changed by the XIII, XIV,
and XV  Amendments, and  it  has  been  frequently  said  in  the
decisions upon those amendments that they were passed in order to
reverse this ruling.

     There are,  however, sundry  things concerning  which States
may legislate  discriminating between residents and nonresidents,
One of the earliest of these decisions was that marital rights of
a special  nature, bestowed  by a  State upon  its  own  citizens
residing within  its borders,  do not  accrue to  the nonresident
widow of  a deceased  nonresident husband  who owned  property in
that State.  It was  held that  such rights  were attached to the
contract of  marriage in  cases in  which the State controlled it
and were  not of  the class  of  personal  rights  of  a  citizen
intended by this clause of the Constitution.(105)

     A State  tax on  shares of  nonresidents in a corporation of
Connecticut, on  a basis  different from  that on which residents
were taxed, was, under the peculiar tax laws of Connecticut, held
not to be a discrimination.(106)

     And a  State law  saving the  statute of  limitations  to  a
resident plaintiff  against an  absent defendant, but allowing it
to run  against a  nonresident plaintiff,  has been  held not  to
discriminate against  the citizen  of another  State  within  the
meaning of  this clause. It was held to be a change of remedy and
not the deprivation of a right.(107)

     An act  of a State legislature granting exclusive privileges
for twenty-five  years to  maintain within  a designated  area  a
slaughter-house, landings  for cattle,  and yards  for  enclosing
cattle intended  for  sale  or  slaughter,  and  prohibiting  all
others, was  held to  be within  the police  power of  the State,
unaffected by  the Federal Constitution or its amendments, and to
be a  regulation for the health and comfort of the people.(108) A
law of  the State  of Iowa  making persons liable for any damages
accruing from  their allowing  cattle from  Texas to run at large
and spread  a disease  known as  Texas fever  was held to work no
discrimination, and  to  be  within  the  police  powers  of  the
States.(109) A  similar law  against  introducing  diseased  live
stock into  Colorado was upheld.(110) In the case of Rasmussen v.
Idaho,(111) the  proclamation of the governor of Idaho forbidding
the introduction from other States of sheep with scab was held to
be no  discrimination  against  other  States  and  a  legitimate
exercise of the police powers of the State.

     State laws  forbidding non-residents from fishing or hunting
within the  limits of  the State, or prescribing terms upon which
they way do so, have been upheld as constitutional, on the ground
that the  States never  surrendered to the Federal government any
of their  rights touching  fishing or  hinting; that  the fish or
game of  the State  is a part of the food supply of the citizens,
in which  the citizens  of  other  States  have  no  interest  or
personal rights  or privileges;  and that a State may control the
subject in  the exercise of its police power,(112) and as a thing
held in trust for its own people.

     The question  of the  right of the State to inspect meat and
provision and  other food supplies, and her right to regulate the
liquor traffic,  is the  subject of  a number  of  the  decisions
hereinafter considered,  but in  those cases decided adversely to
the State the decision bas been placed either upon the interstate
commerce clause  or  upon  the  rights  asserted  under  the  XIV
Amendment, and  they will  be found  under the  discussion of the
latter subject.

           Of the Federal Guarantee of Extradition of
                     Fugitives from Justice
                        (Right 42 above)

     Pursuant  to   this  obligation  the  Congress  has  enacted
statutes providing  for the extradition from one State to another
of fugitives  from justice.  These Federal  statutes control  the
demand, and statutes have been passed in all the States providing
measures in  accordance with  the Federal laws. In the first case
of extradition  presented to  the Supreme Court, the prisoner was
indicted in  Canada and  requisition was  made  by  the  Canadian
government on  the governor  of Vermont, who undertook to deliver
him. He  applied for  a habeas  corpus on  the ground that such a
delivery could  only  be  made  to  a  foreign  government  on  a
requisition upon  the United  States, and  that the United States
would not, as had been shown by its action in another case, honor
the requisition  because there  was no  treaty. The Vermont court
dismissed the  writ, and  the Supreme  Court, by a divided court,
sustained the  action of the State court.(113) In another case it
was held  to be  the duty  of the  governor of  one State, on the
demand of  the governor  of another  State, and the production of
the indictment,  duly certified,  to deliver  up a  fugitive from
justice; that  the function  of the former is merely ministerial,
and that  he has  no right  to exercise  any discretionary power;
that he  is under  moral obligation to perform the compact of the
Constitution,   Congress   having   regulated   the   manner   of
performance; but  that no  law of  Congress could  coerce a State
officer to  perform his duty, and a motion for a mandamus against
the governor  was denied.(114)  And again  it was  held that  the
Federal statute  demanding surrender  of a  fugitive from justice
found in  one of the States or Territories, to the State in which
he stands  accused, applies  to Territories as well as States and
embraces   every    offense   known   to   the   law,   including

     In one  case a  man charged  with crime  in Kentucky fled to
West Virginia.  A requisition  issued for him. While the governor
of West  Virginia was  considering his  extradition the  man  was
seized in West Virginia, forcibly abducted to Kentucky, and there
held for trial. He instituted proceedings seeking to have himself
returned to  West Virginia. The Supreme Court held that there was
no mode  provided by  the Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United
States, by  which Federal  authority could  restore him  to  West

     And a fugitive returned to a demanding State has no immunity
from other  indictments against  him by  the State  from which he
fled, after  he is  returned.(117) But the Supreme Court has said
that to  extradite a  man on one charge and try him on another is
dishonorable.(118) The  governor of  a State, upon whom demand is
made for  the surrender  to another  State of  a citizen  who  is
charged with  being a  fugitive  from  justice,  may  refuse  the
requisition if it be satisfactorily shown to him that the accused
was not  in the  State  at  the  time  the  alleged  offense  was
committed, or  since, for in that case the fact that he fled from
justice is negatived.(119)

     From the  foundation of  the government  and notwithstanding
the absolute power of Congress to regulate the terms of surrender
of fugitives,  the governors of States have been disposed to show
independence on  this subject  of honoring  requisitions. In  the
days of  slavery it  was difficult  to secure  the  surrender  of
fugitive slaves,  and  impossible  to  secure  the  surrender  of
persons charged  in a  slave State  with having  aided slaves  to
escape and  having then  themselves fled. The case of Kentucky v.
Dennison(120) is  an illustration  in point.  In some  States the
executive, before honoring the requisition of the governor of the
demanding State,  claims the right to examine the indictment upon
which the  demand is based, and to determine whether it is in due
form, or to decide whether it charges an offense punishable under
the laws  of the demanding State, which is equivalent to deciding
a demurrer  to the  indictment; and  even to  hear  testimony  to
determine the  question of probable guilt or innocence. A notable
instance of  this is  the case of a recent governor, indicted for
complicity in the murder of his political rival, who, having fled
first to  one and  then to  another State,  was demanded  by  the
authorities of  the State  from which he fled, of the authorities
of both  States in which he sought asylum, but has been protected
from delivery.  Perhaps, in  the instance  cited, it was best so,
but the  better opinion  is that if a crime is charged and demand
is made,  in due  form, accompanied by an exemplified copy of the
indictment, the  duty of  the executive  upon whom  the demand is
made is  to surrender the accused to the demanding State, whether
he may  think him  properly or  improperly indicted,  innocent or
guilty,  leaving   the  questions   of  the  sufficiency  of  the
indictment and  his guilt  or innocence  to be  determined by the
lawfully constituted  authorities of the demanding State upon his
trial there.(121)

        The Guarantee to the Citizen that Persons Held to
          Service or Labor in One State and Escaping to
          Another Shall Not be Discharged Thereby from
         Such Service or Labor but Shall be Delivered Up
                        (Right 43 above)

     This once  exciting  clause  has,  since  the  abolition  of
slavery, ceased  to possess  much practical importance. It may be
left, with  the authorities  cited in  connection with it, to the
study of  those interested  in the controversies to which slavery
gave rise.

        Of the Federal Guarantee to the Citizen that His
        State Shall Have a Republican Form of Government
                        (Right 44 above)

     In the first case in which the Supreme Court was called upon
to enforce  this guarantee  it decided that the question which of
two  rival  governments  existing  in  a  State  was  the  lawful
government of  the State  was not  a  judicial  but  a  political
question; that  is, that  it was to be decided by the legislative
and executive  departments and  not by  the judiciary.  The  case
arose out  of conditions bordering upon civil war in the State of
Rhode Island  in 1842,  resulting  from  an  attempt  of  certain
citizens of  that State to change the organic law of Rhode Island
from government  under a  charter granted by Charles II, which it
had continued  as its form of government after the Revolution, to
government under  a new  constitution framed  by the  people. The
trouble originated  in the  fact that while it was alleged that a
majority of  the people  desired a new constitution, there was no
provision in  the existing law for the calling of any convention.
The charter  government continued, notwithstanding certain people
assembled and  framed and  attempted to  put into operation a new
government. One  Dorr was chosen governor by the adherents of the
new government, and at once came in conflict with the old regime.
The dispute  was popularly  known as  "Dorr's Rebellion," and the
situation soon  led to  military conflict, the arrest, trial, and
conviction of  Dorr, and  his sentence  to imprisonment  for life
(although he  was subsequently  pardoned). In  the excitement the
Federal judiciary  was appealed to, and to the appeal it gave the
above reply.

     The  Federal   executive  and  other  departments  had  held
intercourse with the old government and so continued to recognize
it, and, although neither of the State governments could, as they
were administered  then, be  said to  be a republican government,
under the  decision that  it was  a  political  question,  to  be
disposed of  by Congress,  the  factions  in  Rhode  Island  were
allowed to  flounder on,  and finally untangle their troubles for
themselves without Federal interference. So in that instance this
Federal guarantee  of a  republican government proved to be not a
very practical thing.(122)

     The next  occasion upon  which the  Supreme Court considered
this Federal  guarantee was  after the great Civil War. The State
of Texas  attempted, in  1861, to  secede. Her government and her
people waged war on the United States for four years. In 1865 she
was overcome  by force of arms, and her territory was occupied by
the military  forces of the United States, and her government was
temporarily  administered   by  provisional   appointees  of  the
President of  the  United  States  and  afterwards  by  governors
appointed under  an act  of Congress,  by a  military  commander,
Texas being  a part of Military District No. 5, composed of Texas
and Louisiana,  pursuant to  an Act of Congress of March, 1867. A
State convention,  assembled under  the authority  of the  United
States in  1866, passed  an ordinance  looking to the recovery of
certain bonds  alleged to  belong to  the State,  and one  J.  W.
Throckmorton,  a  governor  whom  that  convention  had  elected,
authorized the  bringing of  the suit.  Two  subsequent  military
governors, Hamilton  and Pease, further ratified this action. The
bill was  an original  bill filed  by Texas  as a  State  in  the
Supreme  Court,   and  while  this  condition  of  her  statehood
continued it  prayed an  injunction concerning  certain bonds and
their delivery  to the  State. The  defense, among  other things,

     1.   The authority  of the parties named to prosecute a suit
          in the name of Texas.

     2.   The right  of Texas, after her course in the Civil War,
          to sue as a State of the Union.

     It fell  to the  lot of  Chief Justice  Chase to  decide the
status of  the States  which had  attempted to secede, after they
were conquered  by the  United States  and before they were fully
restored to  their relations  as States  of the Union. In a great
opinion the following points were decided:

     1.   That the  term State, as used in the Constitution, most
          frequently  expresses  the  combined  idea  of  people,
          territory, and  government; a  political  community  of
          free  citizens,   occupying  a   territory  of  defined
          boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned
          and limited  by a written constitution, and established
          by the consent of the governed.

     2.   That  the   Union  of   these  States  under  a  common
          Constitution, forming  a distinct and greater political
          unit, is  that which was designated by the Constitution
          as the  United States,  and made,  of  the  people  and
          States composing it, one people and one country.

     3.   That the  guarantee to every State of a republican form
          of government  was a  guarantee to  the people  of that

     4.   That the Union was indissoluble.

     5.   That the States nevertheless possessed a right of self-
          government, sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and
          every power,  jurisdiction, and  right not expressly or
          by  fair  implication  delegated  to  the  Union;  that
          without the  States in  union there  could be  no  such
          political body as the United States.

     6.   That the  preservation and  the  maintenance  of  their
          governments was  as much within the care of the Federal
          authority as  was  the  preservation  of  the  national
          government itself.

     7.   That the United States was an indestructible government
          of indestructible States.

     8.   That the  guarantee of  republican  government  in  the
          Union, to  the State,  was as  binding  on  the  United
          States as  the guarantee  of perpetual  union, and that
          Texas was entitled to the performance of that guarantee
          by the final act whereby she became a new member of the

     9.   That her  attempt at secession and all acts intended to
          give it effect were null.

     10.  That the  State continued  to exist  as a member of the
          Union, notwithstanding  its  temporary  government  had
          been destroyed to preserve the Union.

     11.  That  the  United  States,  having  preserved  its  own
          existence, was engaged in performing its equally sacred
          obligation to  provide a  republican form of government
          to the State.

     12.  That this  was a political guarantee to be performed by
          the Congress.

     13.  That Congress  was empowered  to judge  of the ways and
          means of accomplishing that result, and the provisional
          and temporary  military governments  then existing were
          lawful means to that end in a case in which the hostile
          State government  had been destroyed, and until new and
          loyal republican State governments could be organized.

     14.  That  it   behooved  the  judiciary  to  recognize  the
          continual existence  of the  seceding States as members
          of the  Union, notwithstanding the temporary suspension
          of their  relations to  the Union  by the  force of the
          events above referred to.

     No epitome  of this  great decision can do it justice. It is
among the most luminous expositions extant of the vital questions
of which  it  treats,  and  was  followed  thenceforth  in  every
department of the government.(123)

     In a  later case  the  point  was  made  that  the  form  of
government of  a State was not republican in the sense guaranteed
by the  Constitution; that is to say, that certain State statutes
in the frame and execution were not. The Supreme Court reiterated
that the question was a political question, and that if the "form
of  government"  existing  in  a  State  was  recognized  by  the
legislative and executive departments, the judiciary ought not to
question it,  and must  follow the  interpretations of  the State
laws placed on them by the highest State court.(124)

     In a  very recent  case the  Supreme Court,  called upon  to
decide upon  the case  of rival  contestants for  the  office  of
governor of  a State,  declined to  do so,  declaring that it was
pre-eminently a  case for decision by the court of last resort in
the State.  When the  Federal guarantee  off a republican form of
government, and  the XIV Amendment were invoked, it dismissed the
contention by  declaring that  the enforcement  of that guarantee
was intrusted  to the political department of the government, and
that the  powers of  the judiciary  concerning  it  were  not  so
enlarged by  anything in  the XIV  Amendment as to give the court
power to review the judgment of a State court of last resort on a
question of State elections.(125)

     From the  foregoing, which embrace all the utterances of the
Supreme Court  concerning its  powers under the guarantee clause,
it will  be seen  that the  citizen has little or nothing to hope
for, in  the way  of its enforcement, from the Federal judiciary.
Indeed, judging  by the recent utterances of that court, not only
in this  regard, but  on the  subject of extradition,(126) and in
numerous cases  where attempts  have been  made to secure its aid
against gross  frauds the  suffrage,(127) it  would  seem  to  be
willing to  surrender its  existence and  power as  a  coordinate
department of  the Federal  government,  and  gladly  abandon  to
Congress and the executive all efforts to enforce the law, except
in matters not political.

     We come  now  to  consider  those  rights,  privileges,  and
immunities of  the citizen  guaranteed by the early amendments to
the Constitution.

         The Immunity of the Citizen Against Any Law of
        Congress Respecting an Establishment of Religion
            or Prohibiting the Free Exercise Thereof
                          (Amendment I)

     Either by  the bill of rights, the constitution, or the law,
of every  State of the Union, a similar guarantee is given to its
citizens, concerning  State laws.  This does  not mean  that  the
people either  of the  Nation or  of the  State hold  religion in
contempt or desire to belittle it. On the contrary, the oldest of
the bills  of rights  contains reverential references to religion
or the duty which we owe to our Maker. The Christian religion was
judicially  declared   to  be   a  part  of  the  common  law  of
Pennsylvania.(128) But  the English Established Church had become
exceedingly obnoxious  to  the  colonists,  and  their  ideas  of
religious liberty  had  been  imbibed  from  Dutch  and  Lutheran
examples, and  stimulated by what they regarded as oppressions of
the regularly established Church. Hence the prohibition above set

     The first case arising under this clause involved the effect
of the  constitutions,  national  and  State,  and  laws  enacted
thereunder, upon  property of  the Episcopal  Church in Virginia.
The case  arose touching  certain church  property in Alexandria,
which city  was at  that time  in the  District of  Columbia. The
court held  that  the  religious  establishment  of  England  was
adopted, so  far as  applicable, in  the colony  of Virginia, and
that the  freehold of  church  lands  was  in  the  parson;  that
legislative grants  were irrevocable; that the Act of Virginia of
1776, confirming  to the  Episcopal Church,  as successor  of the
Established Church,  its rights to lands, was not contrary to the
State constitution  and  did  not  infringe  any  rights,  civil,
political, or religious, under the State constitution; that later
acts seeking  to divest  the  Episcopal  Church  of  Virginia  of
property acquired previous to the Revolution were null, etc.(130)
By this  decision,  and  others  similar  in  other  States,  the
Episcopal Church retained much property in the older colonies.

     The Supreme  Court has  held that the prohibition above does
not make  good the plea of a person accused of an offense against
morality and decency, that he has acted pursuant to the tenets of
his religious  belief, which  were those of a Mormon.(131) It was
said, "Religious  freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the
United States so far as congressional interference is concerned."
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were violative of social
duties or  subversive of  good order.  "Polygamy has  always been
odious among  the northern  and western  nations of  Europe, and,
until  the   establishment  of  the  Mormon  Church,  was  almost
exclusively a  feature of  the life  of Asiatic  and  of  African
people.' '  The law  punishing polygamy was upheld as intended to
prevent a  pernicious practice,  no matter what was the belief of
the party  engaging in  it The opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Waite is  both interesting and instructive and equally applicable
to other religious immoralities than polygamy.

     In a  later case  the Supreme Court declared that bigamy and
polygamy are crimes by the laws of the United States, by the laws
of Idaho,  and  by  the  laws  of  all  civilized  and  Christian
countries; and  to call  their advocacy a tenet of religion is to
offend the common sense of mankind; that a crime is none the less
such, nor  less odious, because sanctioned by what any particular
sect may  designate as  religion; and that the first amendment to
the  Constitution   was  never  intended  as  a  protection  from
punishment for acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals
of society.(132)

     In a  case recently  decided, it  was held  that placing  an
isolated hospital  building built  by the government in charge of
another hospital,  which was  under the control of Sisters of the
Roman Catholic  Church, was  not obnoxious  to the constitutional
prohibition  against   laws  respecting   an   establishment   of

           Of the Right of the Citizen to Free Speech.
                          (Amendment I)

     This right  is also  guaranteed to their citizens by all the
States. Of  it, it  is sufficient to say that it is a right to be
confined within  the bounds of decency and morality, and gives mo
immunity from  arrest and  punishment for treasonable, seditious,
and inflammatory  appeals. In  time of  war numerous arrests have
been made by 'the authority of military commissions, aud citizens
have been  actually deported by presidential orders without trial
by jury,  and after  vainly seeking  redress under  habeas corpus
proceedings.(134) And  in time  of peace,  under Federal statutes
authorizing the  deportation of  anarchists, persons  have,  from
time to  time, been indicted, arrested, and punished or deported,
for  seditious,   anarchistic,  and   nihilistic  utterances  and

     The  justification   for  such  action  is  that  while  the
constitutions, Federal and State, guarantee freedom of speech and
of  the   press,  the  persons  so  speaking  or  publishing  are
answerable to  the public  authorities  for  their  acts  in  the
interests of good citizenship, morality, and decency.(135)

                   Of the Freedom of the Press
                          (Amendment I)

     The freedom  of the  press has  been described as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty. Unquestionably the suppression of fair
discussion of  public measures in the press was, under the system
against which  the colonists  rebelled, one  of the  most  odious
forms of tyranny. On the other hand, those who, in that day, were
so ardent  for the  absolute liberty  of the press could not have
foreseen the  immense increase  in  public  and  private  printed
matter which was to occur; the almost unlimited power for good or
evil which  the press  was to  possess; the irreparable nature of
the  injuries   which  it  is  often  able  to  inflict;  or  the
irresponsible hands into which so large a portion of the press of
our day was, in time, to pass.(136)

     The State  constitutions and  statutes which  guarantee  the
freedom of  the press,  for  the  most  part,  couple  with  that
guarantee the  condition that  the persons  so printing  shall be
answerable in  damages for  any abuse  of the  privilege. But the
privilege itself is regarded as of such dignity and sanctity that
the courts of sundry States have held that an injunction will not
lie to restrain the publication of an alleged libel, and the only
redress of  a party  libeled is  to bring  an action  for damages
after the fact or prosecute the offender criminally.(137)

           Rights Guaranteed by Amendments II - VIII,
                           XI, and XII

     Of the  other rights guaranteed by the amendments from II to
VIII we  shall not speak in detail, because their nature, extent,
and full  interpretation will be found sufficiently considered in
the authorities  cited in  connection with  their statement.(138)
Nor do  the amendments  numbered XI  and XII bear directly on our

     Having now  come to  the war  amendments, let  us proceed to
consider them in their order.


(1)  Broadhead's History of New York, 1770.

(2)  "The practice  of setting  apart section  No.  16  of  every
     township of  public lands,  for the  maintenance  of  public
     schools is  traceable to  the ordinances  of 1785, being the
     first enactment for the disposal by sale of the public lands
     in the  western territory. The appropriation of public lands
     for that  object  became  a  fundamental  principle  by  the
     ordinance of  1787, which  settled terms  of compact between
     the people and States of the northwestern territory, and the
     original States,  unalterable except  by consent. One of the
     articles affirmed  that `religion,  morality, and knowledge,
     being necessary  for good  government and  the happiness  of
     mankind.' and  ordained that  'schools.  and  the  means  of
     education, should be forever encouraged.' This principle was
     extended, first  by  congressional  enactment  (1  Stat.  at
     large, 550,  para. 6),  and afterward,  in 1802,  by compact
     between the  United States  and Georgia, to the southwestern
     territory. The  earliest  development  of  this  article  in
     practical legislation, is to be found in the organization of
     the state  of Ohio,  and the adjustment of its civil polity,
     according to  the ordinance. preparatory to its admission to
     the Union." Cooper v. Roberts, (1855) 18 How. U.S. 177.

(3)  So persuasive of all our early acts were the examples of the
     Dutch that  even our  national emblem is singularly like the
     flag of the United Netherlands.

(4)  Corfield v.  Coryell. (1823) 4 Wash. U.S. 371. See also Ward
     v. Maryland, (1870) 12 Wall. U.S. 430.

(5)  16 Wall  U.S. 76.   "The  Constitution does  not define  the
     privileges and  immunities of  citizens. For that definition
     we must  look elsewhere."  Minor v.  Happersett,  (1874)  21
     Wall. U.S. 170.

(6)  Revised Code of Virginia, 1819, Vol. 1. page 31.

(7)  "The Confederation  was a league of friendship of the States
     with each  other, so  declared in  the articles  and entered
     into `for  their  common  defense,  the  security  of  their
     liberties, and  their mutual  aud general  welfare,  binding
     themselves to assist each other against all force offered to
     or attacks  made upon  them, or  any of  them, on account of
     religion.  sovereignty,   trade.  or   any  other   pretense
     whatever.' But  its articles  did not form a constitution or
     ordinance  of   government,  with   power  to   enforce  its
     provisions upon  each other,  or even  a compact  having any
     coherence or  binding force  other than  that of a league of
     friendship,  which   its  members   only  claimed   them  to
     constitute." Wharton v. Wise. (1894) 153 U.S. 167.

(8)  "A reasonable interpretation of that instrument [the Federal
     Constitution] necessarily  leads to  the conclusion that the
     powers so  granted are  never exclusive  of  similar  powers
     existing in  the States,  unless where  the Constitution has
     expressly. in  terms, given  an exclusive power to Congress,
     or the exercise of a like power is prohibited to the States,
     or there  is a  direct repugnancy  or incompatibility in the
     exercise of it by the States. The example of the first claim
     is to  be found  In the  exclusive legislation  delegated to
     Congress  over  places  purchased  by  the  consent  of  the
     legislature of  the State  in which  the same  shall be, for
     forts, arsenals,  dock-yards, etc.; of the second claim, the
     prohibition of  a State  to coin  money  or  emit  bills  of
     credit; of the third class, as this court have already held,
     the power  to establish  an uniform  rule of naturalization,
     and the  delegation of  admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
     In all  other cases  not falling  within the classes already
     mentioned, it  seems unquestionable  that the  States retain
     concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the latter
     and spirit  of the  Eleventh Amendment  of the Constitution,
     but, upon  the soundest  principles  of  general  reasoning.
     There is  this reserve, however, that in cases of concurrent
     authority, where the laws of the States and of the Union are
     in direct and manifest collision on the same subject,  those
     of the  Union, being  'the supreme  law of tho land,' are of
     paramount authority,  and the State laws, so far, and so far
     only,  as  such  incompatibility  exists,  must  necessarily
     yield." Houston  v. Moore, (1820) 5 Wheat. U.S. 49. See also
     M'Culloch v.  Maryland, (1819)  4 Wheat.  U.S. 406; Cohen v.
     Virginia, (1821)  6 Wheat U.S. 414; Ableman w. Booth, (1858)
     21 How.  U.S. 516;  Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall. U.S.
     543; Tarble's Case, (1871) 13 Wall. U.S. 406; Ex p. Siebold.
     (1879) 100  U. S.  398; Chinese  Exclusion Case,  (1889) 130
     U.S. 604; Is re Quarles, (1895) 158 U.S. 535.

(9)  Civil Rights Cases, (1883 109 U.S. 3.

(10) "A State  has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
     over all  persons and  things within its territorial limits,
     as any  foreign  nation,  where  that  jurisdiction  is  not
     surrendered or  retained by  the Constitution  of the United
     States. By virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the
     boundless and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety.
     happiness, and  prosperity of its people, and to provide for
     its general  welfare, by  any and  every act  of legislation
     which it  may deem  to be conducive to these ends, where the
     power over  the particular  subject, or  the manner  of  its
     exercise is not surrendered or restrained in the manner just
     stated. All  those powers  which relate  to merely municipal
     legislation, or  what may,  perhaps, more properly be called
     `internal police,'  are not  thus surrendered or restrained;
     and consequently, in relation to these, the authority of the
     State is  complete, unqualified, and exclusive." New York v.
     Mila, (1837) 11Pet. U.S. 139.

     "Both the  States and  the United  States existed before the
     Constitution.   The   people,   through   that   instrument,
     established a  more perfect union by substituting a national
     government, acting,  with ample  power,  directly  upon  the
     citizens,  instead  of  the  confederate  government,  which
     acted, with powers greatly restricted, only upon the States.
     But in  many articles  of  the  Constitution  the  necessary
     existence of  the States,  and, within their proper spheres,
     the independent  authority  of  the  States,  is  distinctly
     recognized. To  them nearly  the whole  charge  of  interior
     regulation is  committed or  left; to them and to the people
     all  powers   not  expressly   delegated  to   the  national
     government are  reserved. The  general  condition  was  well
     stated by  Mr. Madison in The Federalist, thus: `The Federal
     and State  governments are  in fact but different agents and
     trustees of  the people,  constituted with  different powers
     and designated  for  different  purposes'"  Lane  County  v.
     Oregon, (1868) 7Wall. U.S. 76.

(11) Under the  very peculiar  constitution of  this  government,
     although the  citizens owe supreme allegiance to the Federal
     government, they  owe also  a qualified  allegiance  to  the
     State  in  which  they  are  domiciled.  Their  persons  and
     property are  subject to  its laws.  The Brig  Army Warwick,
     (1862) 2 Black U.S. 673.

(12) Ex p.  Yarbrough. (1884)  110 U.S.  651; in re Green, (1890)
     134 U.S. 377; McPherson v. Blacker, (1892) 146 U.S. 1; Wiley
     v. Sinkler,  (1900) 179  U.S.  58;  Swaford  v.  Templeton,.
     (1902) 185 U.S. 487.

      "The  right to  vote for  members of  the Congress  of  the
     United States  is not  derived merely  from the constitution
     and laws  of the State in which they are chosen, but has its
     foundation in  the Constitution of the United States." Wiley
     v. Sinkler  (1900) 179  U.S. 58,  approving Ex  p.Yarbrough,
     (1884) 110 U.S. 651.

(13) Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856) 19 How. U.S. 393; Veazie Bank
     v. Fenno, (1869) 8 Wall. U.S. 533; Scholey v. Rew, (1874) 23
     Wall. U.S.  331; De  Treville v. Smalls, (1878) 98 U.S. 517;
     Gibbons v.  District  of  Columbia,  (1886)  116  U.S.  404;
     Pollock v. Farmers' L & T. Co., (1895) 157 U.S. 429; Pollock
     v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 158 U.S. 601; Thomas v. U.S, (1904)
     192 U. S. 363.  See infra note 9, P. 114.

     "The  men  who  framed  and  adopted  that  instrument  [the
     Constitution]  had   just  emerged  from  the  struggle  for
     independence, whose rallying cry had been that `taxation and
     representation go  together'....  The States were about, for
     all national  purposes  embraced  in  the  Constitution,  to
     become one,  united under  the same  laws. But as they still
     retained their  jurisdiction over  all  persons  and  things
     within their territorial limits, except where surrendered to
     the general  government or  restrained by  the Constitution,
     they  were   careful  to   see  to   it  that  taxation  and
     representation should  go together,  so that the sovereignty
     reserved should not be impaired, and that when Congress, and
     especially  the  House  of  Representatives,  where  it  was
     specifically provided that all revenue bills must originate,
     voted  a   tax  upon   property,  it   should  be  with  the
     consciousness, and  under the  responsibility,  that  in  so
     doing the  tax  so  voted  would  proportionately  upon  the
     immediate constituents  of those who imposed it." Pollock v.
     Farmers' L.& T.Co., (1895) 157 U.S. 429.

(14) "The direct  and declared  object  of  this  census  is,  to
     furnish a  standard by  which `representatives,  and  direct
     taxes, may be apportioned among the several States which may
     be included  within this  Union.'"  Loughborough  v.  Blake,
     (1820) 5 Wheat. U.S. 317.

(15) "The House  of Representatives has the sole right to impeach
     officers of  the government.  and the  Senate to  try  him."
     Kilbourn v. Thompson, (1880) 103 U.S.190.

(16) Anderson  v.Dunn,   (1821)  6   Wheat.  U.S.  204;  Coxe  v.
     MClenachan, (1798)  3 Dall.  U.S. 478; Kilbourn v. Thompson,
     (1880) 103 U.S. 168.

(17) Field v.Clark,  (1802) 143  U.S.  649;  Twin  City  Bank  v.
     Nebeker (1897) 167 U.S. 196.

     "The construction  of this  limitation is  practically  well
     settled by the uniform action of Congress. According to that
     construction, it has been confined to bills to levy taxes in
     the strict  sense of  the words, and has not been understood
     to extend  to bills  for other  purposes which  incidentally
     create revenue.'"  U.S. v.  Norton, (1875)  1 U.S. 569; Twin
     City Bank v. Nebeker, (1897) 167 U.S. 202.

(18) Field v.  Clark (1892)  143 U.S.  649; U.S. v. Ballin (1892)
     144 U.S.  1; Twin City Bank v. Nebeker (1897) 167 U. S. 196;
     La Abra  Silver Min.  Co. v.  U. S.,  (1899) 176  U. S. 423;
     Wilkes County  v.  Coler,  (1901)  180  U.S.  506;  Fourteen
     Diamond Rings v. U.S. (1901) 183 U. S. 176.

     "The purpose  of the Constitution is to secure to the people
     of this  country the best legislation by the simplest means.
     Its framers being mindful of the errors and oversights which
     are bred  in the  heat and strife and divided responsibility
     of legislative  assemblies, and  which they  had  repeatedly
     beheld in  State legislatures,  determined to  secure to the
     people the benefits of revision. and to unite with the power
     of revision  the check  of undivided  responsibility, and to
     place the  power in  the hands  of the  person in  whom  the
     nation reposed,  for the  time being.  the most  confidence"
     U.S. v. Well, (1894) 29 Ct. Cl. 540.

(19) Hylton v.  U.S.  (1796)  3  Dall.  U.S.  171;  M'Culloch  v.
     Maryland, (1819)  4 Wbeat.  U.S. 316; Loughborough v. Blake,
     (1820) 5  Wheat. U.S.  317; Obborn  v. U.  S. Bank  (1824) 9
     Wheat. U.S.  738; Weston  w. Charleston,  (1829) 2 Pet. U.S.
     449; Dobbins  v. Erie  County,  (1842)  16  Pet.  U.S.  435;
     Thurlow v.  Massachusetts, (1947) 5 How. U.S. 504; Cooley v.
     Board of  Wardens, (1851)  12  How.  U.S.  299;  McGuire  v.
     Massachusetts,  (1865)  3  Wall.  U.S.  387;  Van  Allen  v.
     Assessors, (1865)  3 Wall.  U.S.  573;  Bradley  v.  People,
     (1866) 4  Wall. U.S.  459; License  Tax Cases (1866) 5 Wall.
     U.S. 462; Pervear w. Massachusetts. (1866) 5 Wall. U.S. 475;
     Woodruff v. Patham, (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 123; Hinson v. Lott,
     (1868) 8  Wall. U.S.  148; Veazie  Bank v.  Fenno, (1869)  8
     Wall. U.S.  633; Collector v. Day, (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 113;
     U.S. v.  Singer, (1872)  15 Wall.  U.S. 111;  State  Tax  on
     Foreign-held Bonds,  (1872)  15  Wall.  U.S.  300;  U.S.  v.
     Baltimre, etc.,  R. Co., (1872) 17 Wall U.S. 322; Union Pac.
     R. Co.  v. Peniston, (1873) 18 Wall. U.S. 5; Scholey v. Row,
     (1874) 23 Wall. U.S. 331; Merchants Nat. Bank v. U.S. (1879)
     101 U.  S. 1;  Springer v.  U.S. (1881)  102 U.S. 592; Legal
     Tender Cases,  (1884) 110  U.S. 421; Head Money Cases (1884)
     112 U.S.  680; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee 117 U.S. 151; Field
     w. Clark,  (1892) 143  U. S.  649. New York, etc., R. Co. v.
     Pennsylvania, (1894) 153 U.S. 628; Pollack  v. Farmers' L. &
     T. Co.,  (1895) 157 U.S. 429; U.S. v. Realty Co., (1896) 163
     U.S. 427; In re Kollock, (1807) 165 U.S. 526; Nicol v. Ames,
     (1899) 173  U.S. 509; Knowlton v. Moore, (1900) 178 U.S. 41;
     Delima v.  Bidwell, (1901) 182 U.S. 1; Dooley v. U.S. (1901)
     182 U.S. 222; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. U.S. (1901) 183 U.S.
     176; Felsenbeld v. U.S., (1902) 186 U.S. 126; Thomas v. U.S.
     (1904) 192 U.S. 363. See supra, note 3, p. 112.

(20) Gibbons v.  Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S. 1; Brown v. Maryland
     (1827) 12  Wheat U.S. 419; Willson w. Black Bird Creek Marsh
     Co., (1829)  2 Pet. U.S. 245; Worcester v. Georgia, (1832) 6
     Pet. U.S. 515; New York v. Miln, (1837) 11 Pet. U.S. 102; U.
     S. v.  Coombs, (1838)  12 Pet.  U.S. 72; Holmes v. Jennison,
     (1840) 14  Pet. U.S. 640; Thurlow v. Massachusetta, (1847) 5
     How. U.S.  604; Smith  v. Turner,  (1849) 7  How. U.S.  283;
     Nathan v.  Louisiana (1850)  8 How.  U.S. 73; Mager v. Grima
     (1850) 8  How. U.S.  490; U.  S. v.  Marigold. (1850) 9 How.
     U.S. 560;  Cooley v.  Board of  Wardens, (1851) 12 How. U.S.
     299; The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, (1851) 12 How.
     U.S. 443; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., (1851)
     13 How.  U.S. 518; Veazie v. Moore, (1862) 14 How. U.S. 568;
     Smith v.  Maryland, (1855)  18 How. U.S. 71; Pennsylvania v.
     Wheeling. etc.,  Bridge Co., (1853) 18 How. U.S. 421; Sinnot
     v. Davenport  (1859) 22  How. U.S. 227; Foster v. Davenport.
     (1859) 22 How. U.S. 244; Conway v. Taylor(1861) 1 Black U.S.
     603; U.S.  v. Holliday,  (1865) 3  Wall. U.S. 407; Gilman v.
     Philadelphia (1865) 3 Wall. U.S. 713; The Passaic Bridges, 3
     Wall. U.S.  782; Southern  Steamship  Co.  v.  Port  Wardens
     (1867) 6  Wall. U.S.  31; Crandall v. Nevada, (1867) 6 Wall.
     U.S. 35;  White's Bank  v. Smith  (1868) 7  Wall. U.S.  646;
     Waring v.  Mobile (1868)  8 Wall. U.S. 110; Paul v. Virginia
     (1868) 8  Wall. U.S. 168; Thomson v. Pacific R. Co. (1869) 9
     Wall.U.S. 579;  Downham v.  Alexandria  (1869) 10 Wall. U.S.
     173; Clinton  Bridge (1870)  10 Wall.  U.S. 454;  The Daniel
     Ball  (1870)   10  Wall   U.S.557;  Liverpool  Ins.  Co.  v.
     Massachusetts (1870)  10 Wall  U.S. 566; The Montello (1870)
     11 Wall.  U.S. 411;  Ex p.  McNiel (1871)  13 Wall U.S. 236;
     State Freight  Tax Case  (1872) 15 Wall. U.S. 232; State Tax
     on Railway  Gross Receipts  (1872) 15Wall. U.S. 284; Osborne
     v. Mobile (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 479; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
     Fuller (1873)  17Wall. U.S.560; Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1873) 18
     Wall. U.S.  129; Delaware  Railroad Tax (1873) 18 Wall. U.S.
     206; Peete  v. Morgan  (1873) 19  Wall. U.S.  581;  Dubuque,
     etc.,  R.   Co.  v.  Richmond  (1873)  19  Wall.  U.S.  584;
     Baltimore, etc.,  R. Co.  v. Maryland (1874) Wall. U.S. 456;
     The  Lottawanna,   (1874)  21  Wall.  U.S.  558;  Waltan  v.
     Missouri, (1875)  91 U.S. 275; Henderson v. New York. (1876)
     92 U. & 259; Chy Long v. Freedman. (1875) 92 U.S. 275; South
     Carolina v.  Georgia, (1876)  93 U.S. 4; Sherlock v. Alling,
     (1876) 93  U.S. 99;  U.S. v. 43 Gallons of Whisky, (1876) 93
     U.S. 188; Foster v. New Orleans (1876) 94 U.S. 246; MaCready
     v. Virginia, (1876) 94 U.S. 391; @niW, Hannibal Etc., R. Co.
     v. Husen, (1877) 95 U.S. 465; Pound v. Turck, (1877) 95 U.S.
     459; Hall v. De Cuir, (1877) 95 U.S. 485; Pensacola Tel. Co.
     v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1877) 96 U.S. 1; Boston Beer co.
     v. Massachusetts  (1877) 97  U.S. 25;  Cook v.  Pennsylvania
     (1878) 97  U.S. 566; Wheeling, etc., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling
     (1878)  99  U.S.  273;  Northwestern  Union  Packet  Co.  v.
     St.Louis (1879)  100 U.S.  423; Guy  v. Baltimore (1879) 100
     U.S. 434;  Kirtland v.  Hotchkiss (1879) 100 U. S. 491; Howe
     Mach. Co.  v. Gage,  (1879) 100  U. S. 676; Trade-mark Cases
     (1879) 100  U.S. 82; Wilson v. McNamee, (1881) 102 U.S. 572;
     Tiernan v.  Rinker, (1880)  102 U.  S. 123; Lord v. Goodall,
     etc., Steamship  Co., (1881) 102 U. S. 641; Mobile County v.
     Kimball, (1881)  102 U.S.  691; Western  Union Tel.  Co.  v.
     Texas, (1881)  105 U.S.  460; Newport,  etc., Bridge  Co. v.
     U.S., (1881)  105 U.  S. 470;  Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St.
     Louis, (1882)  107 U.S.  365; Turuer v. Maryland, (1882) 107
     U.S. 38;  Escanaba etc.,  Transp. Co. v. Chicago, (1892) 107
     U. S. 678; Miller v. New York, (1883) 169 U.S. 383; Moran v.
     New Orleans.  (1884) 112  U.S. 69;  Foster v. Kansas, (1884)
     112 U.S.  201;  Head  Money  Cases.  (l884)  112  U.S.  680;
     Cardwell v.  American Bridge  Co., (1885)  113  U.  S.  205;
     Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, (1885) 113 U.S. 727; Gloucester
     Ferry Co.  v. Pennsylvania.  (1885) 114  U.S. 196;  Brown v.
     Houston. (1895)  114 U.S.  622;  Railroad  Commission  Cases
     (1886) 116  U.S. 307,  347, 352; Walling v. Michigan, (1886)
     116 U.S.  446; Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U.S. 517; Pickard v.
     Pullman Southern  Car. Co.,  (1886) 117  U.S. 34;  Tennessee
     v.Pullman Southern  Car Co.  (1886) 117  U.S.  51;  Morgan's
     Steamship Co.  v. Louisiana  Board of Health (1886) 118 U.S.
     455; Wabash,  etc., R.  Co. v. Illinois (1886) 118 U.S. 557;
     U.S. v.  Kagama (1886) 118 U.S. 375; Philadelphia Fire Assoc
     v. New  York (1886)  119 U.S.  110; Johson v. Chicago, etc.,
     Elevator Co.  (1886) 119  U.S. 388; Robbins v. Shelby County
     Taxing Dist. (1887) 120 U.S. 489; Corson v. Maryland, (1887)
     120 U.  S. 502;  Fargo v.  Michigan, (1887)  121  U.S.  230;
     Philadelphia.. etc.,  Steamship Co., v. Pennsylvania. (1887)
     122 U.S. 322; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton (1887) 122
     U.S. 347;  Sands v.  Manitee River Imp. Co.. (1887) 123 U.S.
     288; Smith  v. Alabama  (1888) 124 U.S. 465; Willamette Iron
     Bridge Co.  v. Hatch  (1888) 125  U.S.  1;  Pembina  Consol.
     Silver Min.,  etc., Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888) 126 U.S. 181;
     Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. co. (1888) 125 U.S. 406; Western
     Union  Tel.   Co.  v.   Atty.-Gen.  (1888)  125.  U.S.  630;
     California v.  Central Pac.  R. Co.,  (1889) 127  U.  S.  1;
     Ratterman v.  Western Union  Tel. Co.  (1888) 127  U.S. 411;
     Leloup v.  Mobile, (1888)  127 U.S.  640; Kidd  v. Pearsaon,
     (1888) 128  U. S.  1; Asher  v. Texas  (1888) 128  U.S. 129;
     Nashville, etc.,  R. co.  v. Alabama,  (1888) 128  U.S.  96,
     Stoutenburgh v.  Hennick, (1889)  129 U.S.  141; Kimmish  v.
     Ball, (1889) 129 U.S. 217; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama
     State Board  of Assessment,  (1889) 132  U.S. 472; Fritts v.
     Palmer, (1889)  132 U.S.  282; Louisville,  etc. R.  Co.  v.
     Mississippi, (1890) 133 U.S. 587; Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135
     U.S. 100;  Cherokee Nation  v. Southern Kansas R. Co. (1890)
     135 U.S.  641; McCall  v. California,  (1890) 136  U.S. 104;
     Norfolk, etc.,  R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1890) 136 U.S. 114;
     Minnesota v.  Barber, (1890)  136 U.S.  318, Texas, etc., R.
     Co. v.  Southern Pac.  Co., (1890)  137 U.S.  48; Brimmer v.
     Rebman, (1891)  138 U.S.  78;  Manchester  v.  Massachusetts
     (1891) 139  U. S.  240; In  re Rahrer,  (1891) 140 U.S. 646;
     Pullman's Palace  Car Co.  v. Pennsylvania,  (1891) 141 U.S.
     18; Massachusetts v. Western Union Tel. Co.. (1891) 141 U.S.
     40; Crutcher  v. Kentucky,  (1891) 141  U.S. 47;  Voight  v.
     Wright (1891) 141 U.S. 62; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson
     (1891) 141  U.S. 679; In re Garnett (1891) 141 U.S. 1; Maine
     v. Grand  Trunk R.  Co., (1881) 142 U.S. 217; Nishimura Ekiu
     v. U.S. (1892) 142 U.S. 651; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert,
     (1802) 142  U.S. 339;  Horn Silver  Min. Co.  v.  New  York,
     (1892) 143  U.S. 305;  Field v.  Clark. (1892) 143 U.S. 849;
     O'Neil v.  Vermont. (l892)  144 U.S.  323; Ficklen v. Shelby
     County Taxing  Dist. (1892) 145 U.S. 1; Lehigh Valley R. Co.
     v. Pennsylvania.  (1892) 145  U.S. 102;  Harman v.  Chicago,
     (1893) 147 U.S. 396; Monongahela Navs Co. v. U.S. (1893) 148
     U.S. 312;  Brennan v. Titusville, (1894) 153 U.S. 289; Brass
     v. North Dakota. (1894) 163 U.S. 391; Ashley v. Ryan. (1894)
     153 U.S.  436; Luxton  v. North  River Bridge Co. (1894) 153
     U.S. 525;  Postal Tel.-Cable  Co. v.  Charleston (1894)  153
     U.S. 692; Covington, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky (1894) 154
     U.S. 204;  Interstate Commerce  Commission v. Brimson (1894)
     154 U.S.  447; Plumley  v. Massachusetts(1894) 155 U.S. 461;
     Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Interstate Transp. Co., (1895) 155U.S.
     585; Hooper  v. California (1895) 155 U.S. 648; Postal Tel.-
     Cable Co.  v. Adams (1895) 155 U.S. 688; U.S. v. E.C. Knight
     Co., (1895)  156 U.S.  1; Emert  v. Missouri (1895) 156 U.S.
     296; Pittsburg,  etc., Coal Co. v. Louisiana (1895) 156 U.S.
     590; Gulf,  etc., R.  Co. v.  Hefley (1895) 158 U.S. 98; New
     York, etc.,  R. Co.  v. Pennsylvania (1895) 158 U.S. 431; In
     re Debs (1895) 158 U.S. 564; Greer v. Connecticut (1896) 161
     U.S. 519;  Western Union  Tel. Co. v. James, (1896) 162 U.S.
     650; Western  Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, (1896) 163 U. S. 1;
     Illinois Cent.  R. Co.  v. Illinois,  (1896) 163  U. S. 142;
     Hennington v.  Georgia  (1896)  163  U.S.  299;  Osborne  v.
     Florida, (1897)  164 U.S.  650; Scott  v. Donald, (1897) 165
     U.S. 58;  Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor (1897) 165
     U.S. 194;  Lake Shore,  etc., R.  Co.  v.  Ohio  (1897)  165
     U.S.365; New  York, etc.,  R.Co.v.New York  (1897) 165  U.S.
     628; Gladson  v. Minnesota  (1897) 166  U.S. 427;  Henderson
     Bridge Co.v. Kentucky (1897) 166 U.S. 150; St. Anthony Falls
     Water Power  Co. v.  St. Paul  Water Com'rs  (1897) 168 U.S.
     349; Chicago,  etc., R.  Co. v.  Solan (1898)  169 U.S. 133;
     Missourti, Etc.,  R. Co.  v.  Haber  (1898)  169  U.S.  613;
     Richmond, etc.,  R. Co.  v. R.  A.  Patterson  Tobacco  Co.,
     (1898) 169  U.S. 311;  Rhodes v.  Iowa (1898)  170 U.S. 412;
     Vance  v.   W.A.  Vandercook   Co.,  (1898)   170U.S.   438;
     Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U.S. 1; Collins v.
     New hampshire  (1898) 171  U.S. 30;  Patapaco Guano  Co.  v.
     North Carolina Board of Agriculture (1898) 171 U.S. 345; New
     York v.  Roberts (1898) 171 U.S. 658; Hopkins v. U.S. (1898)
     171 U.S.  578; Anderson  v. U.S.  (1898) 171 U.S. 604; Green
     Bay, etc.,  Canal Co.  v. Patten  Paper Col, (1898) 172 U.S.
     58; lake  Shore, etc.,  R. Co.  v. Ohio  (1899) 173U.S. 285;
     Henderson  Bridge  Co.  v.  Henderson  (1899)  173U.S.  592;
     Missouri, etc.,  R. Co.  v.  McCann  (1899)  174  U.S.  580;
     Addyston  Pipe,   etc.,  Co.   v.  U.S.   (1899)  175   U.S.
     211;Louisiana v. Texas (1900) 176 U.S. 1; U.S. v. Bellingham
     Bay   Boom Co.  (1900) 176  U.S. 211;  Lindsay, etc., Co. v.
     Mullen (1900)  176 U.S.  126; Water-Pierce  Oil Co. v. Texas
     (1900) 177 U.S. 28 New York L. Ins.Co. v. Cravens (1900) 178
     U.S. 389;  Scranton v. Wheeler (1900) 179 U.S. 141; Williams
     v. Fears  (1900) 179  U.S. 270;  Wisconsin etc.,  R. Co.  v.
     Jacobson (1900)  179 U.S.  287; Chesapeake,  etc., R. Co. v.
     Kentucky (1900) 179 U.S. 388; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister
     (1900) 179  U.S. 445;  W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota (1900)
     180 U.S.  452; Rasmussen v. Idaho (1901) 181 U.S. 198; Smith
     v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (1901) 181 U.S. 248; Capital City
     Dairy Co.  v. Ohio (1902) 183 U.S. 238; Louisville, etc., R.
     Co. V  Kentucky (1902) 183 U.S.503; Nutting v. Massachusetts
     (1902)  183  U.S.  553;  McChord  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.
     Co.(1902) 183  U.S. 483;  Louisville, Etc., R. Co. v. Eubank
     (1902) 184  U.S. 27;  Stockard v. Morgan (1902) 185 U.S. 27;
     Minneapolis, etc.,  R. Co. v. Minnesota (1902) 186 U.S. 257;
     Reid v. Colorado (1902) 187 U.S. 137; Western Union Tel. Co.
     v. New  Hope (1903)  187 U.S.  419; Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S.
     Glue Co. (1903) 187 U.S. 611; Lousiville, etc., Ferry Co. v.
     Kentucky (1902)  188 U.S.  385; U.S. v. Lynah (1903) 188U.S.
     445; Cummings  v. Chicago  (1903) 188  U.S. 410; The Roanoke
     (1903) 189  U.S. 185; Montgomery v. Portland (1903) 190 U.S.
     89; Petterson  v. Bark  Eudora (1903) 190 U.S. 169; Allen v.
     Pullman's Palace  Car Co.,  (1903) 191 U.S. 171; New York v.
     Knight (1904)  192 U.S.  21; Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Taylor
     (1904) 192  U.S. 64; Crossman v. Lurman (1904) 192 U.S. 189;
     St. ClairCounty  v. Interstate  Sand Co.,  etc., (1904)  192
     U.S.  189;   Buttfield  v.  Stranahan  (1904)  192U.S.  470;
     American Steel,  etc., Co.  v. Speed  (1904) 192  U.S.  500;
     Northern Securities Co. v. U.S. (1904) 193 U.S. 197.

(21) Sturges v.  Crowninshield (1819) 4 Wheat. U.S. 122; M'Millan
     v. M'Neill (1819) 4Wheat. U.S. 131; Ogden v. Saunders (1827)
     12 Wheat. U.S. 213; Boylev. Zacharie (1832) 6 Pet. U.S. 348;
     Gassies v.  Ballon (1832) 6 Pet. U.S. 761; Beers v. haughton
     (1835) 9Pet.  U.S. 329;  Suydam v.  Broadmax (1840)  14 Pet.
     U.S. 67;  Cook v.  Moffat (1847) 5 How. U.S. 295; Dred Scott
     v. Sandford  (1856) 19 How. U.S. 393; Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S.
     (1892) 142  U.S. 651;  Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses(1902) 186
     U.S. 181.

     The  power   of  Congress  to  pass  bankrupt  laws  is  not
     exclusive, but  that   power may  be exercised by the States
     except when  it is  actually exercised  by Congress  and the
     State laws conflict with the Federal law. It is not the mere
     existence of  the power to enact such laws, but its exercise
     by Congress,  which is incompatible with the exercise of the
     same power  by the  State. Otherwise  with the power to pass
     uniform Federal laws of naturalization. "The citizens of any
     one state  being entitled  by the  Constitution to enjoy the
     rights of  citizenship  in  every  other  state,  that  fact
     creates an interest in this particular in each other's acts,
     which does  not exist  with regard  to their  bankrupt laws;
     since State  acts of  naturalization would  thus  be  extra-
     territorial in their operation, and have an influence on the
     most vital interest of other States. On these grounds, State
     laws of  naturalization may be brought under one of the four
     heads or  classes of powers precluded to the States, to wit,
     that of  incompatibility." Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 12 Wheat
     U.S. 277.  See also  Pierce v.  New Hampshire  (1847) 5 How.
     U.S. 585;  Dred Scott  v. Sandford  (18560 19 How. U.S. 405;
     Gilman v.  Lockwood (1866)  4 Wall. U.S. 410; Brown v. Smart
     (1892) 145 U.S. 457.

(22) Briscoe v. Kentucky Com. Bank (1837)11 Pet. U.S. 267; Fox v.
     Ohio (1847)5  How. U.S.  410; U.S. v. Marigold (1850) 9 How.
     U.S. 560;  Legal Tender  Cases (1870) 12 Wall. U.S. 545; The
     Miantinomi (1855)  3 Wall.  Jr. (C.C.)  46,17 Fed. Cases No.

     "The Constitution  was intended  to frame  a  government  as
     distinguished from a league or compact, a government supreme
     in some  particulars over States and people. It was designed
     to provide  the same  currency, having a uniform legal value
     in all  the States. It was for this reason the power to coin
     money and  regulate its value was conferred upon the Federal
     Government, while  the same  power as  well as  the power to
     emit bills  of credit  was withdrawn  from the  States.  The
     States can  no  longer  declare  what  shall  be  money,  or
     regulate  its  value.  Whatever  power  there  is  over  the
     currency is  vested in  Congress." Legal Tender Cases (1870)
     12 Wall. U.S. 545.

(23) Pennsylvania v.  Wheeling, etc.,  Bridge Co., (1855) 18 How.
     U.S. 421;  Pensacola Tel.  Co. v.  Western Union  Tel.  Co.,
     (1877) 94  U.S. 1;  Ex p.  Jackson (1877) 96 U.S. 727; In re
     Rapier, (1892) 143 U.S. 110; Horner v. U.S. (1892) 143 U. S.
     207; In  re Debs  (1895) 158 U. S. 564; Illinois Cent. R. R.
     Co. v.  Illinois (1896) 163 U. S. 142; Gladson v. Minnesota,
     (1897) 166 U. S. 427.

     "Post-offices and  post-roads are  established to facilitate
     the transmission  of intelligence.  Both  commerce  and  the
     postal service  are place  with in  the power  of  Congress,
     because, being  national in  their operation, they should be
     under the protecting care of the national government....  As
     they were  entrusted to  the general government for the good
     of the  nation, it  is not  only the right, but the duty, of
     Congress to  see to it that intercourse among the States and
     the transmission  of  intelligence  are  not  obstructed  or
     unnecessarily encumbered  by  State  regulation."  Pensacoal
     Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1877) 96 U.S. 1.

     "The States before the Union was formed could establish post
     offices and  post-roads, and  in doing  so could  bring into
     play the  police power  in the  protection of their citizens
     from the  use of the means so provided for purposes supposed
     to exert  a demoralizing  influence on  the people. When the
     power  to   establish  post   offices  and   post-roads  was
     surrendered to  the Congress it was as a complete power, and
     the grant  carried with  it the  right to  exercise all  the
     powers which made that power effective." In re Rapier (1892)
     143 U.S. 134.

(24) Grant v.  Raymond, (1832) 6 Pet. U.S. 218; Wheaton v. Peters
     (1834) 8 Pet. U.S. 501; Trade-Mark Cases (1879) 100 U.S. 82;
     Burrow-Giles Lith.Co.  v. Sarony (1884) 111 U.S. 53; U.S. v.
     Duell (1899) 172 U.S. 576;

     "No State  can limit,  control, or  even exercise the power.
     Woolen v.  Banker (1877)  2 Flipp. U.S. 33,30 Fed. Cases No.

(25) Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) 2 Dall. U.S. 419; Stuart v. Laird
     (1803) 1Cranch.  U.S. 299;  U.S. v.  Peters (1809)  5 Cranch
     U.S. 115; Cohen v. Virginia (1821) 6 Wheat. U.S. 264; Martin
     v. Hunter  (1816) 1  Wheat. U.S.  304; Osborn  v. U.S.  Bank
     (1824) 9  Wheat. U.S.  738; Benner  v. Porter  (1850) 9 How.
     U.S. 235; U.S. v. Ritchie (1854) 17 How. U.S. 525; Murray v.
     HobokenLand, etc.,  Co. (1855)  18  How.  U.S.  272;  Ex  p.
     Vallandigham (1863)  1 Wall.  U.S.  243;  Pennoyer  v.  Neff
     (1877) 95 U.S. 714; U.S. v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1878) 98 U.S.
     560; Mitchell  v. Clark  (1884) 110 U.S. 633; Ames v. Kansas
     (1884) 111  U.S. 449; In re Loney (1890) 134 U.S. 373; In re
     Green (1890)  134 U.S.  377; McAllister  v. U.S.  (1891) 141
     U.S. 174;  Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) 165 U.S. 275; Hanover
     Nat.Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U.S. 181.

     It is  manifest that  the Constitution  requires  a  supreme
     court to  be established.  But Congress  is also  bound  "to
     create some  inferior courts,  in which  to  vest  all  that
     jurisdiction which,  under the  Constitution, is exclusively
     vested in  the United States, and of which the Supreme Court
     cannot take  original cognizance.  They might  establish one
     ore  more   inferior  courts;  they  might  parcel  out  the
     jurisdiction among  such courts, from time to time, at their
     own pleasure.  But the  whole judicial  power of  the United
     States should  be, at all time, vested either in an original
     or  appellate   form,  in  some  courts  created  under  its
     authority." Per  Story, J.,  in Martin  v. Hunter  (1816)  1
     Wheat. U.S. 331.

(26) U.S.  v.   Palmer  (1818)   3  Wheat   U.S.  610;   U.S.  v.
     Wiltberger(1820) 5  Wheat U.S.  76;  U.S.  v.  Smith  (1820)
     5Wheat U.S.  153; U.S.  v. Furlong (1820) 5 Wheat. U.S. 184;
     U.S. v. Arjona (1887) 120 U.S. 479.

     The power of the United States to punish an act constituting
     an offense  against the  law of  nations does  not prevent a
     State from  providing for  the punishment of the same thing,
     where the  act is  an offense  against the  authority of the
     State as  well as  that of the United States. U.S. v. Arjona
     (1887) 120 U.S. 479.

(27) Brown v. U.S. (1814) 8 Cranch U.S. 110; American Ins. Co. v.
     356 Bales  Cotton (1828)  1 Pet.  U.S. 511; Mrs. Alexander's
     Cotton (1864)  2 Wall  U.S. 404;  Miller v.  U.S. (1870)  11
     Wall. U.S.  268; Tyler  v. Defrees (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 331;
     Stewart v.  Kahn (1870)  11 Wall U.S. 493; hamiltonv. Dillin
     (1874) 21  Wall U.S. 73; Lamar v. Browne (1875) 92 U.S. 187;
     Mayfield v.  Richards (1885) 115 U.S. 137; Chinese Exclusion
     Case (1889)  130 U.S.  581; Church  ofJesus Christ  v.  U.S.
     (1890) 136 U.S. 1; Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S. 142 U.S. 651.

     "The Federal  power has  a right  to declare  and  prosecute
     wars, and,  as a  necessary incident, to raise and transport
     troops through  and over  the territory  of any State of the
     Union. If  this right  is dependent  in any  sense,  however
     limited, upon  the pleasure  of the  State,  the  government
     itself may be overthrown by an obstruction to its exercise."
     Crandall v. Nevada (1807) 6 Wall. U.S. 44.

(28) Crandall v. Nevada (1867) 6 Wall. U.S. 35; Nishimura Ekiu v.
     U.S. (1892) 142 U.S. 651.

     "The legislation  of the  United States  will be obliged, by
     this provision,  once  at  least  in  every  two  years,  to
     deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on
     foot; to  come to  a new  resolution on  this point;  and to
     declare their  sense of  the matter  by a formal vote in the
     face  of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest
     in the  executive department permanent funds for the support
     of an  army, if  they were  even  uncautious  enough  to  be
     willing  to   repose  in   it  so  improper  a  confidence."
     Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. XXVI.

     "Among the  powers assigned  to the  national government, is
     the power  to raise  and support  armies' and  the power `to
     provide for  the government  and regulation  of the land and
     naval forces.'  The execution  of these  powers falls within
     the line  of its duties; and its control over the subject is
     plenary  and   exclusive....     No  interference  with  the
     execution of  this power  of the  national government in the
     formation, organization, and government of its armies by any
     State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing
     the efficiency  of, if  it did  not  utterly  destroy,  this
     branch of the public service." Tarble's Case (1871) 13 Wall.
     U.S. 408.

(29) U.S. v.  Bevans (1818)  3 Wheat.  U.S. 336;  Dynes v. Hoover
     (1857) 20 How. U.S. 85.

     "The authority  to  build  and  equip  vessels  of  war  is,
     doubtless, implied in the power to declare war, but the same
     authority  is  more  directly  conferred  by  the  power  to
     `provide and  maintain a  navy.'" U.S.  v. Burlington, etc.,
     Ferry Co. (1884) 1 Abb.U.S. 28, 27 Fed. Cases No. 16,151.

(30) Houston v.  Moore (1820)  5 Wheat.  U.S. 1;  Martin v.  Mott
     (1827) 12  Wheat. U.S.  19; Luther  v. Borden  (1849) 7 How.
     U.S. 1;  Crandall v.  Nevada (1867)6Wall  U.S. 35;  Texas v.
     White (1868)7  Wall U.S. 700; Presser v. Illinois (1886) 116
     U.S. 252.

     "So long  as the  militia  are  acting  under  the  military
     jurisdiction of  the State  to which they belong, the powers
     of legislation  over them  are concurrent in the general and
     State  government.   Congress  has   power  to  provide  for
     organizing, arming,  and disciplining  them; and  this power
     being unlimited, except in the two particulars of officering
     and  training  them,  according  to  the  discipline  to  be
     prescribed by  Congress, it  may be  exercised to any extent
     that may  be deemed  necessary by  Congress.  But  as  State
     militia, the  power of the State governments to legislate on
     the same  subjects, having existed prior to the formation of
     the Constitution,  and not  having been  prohibited by  that
     instrument,  it   remains  with   the  States,   subordinate
     nevertheless to the paramount law of the general government,
     operating upon  the same subject." Houston v. Moore (1820) 5
     Wheat. U.S. 16.

(31) Hepburn v.  Ellzey (1804) 2 Cranch U.S. 445; Loughborough v.
     Blake (1820)   5 Wheat. U.S. 317; Cohen v. Virginia (1821) 6
     Wheat.  U.S.   264;  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  356  Bales  of
     Cotton(1828) 1 Pet. U.S. 511; Kendall v. U.S. (1838) 12 Pet.
     U.S. 524;  U.S. v.  Dewitt (1869) 9 Wall. U.S. 41; Dunphy v.
     Kleinsmith (1870)  11 Wall.  U.S. 610;  Willard v.  Presbury
     (1871) 14  Wall U.S.  676; Kohl  v. U.S. (1875) 91 U.S. 367;
     Phillips v.  Payne (1875) 92 U.S. 130; U.S. v. Fox (1876) 94
     U.S. 315;  Ft. Leavenworth  R. Co.  v. Lowe  (1885) 114 U.S.
     525; Gibbons  v. District  of Columbia  (1886) 116 U.S. 404;
     Van Brocklin  v. Tennessee (1886) 117 U.S. 151; Stoutenburgh
     v. Hennick  (1889) 129U.S.  141; Geofroy  v. Riggs(1890) 133
     U.S. 258;  Benson v.  U.S. (1892) 146 U.S. 325; Shoemaker v.
     U.S. (1893)  147 U.S.  282; Chappell v. U.S. (1896) 160 U.S.
     499; Ohio  v. Thomas  (1899) 173  U.S. 276; wightv. Davidson
     (1901) 181 U.S. 371.

     "When the  title is  acquired by  purchase by consent of the
     legislatures of  the States,  the  Federal  jurisdiction  is
     exclusive of  all State  authority. This  follows  from  the
     declaration of  the Constitution  that Congress  shall  have
     `like authority'  over  such  places  as  it  has  over  the
     district which is the seat of government; that is, the power
     of `exclusive  legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader
     or clearer  language could  not be used to exclude all other
     authority than  that of Congress." Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v.
     Lowe (1885) 114 U.S. 532.

(32) U.S. v. Hamilton, (1795) 3 Dall. U.S. 17; Hepburn v. Eltzey,
     (1804) 2  Cranch U.S.  446; Ex  p. Bollman,  (1807) 4 Cranch
     U.S. 76;  Ex p.  Kearney, (1822)  7 Wheat.  U.S. 38;  Ex  p.
     Watkins, (1830)  3 Pet.  U.S. 193;  Ex p. Milburn, (1636)  9
     Pet. U.S.  704; Holmes v. Jennison, (1840) 14 Pet. U.S. 640;
     Ex p.  Dorr (1845) 3 How. U.S. 103; Luther v. Borden, (1849)
     7 How. U.S. 1; Ableman v. Booth, (1858) 21 How. U.S. 506; Ex
     p. Vallandigham,  (1863) 1  Wall. U.S. 243;  Ex p. Milligan,
     (1868) 4  Wall. U.S.  2; Ex p. McCardle, (1868) 7 Wall. U.S.
     508; Ex  p. Yerger,  (1868) 8  Wall. U.S. 85; Tarble's Case,
     (1871) 13  Wall. U.S. 307; Ex p. Lange, (1873) 18 Wall. U.S.
     163; Ex  p. Parks,  (1876) 93  U.S. 18;  Ex p.  Karstendick,
     (1876) 93 U. S. 396; Ex p. Virginia, (1879) 100 U.S. 339; In
     re Neagle  (1890) 135  U. S.  1; in  re Frederich (1893) 149
     U.S. 70.

     "The Constitution  also declares  that the  privilege of the
     writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
     cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
     it. No  express power  is given  to Congress  to secure this
     invaluable right  in the non-enumerated cases, or to suspend
     the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion. And yet it would
     be difficult  to say,  since this  great writ  of liberty is
     usually  provided   for  by   the  ordinary   functions   of
     legislation, and  can be  effectually provided  for only  in
     this way,  that it  ought not  to  be  deemed  by  necessary
     implication within  the scope  of the  legislative power  of
     Congress." Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) 16Pet. U.S. 619.

(33) Fletcher v.  Peck (1810) 6 Cranch U.S. 87; Ogden v. Saunders
     (1827) 12  Wheat.U.S. 213;  Watson v.  Mercer (1834)  9 Pet.
     U.S. 88;  Carpenter v. Pennsylvania (1854) 17 How. U.S. 456;
     Locke v.  New Orleans  (1866) 4  Wall U.S.  172; Cummings v.
     Missouri (1866)  4 Wall.  U.S. 277;  Ex p.  Garland (1866) 4
     Wall. (C.S.) 333; Drehman v. Tittle (1869) 8 Wall. U.S. 595;
     Klinger v.  Missouri (1871)  13 Wall.  U.S. 257;  Pierce  v.
     Carskadon (1872)  16 Wall.U.S.  234; Hopt v. Utah (1884) 110
     U.S. 574;  Cook v. U.S. (1891) 138 U.S. 157; Neely v. Henkel
     (1901) 180 U.S. 109; Southwestern coal Co. v. McBride (1902)
     185 U.S. 499.

(34) License Tax  Cases (1866) 5 Wall. U.S. 462; Springer v. U.S.
     (1881) 102 U.S. 586; Nicol v. Ames (1899) 173 U.S. 509.

     "If Congress  sees fit  to impose  a  capitation,  or  other
     direct tax,  it must be laid in proportion to the census; if
     Congress determines to impose duties, imposts, and excesses,
     they must be uniform throughout the United States. These are
     not  strictly   limitations  of   power.  They   are   rules
     prescribing the mode in which it shall be exercised." Veazie
     Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. U.S. 541.

(35) Cooley v.  Board of Wardens (1851) 12 How. U.S. 299; Pace v.
     Burgess (1875)  92 U.S.  372; Turpin  v. Burgess  (1886) 117
     U.S. 504; Pittsburg, Etc., Coal Co. v. Bates (1895) 156 U.S.
     577; Nicol  v. Ames  (1899) 173  U.S. 509; Williams v. Fears
     (1900) 179   U.S.  270; De  Lima v.  Bidwell (1901) 182 U.S.
     151; Fourteen  Diamond Rings  v. U.S.  (1901) 183  U.S. 176;
     Cornell v. Coyne (1904) 192 U.S. 418.

     "The purpose   of  the restriction  is that exportation, all
     exportation, shall  be free  from national burden." Fairbank
     v.  U.S. (1901) 181 U.S. 292.

(36) Cooley v.  Board of  Wardens  (1851)  12  How.    U.S.  299;
     Pennsylvania v.  Wheeling,Etc., Bridge  Co. (1855)  18  How.
     U.S. 421;  Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U.S. 113; Northwestern
     Union  Packet   Co.  v.  St.  Louis  (1879)  100  U.S.  423;
     Cincinnati, etc.,  Packet Co.  v.  Catlettsburg  (1881)  105
     U.S. 559;  Spraigue v. Thompson (1886) 118 U.S. 90; Morgan's
     Steamship co.  v. Louisiana  Board of Health (1886) 118 U.S.
     455; Johnson  v. Chicago, etc., Elevator Co. (1886) 119 U.S.

     This clause  "is a  limitation upon the power of Congress to
     regulate commerce,  for  the  purpose  of  producing  entire
     commercial equality  within the  United States,  and also  a
     prohibition upon  the State  to destroy such equality by any
     legislation prescribing a condition upon which vessels bound
     from one  State shall enter the ports of another State." Per
     Mr. Justice  Wayne, in  Norris v.  Boston (1849) 7 How. U.S.
     414. See  also Pennsylvania  v. Wheeling,  etc., Bridge  Co.
     (1855) 18  How. U.S.  433; Williams  v. The Lizzie Henderson
     (1880) 20 Fed. Cases No. 17,726a.

     "This provision  operates only as a limitation of the powers
     of Congress,  and in  no respect  affects the  States in the
     regulation of  their domestic  affairs."  Munn  v.  Illinois
     (1876) 94 U.S. 135.

(37) "A State is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or
     confederation. If  these compacts  are with foreign nations,
     they  interfere   with  the  treaty-making  power  which  is
     conferred entirely  on the  general government; if with each
     other, for  political purposes,  they can  scarcely fail  to
     interfere with   the  general  purpose  and  intent  of  the
     Constitution. To grant letters of marque and reprisal, would
     lead directly  to war;  the  power  of  declaring  which  is
     expressly  given   to  Congress."   Per  Mr.  Chief  Justice
     Marshall, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833) 7 Pet.  U.S. 249.

(38) Decisions relating  to making  anything but  gold and silver
     coin a  tender in payment of debts. Craig v. Missouri (1830)
     4 Pet.   U.S.  410;Byrne v. Missourti (1834) 8 Pet. U.S. 40;
     Briscoe v.  Kentucky Com.  Bank (1837)  11  Pet.  U.S.  257;
     Darrington v. Branch Bank (1851) 13 How. U.S. 12.

     Decisions relating  to ex  post facto  law. Calder  v.  Bull
     (1798) 3 Dall. U.S. 386; Watson v. Mercer (1834) 8 Pet. U.S.
     88; Carpenter  v. Pennsylvania,  (1854) 17  How.  U.S.  466;
     Locke v. New Orleans, (1866) 4 Wall. U.S. 172; Ex p. Garland
     (1866) 4  Wall U.S.  333; Gut  v. Minnesota,  (1869) 9 Wall.
     U.S. 35;  Kring v.  Missouri, (1882) 107 U.S. 221; Jaehne v.
     New York (1888) 128 U.S. 189; Medley, Petitioner, (1890) 134
     U.S. 160; Holden v. Minnesota (1890) 137 U.S. 483; Hawker v.
     New York  (1898) 170  U.S. 189; Thompson v. Missouri, (1898)
     171 U.S.  380; McDonald  v. Massachusetts,  (1901) 180  U.S.
     311; Mallett v. North Carolina (1901) 181 U.S. 589; Reetz v.
     Michigan, (1903) 188 U. S. 505.

     Decisions relating  to  laws  impairing  the  obligation  of
     contracts. Fletcher  v. Peck,  (1810) 6  Cranch U.S. 87; New
     Jersey v.  Wilson, (1812)  7 Cranch  U.S.  164;  Sturges  v.
     Crowninshield.  (1819)   4  Wheat.  U.S.  122;  M'Millan  v.
     M'Neill, (1819)  4 Wheat.  U.S. 209;  Dartmouth  College  v.
     Woodward, (1819)  4 Wheat. U.S. 518; Owings v. Speed, (1820)
     5 Wheat.  U.S. 420;  Farment etc.,  Bank v.  Smith, (1821) 6
     Wheat. U.S.  131; Green  v. Biddle.  (1823) 8 Wheat. U.S. 1,
     Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 12 Wheat. U.S. 213; Mason v. Raile,
     (1827) 12 Wheat. U.S. 370; Sauterlee v. Matthewson. (1829) 2
     Pet. U.S.  380; Jackson  v. Lamphire (1830) 3 Pet. U.S. 280;
     Providence Bank v. Billings (183O) 4 Pet. U.S. 514; Mumma v.
     Potomac Co.,  (1834) 8  Pet. U.S.  281; Beers  v.  Houghton.
     (1835) 9  Pet. U.S.  329; Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren
     Bridge, (1837)  11 Pet.  U.S. 420;  Armstrong v.  Treasurer,
     (1842) 16  Pet. U.S.  281; Bronson  v. Kinzie. (1843) 1 How.
     U.S. 311;  McCracken v.  Hayward (1844)  2  How.  U.S.  608;
     Gordon v.  Appeal Tax  Ct., (1845) 3 How. U.S. 133; Maryland
     v. Baltimore,  etc., R. Co., (1845) 3 How. U.S. 534; Neil v.
     Ohio, (1845)  3 How. U.S. 720; Cook v. Moffat, (1847) 5 How.
     U.S. 295;  Planters' Bank  v. Sharp  (1848) 6 How. U.S. 301;
     West River  Bridge Co.  v.  Dix  (1848)  6  How.  U.S.  507;
     Crawford v. Branch Bank, (1849) 7 How. U.S. 279; Woodruff v.
     Trapnall, (1850)  10 How.  U.S. 190;  Paup v. Drew (1850) 10
     How. U.S.  218; Baltimore. etc., R. Co. v. Nesbit, (1650) 10
     How. U.S.  395; Butler  v. Pennsylvania, (1850) 10 How. U.S.
     402; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co., (1851) 13 How.
     U.S. 71;  Vincennes University  v. Indiana,  (1852) 14  How.
     U.S. 268;  Curran v. Arkanue. (1853) 15 How. U.S. 304; Piqua
     Branch of  State Bank  v. Knoop,  (1853) 16  How. U.S.  369;
     Dodge  v.  Woolsey,  (1855)  18  How.  U.S.  331;  Beers  v.
     Arkansas, (1857)  20 How.  U.S. 527;  Aspinwall  v.  Daviess
     County,  (1859)   22  How.   U.S.  364;   Christ  Church  v.
     Philadelphia County,  (1860) 24  How. U.S.  300;  Howard  v.
     Bugbee (1860)  24 How.  U.S. 461;  Jefferson Branch  Bank v.
     Skelly, (1861)  1 Black  U.S. 436;  Franklin Branch  Bank v.
     Ohio. (1861)  1 Black  U.S. 474;  Wabash, etc., Canal Co. v.
     Beers, (1862)  2 Black U.S. 448; Gilman v. Sheboygan, (1862)
     2 Black  U.S. 510;  Passaic River,  etc.. Bridge  v. Hoboken
     Land etc.  Co., (1863) 1 Wall. U.S. 116; Hawthorne v. Calef,
     (1864) 2  Wall. U.S.  10; Binghampton Bridge, (1865) 3 Wall.
     U.S. 51;  Washington, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, (1865)
     3 Wall.  U.S. 210;  Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Rock, (1866) 4
     Wall. U.S.  177; Cummings  v. Missouri,  (1866) 4 Wall. U.S.
     177; Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  (1866)  4  Wall.  U.S.  536;
     Mulligan v.  Corbins, (1868)  7 Wall.  U.S. 487;  Furman  v.
     Nichol, (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 44; Home of Friendless v. Rouse,
     (1869) 8  Wall. U.S.  430; Washingion  University v.  Rouse.
     (1869) 8  Wall. U.S.  439; Butz  v. Muscatine (1869) 6 Wall.
     U.S. 675;  Drehman v.  Stille,  (1869)  8  Wall.  U.S.  605;
     Hepburn v. Griswold, (1869) 8 Wall. U.S. 603; Ohio, etc., R.
     Co. v.  McClure, (1870)  10 Wall.  U.S.  511;  Legal  Tender
     Cases, (1870)  12 Wall.  U.S. 457; Curtis v. Whitney, (1871)
     13 Wall.  U.S. 68;  Penniiylvania College  Cases  (1871)  13
     Wall. U.S.  190; Wilmington  etc., R.  Co. v. Reid (1871) 13
     Wall. U.S.  264, East Saginaw Salt Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw,
     (1871) 13  Wall. U.S.  373; Whits  v. Hart,  (1871) 13 Wall.
     U.S. 646;  Osborn v.  Nicholson, (1871)  13 Wall.  U.S. 854;
     Norwich, etc.,  R. Co. v. Johnson. (1872) 15 Wall. U.S. 195;
     State Tax  on Foreign-held  Bunds; (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 300;
     Tomlinson v.  Jessup, (1872) 15 Wall. U.S. 464; Tomlinson v.
     Branch. (1872)  15 Wall. U.S. 460; Miller v. New York (1872)
     15 Wall.  U.S. 478;  Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman (1872)
     16 Wall.  U.S. 500;  Gunn v. Barry (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 610;
     Humphrey v.  Pegues (1872)  16 Wall.  U.S.  244;  Walker  v.
     Whitehead, (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 314; Sohn v. Waterson (1873)
     17 Wall.  U.S. 596;  Barings v. Dabney. (1873) 19 Wall. U.S.
     1; Head  v. Missouri  University (1873)  19 Wall.  U.S. 526;
     Pacific R.  Co. v. Maguire (1873) 20 Wall. U.S. 36; Garrison
     v. New  York, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S. 196; Ochiltree v. Iowa R.
     Contracting Co.,  (1874) 21  Wall. (U.  S.) 249; Wilmington,
     etc., R.  Co. v.  King. (1875) 91 U.S. 3; Moultire County v.
     Rockingham Ten-Cent  Sav.-Bank (1875) 92 U.S. 631; Home Ins.
     Co. v.  Augusta (1876) 93 U.S. 118; West Wisconsin R. Co. v.
     Trempealeau County,  (1876) 93  U.S. 596; New Jersey v. Yard
     (1877) 95  U.S. 104;  Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Hecht (1877) 95
     U.S. 168;  Terry v.  Anderson (1877) 95 U.S. 628; Farrington
     v. Tennessee  (1877) 95  U.S. 679; Blount v. Windley, (1877)
     95 U.S.  173; Murray  v. Charleston,  (1877)  96  U.S.  432;
     Edwards v.  Kearzey. (1877)  96 U.S. 595; Tennessee v. Sneed
     (1877) 96  U.S. 69;  Williams v.  Bruffy (1877) 96 U.S. 176;
     Richmond, etc.,  R Co. v.Richmond (1877) 96 U.S. 521; Boston
     Beer Co.  v. Massachusetts  (1877) 97  U.S. 25; Northwestern
     Fertilizer Co.  v. Hyde  Park (1878)  97 U.S.  659; Memphis,
     etc., R.  Co. v. Gaines. (1878) 97 U.S. 697; U.S. v. Memphis
     (1877) 97  U.S. 284;  Keith v.  Clark (1878)  107 U.S.  454;
     Atlantic, etc.,  R. Co.  v. Georgia,  (1878)  98  U.S.  359;
     Northwestern University  v.  People,  (1878)  99  U.S.  309;
     Newton v.  Mahoning County,  (1879) 100  U.S. 548;  Memphis,
     etc., R.  Co. v.  Tennessee (1879)  101 U.S.  337; Wright v.
     Nagle, (1879)  101 U.S. 791; Stone v. Mississippi (1879) 101
     U.S.814; South,  etc., Alabama R. Co. v. Alabama, (1879) 101
     U.S. 832; Louisiana v. New Orleans (1880) 102 U.S. 203; Hall
     v. Wisconsin  (1880) 103 U.S. 5; Penniman's Case. (1880) 103
     U.S.  714;  Wolff  v.  New  Orleans  (1860)  103  U.S.  358;
     Koshkonong v.  Burton, (1882) 104 U.S. 668; New Haven, etc.,
     R. Co.  v. Hamersley  (1881) 104  U.S.  1;  Clay  County  v.
     Savings Soc.  (1882) 104  U.S. 579; New York Guaranty, etc.,
     Co. v.  Board of Liquidation, (1881) 105 U.S. 622; Greenwood
     v. Union  Freight R.  Co. (1881)  103 U.S.  13;  St.  Anna's
     Asylum v.  New Orleans,  (1881) 105  U.S. 362;  Louisiana v.
     Pilsbury (1881)  105 U.S.  278; New Orleans v. Morris (1881)
     105 U.S.  278; Close  v. Glenwood  Cemetery, (1882) 107 U.S.
     466; Antoni  v. Greenhow,  (1882) 107  U.S.  769;  Vance  v.
     Vance, (1883)  108 U.S. 514; Memphis Gas Light Co. v. Shelby
     County Taxing  Dist., (Itib3)  109 U.S. 398; Canada Southern
     R. Co.  v. Gebhard  (1883) 109  U.S. 527;  Louisiana v.  New
     Orleans, (1883)  109 U.S. 285; Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co.,
     (1883) 109 U.S. 401; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler,
     (1884) 110  U.S. 347; Butchers' Uulon Slaughter-House, etc.,
     Co. v.  Crescent City  Live Stock  Landing, etc, Co., (1884)
     111 U.S.  746; Nelson  v. Police  Jury. (1884) 111 U.S. 716;
     Marye  v.  Parsons,  (1884)  114  U.S.  325;  Poindexter  v.
     Greenhow, (1884)  114 U.S.  270; Amy v. Shelby County Taxing
     Dist., (1885)  114 U.S.  387; Allen  v. Baltimore,  etc., R.
     Co., (1884)  114 U.S.  311; Effinger  v. Kenney,  (1885) 115
     U.S. 566;  New Orleans Gas Co. v. Lousiana Light Co., (1885)
     115 U.S. 650; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Co., (1885)
     115 U.S.  693. New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, (1885)
     115 U.S. 674; Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, (1885) 166 U.S.
     131; Mobile  v. Watson  (1886) 116  U.S. 289; New Orleans v.
     Houston, (1896) 119 U.S. 265, St. Tammany Water-Works v. New
     Orleans Water-Works,  (1887) 120  U.S. 64;  Church v. Kelsey
     (1887) 121  U.S. 282; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, (1897) 121
     U.S. 388; Seibert v. Lewis, (1887) 122 U.S. 284; New Orleans
     Water-Works Co.  v. Louisiana  Sugar Refining Co. (1888) 125
     U.S. 18;  Maynard v.  Hill, (1888)  125 U.S.  190; Denny  v.
     Bennett (1888) 128 U.S. 489; Williamson v. New Jersey (1889)
     130 U.S.  189; Freeland  v. Williams,  (1889) 131  U.S. 405;
     Campbell v. Wade. (1889) 132 U.S. 34; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
     Miller, (1889)  132 U.S. 75; Pennie v. Reis, (1889) 132 U.S.
     464; Hans v. Louisiana, (1890) 134 U.S. 1; Crenshaw v. U.S.,
     (1890) 134  U.S. 99;  Chicago, etc.,  R. Co.  v.  Minnesota,
     (1890)  134   U.S.  418;   Minneapolis  Eastern  R.  Co.  v.
     Minnesota, (1890) 134 U.S. 467; Hill v. Merchants' Mut. Ins.
     Co., (1890)  134 U.S.  515; McGahey  v. Virginia. (1890) 135
     U.S. 662;  U.S. v.  North  Carolina  (189O)  136  U.S.  211;
     Wheeler v.  Jackson, (1890)  137 U.S. 245; Sioux City St. R.
     Co. v.  Sioux City,  (1891) 138  U.S.  98;  Wheeling,  etc.,
     Bridge Co.  v. Wheeling  bridge Co.,  (1891) 138  U.S.  287;
     Pennoyer v.  McConnaughy (1891)  140 U.S. 1; Scotland County
     Ct. v. U. S., (Idol) 140 U.S. 41; Essex Public Road Board v.
     Skinkle, (1891)  140 U.S.  334;  Stein  v.  Bienville  Water
     Supply Co.,  (1891) 141  U.S. 67; New Orleans v. New Orleans
     Water Works Co., (1891) 142 U.S. 79; New Orleans City, etc.,
     R. Co.  v. New Orleans (1892) 143 U.S. 199; Louisville Water
     Co. v.  Clark (1892)  143 U.S. 1; New York v. Squire, (1892)
     145 U.S.  175; Baker v. Kilgore, (1892) 145 U.S. 487; Morley
     v. Lake  Shore R.  Co. (1892)  146 U.S.  102;  Hamilton  Gas
     Light,  etc.   Co.  v.   Hamilton,  (1892)   146  U.S.  258;
     Wilmington, etc..  R. Co.  v. Alsbrook, (18021 146 U.S. 279;
     Illinois Central  R. Co.  v. Illinois  (1892) 146  U.S. 387;
     Bier v. McGehee, (1893) 148 U.S. 137; People v. Cook, (1893)
     148 U.S.  397; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bristol, (1894) 151
     U.S. 656;  Bryan v.  Board of Education (1894) 151 U.S. 639;
     Duncan v.  Missouri (1894)  152, U.S.  377; New  Orleans  v.
     Benjuiuln, (1894)  153 U.S.  411; Eagle  Ins. Co.  v.  Ohio,
     (1804) 163  U.S. 440; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania
     (1894) 153  U.S. 828;  Mobile, etc.,  R. Co.  v.  Tennessee,
     (1894) 153  U.S. 486;  U.S. v.  Thoman, (1895) 156 U.S. 353;
     St. Louis,  etc., R.  Co. v.  Gill, (1895) 156 U.S. 649; New
     Orleans City, etc., R. Co. v. Louisiana (1895) 157 U.S. 210;
     Bank of  Commerce v. Tenneessee (1895) 161 U.S. 134; Baltzer
     v. North  Carolina (1896)  161 U.S.  240; Pearsall  v. Great
     Northern R.  Co., (1896)  161 U.S. 646; Louisville, etc., R.
     Co.  v.   Kentucky,  (1896)   101  U.S.   677;  Woodruff  v.
     Mississippi, (1896)  162 U.S.  201; Gibson  v.  Missiissippi
     (1896) 162  U.S. 605;  Barnitz v.  Beverly, (1896)  163 U.S.
     119; Hanford  v. Davies,  (1896) 163  U.S.  273;  Covington,
     etc., Turnpike  Road Co.  v. Sandford,  (1896) 164 U.S. 578;
     St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, (1897) 165 U.S. 1; Grand
     Lodge, etc. v. New Orleans (1897) 166 U.S. 143; Baltimore v.
     Baltimore Trust, etc., Co., (1897) 168 U.S. 673; City R. Co.
     v. Citizens  St. R.  Co., (1897) 166 U.S. 657; Wabash R. Co.
     v. Defiance,  (1897) 167  U.S. 88;  Shapleigh v. San Angelo,
     (1897) 167  U.S. 646;  St. Anthony  Falls Water Power Co. v.
     St. Paul  Water Com'rs  (1897)  168  U.S.  340;  Douglas  v.
     Kentucky, (1897)  168 U.S.  488; Galveston,  etc., R. Co. v.
     Texas (1898)  170 U.S.  226; Houston,  etc., R. Co. v. Texas
     (1898) 170  U.S. 243;  Williams v. Eggleston (1898) 170 U.S.
     304; Chicago,  etc., R. Co. v. Nebraska, (1898) 170 U.S. 57;
     Missouri v.  Murphy (1898) 170 U.S. 78; Louisville Water Co.
     v. Kentucky, (1898) 170 U.S. 127; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla
     Water Co,  (1898) 172  U.S. 1; McCullough v. Virginia (1898)
     172 U.S. 102; Connecticut Mut L. Co. v. Spratley, (1899) 172
     U.S. 602;  Citizens Savs  Bank v.  OwensLoro (1899) 173 U.S.
     636; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, (1899) 173 U.S. 684;
     Covington v. Kentucky, (1899) 173 U.S. 231; Henderson Bridge
     Co. v.  Henderson (1899)  173 U.S.  592; Walsh  v. Columbus,
     etc., R.  Co., (1900) 176 U.S. 469; Adirondack R. Co. v. New
     York, (1900)  176 U.S.  335; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens
     (1900) 178  U.S. 389; Looker v. Maynard, (1900) 179 U.S. 46;
     Stearns v. Minnesota. (1900) 179 U.S. 223; lllinois Cent. R.
     Co. v.  Adams, (1901) 180 U.S. 28; St. Paul Gas Light Co. v.
     St. Paul, (1901) 181 U.S. 142; Red River Valley Nat. Bank v.
     Craig, (1901)  181 U.S.  548; Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. etc.,
     Assoc. (1901)  161 U.S. 227; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,
     (1901) 183  U.S. 13;  Orr v.  Gilman, (1902)  183 U.S.  278;
     Wilson v.  Iseminger, (1902)  185 U.S.  55; Vicksburg Water-
     Works Co.  v. Vicksburg,  (1902) 185  U.S. 65;  Hanover Nat.
     Bank v. Moyses (1902) 188 U.S. 181; Northern Cent. R. Co. v.
     Maryland, (1902)  187 U.S.  256; Oshkosh  Waterworks Co.  v.
     Oshkosh (1903)  187 U.S.  437; Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue
     Co. (1903) 187 U.S. 611; Weber v. Rogan, (1903) 188 U.S. 10;
     Blackstone v.  Miller, (1903)  188  U.S.  189;  Waggoner  v.
     Flack,  (1903)   188  U.S.   595;  Owensboro   v.  Owensboro
     Waterworks Co., (1903) 191 U.S. 358; Wisconsin, etc., R. Co.
     v. Powers,  (1903) 191  U.S. 319; Deposit Bank v. Frankfort,
     (1903) 191  U.S. 499;  Citizens' Bank  v. Parker, (1904) 192
     U.S. 73;  Stanislaus County  v. San  Joaquin,  etc.,  Canal,
     etc., Co., (1904) 192 U.S. 201.

(39) McCulloch v.  Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. U.S. 316; Gibbons v.
     Ogden (1824)  9 Wheat.  U.S. 1; Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12
     Wheat. U.S.  419; Mager  v. Grima  (1850) 8  How. U. S. 490;
     Cooley v. Board of Wardens, (1851) 12 How. U.S. 209; Almy v.
     California. (1860)  24 How.  U.S.  169;  License  Tax  Cases
     (1866) 5  Wall. U.S. 462; Crandall v. Nevada. (1867) 6 Wall.
     U.S. 35; Waring v. Mobile, (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 110, Woodruff
     v. Parham,  (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 123; Hinson v. Lott (1868) 8
     Wall. U.S.  148; State Tonnage Tax Cases (1870) 12 Wall.U.S.
     204; State  Tax on  Railway Gross  Receipts (1872)  15 Wall.
     U.S. 284;  Inman Steamship  Co. v. Tinker (1876) 94 U.S. 238
     Cook v.  Pennsylvania (1878)  97 U.S.  566; Keokuk  Northern
     Line Packet  Co. v.  Keokuk, (1877)  95 U.S.  80; People  v.
     Compagnie Generale  Transatlantique,  (1882)  107  U.S.  69;
     Turner v.  Maryland, (1882)  107 U.S.  38; Brown v. Houston,
     (1885) 114  U.S. 622;  Coe. v.  Errol (1886)  116 U.S.  517;
     Turpin v.  Burgess, (1886)  117 U.S.  504; Pittsburg,  etc.,
     Coal Co. v. Bates (1895) 156 U.S. 677; Pittsburg, etc., Coal
     Co. v.  Louisiana, (1895)  156 U.S.  500; Scott  v.  Donald,
     (1897) 165  U.S. 58;  Patapsco Guano  Co. v.  North Carolina
     Board of  Agriculture, (1898)  171  U.S.  345;  May  v.  New
     Orleans (1900) 178 U.S. 406; Dooley v. U.S., (1901) 193 U.S.
     161; Cornell  v. Coyne,  (1904) 192 U.S. 418; American Steel
     etc., Co. v. Speed, (1904) 192 U.S. 600.

     "Prior to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  the  States
     attempted to  regulate commerce, and they also levied duties
     on imports and exports and duties of tonnage, and it was the
     embarrassments  growing   out  of   such   regulations   and
     conflicting obligations  which mainly led to the abandonment
     of the confederation and to the more perfect union under the
     present Constitution."  State Tonnage  Tax Cases  (1870)  12
     Wall. U.S.  214. See also Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat.
     U.S. 439.

(40) Green v.  Biddle, (1823)  8 Wheat.  U.S. 1; Poole v. Fleeger
     (1837) 11  Pet. U.S.  185; Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851)
     12 How. U.S. 299; Peete v. Morgan, (1873) 19 Wall. U.S. 591;
     Cannon v.  New Orleans,  (1874) 20  Wall.  U.S.  577;  lnman
     Steamship Co. v. Tinker, (1876) 94 U.S. 238; Wheeling. etc.,
     Transp. Co.  v. Wheeling.  (1878) 99  U.S. 273; Northwestern
     Union Packet  Co. v.  St. Louis  (1870) 100 U.S. 423; Keokuk
     Northern Line  Packet Co.  v. Keokuk,  (1877)  95  U.S.  80;
     Vicksburg v.  Tobin, (1870)  100 U.S. 410; Cincinnati, etc.,
     Packet Co.  v. Catlettsburg  (1881) 105  U.S.  659;  Wiggins
     Ferry  Co.   v.  East   St.  Louis   (1882)  107  U.S.  365;
     Parkersburg. etc.,  Transp. Co.  v. Parkersburg.  (1882) 107
     U.S. 691;  Presser v.  Illinois, (1886)  110 U.S.  252; U.S.
     465; Huse  v.. Glover.  (1886) 119 U.S. 543; Quachita Packet
     Co. v.  Aiken. (1887)  121 U.S.  444; Indiana  v.  Kentucky.
     (1890) 130  U.S. 479; Virginia v. Tennessee (1893) 148 U. S.
     503; Wharton v. Wise (1894) 153 U.S. 155; St. Louis etc., R.
     Co. v. James (1896) 161 U.S. 545.

     "Looking at  the clause  [in the  Federal  Constitution]  in
     which the  terms `compact'  or  `agreement'  appear,  it  is
     evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of
     any combination  tending to  the increase of political power
     in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
     just supremacy  of the United States." Virginia v. Tennessee
     (1893) 148 U.S. 519.

(41) Field v.  Clark (1892)  143 U.S.  649; Chisholm  v.  Georgia
     (1793) 2  Dall. U.S.  419; Leitensdorfer  v. Webb  (1857) 20
     How. U.S.  176; Ex  p. Siebold,  (1879) 100  U.S. 371; In re
     Green, (1890) 134 U.S. 377; McPherson v. Blacker, (1892) 146
     U.S. 1.

     "Congress is empowered to determine the time of choosing the
     electors and  the day on which they are to give their votes,
     which is  required to  be the same day throughout the United
     States, but  otherwise the  power and  jurisdiction  of  the
     State is exclusive, with the exception of the  provisions as
     to the  number of  electors and the ineligibility of certain
     persons, so  framed that congressional and federal influence
     might be  excluded." McPherson  v. Blacker,, (1892) 146 U.S.

(42) Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, (1830) 3 Pet. U.S. 99.

(43) Hayburns Case  (1792) 2  Dall. U.S. 410; Chisholm v. Georgia
     (1793) 12 Dall. U.S. 410; Glass v. The Sloop Betsey (1794) 3
     Dall. U.S.  6; U.S. v. La Vengeance (1796) 3 Dall. U.S. 297;
     Hollingsworth v.  Virginia. (1798) 3 Dall. U.S. 379; Moisman
     v. Higginson,  (1800) 4  Dall. U.S.  12; Marbury v. Madison,
     (1803) 1 Cranch U.S. 137; Hepburn v. Ellzey, (1894) 2 Cranch
     U.S.  445;   U.S.  v.   More,  (1806)  3  Cranch  U.S.  159;
     Strawbridge v.  Curtis (1806)  3  Cranch  U.S.  267;  Ex  p.
     Bollman (1807)  4 Cranch  U.S. 75;  Rose v. Himely, (1808) 4
     Cranch U.S. 241; Chappedelaine w. Dechenaux, (1806) 4 Cranch
     U.S. 306;  Hope Ins.  Co. v.  Boardman, (1800) 5 Cranch U.S.
     57; U.S.  Bank v.  Deveaux, (1809) 5 Cranch U.S. 61; Hodgson
     v. Bowerbank,  (1809) 5  Cranch U.S. 303; Owings v. Norwood,
     (1809) 5  Cranch U.S.  344; Dorousseau  w.  U.S.p  (1810)  6
     Cranch U.S.  307; U.S.  v. Hudson,  (1812) 7 Cranch U.S. 32;
     Martin v. Hunter, (1816) 1 Wheat. U.S. 304; Colson v. Lewis,
     (1817) 2  Wheat. U.S.  377; U.S.  v. Bevans, (1818) 3 Wheat.
     U.S. 336; Cohen v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. U.S. 264; Ex p.
     v. Kear-  ney, (1822)  7 Wheat.  U.S. 38;  Matthews v. Zane,
     (1822) 7  Wheat. U.S.  164, Osnorn  v. U.S.  Bank, (1824)  9
     Wheat. U.S.  738; U.S.  v. Ortega (1826) 11 Wheat. U.S. 467;
     American Ins.  Co. v.  358 Bales  Cotton, (1828) 1 Pet. U.S.
     511; Jackson  v. Twentyman, (1820) 2 Pet. U.S. 136; Cherokee
     Nation v.  Georgia, (1831)  5 Pet. U.S. 1; New Jersey v. New
     York, (1831)  5 Pet.  U.S. 284;  Davis v.  Packard, (1832) 6
     Pet. U.S.  41, (1833)  7 Pet.  U.S. 270;  U.S. v. Arredondo,
     (1832) 6  Pet. (U.iS.)  601; Breedlove  v. Nicolet, (1833) 7
     Pet. U.S. 413; Brown v. Keene. (1834) 8 Pet. U.S. 112; Davis
     v. Packard  (1834) 8  Pet. U.S. 312; New Orleans v. De Armas
     (1835) 9.  Pet. U.S.  224;  Rhode  lsland  v.  Massachusetts
     (1838) 12  Pet. U.S.  657; Augusta  Bank v. Earle, (1830) 13
     Pet. U.S.  510; Commercial, etc., Bank v. Slocomb, (1840) 14
     Pet. U.S.  60; Suydam  v. Broadnax  (1840) 14  Pet. U.S. 07;
     Prigg v.  Pennsylvania, (1842) 16 Pet. U.S. 539; Louisville,
     etc., R.  Co. v.  Letson, (1844)  2 How.  U.S. 497;  Cary v.
     Curtis, (1845)  3 How.  U.S. 236; Waring v. Clarke, (1847) 5
     How. U.S.  441; Luther  v. Borden,  (1849) 7  How.  U.S.  1;
     Sheldon v.  Sill, (1850)  8 How.  U.S.  441;  The  Propeller
     Genesee Chief  v. Fitzhugh (1851) 12 How. U.S. 443; Fretz v.
     Bull, (1851)  12 How.  U.S. 466;  Neves v.  Scott, (1851) 13
     How. U.S.  208; Pennsylvania  v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co.,
     (1851) 13 How. U.S. 518; Marshall v. baltimore etc., R. Co.,
     (1853) 16  How. U.S.  314; U.S.  v. Guthrie,  (1854) 17 How.
     U.S. 284;  Smith v.  Maryland, (1856) 18 How. U.S. 71; Jones
     v. League,  (1853) 18  How. U.S.  76; Murray v. Hoboken Land
     etc, Co.,  (1855) 18 How. U.S. 272; Hyde v. Stone, (1857) 20
     How. U.S.  170; Irving v. Marshall. (1857) 20 How. U.S. 558;
     Fenn v. Holms, (1858) 21 How. U.S. 481; Morewood v. Enequist
     (1859) 23 How. U.S. 491; Kentucky v. Dennison (1860) 24 How.
     U.S. 66;  Ohio etc.,  R. Co.  v. Wheeler (1861) 1 Black U.S.
     286; The Steamer St. Law. rence (1861) 1 Black U.S. 522; The
     Propeller  Commerce,   (1861)  1   Black  U.S.  574;  Ex  p.
     Vallandigham, (1883)  1 Wall.  U.S.  243;  Ex  p.  Milligan,
     (1868) 4  Wall. U.S. 2; The Moses Taylor (1866) 4 Wall. U.S.
     411; Mississippi  v. Johnson  (1866) 4  Wall. U.S.  475; The
     Hine v.  Trevor, (1868)  4 Wall.  U.S. 553,- Philadelphia v.
     Collector (1866)  5 Wall.  U.S.  720;  Georgia  v.  Stanton,
     (1867) 6  Wall. U.S.  50; Payne v. Hook, (1868) 7 Wall. U.S.
     425; The  Alicia, (1868)  7 Wall.  U.S. 571;  Ex p.  Yerger,
     (1868) 8  Wall. U.S. 85; New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v.
     Dunham, (1870)  11 Wall.  U.S. 1;  Virginia v. West Virginia
     (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 39; Susquehanna, etc., Valley R., etc.,
     Co. v.  Blatchford, (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 172; Chicago, etc.,
     R. Co.  v. Whitton, (1871) 13 Wall. U.S. 270; Tarble's Case,
     (187l) 13  Wall. U.S.  397; Blyew  v. U.S.,  (187l) 13 Wall.
     U.S. 581;  Davis v.  Gray, (1872)  16 Wall. U.S. 203; Sewing
     Mach. Co.'s Case, (1873) 18 Wall. U.S. 553; Home Ins. Co. v.
     Morse, (1874)  20 Wall. U.S. 445; Vannevar v. Bryant, (1874)
     21 Wall.  U.S. 41; The Lottawanna, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S. 558;
     Gaines v.  Fuentes (1875)  92 U.S.  10; Claffin W. Houseman,
     (1876) 93  U.S. 130;  Muller v.  Dows, (1876)  94 U.S.  444;
     Doyle v.  Continental Ins.  Co., (1876) 94 U.S. 535; U.S. v.
     Union Pac.  R. Co.,  (1878) 98 U.S. 589; Tennessee v. Davis,
     (1879) 100  U.S. 257;  Ex p. Boyd, (1881) 105 U.S. 647; Bush
     v. Kentucky, (1882) 107 U.S. 110; Parkersburg, etc., Transp.
     Co. v.  Parkersburg, (1882)  107 U.S.  691;  Grads  v.  U.S.
     Mortgage Co.,  (1883) 108 U.S. 477; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
     Wiggins Ferry  Co, (1893)  108 U.S.  18;  Louisiana  v.  New
     Orleans, (1883)  108 U.S.  568; Ellis  v. Davis,  (1883) 109
     U.S. 485;  Carroll County  v. Smith,  (1884) 111  U.S.  556;
     Southern Pac.  R. Co.  v. California,  (1888) 118  U.S. 109;
     Barron v.  Burnside, (1887)  121 U.S. 186; Lincoln County v.
     Luning. (1890)  133 U.S.  529; Hans  v. Louisiana (1890) 134
     U.S. 1;  North Carolina v. Temple, (1890) 134 U.S. 22; In re
     Neagle, (1890) 135 U.S. 1; Nashua, etc., R. Corp. v. Boston,
     etc., R.  Corp., (1890)  136 U.S. 356; Jones v. U.S., (1890)
     137 U.S. 202; Cook County v. Calumet, etc., Canal, etc, Co.,
     (1891) 138 U.S. 635; Manchester v. Massachusetts, (1891) 139
     U.S. 240;  In re  Garnett, (1891)  141 U.S. 1; U.S. v. Texas
     (1892) 143  U.S. 821; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Denton, (1892)
     146 U.S.  202; Cooke v. Avery, (1893) 147 U.S. 375; Cates v.
     Allen, (1893)  149 U.S.  451; McNulty  v. California. (1893)
     149 U.S.  645; In  re Tyler.  (1893) 149  U.S. 104;  Newport
     Light Co.  v. Newport,  (1894) 151 U.S. 527; New York, etc.,
     R. Co.  v. Bristol,  (1894) 151  U.S. 650; Isreal v. Arthur,
     (1894) 152  U.S. 355; Michigan v. Flint, etc., R Co., (1894)
     152 U.S.  363; New Orleans v. Benjamin, (1894) 153 U.S. 411;
     Mobile, etc.,  R. Co.  v. Tennessee,  (1894) 153  U.S.  486;
     Reagan v.  Farmers' L.  &  T.  Co.,  (1894)  154  U.S.  362;
     Interstate Commerce  Commission v.  Brimson. (1894) 154 U.S.
     447; Plumley  v. Massachusetts  (1894) 166 U.S. 461; Andrews
     v. Swartz  (1895) 156  U.S. 272;  St. Louis  etc., R. Co. v.
     Gill, (1895) 156 U.S. 649; Stevens v. Nichol (1895) 157 U.S.
     370; In  re Debs  (1895) 158  U.S. 564;  Central Land Co. v.
     Laidley, (1895) 159 U.S. 103; Folsom v. Township Ninety-Six,
     (l895) 159  U.S. 611;  Laing v. Rigney, (1896) 160 U.S. 531;
     St. Louis,  etc., R.  Co. v.  James, (1896)  161  U.S.  545;
     Woodruff v.  Mississippi  (1896)  162  U.S.  291;  Fallbrook
     Irrigation Dist.  v. Bradley,  (1896) 164 U.S. 112; Scott v.
     Donalad (1897)  165 U.S.  107; Robertson  v. Baldwin, (1897)
     105 U.S.  275; Chicago  etc., R.  Co. v. Chicago, (1897) 168
     U.S. 226;  Forsyth v.  Hammond (1897)  166 U.S.  506;  Oxley
     Stave Co.  v. Butler  County, (1897)  166 U.S.  648;  In  re
     Lennon, (1897) 166 U.S. 548; City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R.
     Co., (1897)  166 U.S.  557; Douglas  v. Kentucky, (1897) 168
     U.S. 488;  Miller v.  Cornwall R.  Co., (1897) 168 U.S. 131;
     Baker v.  Grice, (1898)  169 U.S.  284; Smyth v. Ames (1898)
     169 U.S. 466; Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co.. (1898) 169
     U.S. 557;  Tinsley v.  Anderson, (1898)  171 U.S. 101; Walla
     Walla v.  Walla Walla  Water Co.,  (1898) 172  U.S. 1; Green
     Bay, etc.,  Canal Co.  v. Patten  Paper Co., (1898) 172 U.S.
     58; Meyer  v. Richmond  (1898) 172  U.S. 82;  McCullough  v.
     Virginia, (1898)  172 U.S.  102; Fitts  u. McGhee (1899) 172
     U.S. 516;  Dewey v. Des Moines (1899) 173 U.S. 193; Nicol v.
     Ames, (1899) 173 U.S. 500; Covington v. Kentucky, (1899) 173
     U.S. 231,  La Abra  Silver Min. Co. v. U.S.. (1899) 175 U.S.
     423; Louisiana v. Texas (1900) 176 U.S. 1; Whitman v. Oxford
     Nat. Bank, (1900) 176 U.S. 559; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum,
     (1900) 176  U.S. 640;  Carter v.  Texas (1900) 177 U.S. 442;
     Smith v.  Reeves (I900) 178 U.S. 436; Western Union Tel. Co.
     v. Ann  Arbor R. Co.. (1900) 178 U.S. 239; Wiley v. Sinkler,
     (1900) 170  U.S. 58;  Missouri v.  Illinois (1901)  180 U.S.
     208, Eastern Bldg., etc.. Assoc. v. Welling. (1901) 181 U.S.
     47; Dooley  v. U.S., (1901) 182 U.S. 222; Tullock v. Mulvane
     (1902) 184  U.S. 497;  Patton v. Brady. (1902) 184 U.S. 608;
     Kansas  v.  Colorado,  (1902)  185  U.S.  125;  Swafford  v.
     Templeton, (1902)  185  U.S.  487;  Mobile  Transp.  Co.  v.
     Mobile. (1903)  187 U.S. 470; Andrews v. Andrews. (1903) 188
     U.S. 14;  Hooker  v.  Los  Angeles,  (1903)  188  U.S.  314;
     Cummings v.  Chicago,  (1903)  188  U.S.  410;  Schaefer  v.
     Werling. (1903)  188 U.S.  516; The  Roanoke (1903) 189 U.S.
     185; Detroit,  etc., R.  Co. v.  Osborn (1903) 189 U.S. 383;
     Patterson v.  barkEudora (1903)  190  U.S.  169;  Howard  v.
     Fleming, (1903)  191 U.S. 126; Arbuckle b. Blackburn, (1903)
     191 U.S. 405; Deposit Bank b. Frankfort (1903) 191 U.S. 499;
     Spencer v.  Duplan Silk  Co. (1903)  191 U.S. 526; Wabash R.
     Co. v. Pearce, (1904) 192 U.S. 179; Rogers v. Alabama (1904)
     192 U.S. 226; South Dakota v. North Carolina (1904) 192 U.S.
     286; Bankers  Mut. Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co.
     (1904) 192 U.S. 371; Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McCIain
     (1904) 192 U.S. 397.

(44) U.S. v.  Insurgents,  (1795)  2  Dall.  U.S.  335;  U.S.  v.
     Mitchell (1795)  2 Dall.  U.S. 348;  Ex p. Bollman, (1807) 4
     Cranch U.S. 75; Burr's Trial, 4 Cranch U.S. 469.

     "To prevent the possibility of those calamities which result
     from  the   extension  of   treason  to  offenses  of  minor
     importance, that  great fundamental  law which  defines  and
     limits the various departments of our government has given a
     rule on  the subject  both to the legislature and the courts
     of America,  which neither  can be  permitted to  transcend.
     `Treason against  the United  States shall  consist only  in
     levying war  against them,  or in adhering to their enemies.
     giving  them  aid  and  comfort.'"  Per  Mr.  Chief  Justice
     Marshall, In  Ex p.  DoIlLnan, (1807) 4 Cranch U.S. 128. See
     also U.S. v. Hoxie, (1808) I Paine U.S. 265.

     "In the  earlier periods of English history, the judges were
     often the  pliant tools of the king, and exercised the power
     of punishing  for constructive treasons, under circumstances
     the most revolting and greatly to the oppression of innocent
     persons. The  wise and sagacious framers of our Constitution
     have effectually  guarded against  such abuses  of power, by
     declaring there  shall be  no conviction for this high crime
     on mere  suspicion or  on proof  of any fact which is not an
     overt act of treason established by two witnesses. Charge to
     Grand Jury, (1861) 1 Bond U.S. 610.

(45) Bigelow v.  Forrest, (1869)  9 Wall. U.S. 330; Day v. Micou,
     (1873) 18  Wall. U.S. 156; Ex p. Lange, (1873) 18 Wall. U.S.
     163; Wallach  v. Van  Riswick, (1876)  92 U.S.  202; U.S. v.
     Dunnington. (1892) 146 U.S. 338.

     "What was  intended by  the constitutional provision is free
     from  doubt.   In  England,  attainders  of  treason  worked
     corruption of  blood and  perpetual forfeiture of the estate
     of the person attainted, to the disinheritance of his heirs,
     or of  those who would otherwise be his heirs. Thus innocent
     children were made to suffer because of the offense of their
     ancestor. When the Federal Constitution was framed, this was
     felt to  be a  great hardship,  and even rank injustice. For
     this reason,  it was  ordained that  no attainder of treason
     should work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during
     the life  of the  person attainted." Wallach v. Van Riswick,
     (1875) 92 U.S. 210.

(46) Mills v.  Duryee (1813)  7 Cranch  U.S.  481;  Hampton    v.
     M'Connel (1818) 3 Wheat. U.S. 234; Mayhew v. Thatcher (1821)
     6 Wheat U.S. 129; Darby v. Mayer, (1825) 10 Wheat. U.S. 465;
     U.S. v.  Amedy, (1826)  11  Wheat.  U.S.  302;  Caldwell  v.
     Carrington, (1835) 9 Pet. U.S. 86; M'Elmoyle v. Cohen (1830)
     13 Pet. U.S. 312, Augusta Bunk v. Earle, (1839) 13 Pet. U.S.
     519; Alabama  State Bank  v. Dalton, (1850) 9 Huw. U.S. 622;
     D'Arey v.  Ketchum (1850)  11 How.  U.S. 165;  Christmas  v.
     Russell, (1866)  5 Wall.  U.S. 200;  Green v.  Van  Buskirk,
     (1868) 7  Wall. U.S.  130; Paul  v. Virginia, (1868) 8 Wall.
     U.S. 168;  Board of  Public Works v. Columbia Cullege (1873)
     17 Wall.  U.S. 521; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall. U.S.
     457; Pennoyer  v. Neff  (1877) 95  U.S.  714;  Bonaparte  v.
     Appeal Tax  Ct.. (1882) 104 U.S. 692; Robertson v. Pickrell,
     (1883) 100  U.S. 608;  Brown v. Houston (1885) 114 U.S. 622;
     Hanley v..  Donoghue, (1885)  116 U.S.  1; Renaud  v. Abbott
     (1886) 116  U.S. 277; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry
     Co., (1887)  119 U.S.  615; Borer v. Chapman (1887) 110 U.S.
     587; Cole  v. Cunningham  (1890) 133  U.S.  107;  Blount  v.
     Walker (1890)  134 U.S. 607; Simmons v. Saul (1891) 138 U.S.
     439; Reynolds  v. Stockton (1891) 140 U.S. 254; Carpenter v.
     Strange (189l)  141 U.S.  87; Huntington  v. Attrill, (1892)
     146 U.S.  657; Glenn v. Garth, (1893) 147 U.S. 360; Laing v.
     Rigney, (1896) 160 U.S. 531; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sturm,
     (1890) 174 U.S. 710; Thormann v. Frame, (1900) 178 U.S. 350;
     Hancock Nat.  Bank v. Farnum, (1900) 176 U.S. 640; Clarke v.
     Clarke, (1900)  178 U.S. 186; Wilkes County v. Coler, (1901)
     180 U.S.  506; W.  W. Cargill  Co. v.  Minnesota, (1901) 180
     U.S. 452;  Johnson v.  New York L. Ins. Co., (1903) 187 U.S.
     491; Andrews  v. Andrews,  (1903) 188 U.S. 14; Blackstone v.
     Miller, (1903)  188 U.S.  180; Finney v. Guy (1903) 189 U.S.
     335; Wabash R. Co. v. Flannigan, (1904) 192 U.S. 29; Germann
     Sav., etc.,  Soc. v. Dormitzer, (1904) 192 U.S. 125; Wedding
     v. Meyer, (1904) 192 U.S. 573.

(47) U.S. Bank  v. Deveaux,  (1809) 5  Cranch U.S. 61; Gassies v.
     Ballon,  (1832)   6  Pet.   U.S.  761;   Rhode   Island   v.
     Massachusettts (1838)  12 Pet.  U.S. 657;  Augusta  Bank  v.
     Earle (1839)  13 Pet. U.S. 519; Moore v. Illinois, (1852) 14
     How. U.S.  13; Conner  v. Elliott,  (1855) 18 How. U.S. 591;
     Dred Scott  v. Sandford (1856) 19 How. U.S. 393; Crandall v.
     Nevada (1867)  6 Wall. U.S. 35; Woodruff v. Parham, (1868) 8
     Wall. U.S.  123; Paul  v. Virginia  (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 168;
     Downham v.  Alexandria (1869)  10 Wall.  U.S. 173; Liverpool
     Ins. Co.  v. Massachusetts (1870) 10 Wall. U.S. 566; Ward v.
     Maryland, (1870)  12 Wall.  U.S. 418;  Slaughter-House Cases
     (1872) 16  Wall. U.S. 36; Bradwell v. State, (1872) 18 Wall.
     U.S. 130;  Chemung Canal  Bank v. Lowery, (1876) 93 U.S. 72;
     McCready v. Virginia, (1876) 104 U.S. 391; Philadelphia Fire
     Assoc. v.  New York,  (1886) 119  U.S. 110;  Pembina Consol.
     Silver Min.,  etc., Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888) 125 U.S. 181;
     Kimmish v.  Ball, (1889)  129 U.S.  217; Cole v. Cunningham,
     (1890) 133 U.S. 107; Manchester v. Massachusetts, (1891) 139
     U.S. 240;  Pittsburg, etc.,  Coal Co.  v. Bates,  (1895) 156
     U.S. 577;  Vance v.  W. A.  Vandercock Co.,  (1898) 170 U.S.
     438; Blake  v. McClung,  (1898) 172  U.S. 239;  Williams  v.
     Fears,  (1900)   179  U.S.  270;  Travellers,  Ins.  Co.  v.
     Connecticut, (1902) 165 U.S. 364; Chadwick v. Kelley, (1903)
     187 U.S.  540; Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue Co., (1903) 187
     U.S. 611;  Blackstone v. Miller, (1903) 188 U.S. 189; Anglo-
     American Provision  Co. v.  Davis Provision  Co., (1903) 191
     U.S. 373.

     "The Constitution  of the  United States  declares that  the
     citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the
     privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
     And although  these privileges  and immunities,  for greater
     safety, are  placed under  the guardianship  of the  general
     government, still  the States may by their laws and in their
     tribunals protect  and enforce  them. They have not only the
     power, but it is a duty enjoined upon them by this provision
     in the  Constitution." Per  Mr. Justice  Taney, in  Prigg v.
     Pennsylvania (1842) 16 Pet. U.S. 629.

(48) Holmes v.  Jennison, (1840)  14 Pet.  U.S. 540;  Kentucky v.
     Dennison, (1860)  24 How. U.S. 66; Taylor v. Taintor, (1872)
     16 Wall.  U.S. 366;  Carroll County v. Smith (1884) 111 U.S.
     556; Ex  p. Reggel  (1885) 114  U.S. 642;  Mahon v.  Justice
     (1888) 127  U.S. 700;  Lascelles v. Georgia, (1893) 148 U.S.
     637; Utter v. Franklin. (1899) 172 U.S. 416.

(49) Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (1842) 16 Pet. U.S. 639; Jones v. Van
     Zandt, (1847)  6 How.  U.S. 215; Strader v. Graham (1850) 10
     How. U.S. 82, Moore v. Illinois (1852) 14 How. U.S. 13; Dred
     Scott v.  Sandford, (1856)  19 How.  U.S.  393;  Ableman  v.
     Booth, (1858) 21 How. U.S. 506.,

     "Every State has an undoubted right to determine the status,
     or domestic  and social  condition, of the persons domiciled
     within its  territory; except  insofar as  the powers of the
     States  in  this  respect  are  restrained,  or  duties  and
     obligations imposed  on them,  by the  Constitution  of  the
     United States." Strader v. Graham, (1850) 10 How.U.S. 93.

(50) Luther v.  Borden. (1840)  7 How.  U.S. 1;  Texas v.  White.
     (1868) 7  Wall. U.S.  700; In re Duncan (1891) 139 U.S. 449;
     Taylor v. Beckham, (1900) 178 U.S. 548.

(51) "It was  one of  the objections most seriously urged against
     the new  constitution by  those who opposed its ratification
     by the  States, that  it contained no formal Bill of Rights.
     (Federalist.  No.lxxxiv.)   And  the   State   of   Virginia
     accompanied her  ratification by  the recommendation  of  an
     amendment embodying  such a bill. (3 Elliot's Debates, 661.)
     The feeling on this subject led to the adoption of the first
     ten amendments to that instrument at one time, shortly after
     the government,  was organized.  These are  all designed  to
     operate as restraints on the general government, and most of
     them for  the protection  of private  rights of  persons aud
     property. Notwithstanding  this reproach, however, there are
     many provisions  in the  original instrument  of this latter
     character." Kring v. Missouri (1882) 107 U.S. 226.

(52) Terrett v.  Taylor,  (1815)  9  Cranch  U.S.  43;  Vidal  v.
     Philadelphia, (1844)  2 How. U.S. 127; Ex p. Garland, (1866)
     4 Wall.  U.S. 333;  U.S. v.  Cruikshank (1875)  92 U.S. 542;
     Reynolds v.  U.S. (1878)  98 U.S.  145;  Spies  v.  Illinois
     (1887) 123  U.S. 131;  Davis v. Beason, (1890) 133 U.S. 333;
     Eilenbecker v.  Plymouth County,  (1890) 134 U.S. 31; Church
     of Jesus  Christ v.  U.S., (1890)  138 U.S.  1; In re Rapier
     (1892) 143  U.S. 110;  Horner v.  U.S., (1892) 143 U.S. 207;
     Bradfield v. Roberts (1899) 175 U.S. 291.

(53) "The right  of the  people peaceably  to assemble  for  this
     purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances,
     or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties
     of the  national government,  is an  attribute  of  national
     citizenship, and,  as such,  under the  protection  of,  and
     guaranteed by,  the  United  States.  The  very  idea  of  a
     government, republican  in form, implies a right on the part
     of its  citizens  to  meet  peaceably  for  consultation  in
     respect to  public affairs  and to petition for a redress of
     grievances." U.S. v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U.S. 552.

(54) Presser v.  Illinois (1886)  116 U.S. 252; Spies v. Illinois
     (1887) 123  U.S. 131; Eilenbeeker v. Plymouth County, (1890)
     134 U.S. 31.

     "This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is
     it in  any manner  dependent upon  that instrument  for  its
     existence. The  Second Amendment  declares that it shall not
     be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than
     that it  shall not  be infringed by Congress. This is one of
     the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the
     powers of  the national  government, leaving  the people  to
     look for  their protection  against any  violation by  their
     fellow-citizens of  the rights  it recognizes,  to  what  is
     called, in The City of New York v. Miln, (1837) 11 Pet. U.S.
     139,  the   powers  which   relate   to   merely   municipal
     legislation, or  what was,  perhaps,  more  properly  called
     internal police,'  `not surrendered  or restrained'  by  the
     Constitution of  the United  States."  U.S.  v.  Cruikshank,
     (1875) 92 U.S. 553.

(55) Smith v. Maryland, (1855) 18 How. U.S. 71; Murray v. Hoboken
     Land, etc.,  Co., (1855)  18 How.  U.S. 272;  Ex p. Milligan
     (1866) 4  Wall. U.S.  2; Boyd  v. U.S., (1886) 116 U.S. 616;
     Spies v.  Illinois  (1887)  123  U.S.  131;  Eilenbeeker  v.
     Plymouth County  (1890) 134  U.S. 31; Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.,
     (1893) 149  U.S.  608;  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.
     Brimson, (1894) 154 U.S. 447; In re Chapman, (1897) 166 U.S.
     661; Adams v. New York, (1904) 192 U.S. 585.

(56) The  security  intended  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  Fourth
     Amendment against wrongful search and seizure is designed to
     prevent  violations   of  private  security  in  person  and
     property and  unlawful invasion  of the sanctity of the home
     of  the  citizen  by  officers  of  the  law,  acting  under
     legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
     such usurpations  when attempted. But the English and nearly
     all of  the American  cases have  declined  to  extend  this
     doctrine to the extent of excluding testimony which has been
     obtained by such means, if it is otherwise competent." Adams
     v. New York, (19O4) 192 U.S. 598.

(57) U.S. v. Perez (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S. 579; Barron v. Baltimore.
     (1833) 7  Pet. U.S. 243; Fox v. Ohio (1847) 5 How. U.S. 410;
     West River  Bridge Co.  v. Dix,  (1848)  6  How.  U.S.  507;
     Mitchell v.  Harmony (1851)  13  How.  U.S.  115;  Moore  v.
     Illinois (1852)  14 How.  U.S. 13;  Murray v.  Hoboken Land,
     etc., Co.,  (1855) 18 How. U.S. 272; Dynes v. Hoover, (1857)
     20 How. U.S. 65; Withers v. Buckley, (1857) 20 How. U.S. 84;
     Gilman v. Sheboygan (1862) 2 Black U.S. 510; Ex p. Milligan,
     (1866) 4  Wall. U.S.  2; Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, (1868) 7
     Wall. U.S.  321; Hepburn  v. Griswold,  (1869) 8  Wall. U.S.
     603; Miller  v. U.S., (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 268; Legal Tender
     Cases (1870) 12 Wall. U.S. 457; Pumpelly v. Green Bay, etc.,
     Canal Co.,  (1871) 13  Wall. U.S.  166; Osborn v. Nicholson,
     (187l) 13  Wall. U.S.  654; Ex p. Lange (1873) 18 Wall. U.S.
     163; Kohl  v. U.S.,  (1875) 91  U.S. 367;  Davidson  v.  New
     Orleans (1877) 96 U.S. 97; Sinking Fund Cases (1878) 99 U.S.
     700; Langford  v.  U.S.,  (1879)  101  U.S.  341,  Kelly  v.
     Pittsburgh, (1881)  104 U.S.  78; Ex p. Wall (1882) 107 U.S.
     265; U.S.  v. Jones (1883) 109 U.S. 513; U.S. v. Great Falls
     Mfg. Co.,  (1884) 112 U.S. 645; Ex p. Wilson (1885) 114 U.S.
     417; Boyd  v. U.S.,  (1886) 116  U.S. 616;  Mackin v.  U.S.,
     (1886) 117 U.S. 348; Ex p. Bain (1887) 121 U.S. 1; Parkinson
     v. U.S.,  (1887) 121 U.S. 281; Spies v. Illinois, (1887) 123
     U.S. 131;  Callan v.  Wilson (1888) 127 U.S. 540; U.S. v. De
     Walt (1888) 128 U.S. 393; Manning v. French, (1890) 133 U.S.
     186; Eilenbecker  v. Plymouth  County, (1890)  134 U.S.  31;
     Louisville, etc.  R. Co.  v. Woodson (1890) 134 U.S. 614; In
     re Ross,  (1891) 140  U.S.  453;  Counselman  v.  Hitchcock,
     (1892) 142  U.S. 547;  Simmons v.  U.S. (1891) 142 U.S. 148;
     Thorington v.  Montgomery (1893)  147 U.S.  490; Monongahela
     Navs Co.  v. U.S.,  (1893) 148  U.S. 312;  Fong Yue  Ting v.
     U.S., (1893) 149 U.S. 698; Lees v. U.S. (1893) 150 U.S. 476;
     Marchant v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  (1894)  153  U.S.  380;
     Linford v.  Ellison, (1894)  155 U.S. 503; Johnson v. Sayre,
     (1895) 158  U.S. 100;  Sweet v.  Rechel (1895) 159 U.S. 380;
     Brown v.  Walker. (1896)  161 U.S.  591; Wong  Wing v. U.S.,
     (1996) 163  U.S. 228;  Talton v.  Mayes (1896) 163 U.S. 376;
     Bauman v.  Ross, (1897)  167 U.S.  648; Wilson  v.  Lambert,
     (1898) 168 U.S. 611; U.S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc. (1898) 171
     U.S. 505;  Maxwell v.  Dow (1900)  176 U.S. 581; Scranton v.
     Wheeler, (1900)  170 U.S.  141;  McDonald  v.  Massachusetts
     (1901) 180  U.S. 311;  Neely v. Henkel, (1901) 180 U.S. 109;
     French v.  Barber Asphalt  Paving Co.,  (1901) 181 U.S. 324;
     Wight v.  Davidson, (1901)181  U.S. 371;  Tonawanda v.  Lyon
     (1901) 181  U.S. 389;  Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio (1902)
     183 U.S.  238; Hanover  Nat. Bank  v. Moyses (1902) 186 U.S.
     181; Dreyer  v. Illinois  (1902) 187  U.S. 71;  Lone Wolf v.
     Hitchcock (1903) 187 U.S. 553; U.S. v. Lynah (1903) 188 U.S.
     445; Japanese  Immigrant Case  (1903) 189 U.S. 86; Hawaii v.
     Mankichi (1903)  190 U.S.  197; Bedford  v. U.S.. (1904) 192
     U.S. 217;  Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U.S. 470; Adams
     v. New York, (1904) 192 U.S. 585.

(58) See cases cited in note 2, supra.

(59) See cases cited in note 2, supra.

(60) See cases cited in note 2, supra.

(61) See cases cited in note 2, supra.

(62) U.S. v.  Coolidge, (1816)  1 Wheat. U.S. 415; Ex p. Kearney,
     (1822) 7  Wheat. U.S.  38; U.S. v. Mills, (1833) 7 Pet. U.S.
     142; Barron  v. Baltimore,  (1833) 7  Pet. U.S.  243; Fox v.
     Ohio, (1847)  5 how. U.S. 410; Withers v. Buckley, (1857) 20
     How. U.S.  84; Ex  p.  Milligan,  (1866)  4  Wall.  U.S.  2;
     Twitchell v. Pennsylvania (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 321; Miller v.
     U.S. (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 268; U.S. v. Cook, (1872) 17 Wall.
     U.S. 168;  U.S. v.  Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U.S. 542; Reynolds
     v. U.S.,  (1878) 98  U.S. 145; Spies v. Illinois, (1887) 123
     U.S. 131; Brooks v. Missouri, (1888) 124 U.S. 394; Callan v.
     Wilson, (1898) 127 U.S. 540; Eelenbecker v. Plymouth County,
     (1890) 134 U.S. 31; Jones v. U.S., (1890) 137 U.S. 202; Cook
     v. U.S.,  (1891) 138  U.S. 157; In re Shibuya Jugiro, (1891)
     140 U.S.  291; In re Ross (1891) 140 U.S. 453; Fong Yue Ting
     v. U.S., (1893) 149 U.S. 698; Mattox v. U.S. (1895) 156 U.S.
     237; Rosen  v. U.S.  (1896) 161  U.S. 29;  U.S.  v.  Zucker,
     (1896) 161  U.S. 475; Wong Wing v. U.S. (1896) 163 U.S. 228;
     Thompson v.  Utah, (1898)  170 U.S.  343;  Maxwell  v.  Dow,
     (1900) 176  U.S. 581;  Motes v.  U.S. (1900)  178 U.S.  458;
     Fidelity, etc,  Co. v.  U.S.. (1902) 187 U.S. 315; Hawaii v.
     Mankiche (1903) 190 U.S. 197.

(63) U.S. v. La Vengeance, (1796) 3 Dall. U.S. 297; Columbia Bank
     v. Okely,  (1819) 4  Wheat. U.S.  235; Parsons  v.  Bedford.
     (1830) 3  Pet. U.S.  433; Livingston v. Moore, (1833) 7 Pet.
     U.S.  469;  Webster  v.  Reid,  (1850)  11  How.  U.S.  437;
     Pennsylvania v.  Wheeliag, etc.,  Bridge Co., (1851) 13 How.
     U.S. 518;  Justices v.  Murray, (1869)  9  Wall.  U.S.  274;
     Edwards v.  Elliott, (1874)  21 Wall.  U.S. 532;  Pearson v.
     Yewdall, (1877)  95 U.S.  294; MeElrath  v. U.S.  (1880) 102
     U.S. 426;  Spies v.  Illinois (1887)  123 U.S. 131; Arkansas
     Valley  Land.   etc.,  Co.  v.  Mann  (1889)  130  U.S.  69;
     Eilenbecker  v.   Plymouth  County.   (1890)  134  U.S.  31;
     Whitehead v. Shattuck, (1891), 138 U.S. 146; Scott v. Neely,
     (1891) 140  U.S. 106;  Cates v.  Allen (1893)  149 U.S. 451;
     Fong Yue  Ting v.  U.S., (1893)  149 U.S.  698; Coughran  v.
     Bigelow, (1896) 164 U.S. 301; Walker v. New Mexico, etc., R.
     Co.. (1897)  165 U.S.  693; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago
     (1897) 166  U.S. 226; American Pub. Co. v. Fisher (1897) 166
     U.S. 464; Fidelity, etc., Co. v. U.S. (1902) 187 U.S. 315.

(64) Sm ca"d cited in note 1, supra.

(65) Pervear v.  Massachusetts (1866)  5 Wall. U.S. 475; Spies v.
     Illinois (1887) 123 U.S. 131; Manning v. French, (1890)  133
     U.S. 186;  Eilenbecker v.  Plymouth County,  (1890) 134 U.S.
     31; McElvaine  v. Brush,  (1891) 142  U.S. 155,  O'Neili  v.
     Vermont, (1892)  144 U.S.  323; McDonald  v.  Massachussetts
     (1901) 180 U.S. 311.

(66) Livingston v.  Moore, (1833)  7  Pet.  U.S.  469;  Spies  v.
     Illinois (1887) 123 U.S. 131.

     "This government  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  one  of
     enumerated powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only
     the powers  granted to  it, would  seem too apparent to have
     required to  be enforced  by all  those arguments  which its
     enlightened friends,  while  it  was  depending  before  the
     people, found  it necessary  to urge.  That principle is now
     universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent
     of the  powers actually  granted is perpetually arising, and
     will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall
     exist." M'Culloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. U.S. 405.

(67) Chisholm v.  Georgia. (1793) 2 Dall. U.S. 419; Hollingsworth
     v. Virginia,  (1798) 3  Dall. U.S.  378; Martin  v.  Hunter,
     (1816) 1  Wheat. U.S.  304; M'Culloch  v. Maryland. (1819) 4
     Wheat. U.S.  316; Anderson v. Dunn, (1821) 6 Wheat U.S. 204;
     Cohen v.  Virginia (1821)  6 Wheat  U.S. 264; Osborn v. U.S.
     Bank (1824)  9 Wheat.  U.S. 738; Buckner v. Finley, (1829) 2
     Pet. U.S.  586; Ableman  v. Booth,  (1858) 21 How. U.S. 506;
     Collector v.  Day, (1870)  11 Wall.  U.S.  113;  Claffin  v.
     Houseman, (1876) 93 U.S. 130; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker,
     (1876) 94  U.S. 238;  U.S.  v.  Fox.  (1876)  94  U.S.  315;
     Tennessee v.  Davis (1879)  100 U.S. 257; Spies v. Illinois,
     (1887) 123  U.S. 131; Pollock v. Farmers' L & T. Co., (1895)
     157 U.S.  429; Forsyth v. Hammond, (1897) 166 U, S. 506; St.
     Anthony Falls  Water Power  Co. v.  St. Paul  Water  Com'rs,
     (1897) 168 U.S. 349; Missouri, etc., R. Co., v. Haber (1898)
     169 U.S.  613; Hancock Mut. L Ins. Co. v. Warren, (1901) 181
     U.S. 73;  Kansas v.  Colorado.  185  U.S.  125;  Andrews  v.
     Andrews (1903)  188 U.S.  14; Church  v. Kelsey,  (1887) 121
     U.S. 282; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, (1887) 127 U.S. 444;
     Western Union  Tel. Co.  v. Pendleton.  (1887) 122 U.S. 347;
     Bowman v.  Chicago, etc.  R. Co.. (1888) 126 U.S. 465; Mahon
     v. Justice  (1888) 127  U.S. 700; Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135
     U.S. 100; Manchester v. Massachusetts (1891) 139 U.S. 240.

     "The perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means
     implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of
     the right  of  self-government  by  the  States.  Under  the
     Articles  of   Confederation   each   State   retained   its
     sovereignty, freedom,  and independence,  and  every  power,
     jurisdiction, and  right  not  expressly  delegated  to  the
     United States.  Under the Constitution, though the powers of
     the States  were much  restricted,  still,  all  powers  not
     delegated to  the  United  States,  nor  prohibited  to  the
     States, are  reserved to  the States respectively, or to the
     people.... Not  only, therefore,  can there  be no  loss  of
     separate and  independent autonomy  to the  States,  through
     their union  under the  Constitution,  but  it  may  be  not
     unreasonably said  that the  preservation of the States, and
     the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the
     design and  care of  the constitution as the preservation of
     the Union  and the  maintenance of  the national government.
     The  Constitution,  in  all  its  provisions,  looks  to  an
     indestructible Union,  composed of  indestructible  States."
     Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 700.

(68) Ohio v. Dollison. (1904) 194 U.S. 445.

     "That the  first ten articles of amendment were not intended
     to limit  the powers  of the State governments in respect to
     their own  people, but to operate on the national government
     alone, was  decided more  than a  half century ago, and that
     decision has  been steadily  adhered  to  since."  Spies  v.
     Illinois (1887) 123 U.S. 166.

(69) "Apportionment is  an  operation  on  States,  and  involves
     valuations and  assessments which  are arbitrary, and should
     not be  resorted to  but in case of necessity. Uniformity is
     an   instant   operation   on   individuals,   without   the
     intervention of assessments, or any regard to States, and is
     at once  easy, certain, and efficacious." Per Patterson, J.,
     in Hylton v. U.S. (1794) 3 Dall. U.S. 180.

(70) (1895) 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601.

(71) (1880) 103 U.S. 168.

(72) (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S. 1.

(73) (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S. 1.

(74) Northern Securities Co. v. U.S. (1904) 193 U.S. 197.

(75) The power  conferred by  this provision  of the Constitution
     "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
     which commerce  is to  be governed.  This  power,  like  all
     others vested  in Congress,  is complete  in itself,  may be
     exercised  to   its  utmost   extent,  and  acknowledges  no
     limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution."
     Per Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9
     Wheat. U.S. 197.

(76) "The  power to  regulate commerce  covers a  wide field, and
     embraces a    great  variety  of  subjects.  Some  of  these
     subjects call  for uniform  rules and  national legislation;
     others  can  be  best  regulated  by  rules  and  provisions
     suggested  by   the  varying   circumstances  of   different
     localities,  and   limited  in   their  operation   to  such
     localities  respectively.   To  this  extent  the  power  to
     regulate commerce  may be  exercised by  the States. Whether
     the power  in any  given case  is vested  exclusively in the
     general government depends upon the nature of the subject to
     be regulated."  Gilman v.  Philadelphia (1865)  3 Wall. U.S.
     726. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) 12 How. U.S.
     319. Exp.  McNiel (1871)  13 Wall U.S. 240; Mobile County v.
     Kimball (1881)  102 U.S. 691; Walling v. Michigan (1886) 116
     U.S. 455;  Robbins v.  Shelby County Taxing Dist. (1887) 120
     U.S. 492.

(77) Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., (1904) 193 U. S. 197.

(78) McCready v. Virginia (1876) 94 U.S. 391.

(79) Geer v. Connecticut (1896) 161 U.S. 519.

(80) Lawton v. Steele (1894) 152 U.S. 133.

(81) 3 Bl. Com. 129.

(82) Ex p. Yerger, (1868) 8 Wall. U.S. 95.

(83) n re  Neagle, (1890),  136 U.  S. 1; In re Frederich. (1893)
     140 U.S. 70.

(84) Ableman v.  Booth (1858)  21 How.  U.D. 506;  Tarble's  Case
     (187l) 13 Wall. U.S. 397.

(85) The great and leading intent of the Constitution and the law
     must be  kept constantly  in view  upon the  examination  of
     every question  of construction.  That intent, in respect to
     the writ  of habeas  corpus, is  manifest. It  is that every
     citizen may  be protected  by judicial  action from unlawful
     imprisonment. To  that end  the Act  of 1789  provided  that
     every court  of the  United State should have power to issue
     the writ.  The jurisdiction thus given in law to the circuit
     and  district   courts  is   original;  that  given  by  the
     Constitution and  the law  to this court in appellate. Given
     in general terms, it must necessarily extend to all cases to
     which the judicial power of the United States extends, other
     than those expressly excepted from it." Ex p. Yerger, (1868)
     8 Wall. U.S. 101.

(86) (1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2.

(87) "So much  importance did  the convention  attach to  it [the
     prohibition against  the passage  of any ex post facto law],
     that it  is found  twice in  the Constitution,  first  as  a
     restraint upon  the power  of the  general  government,  and
     afterwards as a limitation upon the legislative power of the
     States." Kring v. Missouri, (1882) 107 U.S. 227.

     "All the  restrictions contained  in the Constitution of the
     United States  on the  power of  the State legislatures were
     provided  in   favor  of   the  authority   of  the  Federal
     government. The prohibition against their making any ex post
     facto laws  was introduced  for greater  caution,  and  very
     probably arose  from the  knowledge that,  the Parliament of
     Great Britain  claimed and  exercised a  power to  pass such
     laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder. or bills
     of pains  and penalties." Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 Dall. U.S.

(88) Cummings v. Missouri. (1866) 4 Wall. U.S. 323.

(89) (1866) 4 Wall. U.S. 277.

(90) (1866) 4 Wall. U.S. 333.

(91) Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 6 Cranch U.S. 138.

     "Laws  of   this  character   are  oppressive,  unjust,  and
     tyrannical; and,  as such,  are condemned  by the  universal
     sentence of  civilized man.  The injustice and tyranny which
     characterizes ex Post facto laws consist altogether in their
     retrospective operation,  with  applied  with  equal  force,
     although not  exclusively, to  bills of attainder." Ogden v.
     Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat. U.S. 266.

(92) Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, (1854) 17 How. U.S. 456.

(93) "As the  clause was  first  adopted,  the  words  concerning
     contracts were  not in  it, because it was supposed that the
     phrase,`ex  Post   facto  law'   included  laws   concerning
     contracts as  well as  others. But it was ascertained before
     the completion  of the  instrument that  this was  a  phrase
     which,   in    English   jurisprudence,   had   acquired   a
     signification limited to the criminal law, and the words `or
     law impairing  the obligation  of contracts'  were added  to
     give security  to rights  resting in contracts. 2 Bancroft's
     History of the Constitution, 213." Kring v. Missouri, (1882)
     107 U. S. 227.

     "The evil  which this  inhibition on the States was intended
     to prevent  is found  in the  history of  our Revolution. By
     repeated acts of legislation in the different States, during
     that  eventful  period,  the  obligation  of  contracts  was
     impaired. The  time and mode of payment were altered by law;
     and so  far was  this interference  of legislation  carried,
     that confidence between man and man was well-nigh destroyed.
     Those proceedings  grew out of the paper system of that day;
     and the  injuries which  they inflicted  were deeply felt in
     the country  at the  time the  Constitution was adopted. The
     provision was  designed to prevent the States from following
     the precedent of legislation so demoralizing in its effects,
     and  so  destructive  to  the  commercial  prosperity  of  a
     country." Per Mr. Justice McLean, in Charles River Bridge v.
     Warren Bridge  (1837) 11  Pet. U.S. 573. See also Edwards v.
     Kearzey (1877) 96 U.S. 604, et seq.

(94) (1837) 11 Pet. U.S. 420.

(95) "It is  competent for  the States  to change the form of the
     remedy, or  to modify  it otherwise,  as they  may see  fit,
     provided no  substantial right  secured by  the contract  is
     thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix definitely
     the line  between alterations  of the remedy which are to be
     deemed legitimate,  and  those  which,  under  the  form  of
     modifying the  remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case
     must be  determined upon its own circumstances." Von Hoffman
     v. Quincy. (1866) 4 Wall. U.S. 553.

(96) U. S. Bank v. Devereaux, (1809) 5 Cranch U.S. 61.

(97) Gassies v. Ballon, (1832) 6 Pet. U.S. 761.

(98) Augusta Bank  v. Earle,  (1839) 13  Pet. U.S. 519; Lafayette
     Ins. Co.  v. French,  (1855) 18  How.  U.S.  404,  Ducat  v.
     Chicago (1870)  10 Wall.  U.S. 410;  Liverpool Ins.  Co.  v.
     Massachusetts (1870)  10 Wall.  U.S. 566;  Paul v. Virginia,
     (1869) 8  Wall. U.S.  168; Philadelphia  Fire Assoc  v.  New
     York, (1886) 110 U.S. 110; Pembina Consol. Silver Min., etc.
     Co. v.  Pennsylvania (1888) 125 U.S. 181; Orient Ins. Co. v.
     Daggs, (1899) 172 U.S. 561.

     "A grant  of corporate  existence  is  a  grant  of  special
     privileges to  the corporators,  enabling them  to  act  for
     certain designated  purposes as  a  single  individual,  and
     exempting them  (unless otherwise  especially provided) from
     individual  liability.   The  corporation,  being  the  mere
     creation of  local law,  can have  no legal existence beyond
     the limits  of the  sovereignty where created. . . . It must
     dwell in  the place  of its  creation, and cannot migrate to
     another sovereignty."  Paul v. Virginia, (1868) 8 Wall. U.S.

(99) Anglo-American Provision  Co. v. Davis Provision Co., (1903)
     191 U.S.373.

(100) Home  Ins. Co. v. Morse, (1874) 20 Wall. U.S. 445; Doyle v.
     Continental  Ins.   Co.,  (1876)  94  U.S.  635;  Barron  v.
     Burnside, (1887) 121 U. S. 186.

     "The Constitution  of the  United States  declares that  the
     judicial power  of the  United States  shall extend  to  all
     cases in law and equity arising under that Constitution, the
     laws of the United States, and to the treaties made or which
     shall be  made under their authority. . . . to controversies
     between a  State and  citizens of another State, and between
     citizens of  different  States..  The  jurisdiction  of  the
     Federal courts,  under  this  clause  of  the  Constitution,
     depends upon  and is  regulated by  the laws  of the  United
     States. State  legislation cannot  confer jurisdiction  upon
     the federal  courts,  nor  can  it  limit  or  restrict  the
     authority  given   by   Congress   in   pursuance   of   the
     Constitution." Home Ins. Co. u. Morse, (1874) 120 Wall. U.S.

(101) Blake  v. McClung,  (1898) 172  U.S. 230,  where the  court
     said: "Although, generally speaking, the State has the power
     to prescribe  the conditions upon which foreign corporations
     may enter  its territory  for purposes  of business,  such a
     power cannot  be exerted  with the  effect of  defeating  or
     impairing rights  secured to  citizens of the several States
     by the supreme law of the land."

(102) Pembina  Consol. Silver  Min., etc.,  Co.  v.  Pennsylvuaia
     (1888) 125 U.S. 181.

(103) Ward  v.  Maryland,  (1870)  12  Wall.  U.S.  419;  Guy  v.
     Baltimore, (1879) 100 U. S. 434; Walling v. Michigan. (1886)
     116 U. S. 446.

     "No state  can, consistently  with the Federal Constitution,
     impose upon  the products  of other  States, brought therein
     for sale  or use,  or upon  citizens because  engaged in the
     sale therein. or the transportation thereto, of the products
     of other  States, more  onerous public burdens or taxes than
     it imposes  upon the  like products of its own territory. It
     this were  not so,  it is  easy to perceive how the power of
     Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
     the several  States could  be practically  annulled, and the
     equality of  commercial privileges  secured by  the  Federal
     Constitution to citizens of the several States be materially
     abridged and  impaired." Guy  v. Baltimore  (1979) 100  U.S.

     "Grant that  the  States  may  impose  discriminating  taxes
     against the  citizens of  other States,  and it will soon be
     found that  the power  conferred upon  Congress to  regulate
     interstate commerce  is of  no value,  as  the  unrestricted
     power of the States to tax will prove to be more efficacious
     to promote  inequality than  any regulations  which Congress
     can pass  to preserve  the equality of right contemplated by
     the Constitution  among the  citizens of the several States.
     Excise taxes,  it is  everywhere conceded, may be imposed by
     the States,  if not  in any  sense  discriminating;  but  it
     should not  be forgotten  that the  people  of  the  several
     States  live   under  one  common  Constitution,  which  was
     ordained to  establish justice,  and which, with the laws of
     Congress, and  the treaties made by the proper authority, is
     the supreme  law of  the land;  and that  that  supreme  law
     requires equality  of burden,  and forbids discrimination in
     State taxation  when the power is applied to the citizens of
     other States.  Inequality of  burden, "well  as the  want of
     uniformity  in   commercial  regulations,  was  one  of  the
     grievances of  the citizens under the Confederation; and the
     now Constitution  was adopted, among other things, to remedy
     those defects in the prior system." Ward v. Maryland. (1870)
     12 Wall. U.S. 430.

(104) Corson v. Maryland (1887) 120 U.S. 502.

(105) Conner v. Elliott. (1885) 18 How. U.S. 691.

     "According to  the express  words aud  clear meaning of this
     clause, no  privileges are secured by it, except those which
     belong to  citizenship.  Rights,  attached  by  the  law  to
     contracts by  reason of  the place  where such contracts are
     made or  executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of
     the parties to those contracts, cannot be deemed `privileges
     of a  citizen,' within  the meaning  of  the  Constitution."
     Conner v. Elliott, (1855) 18 How. U.S. 593.

(106) Travelers Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, (1902) 185 U.S. 364. See
     also Eldridge v. Trezevant. (1896) 160 U.S. 452.

     In passing upon the constitutionality of tax laws, the court
     "can only  consider the  legislation that  has been had, and
     determine whether  or no  its necessary operation results in
     an unjust  discrimination between  the parties  charged with
     its burdens.  It is  enough that  the State  has  secured  a
     reasonably  fair   distribution  of  burdens,  and  that  no
     intentional  discrimination   has  been  made  against  non-
     residents..... Perfect  equality aud  perfect uniformity  of
     taxation as  regards individuals  or  corporations.  or  the
     different classes  of property  subject to  taxation,  is  a
     dream  unrealized."  Travellers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Connecticut.
     (1902) 185 U.S. 364.

(107) Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, (1876) 93 U.S. 72.

(108) Slaughter-House Cases (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 36.

(109) Kimmish v. Ball, (1889) 120 U.S. 217.

(110) Reid v. Colorado, (1902) 187 U.S. 137.

(111) (1901) 181 U.S. 108.

(112)  McCready   v.  Virginia,  (1878)  94  U.S.  301;  Geer  v.
     Connecticut  (1806)   161   U.   S.   519;   Manchester   v.
     Massachusetts (1891)  139 U.S. 240; Lawton v. Steele, (1804)
     152 U.S. 133.

     An appropriation by the State of "its tidal waters and their
     beds to  be used  by its  people as  a common for taking and
     cultivating  fish,   so  far  as  it  may  be  done  without
     obstructing navigation,...  is in  fact nothing  more than a
     regulation  of  the  use  by  the  people  of  their  common
     property. The  right which  the people  of  the  State  thus
     acquire comes  not from  their citizenship  alone, but  from
     their citizenship  and property  combined. It is, in fact, a
     property right,  and not  a mere  privilege or  immunity  of
     citizenship." McCready v. Virginia (1876) 94 U.S. 395.

(113) Holmes v. Jennison, (1840) 14 Pet. U.S. 540.

(114) Kentucky v. Dennison, (1860) 24 How. U.S. 66.

(115) Ex p. Reggel, (1885) 114 U.S. 642.

     "Looking .  . .  to the  words of  the Constitution - to the
     obvious policy  and necessity  of this provision to preserve
     harmony between  States, and  order  and  law  within  their
     respective  borders,  and  to  its  early  adoption  by  the
     colonies, and  then by the confederated States, whose mutual
     interest it  was to give each other aid and support whenever
     it was  needed -  the conclusion  is irresistible, that this
     compact engrafted  in the  Constitution  included,  and  was
     intended to include, every offense made punishable by law of
     the State  in which  it was committed, and that it gives the
     right to  the executive authority of the State to demand the
     fugitive from  the executive authority of the State in which
     he is  found; that  the right given to `demand' implies that
     it is an absolute right; and it follows that there must be a
     correlative obligation to deliver, without any  reference to
     the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws
     of the  State to  which the  fugitive has fled." Kentucky v.
     Dennison (1860) 24 How. U.S. 103.

(116) Mahon v. Justice, (1888) 127 U. S. 700.

(117) Lascelles  v. Georgia,  ( 1893)  148 U.  S. 537; Roberts v.
     Reilly, (1885)  116 U.  S. 80; 12 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law
     (2d ed.) 606.

     "It is  settled by  the decisions of this court that, except
     in  the   case  of  a  fugitive  surrendered  by  a  foreign
     government, there  is nothing  in the Constitution, treaties
     or laws  of the  United States  which exempts  an  offender,
     brought before  the courts of a State for an offence against
     its laws,  from trial  and punishment,  even though  brought
     from another  State by  unlawful violence,  or by  abuse  of
     legal process." Lascelles v. Georgia, (1893) 148 U. S. 543.

(118) U.S. v. Rauscher, (1886) 119 U. S. 407.

(119) People v. Hyatt, (1902) 72 N.Y. 170, and cases cited

(120) (186O) 24 How. U.S. 103.

(121) Pearce v. Texas, (1894) 155 U. S. 311.

(122) Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. U.S. 1.

     "Under this  article  of  the  Constitution  it  rests  with
     Congress to decide what government is the established one in
     a State.  For the  United States   guarantee to each State a
     republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
     government  is  established  in  the  State  before  it  can
     determine whether  it is  republican or  not. And  when  the
     senators and  representatives of  a State  are admitted into
     the councils  of the  Union, the authority of the government
     under which  they are  appointed, as  well as its republican
     character,  is   recognized  by  the  proper  constitutional
     authority. And  its  decision  is  binding  on  every  other
     department of the government, and could not be questioned in
     a judicial  tribunal... So  too, as relates to the clause in
     the above-mentioned  article of  the Constitution, providing
     for cases  of domestic  violence. It  rested with  Congress,
     too, to  determine upon  the means  proper to  be adopted to
     fulfil this  guarantee. They  might, if  they had  deemed it
     most advisable  to do  so, have  placed it in the power of a
     court to  decide when  the contingency  had  happened  which
     required the  Federal government  to interfere. But Congress
     thought otherwise,  and no  doubt wisely;  and by the Act of
     February 28,  1795,...the  power  of  deciding  whether  the
     exigency had  arisen upon which the government of the United
     States is  bound to  interfere, is  given to the President."
     Luther v. Borden (1849) 7How. U.S. 1.

(123) Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 700.

(124) In re Duncan (1891) 139 U. S. 449.

(125) Taylor v. Beckham, (1900) 178 U. S. 548.

(126) Kentucky v. Dennison, (1860) 24 How. U.S. 103.

(127) Williams  v. Mississippi  (1898) 170  U. S.  213; Green  v.
     Mills. (C. C. A. 1895) 69 Fed. Rep. 862, 159 U.S. 651; Giles
     v. Harris (1903) 189 U. S. 486.

(128) Vidal w. Philadelphia (1844) 2 How. U.S. 198.

(129) For  an interesting  account of  the reasons leading to the
     adoption of  this provision  and the manner of its adoption,
     see Reynolds v. U. S., (1878) 98 U. S. 162-194.

     "The oppressive  measures adopted,  and  the  cruelties  and
     punishments inflicted  by the governments of Europe for many
     ages, to  compel parties  to  conform,  in  their  religious
     beliefs and  modes of  worship, to  the views  of  the  most
     numerous sect,  and the  folly of  attempting in that way to
     control the  mental operations  of persons,  and enforce  an
     outward conformity  to a  prescribed standard,  led  to  the
     adoption of the amendment in question. It was never intended
     or supposed  that  the  amendment  could  be  invoked  as  a
     protection against  legislation for  the punishment  of acts
     inimical to  the peace,  good order  and morale of society."
     Davis v. Beason, (1890) 133 U.S. 342.

(130) Terrett v. Taylor (1815) 9 Cranch U.S. 43.

(131) Reynolds v. U.S. (1878) 98 U.S. 145.

     By the  provision against  any law of Congress respecting an
     establishment of  religion, or prohibiting the very exercise
     thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,
     "Congress was  deprived of  all legislative  power over mere
     opinion, but  was left  free to  reach actions which were in
     violation of  social duties,  or subversive  of good order."
     Reynolds v. U.S. (1878) 98 U.S. 164.

(132) Davis  v. Beason,  (1890) 133  U.S. 333;  Church  of  Jesus
     Christ v. U. S., (1890) 136 U.S. 1.

(133) Bradfield v. Roberts, (1899) 175 U. S. 291.

(134) Ex p. Vallandigham, (1863) 1 Wall. U.S. 243.

(135) U.  S. v.  Williams (1904)  194 U.  S. 270, where the court
     said: "We  are not to be understood as deprecating the vital
     importance of  freedom of  speech and  of the  press, or  as
     suggesting limitations  on the  spirit of liberty, in itself
     unconquerable,  but   this  case   does  not  involve  those
     considerations. The  flaming brand  which guards  the  realm
     where no human government is needed still bars the entrance;
     and as  long as  human governments  endure  they  cannot  be
     denied the power of self-preservation.

     "In incorporating these principles (the first ten amendments
     to the  Constitution) into the fundamental law, there was no
     intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to
     be recognized  as if  they had been formally expressed. Thus
     the freedom  of speech and of the press (Article I) does not
     permit the  publication of  libels, blasphemous  or indecent
     articles, or  other publications  injurious to public morals
     or private reputation." Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) 165 U.S.

(136) "It  is well  understood, and  received as  a commentary on
     this provision  for the  liberty of  the press,  that it was
     intended  to  prevent  all  such  previous  restraints  upon
     publications as had been practiced by other governments, and
     in early  times here,  to stifle  the  efforts  of  patriots
     towards enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights
     and the duties of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be
     unrestrained, but  he who  used it  was to be responsible in
     case of  its abuse;  like the right to keep fire arms, which
     does  not  protect  him  who  uses  them  for  annoyance  or
     destruction." Per  Parker, C.J., in Com. v. Blanding, (1825)
     3 Pick. (Mass.) 314.

(137) Marlin  Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, (1902) 171 N. Y. 384, and
     cases cited.

(138) Ohio v. Dollison, (1904) 194 U. S. 446.

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John S. Wise