Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state
and federal witness
c/o General Delivery
Battle Lake [zip code exempt]

In Propria Persona

Under Protest and
by Special Visitation


                         EIGHTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 97-2099-MNST
          Plaintiff [sic]/      ) USDC Minneapolis #CR-4-96-65
          Appellee,             ) DCUS Minneapolis #4-96-65
     v.                         )
                                ) MOTION FOR REHEARING
                                ) Local FRAP Rule 40A(b)(2);
          Defendant [sic]/      ) 28 U.S.C. 1652;  Ninth
          Appellant.            ) and Tenth Amendments;
________________________________) REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

COMES NOW  Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, Citizen of Minnesota

state, federal  witness, expressly  not a  citizen of  the United

States ("federal  citizen"), and  Appellant in the above entitled

matter (hereinafter  "Appellant") to  move this  honorable Court,

pursuant to  Rule 40A(b)(2)  of the  Federal Rules  of  Appellate

Procedure ("FRAP"),  for rehearing  en banc of Appellant's MOTION


this Court, which ORDER was dated April 29, 1997.

     In support  of the  instant MOTION  FOR  REHEARING  EN  BANC

(hereinafter  the   "MOTION  FOR  REHEARING"),  Appellant  hereby

respectfully  requests  the  entire  banc  of  qualified  Judges,

currently assigned  to preside upon this honorable Court, to take

formal judicial Notice of the following local Rule, to wit:

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 1 of 16


     (b)  Petition for Rehearing.

     request of  any judge on the panel, a petition for rehearing
     by a  panel will  be treated  as a petition for rehearing en
     banc.   Every petition for rehearing en banc, however, shall
     automatically be  deemed to include a petition for rehearing
     by the panel.
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Accordingly,  Appellant   proceeds  on   the  basis  of  the

presumption that  the panel  which denied  Appellant's MOTION FOR

RELEASE  PENDING  APPEAL  on  April  29,  1997,  will  separately

consider this  MOTION FOR REHEARING and advise the entire banc of

their ruling on same, before the entire banc rules on same.


     In support  of this  MOTION FOR REHEARING, Appellant submits

that the grounds for granting same are itemized thoroughly in the

two (2) Reporter's Transcripts ("RT's") of:

     (1)  the sentencing  hearing had  before the  United  States
          District Court  ("USDC") on April 21, 1997 (hereinafter
          "21RT");  and,

     (2)  the hearing  on Appellant's  MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING
          APPEAL  heard   before  the  USDC  on  April  23,  1997
          (hereinafter "23RT").

     Appellant shall  quote the  21RT and  the 23RT by using bold

type to highlight all quotations taken therefrom.

     Appellant therefore  incorporates by reference both RT's, as

if set  forth fully  herein,  with  the  proviso  that  the  23RT

evidently contains numerous errors which this Court would do well

to consider carefully, to avoid possible prejudice to Appellant's

arguments  submitted   herein.     To  this  end,  Appellant  has

previously  filed  and  served  a MOTION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF


           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 2 of 16

     Appellant respectfully  requests this Court to rely upon the

source documents  for certain  contiguous blocks  of text  in the

21RT, because  Appellant did  attempt diligently to read verbatim

from these  source documents at the hearing recorded in the 21RT.

These source  documents, and corresponding locations in the 21RT,

are itemized as follows:

            Allocution at Sentencing Hearing

     Subject Matter                     Location in 21RT

     Beginning                          21RT 2:9

     Allocution                         21RT 15:15

     Credentials                        21RT 19:6

     Lack of Jurisdiction               21RT 20:11

     Liability Statutes                 21RT 23:13

     Jury Selection and Service Act     21RT 24:7  ("JSSA")

     Withdrawal of Plea                 21RT 25:2

     Notice of Appeal                   21RT 25:6

     Clarification of Terms [starts]    21RT 25:10

     Clarification of Terms [ends]      21RT 26:4

     Urgent Memo (filed by USDC)        21RT 26:20 (not read)

     In contrast, Appellant did not attempt to read verbatim from

any source  documents at  the hearing  on April 23, 1997, and for

this reason,  at the present time Appellant has no means by which

to correct any errors which may be extant in the 23RT.

     In summary,  Appellant recommends this honorable Court first

to consider  the 23RT  infra, then the 21RT supra, and lastly the

source documents for 21RT, relying upon the table supra to locate

corresponding blocks  of text  in the 21RT proper.  This Court is

advised to  recognize that  the 21RT  contains certain matters in

addition to those which are covered in said source documents.

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 3 of 16


             Judicial Incompetence: "sui something"

     Appellant submits  that the  23RT exhibits  evidence of bias

and prejudicial  incompetence in the man presiding over the USDC.

Appellant herein highlights this evidence as follows:

     23RT:2:16 I now  have before  me a  motion signed  by Edward
     [sic] C. [sic] Gilbertson sui something [sic].

     Appellant argues that pleadings are proper when they exhibit

the phrase  "Sui Juris" immediately after Appellant's Proper Name

(not  nomme de guerre)  at the top, left-hand corner of each face

page.   Confer at  "Sui juris"  in Black's  Law Dictionary, Sixth

Edition (hereinafter "Black's"), to wit:

     Sui juris.   Latin.   Of  his own  right;   possessing  full
     social and civil rights;  not under any legal disability, or
     the power of another, or guardianship.

          Having capacity to manage one's own affairs;  not under
     legal disability to act for one's self.

     The  bias   exhibited  by  Mr.  Rosenbaum  in  the  23RT  is

reinforced by Appellant's finding in the Historical and Statutory

Notes following 28 U.S.C. 451 in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure

and Rules, West Publishing Company, 1996 edition, to wit:

     Words "learned  in law"  were omitted  as unnecessary.  Such
     requirement is  not made  of United  States  judges  and  no
     reason appears  to  make  a  distinction  respecting  United
     States attorneys.
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Appellant  submits   that   clear   evidence   of   judicial

incompetence by Mr. Rosenbaum is sufficient ground for this Court

to release  Appellant, pending  appeal, upon  the same  terms and

conditions as Appellant's pre-trial release. See 28 U.S.C 372(c).

     Further in  the 23RT, Mr. Rosenbaum is frank enough to admit

that he  did not  understand one of Appellant's spoken sentences.

The sentence in question now follows, to wit:

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 4 of 16

     23RT 4:21 THE DEFENDANT:   ...  And  I  would  request  this
     release due  to the  fact that  I have  filed  a  notice  of
     petition and intend to proceed with this ... appeal, because
     I believe  I have  done enough  ... publishing forth the law
     and information  about the  law and cites, case law, to back
     up what I have said. [sic]

          THE COURT:  Miss Reporter, would you read back his last
     sentence, please.

          (Read back.)

          THE DEFENDANT:   I should pull back and strike the word

          THE COURT:   That's as -- I will be frank to tell you I
     didn't understand  what that  last  sentence  meant,  and  I
     thought it would get better if I heard it again.

                                                 [emphasis added]

            Denial of Right to Assistance of Counsel

     Appellant clearly  presents the  grounds on  which the  USDC

should have  released Appellant.   See  23RT:5:11.  But, at a key

point in  this presentation,  Appellant stops,  because Appellant

was being denied effective assistance of Counsel at that moment:

     23RT:6:9  THE DEFENDANT:   ...  I don't  know anything  more
     what to say, because I wanted to have opportunity to consult
     with this  counselor [Paul  Andrew Mitchell],  but that  has
     been denied.
                                                 [emphasis added]

     Despite  what   follows,  up   to  and  including  23RT:7:4,

Appellant submits  that the  real  reasons  for  Mr.  Rosenbaum's

position is  found in  the dialogue  beginning  at  23RT:3:1  and

ending at  23RT:3:21, inclusive.   Mr. Rosenbaum erred therein by

disqualifying Appellant's  chosen  Counsel  merely  because  said

Counsel is not a licensed attorney [sic], and He has no intention

of ever  becoming a  licensed attorney,  because of  the original

13th Amendment  (1819).   See Article V;  Supremacy Clause;  Full

Faith and Credit Clause; records of the Commonwealth of Virginia;

28 U.S.C. 1652;  and Minnesota state Constitution.

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 5 of 16

     Consequently, Appellant  was denied  assistance of  Counsel,

which is  a fundamental  Right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

See Johnson  v. Zerbst,  304  U.S.  458,  468  (1938).    Such  a

deprivation ousted  the USDC  of any  and all  jurisdiction which

said USDC might otherwise have had.  See Johnson supra.

     Moreover,  Appellant   has  relied   extensively  upon   the

published decisions  of the Supreme Court of the United States on

the question of Counsel, and should not be punished unnecessarily

for doing  so.   See U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973).



OF CHOICE:  Sixth  Amendment,  previously  executed,  filed,  and

served upon all interested parties, and replete with authorities.

                    Questions of Law and Fact
            Likely to Result in Reversal or New Trial

     The United States Attorney opens this question as follows:

     23RT:7:6  MR. SHEA:   Your  Honor, the United States opposes
     the motion under Section 3143, Title 18.

          One of the requirements for the Court to find, to grant
     a motion such as this, is that the defendant has presented a
     question of  law or  a fact  that is  likely to  result in a
     reversal and  order  of  new  trial.    In  other  words,  a
     substantial question  of law or fact.  We believe none exist
     [sic] in  this case,  none have [sic] been identified by the
     defendant, and  on that  ground we feel the motion should be

Here, Mr. Rosenbaum discusses the statute at 18 U.S.C. 3143, even

quoting this statute verbatim, after which Mr. Rosenbaum says:

     23RT:9:1  That's the rule which I'm required to follow.  All
     right.   You may  say anything  further about that, and that
     only, and then I will rule.

          THE DEFENDANT:   Okay.  The law that, or the thing that
     I want  to  appeal,  I  want  to  challenge  again,  is  the
     jurisdiction of this Court.  The constitutional jurisdiction
     of this Court.

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 6 of 16

          THE COURT:  On what basis?

          THE DEFENDANT:   On  the basis  that I am not a federal
     citizen, nor do I abide or live in a federal zone.

          THE COURT:  Okay.

          THE DEFENDANT:   And  that ...  it is  not done  to ...
     circumvent or  to delay  this process.   And  this  was  the
     appeal I  did earlier,  but I  did untimely.   In  which the
     appeals court  sent its  decision down  that it was not, did
     not have  jurisdiction because  sentencing, or the judge had
     not certified.  So that is one of the things that I --

          [unexplained gap here]

          And also  the constitutionality  of the  Jury Selection
     Act  as  far  as  limiting  jury  members  to  just  federal
     citizens, where  I've stated in court that I am a Citizen of
     Minnesota state.   I'm  challenging that  aspect of the jury
     selection act [sic].

          I'm also  challenging in  this appeal the aspect of ...
     competent  counsel,   which  was   part  of  the  sentencing
     guidelines and  Rule 32,  I think  I alluded  to that  in my

          And I'm  also challenging  ... the ... fact that I have
     requested that the Freedom of Information Act credentials of
     all the  actors.  I have not ... you know, that are required
     under law  to ...  have their oaths certified, signatures on
     file.    Which  I've requested  and have  not  obtained  any
     certified to this point.  That includes all the way from the
     judicial  to  the  legislative  to  the  agencies  that  are
     involved as well.

          THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.

     Appellant has  thus itemized  the specific  questions of law

and fact  which are  likely to  result in a reversal and order of

new trial.   Appellant argues that these are, indeed, substantial

questions of  law and  fact, in particular, Appellant's arguments

concerning the  Jury Selection  and Service  Act ("JSSA") and the

Freedom of  Information Act  ("FOIA");  but Messrs. Rosenbaum and

Shea appear  to claim  a superior  knowledge of  the future here,

providing further  evidence of bias and irreversible prejudice in

a hearing  at which  the USDC  ultra  vires  decided  Appellant's

freedom or detention. See Fifth Amendment; 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 7 of 16

               Mr. Rosenbaum's Responses to Issues

     At this  point, Mr.  Rosenbaum responds  to these  issues as


     23RT:10:18   THE COURT:  ...  But the primary concern that I
     have is, first of all, whether or not you are -- no, you are
     a person  who adamantly  refuses to  admit that  you  are  a
     citizen of  the United  States [sic]  and that this Court or
     the United States has any authority over you.  Now, a person
     who makes  such a  statement is  not a  person  who  can  be
     depended upon to return to the court.

     Appellant submits  that  this  statement  by  Mr.  Rosenbaum

clearly deprived  Appellant of  His fundamental Rights to freedom

of speech  and to  petition government for redress of grievances,

as guaranteed  by the  First Amendment,  in clear violation of 18

U.S.C. 242: deprivation of fundamental Rights under color of law.

See Chambers  v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907),

in which  the high  Court held  that the  Petition Clause  is the

Right   conservative   of   all   other   rights!      See   also

"Right/Constitutional Rights/Political  rights" in Black's supra.

In  particular,  the  Right  of  state  Citizenship  [sic]  is  a

political Right,  of which  Mr. Rosenbaum  clearly  has  deprived

Appellant here, and in what follows:

     23RT:10:23  And the reason is is because if the Court has no
     authority over you, you are obviously free, as you have felt
     in the  past, to disregard the mandates of Congress, and per
     force you  would also  feel free  to disregard  this Court's
     instruction, because  you do  not recognize this Court.  You
     have said so in your own statements.

     Appellant submits that Mr. Rosenbaum has flatly contradicted

himself here,  and elsewhere,  by stating  that Appellant  is not

someone who  can be  depended upon to return to the USDC when, in

point of  fact, staring  Mr. Rosenbaum  right in  the face is the

Person of  Appellant, who  voluntarily appeared at the sentencing

hearing, when He could have absconded, but at no time ever did!

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 8 of 16

     Moreover, Mr.  Rosenbaum strongly  implies that  the USDC is

committing extortion  against Appellant,  by forcing Appellant to

submit  to  its  "instruction",  when  the  USDC  had  no  lawful

authority over Appellant in the first instance.  Paraphrasing Mr.

Rosenbaum now,  if the  USDC has  no jurisdiction,  Appellant was

obviously free  (as Appellant  has felt in the past) to disregard

the USDC's "instruction" [sic] (whatever that is);  Mr. Rosenbaum

is ironically correct here, for once. See 18 U.S.C. 872 and 1951.

     Appellant submits  that the  official record  of the instant

case exhibits more than sufficient proof that the USDC lacked any

jurisdiction whatsoever  over the  subject matter.  This evidence

is to  be found,  in particular,  in  Appellant's  AFFIDAVITS  OF

DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE  executed,  served,  filed  in  the

record, and unrebutted to date.  There are no regs for IRC 7402.

     Moreover, the  offices of  the U.S.  Attorney and  Solicitor

General fell  totally  and  completely  silent  in  the  face  of


AND JURISDICTION IN THE PARTICULARS, executed, served, and filed.

There are no regs for 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. either!

     Their silence  is, therefore,  a fraud  upon Appellant,  the

American People,  and the  district courts, when there is a legal

or a  moral duty  to speak.  See U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299

(1977).   Moreover, silence  activates estoppel.   See Carmine v.

Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906).  See also IRC 7401, in pari materia.

     Said moral  and legal  duty arises  from evidence  that  the

requisite Oath  of Office has been properly executed and recorded

by each  and every  government actor  who has touched the instant

case in any way, including Mr. Rosenbaum in particular.

           Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 9 of 16

     To this  end, Appellant went to exhaustive efforts timely to

request the  requisite credentials from all of said actors, under

authority of  the FOIA.   Appellant also went to the same efforts

timely to  appeal their  failure to produce certified evidence of

said credentials.  Uncertified documents are not admissible.

     Last but  not  least,  Appellant  went  the  final  mile  by

submitting a  lawful NOTICE  AND  DEMAND  to  the  Administrative

Office of the United States Courts, and to the Clerk of the USDC,

demanding exhibition of the requisite credentials.  Appellant did

this in recognition of the colorable authority to be found in the

blanket FOIA  exemption for  the entire  federal judicial branch.

See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(A) and (B).

     Finally,   Appellant    has   explicitly    challenged   the

constitutionality of  said blanket  exemption  for  being  overly

broad, and  for violating  the  Oath of Office  provision in  the

Constitution for  the  United  States  of  America,  as  lawfully

amended (hereinafter  "U.S.  Constitution").    See  Article  VI,

Clauses 2 and 3 ("6:2", "6:3");  28 U.S.C. 453;  5 U.S.C. 3331.

     As such,  Appellant has raised meritorious and non-frivolous

issues, which  separately invoke the original jurisdiction of the

District Court  of the  United States  ("DCUS"), a forum which is

convened under authority of Article III in the U.S. Constitution;

the  USDC  is a forum convened  under  Article  IV  in  the  U.S.

Constitution.  See American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,

1 Pet.  511, 7  L.Ed 242 (1828);  Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258

U.S. 298  at 312,  66 L.Ed  627 (1921);   5  U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B);

ORDER dated May 21, 1996, In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New

Life Health Center Company, USDC Arizona, Tucson, #GJ-95-1-6.

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 10 of 16

     Appellant submits  that Mr.  Rosenbaum either did not bother

to confirm Appellant's numerous citations on this distinction, or

did not  understand them,  even if he did confirm them.  This was

painfully confirmed when the subject of Appellant's COMPLAINT FOR


           Mr. Rosenbaum Was Recused by 28 U.S.C. 455

     In general,  the presiding  judge of  any district  court is

presumed to  have executed  the solemn Oath of Office required of

him (her)  by Article  VI, Clause 3 ("6:3") and by 28 U.S.C. 453.

This Oath  is like an on-off light switch in that, per force, its

execution activates  all the  guarantees in the federal and state

constitutions, without exception.  Fiat lux et lux erat in mundo.

This causal  connection between  those guarantees  and a  judge's

Oath of Office is tersely expressed as follows:

     A district  judge is  bound by  oath of office to uphold the
     Constitutions of  the United States and the State of Hawaii;
     rule excluding  illegally seized evidence falls within scope
     of such  oath as  such  rule  is  a  sanction  essential  to
     upholding  federal   and  state   constitutional  safeguards
     against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.    State  v.
     Wilson, 519 P.2d 228.

                [American Digest System, Eighth Decennial Digest]
                ["Judges", page 969, Section 5: "Qualifications"]

                                                 [emphasis added]

     Therefore, using  this elegant  logic, all  the Rights which

are guaranteed  by both  the state  and federal constitutions are

sanctions which fall within the scope of the Oath of Office.  The

guarantee of due process of law is a Right which is on a par with

a multitude  of all  other Rights  which are  guaranteed by those

constitutions, whether or not they are enumerated.  Together, the

Ninth and  Tenth Amendments  provide explicit guarantees for that

multitude, without any need to enumerate them.

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 11 of 16

     Applying  these  principles  to  the  instant  case  is  not

difficult.  Appellant designed one deadline for exhaustion of all

FOIA remedies,  and for  production of  all  certified  documents

demanded  in  Appellant's  NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF  OF POWER,


     When  this   deadline  passed   without  exhibition  by  any

government employees of any of the documents requested, Appellant

testified  to  this default  in His  AFFIDAVITS OF DEFAULT AND OF

PROBABLE CAUSE.   Appellant  submits that  the  passage  of  this

deadline provided  Appellant with  sufficient probable  cause  to

remove the  criminal case  from the USDC into the DCUS, whereupon

Appellant petitioned  a three-judge  DCUS panel  for a Warrant of

Removal.   See  Appellant's  VERIFIED  PETITION  FOR  WARRANT  OF


Rule 38 in chief;  Seventh Amendment;  other authorities therein.

     At this  moment, Appellant  filed a  separate MOTION TO STAY



1865(b)(1).   As such, this constituted Appellant's third attempt

(1-2-3) to  present, and  obtain a proper hearing on, Appellant's

challenge to  section 1865(b)(1), for exhibiting prohibited class

discrimination against Citizens of Minnesota state who choose not

also to be federal citizens.  See Gardina v. Board of Registrars,

48 S.  788, 791 (1909);  State v. Fowler, 6 S. 602 (1889);  Tenth

Amendment;   Guarantee Clause;  Right of Election;  all citations

in the DCUS STAY MOTION;  "Federal citizenship" in Black's supra;

lastly, Appellant's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, executed, served,

filed in the USDC, and denied ultra vires (1-2).

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 12 of 16

     Appellant submits  that no single federal judge is qualified

to preside  on the  DCUS, even  for preliminaries, whose judicial

compensation is  being diminished  by federal  income taxes.  See

3:1;   Evans v.  Gore, 253  U.S. 245 (1920);  Lord v. Kelley, 240

F.Supp. 167,  169 (1965).   C.J. Rehnquist has argued, before the

University of  Arizona Law  School in January of 1997, that Evans

supra was  overturned by  O'Malley v.  Woodrough,  307  U.S.  277

(1939).   Appellant disputes  the main holding in O'Malley supra,

for being predicated upon two false and rebuttable premises:

     (1)  there is only one class of citizens (there are 2), and

     (2)  all federal judges are citizens of either class (but no
          federal law requires judges to be citizens at all).

     Moreover, no  single judge  is qualified  to preside  on the

USDC or  the DCUS  who cannot,  or will  not, exhibit the Oath of

Office required  by 6:3  and 28  U.S.C. 453.   There  is a strong

presumption in  favor of  public access to judicial records.  See

Valley Broadcasting Co. v. USDC, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986).

     Thus, Appellant  argues that  Mr.  (not  "Judge")  Rosenbaum

never timely  exhibited his  requisite credentials,  nor did  the

USDC Clerk,  nor did his employer -- the Administrative Office of

the U.S.  Courts in  Washington,  D.C.    Nobody  did!    Silence

activates estoppel,  Carmine supra;   silence  is a  fraud, Tweel

supra.   Failure to qualify by filing bond and taking the oath is

ground for  ouster by  quo warranto.   See 51 C.J. 319;  State v.

Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279;  Respublica v. Wray, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 429.

     It was  at this  precise point  in  the  instant  case  that

Appellant filed a timely and proper COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, specifically to compel Mr. Rosenbaum et al. to

disclose credentials  improperly  withheld,  and  permanently  to

enjoin Mr. Rosenbaum et al. from improperly withholding same.  At

the sentencing  hearing, Mr.  Rosenbaum was told, in no uncertain

terms, that he had a personal interest in the instant case:

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 13 of 16

     21RT:4:16   THE COURT:    Can  you  tell  me  what  personal
     interest you feel is involved?  Free free to set it out.

          THE DEFENDANT:   ...  And that  was for a complaint for
     injunctive relief and the fact where I requested credentials
     of all the actors in this court.

          THE COURT:  Okay.  [!]

     Further, the  very same issue arose again during the hearing

on April 21, 1997:  21RT:9:16 and 21RT:10:12.  In particular, see

21RT:10:20, recorded as follows:

          THE COURT:   There  was actually  a complaint served on
     the government?  It lists me as a defendant.  [emph. added]

          MR. SHEA:   It  also includes  a demand  for  immediate
     recusal, I believe. [!]

          THE COURT:  Well, I will -- I will consider this later,
     but at  this time  ... asking  for any  present relief, it's
     denied.  [emphasis added]

          THE DEFENDANT:   And  I would  like the  record to show
     that I object.  [!!]

          THE COURT:  I'm sorry?

          THE DEFENDANT:   I'd  like the  record to  show that  I
     object.  [!!!]

          THE COURT:  Objection's noted. [text in brackets added]

     Appellant is  entirely satisfied  that  the  official  court

record  now   before  this   honorable   Court   provides   ample

justification to  release Appellant,  upon  the  same  terms  and

conditions as  Appellant's pre-trial  release, if  for  no  other

reason than  the obvious,  irrefutable, and  adverse conflict  of

interest which  Mr. Rosenbaum  exhibited at  both the  sentencing

hearing  and   the  hearing  had  before  the  USDC  to  consider

Appellant's timely and proper MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL.

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 14 of 16

                        REMEDY REQUESTED

     Wherefore, all  premises having  been  properly  considered,

Plaintiff hereby  moves this  honorable United  States  Court  of

Appeals for  the Eighth Circuit, for an immediate ORDER releasing

Appellant from  detention by the Bureau of Prisons, upon the same

terms and  conditions as  Appellant's pre-trial  release, pending

final review of the myriad and substantial issues of law and fact

which have arisen in the instant case, which issues Appellant has

diligently striven  to document  in perfect  form, and in perfect

citations  to  the  pertinent  constitutional  provisions,  laws,

treaties,   regulations,   and   related   policies,   practices,

procedures,  forms,  rules  and  customs  of  the  United  States

(federal government), emphasizing Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3.

     Thank you all for your careful and considerate attention.


I, Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty

of perjury,  under the  laws of  the United  States  of  America,

without (outside)  the "United  States", that the above statement

of facts  and laws is true and correct, to the best of My current

information, knowledge,  and belief,  so help Me God, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1746(1).

Dated: ______________________________

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 15 of 16

                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Everett  C.  Gilbertson,  Sui  Juris,  hereby  certify,  under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years

of age,  a Citizen  of one  of the  United States of America, and

that I personally served the following document(s):

           Local FRAP Rule 40A(b)(2);  28 U.S.C. 1652;
                   Ninth and Tenth Amendments;
                    REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first

class United  States Mail,  with  postage  prepaid  and  properly

addressed to the following:

Attorney General                   James M. Rosenbaum
Department of Justice              United States District Court
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]

Solicitor General                  Henry Shea
Department of Justice              United States Attorneys
10th & Constitution, N.W.          110 South Fourth Street
Washington [zip code exempt]       Minneapolis [zip code exempt]

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.     William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Counselor at Law, federal witness    U.S. Supreme Court
c/o 2509 North Campbell Ave., #1776  One First Street N.E.
Tucson [zip code exempt]             Washington [zip code exempt]

Dated:  __________________________________

/s/ Everett C. Gilbertson
Everett C. Gilbertson, Sui Juris
Citizen of Minnesota state, federal witness
(expressly not a citizen of the United States)

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice

[See USPS Publication 221 for addressing instructions.]

          Motion for Rehearing En Banc:  Page 16 of 16

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U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, 8th Circuit